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Abstract 
This thesis examines the impact on individuals who suffer from significant financial loss. It 
also highlights broader environmental issues relating to financial provision for individuals, 
particularly in retirement. Such issues include regulation, financial literacy, the significant 
choice available, and the need for professional financial advice. These are particularly 
significant in the Australian context where financial self-sufficiency is promoted as a 
desired option in retirement. 
The collapse of Queensland-based Storm Financial is used as a case study to investigate 
these matters. A qualitative approach was taken with elements of grounded theory and 
narrative inquiry utilised when engaging with the available data. Available data from a 
2009 Parliamentary Inquiry includes 823 pages of public hearing transcripts and 2879 
pages of written submissions. Interviews with 15 different parties were also carried out, 
giving rise to 33 hours of recorded conversation. To mitigate issues of researcher and 
participant bias and a reliance on qualitative interpretation as the primary tool of analysis , 
various procedures including triangulation and member checking were adopted. 
It is apparent that sudden and significant financial loss is devastating. An individual's 
emotional wellbeing is a primary casualty, and one's mental health is also vulnerable. An 
individual 's social world is also impacted, including relationships with family and friends , 
how one engages in community activities, and the ability to partake in familial and cultural 
roles. Financial victims also perceive a sense of judgement from society at large about their 
losses. 
A loss of trust may be the epitome of financial loss. Any financial promise requires trust in 
institutions, professional service providers, government via licensing and regulation, and 
others including oneself. Trust in all of these entities is impacted when loss occurs, and is 
highl y dependent on not just the size but also the circumstances of those losses. The loss of 
trust and the loss of financial means leads in tum to a lack of control over one's life . Many 
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of these impacts are reflected in other traumatic circumstances, and some are seen to be 
particularly exacerbated in the specific case of Storm. 
These impacts demonstrate that vulnerability exists when encouraging self-sufficiency in 
retirement. Greater individualisation in financial provision introduces risks that current 
regulation may not be equipped to mitigate, particularly in the areas of licensing and 
disclosure. Information asymmetry between informed and non-informed participants 
exacerbates these risks. This highlights the importance of ethical disposition when dealing 
with financial affairs. 
The current retirement 'pillars' of the age pension, superannuation and other savmgs 
describe 'mechanisms' of income, but an alternative pillared system of government, other 
institutions, and oneself is offered to highlight the underlying sources of trust. 
Storm's collapse highlights that money matters but not for its own sake - it is the 
subsequent loss of control and options that is tangibly impacted. Significant financial loss is 
therefore anything but trivial, and a strong dependence of overall wellbeing on financial 
wellbeing is highlighted. Any system which allows unnecessary risks upon the attainment 
of such financial wellbeing for individuals should therefore be subjected to critical scrutiny. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Overview 
Academic interest in personal financial planning and the financial services industry is a 
growing but relatively understudied field. Significant gaps that exist include the 
incorporation of actual decision making abilities and actions of individuals in the financial 
realm, examining how risk can be presented and understood in real rather than hypothetical 
settings, and in particular, studies into the costs of mistakes and significant losses at an 
individual level. Events in recent years such as significant volatility in investment markets, 
and a growing push for self-sufficiency in financial provision in the Australian context (and 
beyond), suggests that the costs of major financial losses at an individual level are not 
understood well enough. 
As such, in the following subsections we outline our motivation for this thesis and the 
resulting key research goals. We then present an overview of the overall approach in terms 
of data and methodology, an overview of the findings , and an overview of the structure of 
this thesis. 
1.1.1 Motivation 
It is not a new observation that various financial and economic models do not yet capture 
( or are perhaps not even capable of capturing) the actual decision making abilities and 
actions of individuals, nor the impact in real terms of choices made at that individual level. 
For example, in the context of drawing an income in retirement, a significant gap exists 
between real-life behaviour and that implied by economic models, with a notable lack of 
psychological or behavioural biases being part of any economics model in this area 
(MacDonald et al. 2011) 1• Others further claim that consumer finance itself is a ' vastly 
understudied ' field (for example, Morrison 2009). 
1 MacDonald et al. (2011) add that this is a "well acknowledged" weakness among researchers in this area. 
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In particular, an unresolved issue within household financial behaviour is the cost of 
mistakes, with few studies in this area (Poterba 2008). This is possibly due to academic and 
media preferences to cover corporate collapses at the level of the corporate entity, with 
some attention given to the impact on high profile persons associated with any collapse but 
little to the significant financial hardship suffered by many others (Monison 2009). Some 
studies have considered the impact of wealth shocks on health, by looking at quantifiable 
and 'high frequency ' health measures such as changes in sleep patterns and blood pressure 
(highlighted by Banks 2010). However, these generally only consider the impact of small 
wealth shocks, and do not generally consider costs other than the more obvious health and 
financial stresses, nor the more involved nuances between such impacts. It is sufficient to 
say here that research specifically looking at those who suffer from major investment 
company related collapses is, at this stage, minimal (Momson 2009). 
1.1.2 Research Questions 
As such, we are motivated to consider what the impacts of significant financial shocks are 
on those who suffer them. In particular, a broad question shapes this investigation: 
• What are the impacts on people when they experience a significant financial shock? 
We postulate that such an investigation might also yield insights about the wider role of 
government, the financial services industry, and even societal structures at large, that 
provide for the wellbeing of individuals (financial or otherwise). A secondary goal is 
therefore to be able to provide infonned and evidential commentary on the nature of the 
Australian system of financial provision for individuals, particularly in the context of 
provision in retirement. 
1.2 Overview of approach 
Storn1 Financial was a Queensland-based financial planning business which collapsed 
suddenly in late 2008. Unfortunately for investors with Stonn, their circumstances provide 
an infonnative case study for insights into the main research question. This offers a point of 
difference with most existing literature on many aspects of the financial services industry, 
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which circle around issues of financial provision in comparatively benign contexts2. As 
such, a case study approach within a qualitative framework offers the opportunity to 
discover useful insights about the complexities associated with significant financial losses. 
As each qualitative study is umque, this necessitates the need for an approach which 
although systematic and orderly, is necessarily also unique. The approach adopted utilises 
elements of grounded theory and narrative inquiry, which we find of particular value given 
the volume and variety of data available. These approaches do not start from an explicit 
theoretical viewpoint, but rather they allow us to observe and build on themes as they 
emerge over the course of the research. 
1.2.1 Data 
A wealth of qualitative data and information exists in the public domain with respect to 
Storm's collapse, including extensive industry and media commentary, and data associated 
with a Parliamentary Inquiry into Storm and other similar collapses. The main publicly 
available data consists of 823 pages of written transcripts, arising from nine public hearings 
involving Inquiry members and 106 separate individuals (representing 40 distinct entities 
such as banks, financial planning businesses, government entities, professional associations 
-
and individuals including investors), and 2879 pages of written submissions from 356 non-
confidential submissions to the Inquiry (including 168 from Storm investors) . 
Also arising from Storm was the formation of a collective group of impacted investors 
called the Storm Investors Consumer Action Group (SICAG), and this group was contacted 
to source ex-Stonn investors for interviews. As a result, fifteen different participants (a 
'participant' is either an individual or a couple) were interviewed including thirteen ex-
investors and two ex-Storm advisers. Three of the fifteen participated in one interview, and 
twelve participated in two interviews some 12-15 months apart, giving rise to 27 interviews 
and 33 hours of recorded conversation altogether. 
2 To name but a few phrases, many studies relating to the financial services industry and the services it 
provides are couched in terms of 'retirement planning ', ' insurance needs' , ' wealth creation ', ' utility 
maximisation ', ' savings choices ', ' investment preferences', ' the value of advice ', and so on. Furthennore, 
most surveys/studies of financial 'wellbeing' are not based on circumstances involving traumatic episodes. 
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A variety of what we term ' other conespondence ' has also been received in the course of 
this research, and this provides a further and highly insightful data source. Additionally, the 
consulting firm AEC Group Ltd conducted surveys of Stonn investors soon after its 
collapse, and this together with our own observations adds to the breadth and volume of 
data. A summary of the major data sources and what each source covers in tenns of an 
investor' s experience with Stonn over time, is given below. 
Table 1: Summary of data sources 
Time period that data source can relate to 
Data Source Investing Time of Storm's Up to six months 3-4 years after 
with Storm collapse following collapse collapse 
Submissions to Inquiry ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hearings of Inquiry ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Interviews ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations ✓ 
Other correspondence ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
1.2.2 Methodology 
Findings from interviews are generally used as the basis for describing the major themes 
and issues that emerge. This is because interviews can be particularly illuminative, given 
the ability to explore people ' s experiences and perspectives in depth, the ability to be 
flexible and adapt the approach within the interview itself, the open-ended opportunity for 
participants to describe their views, and the ability to clarify ambiguous responses. 
However, a first consideration of possible themes and issues arose from reading a selection 
of submissions, which then helped shape the approach to interviews. Findings from 
interviews then allowed other data sources to be examined in a manner that allowed 
maximum utility to be gleaned from each, allowing a discussion and significance of arising 
themes to be examined in more depth than otherwise. Data sources were revisited 
repeatedly in an iterative manner to ensure that as the themes developed into more involved 
statements and descriptions, the supporting points were accurate in the context in which 
they were made. We al so applied a simple coding process to the 356 available public 
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submissions to indicate and summarise additional evidence relating to relevant maJor 
points. 
Unavoidably the overall analysis relied on our own sense of interpretation and intuition 
about the important aspects within the data, as well as the interpretation of research 
participants themselves. We suggest several ways in which this interpretative dependence is 
made clear and transparent (importantly, by being grounded in the data itself), as well as 
how the biases of ourselves as researchers and of the research participants themselves are 
mitigated. 
1.2.3 Presentation of results 
The overall intent is to present evidence which demonstrates an adherence to the underlying 
data, and which arises from a systematic approach. A challenge in this regard concerns the 
large volume of data, the variety of experiences represented, the variety in methods of 
portraying those experiences, differences in the brevity, clarity, accuracy and recollection 
of individual experiences, the emotion and pain associated with real loss and grief having 
been experienced, and the paucity of any existing theoretical or even procedural 
frameworks and guidelines to refer to within the context of significant and sudden financial 
-loss. On a positive note, this allowed us a certain freedom and flexibility to pursue an 
approach which best leverages the particular circumstances of this case. 
As such, evidence presented in this thesis is highly descriptive (in line with much 
qualitative research). However, the substantial data from other sources is used to either 
support, modify, further contextualise or suggest alternatives to what the interviews give 
rise to. 
In the main body of results (in chapters six and seven), 554 separate verbatim excerpts are 
referred to as evidence directly from the underlying data. A breakdown of these excerpts by 
source and by contributor is as follows: 
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Table 2: Breakdown of data excerpts used in chapters six and seven 
Interviews Public Public Other Total 
submissions hearings con espondence 
Investors 25 8 87 45 13 403 
Storm employees and advisers 30 2 8 l 41 
Financial planners 0 17 9 7 43 
Others 0 26 47 4 77 
Total 288 132 109 25 554 
Despite the breadth and depth of data indicated above, there is no single process or 
procedure to ensure whether the findings arising from a qualitative study are credible in 
themselves. However many procedures which do provide some assurance are given in the 
qualitative literature, and several have been adopted in this thesis . In particular, we adopt 
the use of triangulation and member checking in several ways, and acknowledge that 
although no procedure ensures validation in itself, a combination can support assertions that 
the overall findings are credible. The detail of our approaches to this are discussed in detail 
in chapter five, and highlighted again in chapter eight. 
1.3 Overview of Findings 
The findings arising in this thesis relate firstly to the impacts on individuals of significant 
financi al shocks, and then to the insights on the overall system of financi al provision in 
Australi a. 
1.3.1 Impacts of a significant financial shock 
The impact of sudden and significant financial loss is devastating for those involved. The 
areas of impact that emerged from the data relate firstly to an individual' s personal world in 
tenns of emotional and health impacts; secondly to an individual' s social world in tenns of 
relationships with partners, famil y and friends, as well as with local communiti es; and 
thirdl y to an individual' s level of trust and engagement with the wider world around them, 
particul arly as it pertains to participants in providing professional and financi al provi sion . 
The net effect of all these areas of impact is seen to be a loss of contro l in one' s li fe choices 
and options. 
- 19 -
1.3.1.l lmpacts on the personal world 
A first and immediate area of impact concerns an individual ' s emotional state. Given the 
sudden demise of Storm, a sense of shock was felt by investors, which was often associated 
with feelings of numbness and disbelief which were predominantly, but not exclusively, 
short term reactions. 
A deep sense of real and protracted anger at various parties was also felt , and still resides 
some years on for many investors. This has been exacerbated not only by the collapse of 
Storm, but also by events and revelations since that time. A related emotional outlet has 
been fear, which also exists for a variety of investors as they contemplate a future with 
limited financial means. Where the investment with Stonn was to provide for dependents, a 
feeling of angst and fear of one ' s situation now is especially apparent. Aspects of 
frustration, regret and guilt predominate for many investors as they reflect on their own 
decisions over time, the actions of others, and where it leaves them today. 
In terms of the impact on health, it is in the realm of mental wellbeing that the impacts of 
significant financial loss appear to be particularly pronounced. Examples of stress, anxiety, 
depression and a need for a variety of medication did and still abound amongst investors. 
Other evidence indicates that the incidence of such conditions appears to be well above 
estimates for the general population. Elements of self-harm were also frequently 
mentioned, and feature as an especially severe impact for many. 
Mental wellbeing is not independent of physical wellbeing however, and many examples 
exist of adverse physical impacts as well. 
1.3.1.2 Impacts on the social world 
A second area of impact concerns the social world of an individual ' s life. Marriages and 
close relationships have been impacted, and where this has fallen short of a formal divorce, 
separation or break-up, the impact has nevertheless been real and very personal. 
Relationships with friends and family have been another casualty, with a range of negative 
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impacts resulting from either very direct judgements and criticisms being made, or more 
subtle changes that have arisen. In other cases, responses of others have been favourable, 
with tangible help and emotional support being offered. It may be the case that the status of 
a relationship prior to such losses is an indication of how it will be after such losses, though 
this is not a conclusive insight - for some, formerly close friends are now no longer that, 
whereas for others, friendships have become closer through such adverse circumstances. 
Another aspect of one ' s social world to have been impacted is the ability to be involved in 
wider cultural, familial and community roles. It has been particularly galling for investors 
who were grandparents, who now perceive a loss of means and ability to fulfil that familial 
role in the manner they were anticipating. Other impacts concern the diminished ability 
(and for some, no ability) to be involved in sporting, charitable and other community 
pursuits, due to the lack of financial means to do so. For others, an increased sense of social 
isolation relates more to the emotional bankruptcy now being felt. 
An especially debilitating response relates to the perception of judgement upon financial 
disaster victims from the community at large. This can lead to further withdrawal from 
society. Overall social impacts are also exacerbated by the 'network ' effect, arising from 
the concentration of investors in family groups and concentrated geographical areas. This 
can result in support networks not being as available or helpful as they otherwise would be. 
1.3.1.3 A loss of trust 
A third area of impact involves a loss of trust. This trust relates to a range of parties that 
would otherwise be relied upon for financial and overall wellbeing. The most obvious 
target for impacted trust is in the strategy offered by Stonn and many of the personnel 
involved, albeit mitigated by the fact that Stonn no longer exists as an company. The wider 
financial planning profession is another party in who distrust now predominates. The 
manner in which some compensation and settlements have occurred since Stonn ' s collapse 
has also resulted in anger and distrust towards some legal firms. The role of the government 
is also seen with some suspicion by many, particularly through the role of the government 
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regulator ASIC3 but also through the regulatory settings in place, services provided by 
Centrelink4, and post-collapse responses. A loss of trust in oneself has also eventuated for 
many investors, arising from the aforementioned emotional impacts of frustration, guilt and 
regret. 
Perhaps the epitome of Storm' s collapse in terms of trust is the disenchantment, anger and 
adverse perceptions of the banks and credit providers involved. Importantly and especially 
in the case of Storm, this lack of trust has arisen as much from events post-collapse as it has 
from events pre- and during the collapse. It is evident that this severe loss of trust in what 
should otherwise be a cornerstone institution in one' s financial affairs, is a particularly 
damaging outcome of Storm's collapse. 
1.3.1.4 A loss of control 
Such widespread distrust in aspects of government, other institutions, related professions, 
and oneself, is not a positive outcome for any participant in Australian society. What this 
can lead to, amongst other things, is a lack of control in one' s life. 
From interview findings in particular it is apparent that a major challenge for investors was 
a need to feel they have some say in their life. With diminished financial means, a low 
likelihood of recovery for many within any reasonable timeframe, and the legacy of the 
emotional, social and trust-related impacts, there is a heightened sense of vulnerability to 
adverse life events. These events can relate to changes in some or all of housing, health, 
vocational and family circumstances. 
1.3.2 The system of financial provision 
The findings from Storm suggest issues and challenges exist with the Australian system of 
financial provision. The system currently in vogue consists of the age pension, 
superannuation savings, and other savings: a ' three-pillar' framework . Although this 
3 ASIC is the Australian Securities and Investments Commission, one of two major government regulators of 
the financial services industry. The role of ASIC is discussed in more detail in chapter two. 4 Centrelink is the primary governmental agency responsible for the assessment and payment of a range of 
social security benefits. 
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framework is not ' wrong ' in the context of the ends to which it is promoted, an alternative 
framework better reflects the true sources of reliance in financial affairs. In this alternative, 
each ' pillar ' is a source of trust rather than a mechanism of income, with the pillars being 
government, non-government institutions, and oneself. Given that these three sources were 
major casualties in terms of impacted trust, this highlights the real sources of vulnerability 
that exist for individuals in their goal and perceived duty to seek financial self-sufficiency. 
Trends towards greater individualisation of financial prov1s10n have occurred in 
conjunction with other risks increasing as well, including increased longevity and 
complexity. With financial literacy relatively low and information asymmetry apparent, this 
raises questions about the effectiveness of a regime which relies heavily on licensing and 
disclosure. This places a greater onus on a more intangible factor - the ethical disposition of 
all participants in the financial system. 
Storm's collapse highlights that money does indeed matter, but not for its own sake - it is 
the subsequent loss of control and options that is tangibly impacted. Significant financial 
loss is therefore anything but trivial, and where trust and control is lost, this highlights the 
strong dependence of overall wellbeing on financial wellbeing. Any system which places 
excessive risks upon the attainment of such financial wellbeing should naturally be 
subjected to critical scrutiny. 
1 .4 Structure of thesis 
Chapter two discusses the landscape of the financial services and advice environment in 
Australia. Such an environment is shaped by regulatory settings, the encouragement for 
individuals to be self-sufficient, a general lack of financial literacy in areas that are needed 
for such self-sufficiency, and a variety of behavioural factors and biases, all of which 
expose individuals to certain risks in navigating through such an environment. The need for 
many to have professional financial advice is highlighted, together with a discussion of 
reasons why such advice is not often sought. 
Chapter three presents an overview of the collapse of Stonn Financial. This overview 
describes perceptions of the circumstances and impact of the collapse from general sources 
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such as the media, Storm' s administrators, and from the few professional and academic 
papers that have given it attention to date. This sets the scene for a more considered, 
involved and detailed examination of impacts at the individual level later in the thesis. 
Chapter four gives a (necessarily) broad overview of a range of events and circumstances 
that can impact an individual ' s wellbeing. This includes traumatic events such as those 
leading to post-traumatic stress syndrome, the impacts of natural disasters, personal 
addictions, and health issues. It also includes events leading more directly to substantial 
financial loss or stress, such as job loss. This overview is not exhaustive or comprehensive, 
but illustrates the variety of impacts that can occur. This too sets the scene for the later and 
more detailed investigations into the impacts on individuals associated with Storm. 
Chapter five details the overall methodological approach taken. It also describes the source, 
treatment and fidelity of data used, and highlights the approach to managing key risks with 
the qualitative nature of the data. This includes issues of confidentiality and the possibility 
of inadvertent harm to participants. 
Chapter six presents the main findings of this thesis. It is structured around the main 
research question: what are the impacts on people when they experience a significant 
financial shock? Although findings from interviews generally form the basis of description 
for the major themes and issues that emerge, the other data sources also contribute 
significantly to the overall discussion. In order to provide as much context as possible when 
describing what are challenging and inter-related issues, a feature of the presentation of 
results is the heavy use of raw data excerpts - 479 in all - with 379 of these specifically 
pertaining to the views of investors. 
Chapter seven presents what can be inferred more widely from Storm regarding issues and 
challenges with the Australian system of financial provision. As such, the focus is less on 
the explicit views and perceptions of investors with only 24 of the 75 data excerpts 
explicitly representative of their views, and a greater focus is on the views of others. 
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Chapter eight provides a summary of the thesis. It outlines the methodological approach 
taken, summarises the key findings , and provides some concluding remarks . 
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Chapter 2: The Landscape of Financial Services 
and Advice 
2.1 Introduction 
Individuals face a number of financial and non-financial risks over their lifetime, especially 
around implications of longevity and adverse health. These risks are discussed in this 
chapter, in the context of the major trend that has significant implications for the financial 
wellbeing of individuals: the shift away from government- and employer- provided support 
in retirement, to a greater individualisation or self-provision of financial wellbeing. 
The complexity of the financial landscape is highlighted as a critical factor within such 
moves to greater individualisation, and the need for greater involvement of individuals in 
their own financial wellbeing demands greater levels of financial literacy than appear to be 
the case at present. Individuals and institutions also need to appreciate the swathe of 
behavioural factors involved in decision making, these are also summarised in this chapter. 
Given the possibility that individual savings may be inadequate for the requirements of 
individuals in retirement, there is an apparent need for many to seek professional financial 
advice. This need as well as associated issues of trust and the difficulty of assessing value 
in such advice, are discussed in this chapter. We then conclude with a discussion of the 
overarching regulatory environment that individuals, professionals and institutions must 
work within, in order to deliver satisfactory financial provision for all. 
2.2 Overview of the Australian System 
2.2.1 A System of three pillars 
Financial security in Australia, in the context of savings and provision over a lifetime and 
particularly for retirement, is essentially built on a system of 'pillars'. The first of these is 
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an age pens10n. This is not an automatic entitlement for those who reach the age of 
eligibility, but is subject to two means tests - one based on assets, the other based on 
income. The pension payment is at the rate which is the lower that results from each of 
these two tests, with the full age pension rate generally accepted to be close to a rate that 
could provide for a modest lifestyle (RWA 2012). 
A second pillar is a mandatory retirement savings scheme, which is paid for via employer 
contributions that must be a minimum of 9% of salary (to rise incrementally to 12% by 
2020). These contributions are the 'superannuation guarantee' (SG) and this superannuation 
component is managed by the private sector, rather than government. 
Pillar three consists of voluntary and private savmgs, with any contributions at the 
discretion of individuals, and/or employers. Via the use of advantageous tax breaks, there is 
strong encouragement for these extra savings to be allocated into superannuation accounts 
(Taylor and Wagland 2011). 
2.2.2 Superannuation 
2.2.2.1 Recent history and growth 
There was an extended political lead-in to the establishment of superannuation in Australia 
(see, for example, Durie 2009; RWA 2012), and the introduction of the compulsory SG in 
1992 meant that superannuation coverage became virtually universal for wage and salary 
eamers5. Minimum employer contributions began at 3% of wages in 1992, increased over 
time to the current level of 9%, and will increase again to 12% by 2020. The growth in the 
overall level of superannuation has been rapid and significant, with total funds under 
management equal to $1 .4 trillion as at 30 June 2012, and annual contributions to 
superannuation funds totalling $1 18 billion in the year to June 2012 (APRA 2013 ). 
A major economi c catalyst for the introduction of the SG was the significant ageing of the 
population, which would lead to a significant taxpayer burden through resultant age 
5 SG pa yments must be paid by an emp loyer fo r anyone who earns $45 0 or more per month. The self-
employed and the unemployed are not covered by the SG. 
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pension payments (Taylor and W agland 2011 ). It could also improve the economy by 
increasing long term savings (Sherry 2012), thereby generating available capital for further 
investment. This was (and is), however, effectively involuntary deferred pay, introduced in 
lieu of immediate pay increases (RW A 2012). Equity across workers was also an important 
consideration, with the SG now allowing those formerly without superannuation and its 
associated taxation advantages, some access to those benefits (Sherry 2012; Smith 2009)6. 
Although the rationale to alleviate future pension costs was influential, the introduction of 
the SG was not intended to provide for an adequate retirement income of its own accord, 
nor was it intended as a means to retire early (Kelly and Harding 2004). The SG's relatively 
low initial contributions and a lengthy phase in of higher contributions meant that, 
according to government, it was intended as a supplement to rather than replacement of the 
age pension (Sherry 2012)7. Nevertheless, as the age pension potentially provides 
something close to a modest lifestyle, then individuals must rely on their superannuation 
(and other savings) in order to provide something more than that. Furthermore, as an 
individual on a lifetime of higher superannuation contributions will likely have their age 
pension reduced due to the associated means tests, then there effectively is a shift from age 
pension provision to encouragement of providing a retirement income through private 
means (RWA 2012)8. This can also be viewed as a substitution of taxpayer-funded age 
pension payments with taxpayer-funded superannuation tax advantages. 
2.2.2.2 The decline in Defined Benefits Schemes 
Mirroring the growth of superannuation savings arising from the SG has been the decline in 
employer-sponsored defined benefit (DB) schemes. A DB scheme effectively specifies a 
payment amount for an individual in terms of a pensionable income, which is generally 
6 Namely, those with lower/middle income such as blue collar, service sector, and part-time/casual workers, 
women, and others amongst the 60% of the workforce who had no superannuation at that time (Sherry 2012), 
or as Smith (2009) puts it, more people "than the salaried executives who were the main beneficiaries of 
schemes prior to that reform" (p.519). 
7 Sherry (2012) states that "compulsory super was not and cannot replace the age pension despite the 
misleading claims by some and the resulting widely held belief in the community that 'the government wants 
us to be self funded and there will be no age pension in the future "' . 
8 A point also partially acknowledged by Sherry (2012) in that superannuation savings will, "due to the 
pension means test, increasingly, reduce the number of retired persons receiving the age pension in part or 
whole" . 
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based on years of service and the salary level(s) an individual has had . Investment decisions 
and the sufficiency of accumulated contributions to meet that pensionable income are the 
responsibility of the employer (sponsor) rather than that of the individual. In contrast, the 
SG is based on a defined contribution (DC) system, which specifies the level of 
contributions being made into an individual's superannuation fund(s). In this system, 
choices about investment decisions reside with the individual and with no pensionable 
income being specified, 'sufficiency ' is not an aspect that sponsors are responsible for. 
Although the shift from DB to DC schemes is a relatively recent phenomenon (MacDonald 
et al. 2011 ), the decline in DB schemes in Australia has been pronounced, with most public 
and private DB schemes now closed to new members. This reflects similar trends in other 
parts of the world (Black et al. 2002; Gallery et al. 2011 ; lannicola and Parker 2011; 
Lusardi and Mitchell 2011; Warren 2006). Some advantages exist with this trend, such as 
DC plans being more flexible than conventional DB plans, allowing greater mobility of the 
labour force (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
2.2.3 A fourth pillar? 
Some industry experts also describe home ownership as a fourth pillar of the Australian 
system (Knox 2010) . As well as being the most sizable purchase that most people will 
make in their lifetime, the value of home ownership is important in many other dimensions, 
When viewed as an investment an owned home can be an important contributor to financial 
security. If a house is owned by the time an individual retires, this confers the important 
economic benefit of eliminating future housing rental costs9. As well as this, through the 
mechanism of a reverse mortgage, an individual can lock in an additional income stream 
for life (MacDonald et al. 2011; Me1ion 2008) 10. 
9 Assum ing no future changes in housing needs, and of course ignoring the additional co ts associated with 
home ov-rnership such as insurance, rates, and maintenance. 
10 Although there are doubts as to how many Australians will utilise equity in their home for this purpose 
(Kell y and Harding 2004 ), the market has been stead ily growing in recent years. As at 31 December 20 11 
there were 42 ,000 reverse mortgages in Austra lia, totalling loans of approxi mately $3.3 bn (SEQUAL/Deloitte 
20 12). Given the growing interest , the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) also has an 
on-line calculator specific to reverse mortgages, at https://www.moneysmart.gov.au/tools-and-
resources/ calculators-and- tools/reverse-mortgage-ca lcu la tor. 
- 29 -
Additional benefits of home ownership include it being a security against which additional 
borrowing can be enabled at times of need (Campbell 2006). Thus, borrowing against or 
selling the home can act as a possible hedge against significant and unexpected costs such 
as those associated with medical care. However, housing is a relatively illiquid asset 
(Campbell 2006), and selling at depressed prices when quick access to its equity is required 
is a real risk (Siegel 2011 ). 
Less tangible in a direct financial sense, but essential to overall wellbeing, are factors such 
as the emotive attachment that homeowners may have to their house. Where such 
ownership spans several years, decades, or generations, the house is then a 'home' and its 
associated memories and history undoubtedly shape part of overall mental wellbeing. It 
also provides physical security, contributes to an individual's sense of identity, and it is 
likely to be in a geographic area where the resident's social circles and sense of community 
is located. Indeed, important social implications of home ownership include having a stable 
base for involvement in community and civic duties, a signalling of social standing, and a 
demonstration of financial worth and "economic certification" that one can embark on what 
is likely the most significant asset that most will ever purchase (Warren 2003b ). 
2.3 Features of the System 
2.3.1 Complexity and Volume of Choice 
The Australian financial system is now very complex, due to many factors. For example, 
differing and complex taxation regimes for differing entities and individuals; restrictions 
( and changing levels) on both contributions and access to superannuation; a plethora of 
insurance options and platforms 11 ; choice from a large range of superannuation funds and 
investment options; a variety of approaches to utilise debt but which differ significantly 
from each other12 ; different ways to structure these debt arrangements in terms of interest 
rate offers, guarantees and balancing exposure to fixed and variable rates; and aged care 
provision which depends on factor such as assets, income, and the required standard of care 
11 The primary options in terms of personal coverage concern life, total and permanent disablement, trauma, 
income protection cover, health and general insurances, with some life insurances available within as well as 
outside of superannuation. 
12 This includes house, car, investment, and personal loans, credit cards, and other consumer purchase 
arrangements such as hire purchase. 
- 30 -
(McKee 2010) . These and other areas that add to the complexity for individuals are also 
prevalent in other countries, and is given much attention by various commentators (for 
example, Bodie et al. 2008; MacDonald et al. 2011; Warren 2006) . 
This complexity has been accentuated in the Australian context by a push toward self-
funded retirement, particularly in the rules and regulations concerning superannuation and 
its interaction with the other pillars (Chardon 2011; McKee 2010; RWA 2012). The fact 
that various aspects of these pillars and their interaction have changed over time and/or 
have been signalled that they may change in the future complicates the picture further 13 . Of 
particular interest is the requirement for individuals to be actively involved in making a 
range of choices for their financial wellbeing. With the prevalence of DC sche1"!1es and 
encouragement toward self-sufficiency, choices must be actively made concerning fund and 
investment allocations whilst saving, as well as how to manage and utilise these savings 
whilst in retirement (Beshears et al. 2011; Bodie et al. 2008; Gallery et al. 2011; 
MacDonald et al. 2011). 
Taylor and Wagland (2011) go as far as saying that the financial landscape has completely 
changed in recent years , with numerous products now on offer, which themselves are 
increasing in ·sophistication (Gerrans and Hershey 2012) and variety (Smith 2009) 14 . Not 
only do individuals face the challenge of understanding various products as separate 
entities, they also need to understand the products in combination (Black et al. 2002) and 
relate them to their individual needs. 
2.3.2 Individualisation of Risk 
The availability of choice for individuals had been described as a heavy burden, whereby 
such choice is only effective if individuals appreciate and can make appropriate investment 
decisions (Bateman et al. 201 0; 2011 a) . Investment risk (the risk that an individual ' s 
investment will not yield the returns required to provide an adequate income in retirement) 
can eventuate in various ways : for example, through capital losses on investments, the 
13 For example, the age of e ligibility for the Age Pension is to increase to 67 progressively from 201 7, and 
this itse lf will be reviewed again in 2023 (RWA 201 2). 
14 The a1Tay of products and opportunities has been described as " bewildering' ' (Worthington 2006 , p.59 , 
c ited in Chardon 20 11 , p .54) . 
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subsequent realisation of investments at depressed values, and also through balancing a 
need to take enough risk whilst accumulating savings, in order to provide for inflation 
protection throughout retirement (RWA 201 Oa). 
In addition to investment risk in the phase of accumulating savings for retirement, this risk 
also applies in the retirement phase. Given that the needs of individuals are unlikely to be 
constant throughout retirement (Mills and Young 2004; RWA 2010b), much attention also 
has to be given to decisions about strategies to draw down funds from accumulated savings, 
with sufficient planning to balance the competing requirements of growth and liquidity 
(MacDonald et al. 2011). Thus, much more risk now has to be absorbed at an individual 
rather than collective level (Warren 2006), with major risks now residing with each 
individual rather than collectively across others and across time, as it would with DB and 
other less individualistic schemes (Smith 2009). 
Investment risk, however, is just one of a number of risks and uncertainties faced by 
individuals. Also relevant is uncertainty due to inflation, changing home care expenses, 
lifestyle related costs such as changes in accommodation arrangements, transport costs, 
expenses associated with unplanned events such as divorce or unanticipated needs of family 
members, and how taxes and government benefits might change in the future (MacDonald 
et al. 2011; RWA 201 Ob). In particular, two major risks concern health and longevity. 
These and other important aspects of greater risk residing with individuals are discussed in 
more detail below. 
2.3.2.1 Longevity Risk 
Longevity risk arises from uncertainty around the length of one's future lifetime - giving 
rise to the possibility that an individual's savings may be inadequate to sustain them over 
their remaining lifetime. This risk is further exacerbated by trends of decreasing mortality 
(increasing life expectancy) over time. Indeed, the life expectancy for a 65 year old male in 
Australia is now approximately 86, an improvement of 10 years over the past century, and 
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for a 65 year old female it is now approximately 87, an improvement of 12 years over that 
same time period (RWA 2012) 15 . 
This ri sk is also complicated by other factors. These include the tendency of individuals to 
underestimate their life expectancy (Banks et al. 2004; O' Brien et al. 2005), or simply 
being unaware of the longevity risk they face. The latter is understandable when compared 
to , for example, investment risk, in that investment risk can be personally experienced in 
the short tenn . In contrast, the issue of longevity is not a specific event that provides 
tangible motivation here and now, but by definition it unfolds over time. 
Thus, the risk that an individual could outlive their savings for the reason of long;evity is 
seen as very real in Australia and elsewhere (Ameriks et al. 2001; Iannicola and Parker 
2011; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011; Poterba et al. 2008 ; RWA 2010a). Furthermore, if life 
expectancy continues to rise, then the likely outcome is that the retirement period will also 
rise, significantly so if mortality improvements are greater than expected (MacDonald et al. 
2011 ). Thus, for a given level of savings, consumption would have to decrease more than 
that anticipated (Ameriks et al. 2001; RWA 2010a) . 
2.3.2. 2 Health Risks 
Expenses and risks associated with health issues can differ significantly from expenses and 
risks arising from other causes, for many reasons . Firstly, in contrast to anticipated needs 
such as education, recreation and food , the onset of a poor health is often unexpected and as 
such, any resultant expenses can be unpredictable. These expenses can be manifest through 
the direct costs of health such as medication, but also through secondary effects such as the 
refi tting of a home, relocation due to a disability or impainnent, or a loss in the ability to 
li ve independently, which can also lead to a need for long-term support (MacDonald et al. 
20 11 ). 
15 RWA (2012) add further that further improvements of·· ] to 2 years are expected every decade·· (p.4). 
Furthermore. ··the estimation of life expectancy has also been on the low-side for some time, as longevi ty 
improvements have outpaced predictions in most developed countries·· (MacDonald et al.201 1 ). 
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Secondly, the associated expenses may be very high relative to other causes, particularly in 
contexts where healthcare cover is not comprehensive (notably the US, but also in the 
mixed system of private and public provision in Australia which leaves gaps in the funding 
of overall care which individuals have to cover themselves). Furthermore, the expenses 
associated with healthcare have continued to rise over time (Ianni cola and Parker 2011 ). 
Another factor is that the incidence of health issues and associated expenses tends to 
increase with age. So whilst someone early in retirement might not anticipate significant 
health expenses in the near future, with longevity improvements they are more likely to live 
to an advanced age which itself brings a higher probability of a deterioration in health 
(MacDonald et al. 2011). Thus, as education, recreation, food and possibly housing needs 
(ifliving in an unencumbered home) might be expected to decrease with age, an increase in 
health expenses with age is likely. 
These factors pose particular risks to individuals and family groups. So much so, that the 
concern with health care costs, together with the associated issue of long term care, was the 
number one concern amongst a survey of US retirees (Greenwald et al. 2006, cited in 
MacDonald et al. 2011) 16• An additional complication is whether there is sufficient 
commitment from various social institutions to continue to provide health-related services 
in the foreseeable future (Lucas 2008; Sinclair and Smetters 2004, cited in MacDonald et 
al. 2011). This could be government related institutions, or other institutions such as 
private-public partnerships, volunteer based groups, or other entities that provide for the 
general health and wellbeing of individuals within society. 
2.3.2.3 Institutional Risk 
Naturally, government is expected to continue to play a maJor role in all aspects of 
individuals' lives, including the provision of financial support, particularly with regards to 
retirement. This expectation is highlighted by an Australian qualitative study which found 
16 In contrast, a 2010 survey of Australian Seniors indicted that the risk of inflation was the highest concern of 
that cohort. However, it was not determined in detail how much of this concern was implicitly related to 
rising costs of healthcare as well, and/or it may also show a greater confidence in the level of public health 
provision in Australian when compared to the US (Higgins and Roberts 2012) . 
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that baby boomers from low socioeconomic backgrounds had a strong belief that direct 
responsibility for their future welfare should continue to reside with the goven11nent (Quine 
et al. 2006). Others see that ongoing govenllnental support may have more indirect 
mechanisms to support self-provision as well, such as the recent legislative increases to the 
SG, continuing encouragement of additional private contributions, changes to tax incentives 
and levels, and so on (Kelly and Harding 2004). 
What is possible is a relatively lower influence of direct social security payments in the 
future. This may come about in several ways. For example, through direct reductions in 
goveTI11Tient provided retirement benefits (not likely in Australia, but possible elsewhere 
(Ianni cola and Parker 2011 )), through the raising of eligibility ages, or through_ people 
needing to work longer for financial security and thereby deferring any entitlement(s) to 
older ages. A decrease in relative importance of social security payments will also occur as 
private and superannuation savings levels increase_ These factors together with anticipated 
greater fiscal pressures on goveTI11Tient in the future will mean that at the very least, in all 
likelihood, the relative importance of social security will not increase in relative terms 
(Kelly and Harding 2004). 
2.4 Implications for Individuals 
2.4.1 Possibility of Inadequate Savings 
The individualisation of risk and its associated features can lead to inadequate savings in 
retirement, which is the most obvious detrimental financial outcome for an individual. The 
possibility that insufficient savings may be prevalent is a real risk in Australia as well as 
other developed countries (DiCenzo et al. 2011; Kelly and Harding 2004; Ntal ianis and 
Wise 2011 ). This can arise from insufficient levels of SG contributions, SG contributions 
paid over too short a time period, low levels of voluntary savings, and/or poor investment 
returns. 
Particular attention has been given to this problem for older cohorts of workers and those 
just entering retirement. Part of the problem for those in this cohort - effectively but not 
exclusively the baby boomer generation - is that many have simply not put aside enough 
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money over their working lives to save for retirement (Kelly and Harding 2004). As well as 
any applicable behavioural reasons for this state of affairs, this may reflect factors such as 
lower real wages over their lifetime than later generations, corrosive impacts of inflation 
earlier in their working lives such as with the oil shocks of the 1970 ' s, extremely high 
interest rates in the earlier days of home purchase through to the mid to late 1980 ' s, and fee 
increases for the tertiary education of their children. 
A further explanation resides with the particular circumstances that this cohort has faced in 
terms of governmental encouragement to save. For example, when the oldest baby boomers 
hit age sixty around the year 2006, most would have only had SG contributions for a 
maximum of 15 years, and would have received the higher contribution rate of 9% for less 
than 5 years. Thus, the SG has not added to retirement adequacy for many workers (Kelly 
and Harding 2004). For this reason, many baby boomers consider that government has a 
key role to continue to provide for their retirement needs in a significant way (Quine et al. 
2006). 
Another explanation relates to the nature of retirement planning itself. For baby boomers on 
the cusp of retirement, the time horizon for planning and taking action is limited, and this 
brings a number of further complications. Any adverse outcomes arising from a lack of 
planning and/or saving are not easily corrected when there is little time until retirement. 
This is compounded for those who have already left the workforce (Gerrans and Hershey 
2012), and also when mistakes have been made with investment and other financial 
decisions (Banks 201 0; Brown 2008). In particular, these factors are exacerbated further 
and significantly by shocks such as the recent global financial crisis (GFC) (Banks 2010), 
leaving those close to retirement with very little room to manoeuver in terms of recovery 17. 
Seemingly unavoidable consequences of growing older also are influential, as extra medical 
expenses are likely to be incurred, and it may be harder to continue or return to work. It is 
also suggested that there is a greater risk of exercising poor financial judgement and being 
17 As DiCenzo et al. (2011) neatly surmise, for such individuals "the allowable margin of error is narrow, the 
time to 'make up' for mistakes short, and the potential consequences of blunders dire" . 
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more vulnerable to fraud and scams (MacDonald et al. 2011) 18. Again, the issue of reduced 
time horizons and limited time and financial means to recover from such setbacks 
compounds these risks further 19. 
2.4.2 The requirement for self-funding 
A clear implication of the aforementioned legislative, fiscal and cultural changes is the 
requirement for individuals to now be far more self-sufficient for their overall financial 
wellbeing. This is undoubtedl y the trend across many western countries20 but particularly 
so in Australia (Smith 2009). With this trend comes consequences - that individuals need to 
be able to make appropriate decisions, and also be able to bear the resultant elevated risks . 
This trend does not just apply to how and how much an individual can save for retirement -
though this is clearly important - but the more encompassing issue is how they provide for 
their requirements over an entire lifetime. This is more an issue of smoothing one's income 
earned whilst working, and indeed, is the central question of life-cycle finance (Siegel 
2008). It infers a lifetime of responsibility on the individual for decisions relating to all of 
saving, investing, and spending (Bodie et al. 2008; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011 ). 
Smoothing one 's income and earnings over an entire lifetime presents important options for 
an individual to consider, including the choices of how much and when to work, save, 
borrow, invest (in both financial and human capital), and consume. Borrowing and utilising 
debt arrangements is a prevalent and important feature of modem household behaviour, 
which essentiall y is a smoothing technique that enables present consumption funded 
through future earnings . Naturall y all borrowing should come repl ete with warnings and 
advice about the associated benefits and ri sks , but as the GFC as one example has shown, 
the associated risk is often underestimated or ignored2 1. Having the option of working into 
18 This includes --being mi sled by un scrupulous advisors. since mental hea lth , as we ll as phys ica l health. often 
deteriorate with age .. (MacDonald et al. 201 1 ). 
19 
-- with ret irees typically unab le to replen ish assets lost through fraud because of limited earnings potential. 
th e impact of fraud can be par1icularly devastating .. (Cooperstein. quoted in Siegel 20 11 ). 
20 Barberi and Thaler (2003): Black et al. (2002) : Chardon (20 11 ) (citing Kell y 2003): Gallery et al. (20 11 ) 
(citing Bonoli and Shinka\\·a 2005): Gerrans and Hershey (2012): Taylor and Wagland (20 11 ): Turner (2008). 
21 Rappapor1 (200 8) succinctly cautions that fo r the vas t majo ri ty of workers. ·· if borrowing goes beyond 
student loans and a home mor1gage . I do not think it is a good idea . We do not rea ll y know what our ultimate 
inc ome\\ ill be .. (p. 179). 
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older ages, whether part time or full time, and as far as health, skills and opportunity 
allows, can potentially greatly enhance the financial security and wellbeing of retirees. 
However, lifetime consumption smoothing is not the holy grail of personal finance, as there 
are many risks involved in an individual ' s personal and financial affairs that can throw a 
lifetime financial plan into disarray. Hence, some consider consumption smoothing 
unrealistic (Rappaport 2008). Notably for our purposes, pursuing such goals and making 
related decisions now involves relatively little assistance from employers (Beshears et al. 
2011). This bestows a key responsibility on the individual more so than before (FLF 2008 ; 
Taylor and Wagland 2011) - not just to make decisions, but to be financially literate in 
doing so. 
2.4.3 A need for financial literacy 
Financial literacy is defined as 'the ability to make informed judgments and to take 
effective decisions regarding the use and management of money' (ASIC 2003; 
Commonwealth Bank Foundation 2004). Such a definition infers more than merely having 
a degree of knowledge about monetary issues (though that is important in itself), but it 
implies and requires an individual to be able to make decisions and modify their behaviours 
-in a way that is financially advantageous to them (Chardon 2011). 
At a minimum, being financially literate involves having knowledge and making informed 
decisions on issues concerning general money and asset management, banking, budgetary 
necessities, investments, the use of debt, the comparison of financial products, and tax 
(Campbell 2006; Crossan et al. 2011 ; Fear 2008 ; Kimball and Shumway 2006; Moore 
2003; Taylor and Wagland 2011; Van Rooij et al. 2011 ; Widdowson and Hailwood 2007). 
In terms of the challenges associated with the complex financial culture that currently 
pervades many developed countries (notably Australia), the demonstration of financial 
literacy has additional and specific requirements. These include being able to plan over 
longer rather than shorter time periods (Campbell 2006), making appropriate choices 
regarding superannuation funds and investment options (Gallery et al. 2011), a working 
appreciation of the time value of money, and appreciating the advantages of risk pooling 
mechanisms such as with insurance (Fear 2008). 
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2.4.3.1 Implications 
The implications of this need for financial literacy are profound and can have significant 
ramifications for individuals, in terms of their savings, retirement options, and overall 
financial security (Chardon 2011 ; Gallery et al. 2011; Lusardi and Mitchell 2011; McKee 
201 O; Taylor and Wagland 2011 ). One straightforward example of this is the use of credit. 
The use of too much credit, its utilisation in inappropriate settings, a general recklessness 
towards the risks involved, or an unawareness of the underlying costs and conditions can 
and has trapped many people into a cycle of debt that they struggle to break free from 
(Warren 2007). 
Another important implication is that improved financial literacy offers the potential for 
greater financial control, flexibility and wellbeing. For example, this includes being able to 
take advantage of more sophisticated financial products and markets now available to 
individuals (FLF 2008), making sense and use of a wide range of options and products, and 
overall , making one's own choices about how to invest wealth over a lifetime and then 
draw on that wealth during retirement (Ameriks et al. 2001). But, with opportunity also 
comes responsibility, and the level of individual responsibility has now increased 
significantly. Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) describe this need for financial literacy and the 
associated responsibility as a ' heavy ' burden for individuals to bear. 
It is also worth noting that the degree of reliance on financial literacy is context dependent. 
For example, in New Zealand where there is a universal (non-means tested) public pension 
and whose payment amount is a higher proportion of the average wage when compared to 
Australia, this provides some security and insurance against the cost of adverse savings 
outcomes in the context of retirement income. As such, financial literacy does not appear to 
be as significantly associated with planning for retirement as it is in Australia where the 
pension is not universal (Crossan et al. 2011 ). 
2.4.4 Levels of financial literary 
What is known about levels of financial literacy in the population generally comes through 
surveys, and also via what can be inferred from choices made in financial settings such as 
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superannuation and debt markets. On a cautionary note however, any stated 'average' 
behaviour in itself can be quite misleading, so it is necessary to consider the issue of 
financial literacy from a number of angles22 • Nevertheless, as a broad summary, what is 
apparent is that despite today's world of financial choice, complexity and self-reliance, 
levels of financial literacy in the population are generally considered to be too low, given 
the responsibility that individuals must bear (Brown 2008; Iannicola and Parker 201 O; 
Widdowson and Hailwood 2007; Wills 2009). 
2. 4. 4.1 The problem of complexity and risk 
Major financial literacy surveys in Australia include a 2007 telephone survey of 7,500 
Australians conducted on behalf of the Financial Literacy Foundation (FLF), and four 
surveys conducted on behalf of the ANZ (2002, 2005, 2008, 2011). In tenns of what might 
be called straightforward knowledge and application23 , the results generally attest to a 
reasonable level of capability within the population. However, when considering more 
complex issues, the situation is more worrying. In an investment context, just 6% of 
respondents would consider reputation when investing (FLF 2007) and 26% of respondents 
did not understand that short term fluctuations in market values could be expected even 
with a 'good' investment (ANZ 2011). These findings are not one-off but in conjunction 
with the earlier ANZ surveys, they present a relatively consistent picture over time. 
Appreciation of the importance of diversification also fares badly, with only half of 
respondents considering diversification of investments to be 'very important' (ANZ 2008). 
In terms of understanding compound interest, 67% of respondents claim to understand the 
concept but only 28% could actually solve a relevant problem (ANZ 2005). This difference 
between reported or self-assessed capability appears further with regards to personal 
investing. Despite a high reported level of confidence with one' s ability to invest ( 69% of 
22 Kotlikoff (2008) gives an effective analogy in this regard : "Vast numbers of households save, insure, and 
avoid risk either far too much or far too little. The fact that households make both types of mistakes and that, 
as a consequence, generate average behavior that, on its face , is not extreme offers little professional 
consolation. The medical community would not declare that heart disease has been cured if half of peoples ' 
hearts beat too fast and the other half too slow" (p.57). 
23 For example, the management of daily financial affairs such as budgeting, and identifying the best 
indication of a superannuation fund ' s performance (ANZ 20 I I; FLF 2007; Taylor and Wagland 2011). 
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respondents claiming to be relatively confident), just 34% would actually consider both risk 
and return when investing (FLF 2007). This is supported by a subsequent study focusing 
solely on the financial attitudes and experiences of women, which found that less than a 
third would consider both risk and return when making investment decisions (FLF 2008). 
The difference between self-assessed investment confidence and some proxies of actual 
competence therefore raises some doubt over the fidelity of other self-assessed capabilities. 
For example, over 80% of respondents reported a high level of confidence in choosing 
appropriate insurance and being able to recognise an investment scam (FLF 2007) - both 
key aspects of protecting one' s financial wellbeing. However, given the main features of 
investment (namely risk and return) and how a scam can use these to sway investors 
towards a certain decision, it is reasonable to conclude that this poses real risk for many 
investors and that a self-assessed measure of ability to protect oneself can overstate the 
reality. Findings from the ANZ (2011) survey further attest to this, with 87% of 
respondents believing that an investment with high return was likely to have higher than 
average market risk, but only 53% would not consider an investment offering a return well 
above the market rate with no risk. 
Thus, it is specifically in the area of risk where a lack of financial literacy is particularly 
apparent. The findings above and from other international surveys lead to the 
generalisations of various observers that, overall, individuals have limited knowledge of 
risks specific to certain assets (Wills 2009), they have difficulty appreciating the 
consequences of risks (Smith 2009), and the diversification of risk itself is a challenge 
(Lusardi and Mitchell 2011) . Bateman et al. (201 lb) state that Australian findings of 
uneven financial competence and a poor understanding of risk management and investment, 
confirm patterns seen elsewhere in the world. 
2. 4. 4. 2 Factors in finan cial literacy levels 
Financi al literacy levels are not consistent across all individual characteristics, but rather 
some variation exists across factors such as age, educational attainment, occupation, work 
status, and income (ANZ 2011 , Gallery et al. 2011 ). For example, financial knowledge is 
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lower in older populations which can make them more vulnerable to scams and poor 
choices (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
There are also differences between the sexes when it comes to financial literacy. Across 
many countries, a consistent finding is that women are less financially knowledgeable than 
men but importantly, they are also aware that they know less (Lusardi and Mitchell 2011). 
This is evidenced by their higher likelihood to state that they do not know the answers to 
certain financial literacy questions, rather than claiming to know the answers even when 
they do not. These international insights are supported by Australian studies which 
highlight that a high proportion of women (70%) recognise the importance oflearning more 
about financial matters (FLF 2008). Of more concern are findings around the use of debt -
as many as 20% of respondents would get into debt buying something they can' t afford, 
and as many as 25% do not pay their total credit card balance each month (FLF 2008). 
2. 4. 4. 3 Reasons for financial literacy levels 
Whilst many researchers, policymakers, industry commentators and the industry itself may 
bemoan a general lack of financial literacy, perhaps it is not surprising that such levels of 
financial literacy exist. Two potential reasons for this are the nature of the issues at hand, 
and the attitude of individuals towards those issues. 
Firstly, although people have familiarity with money24, there are limitations to what can be 
learned from one' s own financial experiences. This is because each person only goes 
through each life stage once, and when decisions relate to a long term horizon it is often 
difficult to assess the worth or otherwise of such decisions. Furthennore, what is available 
to individuals in terms of financial products and options can rapidly change, meaning that 
previously acquired knowledge can be quickly out of date. As such, the nature of life long 
24 
"Before we learn to read, we learn that money is serious stuff. Our money must be treated with care and 
kept in a safe place, unlike most of our other possessions, which can be treated rather cavalierly without our 
being rebuked by our parents. Money should never be spent without thoughtful consideration, and if we do 
spend money unwisely, we are quickly made to regret it. Our young lives are commodified, and money is the 
superior commodity. It symbolizes all that it can buy, and we may even come to believe that there is little that 
it cannot" (Allen et al. 2000, p.427). 
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financial planning and provision may mean that many individuals are not likely to ever 
attain c1itical levels of financial literacy (Beshears et al. 2011 ). 
This is exacerbated by the nature of today ' s financial landscape. Its array of choices, 
products and options available can undoubtedly confuse and generate significant stress for 
many people (ANZ 2011 ; Beshears et al. 2011; FLF 2008; Taylor and Wagland 2011 ). As 
such and given that the landscape is complicated, the existence of poor decisions is of no 
surprise (Campbell 2006). This however is not a slight on those everyday workers and 
employees, whose requirement to have the skills and ability to take charge of their own 
affairs has rapidly increased. For many, the shift of responsibility from collective avenues 
(employers and government) to the self has occurred within their working lives. Th\s leaves 
many as essentially ' involuntary' investors, who nevertheless are being asked to make 
important decisions in areas for which many have no experience or indeed interest in 
(Gallery et al. 2011). 
A second factor concerns a retrenchment of the will to engage. In the face of much choice 
and complexity, individuals can simply avoid an issue altogether, or where that is not an 
option, simply revert to default options because that requires less effort25. There is plenty of 
evidence for both of these responses in the marketplace today. For example, even though 
86% of respondents consider the age pension to be insufficient for retirement and 73 % 
consider that SG contributions will not meet their retirement needs (FLF 2007), many 
Australian baby boomers conduct little planning for retirement in addition to minimum SG 
contributions (Hunter et al. 2007). When the limitations of these pillars of the age pension 
and superannuation savings are appreciated, but nevertheless sole reliance is placed on 
them, this is an issue of both default and avoidance26 . The choice not to make longer tenn 
plans for savings and retirement needs is also reflected in other findings (Collins 201 0; 
Iannicola and Parker 201 0; Wills 2009). 
25 These (and other) behavioural responses are discussed in more detail shortl y. 
26 The issue of default witrun superannuation is further evidenced by the observati on that up to 80% of 
members go with the investment option that i offered as a default , with most of these members likely not 
making an active choice to do so (Cooper et al. 20 I 0). In contrast and to highli ght the likely selec tion effects 
occurring within the current Australian superannuation market, members with a self managed superannuati on 
fund (S MSF) displ ay higher scores in survey categories concerning planning ahead, choosing products, 
staying in fo rmed and fi nancia l contro l (ANZ 20 11 ) . 
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2.4.5 Behavioural factors 
Also of interest are the actual behaviours that emerge when individuals have to make 
decisions in a financial context, and what those decisions are influenced by. The 
conventions of financial and economic theory have been to assume that individuals make 
decisions to maximise their utility, based on some trade-off between risk and return. Yet 
what has emerged from the more involved research into behavioural studies is that rather 
than a constant aversion to risk being the modus operandi, what actually is applied are 
differing levels of importance to potential gains and losses, which themselves differ 
depending on their assessed likelihood (Bateman et al. 2010; Kahneman and Tversky 1979; 
Weber et al. 2011). Many other insights about the behaviours exhibited by individuals have 
been suggested since Kahneman and Tversky ' s (1979) ground-breaking paper in this field. 
Sources of insights into these behavioural ' biases' include laboratory studies, analyses of 
survey data on actual financial decisions made, surveys examining hypothetical investment 
decisions, and responses to risk profiling questionnaires (Bateman et al. 2010). 
Summarising or consolidating the range of such biases and behaviours is not 
straightforward, and usually a particular study would present just those biases that are 
relevant to the study at hand. We offer a slightly different approach here by presenting short 
descriptions of a large range of behavioural biases emerging from the literature, and arrange 
them into three categories. The first category relates to what arises from the environment 
that an individual is placed in - in particular in the Australian context, this concerns choice. 
Secondly, any individual is part of a social group in some shape or form, so the behavioural 
biases originating from that social influence is a separate category. Thirdly are those 
behavioural biases that predominantly originate internally, from within an individual. We 
do not claim this is exhaustive or optimal in the content or style offered and the 
categorisation of any particular behaviour or bias may well be arguable ( or indeed overlap 
in more than one category), but in order to build a picture of the various influences that an 
individual investor faces, we find this categorical arrangement useful. 
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2.4.5.1 Environmental influences27 
Table 3: Environmental influences 
Type Description 
Too much choice The satisfaction associated with having and making choices may 
The tyranny of choice be limited to where there are small numbers of alternatives. With 
Choice overload more choices, satisfaction can decline, as making a choice 
becomes more difficult and frustrating . Difficulty exists in 
choosing from many options because there are limits to the amount 
of information that can be considered. 
2. 4. 5. 2 Social influences 
Table 4: Social influences 
Type Description 
Confinnation bias When investors seek out and take on board only those opinions 
which provide confirmation that their choices are appropriate. 
Decision framing Decisions can be impacted by the way in which infonnation is 
presented or framed. For example, whether an annuity purchase 
represents an insurance against longevity, or a forfeiture of 
consumption in the interim. 
Groupthink Groups of individuals can reinforce the belief that a collective 
point of view is the correct one. 
27 Sources fo r the three tables that fo llow are: Baker and Nofsigner 2002 (who further cite Belsky and 
Gilovich 1999; Shefrin 2002 ; Shefrin and Statman 1985) ; Barberis and Thaler 2003 (who further cite Benartzi 
and Thaler 2001 ); Bateman et al. 2010 (who further cite Ameriks and Zeldes 2004; Bateman et al. 2009; 
Benartzi and Thaler 1995; Benartzi, Peleg and Thaler 2009; Clark and Strauss 2008; Gerrans and Clark-
Murphy 2004 , Hallahan, Faff and McKenzie 2003 , Holt and Laury 2002 , Kahneman and Riepe 1998 , Tversky 
and Kahneman 1974); Benartzi and Thaler 1999; Beshears et al. 2006; Beshears et al. 20 11 (who further cite 
Card and Ransom 20 11 , Choi et al. 2009b); Brown 2009; Duflo and Saez 2002; Engelmann et al. 2009 ; Fear 
2008; FLF 2008 ; Ga llery et al. 20 11 ; Gerrans et al. 2006 (who further cite Hauser and Wemerfelt 1990 , 
Iyengar and Lepper 1999 , 2000, Kahneman and Tversky 1982) ; Hilton 200 I (who farth er ci te Fortuna 1998, 
M itchell and McGo ldri ck 1996) ; Hoffmann and Broekhui zen 2009 (who further cite Bikhchandani et al. 
1992 , De Bandt 1998 , Hirschleifer 200 1, Johnson et al. 2005 , Shiller 1995); Hung and Yoong 20 10; 
Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984 ; Karz 20 10; Kotlikoff 2008; MacDonald et al. 20 11 (who further cite 
Brown et al. 2008 , Brown et al. 2009a , Greenwa ld et al. 2006, Morrison 2000 , Webb 2009); Mullainathan et 
al. 20 12: Munnell 2008: Reeson and Dunstall 2009 ; Smith 2009 ; Speelman et a l. 2007 (who further cite Sethi -
lyengar, Hubem1an and Jiang 2004); Statman 1988 ; Thaler 1999 ; Van Munster 20 11; Weber et al. 20 11 (who 
further ci te Egan et al. 20 11 , Nos ic and Weber 20 10, Odean 1998 , Staw 1976 , Thaler and Johnson 1990, 
Weber, M and Camerer 1998). 
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Herding Conforming to what friends and family are doing can lead to 
herding behaviour where, for example, the latest ' hot' stock is 
purchased due to not wanting to miss out on the next big thing. 
Peer influence Peers (in particular colleagues) can have a strong influence on 
decisions and those in a peer group can develop similar tastes, 
interests, and lifestyles. 
Social influence When in an uncertain situation, social information is sought out as 
an important information source. 
Social norms Social norms can emerge from the beliefs and actions of a 
particular peer group. 
There are clear relationships and connections between vanous influences above. For 
example, peer influence and social influence can lead to social norms, and if done 
collectively confirmation bias would lead to herding. However, there are also subtle 
differences as well. For example, social nonns suggests a strong influence of those around 
an individual, social influence merely says that social information is useful but not 
necessarily persuasive, and herding operates more on fear that something may be missed 
out on by not acting now. 
2.4.5.3 Individual Influences 
Table 5: Influences internal to an individual 
Type Description 
Absence of long-term When comprehensive and long term plans are not considered. May 
planning arise from the conditioning of individuals to adjust to financial 
setbacks during their working life through adjusting consumption, 
earning, and being flexible, believing this will continue in perpetuity. 
Ambiguity aversion A fear of the unknown or the uncertain can mean that familiar is 
preferred to the unfamiliar. 
Anchoring effects Irrespective of the relevance of an initial piece of information, there 
may nevertheless be a focus on this. An example is a fixation on a 
particular stock price (usually the purchase price), and movements 
from this price dictate if pleasure or pain results. 
Attachment bias 
Choice bracketing 
Cognitive dissonance 
Default bias 
Disposition effect 
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Where attachment to a particular security occurs. This may be simply 
an emotional attachment due to loyalty (particularly employees buying 
their employer's stocks, or family hi story), identification with some 
aspect of marketing, or some other emotional attachment. 
Related to mental accounting in that a number of choices can be 
viewed in totality, or separately and independently from one another. 
Often various aspects of one's financial affairs are not integrated, but 
mental accounting takes hold, with attention being separately applied 
to each aspect, leading to independent decisions in each aspect also. 
Where memories are selectively filtered to minimise infonnation that 
conflicts with a particular belief, or seek out infonnation that supports 
that belief. 
When decisions are complicated, decisions can be put off and staying 
with a default option results. Employees might also consider that a 
default exists because someone has assessed that it is the best option 
for them. 
Where losing stocks are held for too long due to a reluctance to sell , 
and where winning stocks are sold too soon. Relates to an individual ' s 
disposition to avoid regret (selling a losing stock realises a loss), and 
the disposition to seek pleasure or pride (selling a winner confirms a 
gain). 
Escalation of commitment Individuals can take significantly more ri sk, on the same investment 
('double up or nothing ') opportunity, following a loss . This is done in the belief it may recoup 
Familiarity bias 
Gambler's fallacy 
Heuristics 
losses. 
Where a preference is exercised for that which is fa miliar, poss ibly 
because this allows a more invo lved evaluation to occur. Individual s 
may consider that this lowers risk, but can lead to too much faith in 
what is immediately familiar. 
When then is a belief that some 'se lf-correctin g' process ex ists for 
one's chosen investments chosen, and that their time for a rise in value 
' will come ' again. 
When faced with complex choices, a reli ance on heuristics, rul es of 
thumb or mental shortcuts can occur. This may mean a reversion to 
what is familiar, an imitat ion of others , nai·ve di versification, reliance 
on more easily remembered infonnation, or anything else that reduces 
Home bias 
House money effect 
Hyperbolic discounting 
Illusion of control 
- 47 -
the complexity of the decision into something that is simpler and more 
manageable. 
Like familiarity bias but where the familiarity is purely with local or 
national opportunities rather than international ones. 
Where there is enhanced risk taking after gains, more so than after 
losses. In contrast to escalation of commitment which is prevalent in 
an investment framework, the house money effect prevails in a lottery 
or gambling framework. In this latter situation, any winnings are 
treated as an additional bonus and not really owned by the individual, 
hence additional risk is preferred for the possibility of greater gains. 
When recent information is given a great deal of weight and influence. 
Individuals can overestimate the control they have over outcomes. 
May be due to their conditioning from having received regular pay 
over their working lives, allowing them to make choices and have 
control at regular points in time. 
Insufficient diversification Investors may not diversify enough, often by weighting heavily on 
'home' or local/national investments (leading to 'home bias'). 
Intuition 
Law of small numbers 
Loss aversion 
Mental accounting 
In contrast to explicitly planning, individuals may rely on intuition for 
investment decisions, long-term planning, and when to change 
spending habits. 
Investors may think they see patterns in data over the short term or 
small numbers of stocks, and act accordingly rather than consider 
patterns more realistically emerging within larger data frames. 
When, given an equivalent loss or gain, the fall in investor utility from 
the loss exceeds the increase associated with the gain. Generally, 
individuals tolerate a foregone gain more so than a loss, even when 
economically similar. This bias is accentuated following a realised 
loss, giving rise to heightened fear of more losses. 
This has many forms. 
1. How situations are perceived. For example, choosing between a 
500ml can of coke for $1.50 and a 1.5L bottle for $1.75. Does the 
decision depend on a comparison of price and volume, or actual need 
at the time? 
2. Assigning certain activities to certain accounts. This can assist with 
self-control, and allow an easier approach to measuring progress 
Mood dependence 
Nai've diversification 
Optimism bias 
Overconfidence 
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towards specific goals. 
3. How frequently the separate accounts are evaluated and whether 
their separation and intent has a short or long time horizon . 
4. A preference for round numbers such as 5% or 10%, and for simple 
solutions such as a 50:50 split between two options rather than other 
ratios. 
Mood affects choices, whereby good moods can lead to more 
optimistic judgements, and bad moods can lead to more critical 
behaviour. 
Individuals may diversify in a nai've fashion, often using simple 
strategies such as allocating l In of their savings to each of n available 
investment options, regardless of what those options are. 
Many people believe that their judgements are better than average, 
with misfortune more likely to strike others than themselves. Can lead 
to persistent underestimation of risk and greater overall risk taking 
behaviours. 
Many investors are overconfident in their financial knowledge, 
understanding and judgments. Leads to explicitly maintaining control 
of assets and investments, rather than seeking additional financial 
information and advice. 
Probability weighting bias Individuals tend to overweight small probabilities and underweight 
Procrastinate 
Regret aversion 
Representative bias 
large probabilities of an event. 
Individuals often procrastinate planning, decisions or action. They may 
perceive that such postponement(s) have no immediate penalty, or they 
may be unmotivated due to being faced with complicated choices. 
Individuals act in a way to minimise the chance of feeling regret. 
Many dimensions to this, such as regret being higher with decisions 
not taken than with decisions that were taken , regret is often avoided 
such as not selling investments where doing so would realise a loss , 
and regret can be stronger when the outcome arose from a decision(s) 
made by the individual themselves . 
Where similar qualities in different investments suggest that similar 
outcomes are likely, but can lead to judgements being based on 
stereotypes rather than actual prospects. 
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Risk aversion The degree to which an individual is not willing to take on risk, even 
when there is a potentially greater return. This bias is very dependent 
on the framing of particular options: for example, risk aversion may 
dominate when only gains are involved, but risk-seeking may 
dominate when facing the possibility of loss. 
Self-control Associated with a lack of discipline to proactively save, even when 
attractive incentives exist to do so. Can stem from inertia, 
procrastination, and an unwillingness to forfeit a level of consumption 
now. 
Short sighted investment Little concern paid to longevity risk, and preferring to invest in liquid 
horizon assets rather than consider longer term options. 
Status quo bias If making a change can mean a potential loss, this may outweigh the 
perceived benefits, even when those benefits are greater. Exhibited 
through things such as preferring to hold existing investments, 
preferring default option(s), and not changing decisions because this 
might equate to an admission that the initial decision was wrong. 
Again, there are relationships and connections between many stated influences in the above 
table. Simply being in a positive mood can lead to optimism bias, which can lead to 
overconfidence and the illusion of control. Optimism can also mean that less critical 
analysis is undertaken, with any negative information downplayed or ignored, which is 
related to cognitive dissonance. The use of mental accounting can lead to naive 
diversification and choice bracketing, with a subsequent absence of long-term planning, the 
downside of which can be exacerbated by sudden ( over)reactions to major events via 
hyperbolic discounting. 
An example of how social and individual-oriented influences interact is given by 
overconfident investors - this may either mean that peer influence is lessened because that 
investor has little interest in what others can tell them, or the overconfidence itself may 
have arisen due to a combination of groupthink, social norms and familiarity bias. The 
environmental factor of choice overload and its associated cousin of complexity may drive 
individuals to the use of particular heuristics, perhaps falling back on default biases, which 
itself may be exacerbated by social influence and mental accounting in a particular context 
(notably choice of superannuation investment options). 
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The point here is not to illustrate an exhaustive number of particular com1ections and 
scenarios, nor to demonstrate a developed appreciation nor need of particular tern1inology 
as vital to our inquiry. Rather, it is to highlight that a number of factors are at play in any 
individual ' s decision making process at any one time, that the source of any applicable 
biases may be varied, and that understanding that a range of behaviours have been observed 
in many financial contexts may help explain some of what we later observe in the unique 
situation(s) that our research participants find themselves. 
2.5 The Role of Advice 
It is apparent that many individuals may not make good financial decisions if left to their 
own means (Mullainathan et al. 2012), particularly given the complexity that features 
within the current landscape (RWA 2012). Given the implications of poor decisions and 
outcomes, this means that many individuals need to seek help for various aspects of their 
financial affairs. Doing so requires an awareness of that need, a willingness to seek help, 
and the availability of suitable sources for that help. The obvious point of call for assistance 
is with professional financial services, but it can also be a range of non-professional or 
infonnal sources. Both of these are reviewed in the discussion below. 
2.5.1 Non-professional sources of advice 
It is common for people to utilise multiple sources of infonnation to help with their 
financial decision-making (ANZ 2008), including those from non-professional sources28. 
Sources originating from social interaction includes family members, friends , work 
colleagues, and other peers. Education seminars, community services, and government 
sources are also useful and tend to relate to specific, single issues. For example, 
superannuation funds may give seminars regarding the benefits of voluntary contributions, 
Centrelink may advise on eligibility for certain benefits, and some community programs 
may give limited advice around the basics of budgeting or point people in the right 
direction for specific tax advice. 
28 References for the sources that fo ll ow are: Baker and Nofsigner (2002) ; FLF (2008); Gallery et al. (2011 ); 
Iaimico la and Parker (2011 ); McAlexander and Scammon ( 1988); McKee (20 l 0); Mullainathan et al. (2012) ; 
N tali anis and Wise (2011 ); Wills (2009) . 
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Sources which originate more from personal readings or investigations can include various 
items in the financial media (such as the thoughts of personal finance experts m 
newspapers, magazines, radio and television), media advertising and information m 
general, publications directly from the finance industry, books, and publications from 
government. Again, many sources such as the Product Disclosure Statements (PDS) of 
superannuation funds and investment opportunities will be quite specific to a particular 
issue or opportunity. Indeed, any advice directly from a superannuation fund must relate 
only to options (investment or insurance) within that specific fund itself. 
A further source which has clearly grown in significance in recent years is the internet. This 
transverses the boundary between social and personal sources of information, in that it can 
be used as either, and undoubtedly its use can change the way that people now make 
investment decisions (Baker and Nofsigner 2002). Now, interested investors can have much 
information as promptly as industry professionals, they can enter financial transactions 
independently of a professional if they choose to , and it can be done more cheaply than 
before (Smith 2009) . 
Of interest is the relationship between financial literacy and the reference to particular 
sources of advice. A number of studies confirm that individuals-with low levels of financial 
literacy are more likely to get advice from peers or family than those with higher levels of 
financial literacy (ANZ 2008; Gallery et al. 2011 ; McAlexander and Scammon 1988; van 
Rooij et al. 2011)29 . Conversely, those with higher financial literacy were more likely to 
rely on professionals such as financial advisers. Gender differences also exist, with women 
more likely to consider getting information and advice from some community services and 
government sources, as well as professional sources such as financial advisers (FLF 2008). 
2.5.1 .1 The downside risk 
Although the range and variety of non-professional sources plays an important role and in 
some cases may be helpful for many individuals, there are clear risks with a reliance on 
29 Rather than financial literacy levels, Ianni cola and Parker (2010) refer to "non-affluent consumers" being 
"rnore likely to only receive financial advice from informal, trusted sources, such as family and friends". 
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such sources. The first of these is that these sources may not in fact be providing 
appropriate advice. This is no surprise as friends , family and peers are not likely to be 
experts in the field of personal finance either, but simply are people who are open enough 
to offer whatever help they can give. But given the low levels of financial literacy, this 
naturally is as likely to pertain to them as it does to the self. Furthennore, if an individual 
has not been able to work out the advantages and disadvantages of certain decisions for 
themselves, relying on others who themselves may not have done so simply exacerbates the 
problem. In this sense also the impact of peers may be as much a hindrance as a help. 
The inappropriateness of advice is also likely due to generational differences with financial 
issues. What was good advice twenty years ago may not apply today, with different rules 
pertaining to tax, superannuation as a savings vehicle (especially so given the transition 
from DB to DC schemes), and changes in available investment options and debt 
arrangements. The use of the internet as a research tool can exacerbate these risks , where 
the wealth of financial infonnation can lead to individuals becoming over-confident, 
thinking they have greater knowledge than what they actually do have. This can lead to 
other apparent biases such as optimism and in particular, an illusion of control (Smith 
2009). 
A further risk concerns the fact that each individual is unique, with factors such as the level 
of family support, attitudes to risk, testamentary intent, belief(s) and attitudes towards 
retirement differing between individuals (McKee 2010). And, although some non-
professional sources may provide specific guidance for specific issues, such advice is 
unlikely to consider someone' s situation at a comprehensive level or be individualised for 
their particular circumstances (Iannicola and Parker 2011 ). 
2.5.2 Professional Advice 
The combination of complexity associated with personal finance, the push to self-reliance, 
the uniqueness of each person ' s financial situation, the limited opportunity an individual 
has to gain experience due to infrequent consideration and purchase of products, low 
finan cial literacy levels, changing rules , a multitude of choices and options, and so on, all 
point to a critical role for professional financial advice (Allen et al. 2000; FSA 2009; 
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Gerrans and Hershey 2012; Iannicola and Parker 2010; McKee 2010; Morris 2010). This 
makes a consideration of the role of professional advice of much interest and importance. 
2.5.2.1 Features and histo,y 
The Australian Financial Planning Association (FP A) describes financial planning as 
' developing strategies to help you manage your financial affairs and meet your life goals' 30 . 
Determining a financial plan in conjunction with a professional is essentially an interaction 
between goals (such as retirement) and beliefs (such as perceptions of money), with 
multiple functions required of a financial adviser in order to provide such a service. 
According to Kliplin (2010), an adviser should provide strategic advice31 , tactical advice32, 
an implementation of decisions made, and then help keep individuals on track to achieve 
their financial goals. Similar functions are suggested by Johnson (1983)33 . Kotlikoff (2008) 
refers to financial planning as a highly precise business, whereby the dangers of mistakes 
are real with the possibility of poor outcomes in terms of financial health a very real 
prospect. 
As a profession, financial planning is relatively new (Hunt et al. 2011; Santacruz 2011). It 
has emerged rapidly over the last twenty years or so from origins in not only life insurance 
sales, but also from some services offered in part by accountants, lawyers, and investment 
brokers associated with stocks and managed funds (Collett 201 0; Cowen et al. 2011; 
Santacruz 2011). Thus, from relatively narrow specialties it has and continues to morph 
into a unique and distinct profession ( Cowen et al. 2011). 
However, debate exists as to whether personal financial planning is a true profession, 
versus the alternative of being a sales or distribution arm of the financial services industry. 
Murphy and Watts (2009) discuss four attributes which can be used to distinguish between 
the two: whether responsibility of advice is based on ' self-interest' or ' public interest'; 
30 http ://www.fpa .asn.au/default.asp?action=article&ID=22724, accessed 22 March 2013 . 
31 Coaching and guiding individuals through various life changes. 
32 Expertise on insurance, investments and superannuation, all within an appropriate individualised plan. 
33 Financial planning is enabled through "thorough collection and impartial analysis of infonnation on the 
factual and affective dimensions of a person's or family' s total financial situation; the identification of needs 
and the establishment of specific financial objectives; and the formulation, implementation, and continuous 
monitoring of a comprehensive financial plan to achieve them" (cited in McAlexander and Scammon 1988, 
p.185). 
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whether a systematic body of theory is 'stable ' which accepts prevailing knowledge as 
sufficient or ' creative ' which seeks to increase knowledge over time; whether professional 
authority is conferred via sanctioned rules of from superior knowledge; and whether ethical 
responsibility is regulatory or self-imposed34. Evidence from the UK suggests that financial 
planning currently falls short of a true profession in the attributes of ethical responsibility, 
and having a systematic body of theory (Gaskell and Ashton 2008, cited in Murphy and 
Watts 2009)3 5. Others suggest a middle ground by referring to it as an 'applied 
profession ' 36 . 
Whatever the appropriate description, financial planning has grown in Australia to a stage 
where it is now a significant industry in itself. Despite limited publicly available 
infonnation regarding total revenue arising directly from advice (rather than product and 
administrative revenue) , McKee (2010) estimates total recurring financial planning 
revenues in Australia to be approximately A$ l .O - 1.5 billion per annum. 
2.5.2.2 Rationale and benefits 
As highlighted previously, there are vanous factors which justify someone seeking 
professional financial advice. As such, the industry itself often markets itself at a broad 
enough level to appeal to anyone who has an interest in greater wealth, protection or peace 
of mind37. In this sense, there is common ground between the portrayal of value of 
professional advice to portrayal of value offered from other professional services. For 
example, referring to experts for advice in general is common practice38 , and financial 
34 All the latter op tions on each attribute point to a profess ion, all the fom1er options po int to the rea lm o f 
services offered being camped within an industry. 
35 The latter point is a lso highlighted by Black et al. (2002) who state that personal financial planning (PFP) 
" has evo lved large ly devoid of a theoret ica l foundation", and that " few di sc iplines achi eve recogniti on and 
respec t without a strong theory base, particularly within higher educa tio n. We believe that PFP will prove no 
exception ' ' (p.2). 
36 An implication of wh ich is that " a simple maste ry of theoretical knowledge is cons idered insuffi c ien t 
preparation for students entering such a profess ion" (Goetz et a l. 2005 , cited in Cowe n et a l. 20 I I, p.5). 37 As one example, " the va lue of adv ice is relevant to anyone who aim s to be financiall y independent' ' (NAB 
2012). 
38 In particular, ·' the mos t prominent s ituati ons in whi ch people turn to experts fo r advice occur under 
conditions of enhanced uncertainty, such as an economic recession. During such times, people may fee l unfit 
to predi ct the consequences of their choices, and may seek the counsel of experts to reduce the enhanced 
perception of ri sk' . (Engelmann et a l. 2009). 
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health being entrusted to professional advisers 1s compared to physical health being 
entrusted to professional physicians (Allen et al. 2000). 
The potential direct benefits of professional financial advice are considered significant in 
many circumstances (McKee 2010). For example, information and confidence to invest in 
risky assets leading to improved investment retums39, protection from fraud, and where 
applicable, reduced transaction costs (Hung and Yoong 2010; Mullainathan et al. 2012). 
One mechanism by which these benefits can come about is via the adviser helping an 
individual to consider their position in totality4° rather than piecemeal (Black et al. 2002). 
Another interesting and quite specific mechanism is suggested by the experimental studies 
of Engelmann et al. (2009). They measure neural activation patterns in response to certain 
stimuli and situations, with results suggesting that one role of expert advice is the transfer 
or offloading of some decision making requirements from the individual to the expert. In 
other words, the presence of an expert could potentially be viewed as an explicit resource 
for assessing the likelihood or need for some proposed strategy or product. 
A range of important but non ( directly) pecuniary benefits are also associated with financial 
advice, and such qualitative or intangible benefits are considered as important as any other 
benefits that might accrue to the customer (Collins 201 O; Hunt et al. 2011; McKee 201 O; 
RWA 2008). The first of these arises from an adviser operating more as a financial coach 
than as a specific investment adviser (Kliplin 2010). As a first step this may simply mean 
making the customer aware or helping them to set specific goals (Hayhoe 2001, cited in 
Hunt et al. 2011, p.70), which then allows a plan to be put in place to meet those goals. 
Having a plan in itself can provide peace of mind, which if done comprehensively and 
realistically then allows the customer a degree of control as well as financial protection 
against unforeseen events, such as death or disability (RWA 2008). As such, those using 
financial advisers may be more engaged with their finances, and subsequently have greater 
certainty and control over this area of their lives (Kliplin 2010). 
39 Importantly, this helps ameliorate some major and additional investment mistakes made by many 
individuals, such as underdiversification of risky portfolios (Campbell 2006). 
40 A consideration of all assets and liabilities, and one's situation with regards to self, nuclear and extended 
family. 
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What these additional benefits can lead to is a sense of empowem1ent on behalf of the 
customer. By firstly providing the customer with financial knowledge and advice, this 
allows someone to appreciate and have some understanding of what options are before 
them (deVries 2009). This further allows them to make infonned decisions and willingly 
take responsibility for those decisions, which is one definition of empowennent (Hunt et al. 
2011 ). As such, a value of the advice process is the opportunity for guidance and direction 
in making important life decisions, with the customer themselves feeling empowered, 
satisfied and good about doing so (Hunt et al. 2011 ; Kliplin 2010). 
2.5.2.3 Selecting an Adviser 
Wijetllake (2012) reports three qualities that consumers consistently look for when 
selecting an adviser: 
1. Concern: having a genuine focus on client needs rather than anything self-related41 ; 
2. Candour: being honest rather than pretending to know or exaggerating; 
3. Competence: knowing what customer-specific problems can be solved and how to 
solve them. 
The key aspect of human relationships that underlies these qualities is that of trust. Trust 
can be defined as "an expectancy held by an individual or a group that the word , promise, 
verbal , or written statement of another individual or group can be relied on" (Rotter 1971 , 
p. 444, cited in Tan 2009). It is clearly of much importance in any professional relationship 
(Ianni cola and Parker 201 0; Kliplin 201 0; McKee 201 0; Wijetllake 2012), particularly so 
because of the requirement to disclose one ' s personal affairs, usually on a confidential 
basis, and the inherent reliance of the customer on the professional to achieve a desirable 
outcome (Hunt et al. 2011 ). It is essential therefore for a customer to know that the 
financial adviser will put their needs first , and the onus is on the adviser to clearly 
demonstrate their priority of meeting those needs (Murphy and Y etmar 201 0) . 
41 Notably, thi s includes onese lf, one 's products and one ' s services. 
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Another feature of the issue of trust is that the customer-adviser relationship is likely to be a 
long-term one, in the vein of a lifelong financial guide and coach for key events and 
decisions over a lifetime. The ideal outcome of such a relationship over a long time period 
is that the customer will feel a strong sense of control and comfort about the management 
of their financial affairs (McKee 2010). 
Of relevance then is how a potential customer gains assurance of the quality of the adviser, 
and how they establish trust in such a critical relationship. It is here that we find a common 
thread to the mechanisms and sources that individuals refer to when seeking greater 
knowledge of financial matters for themselves. Just as individuals tend to ask family and 
friends for advice directly about financial matters, so too as a first port of call do they often 
ask family and friends about their opinions of particular advisers (Collett 2011 ; FSA 2009; 
McAlexander and Scammon 1988). Friends and family may be good sources of opinion 
because of their own dealings with a particular adviser (FSA 2009), thereby operating in 
the vein of a personal referral (Wijetllake 2012). 
Other factors are also relevant here, including those related to what we term 'peer related 
credentials ' . These include the recommendations of other professionals (for example, 
lawyers and accountants), the reputation of the company with w_hich the financial adviser is 
affiliated (for example, the advice arm of a particular bank), and the adviser's own 
professional qualifications and credentials (FSA 2009; McAlexander and Scammon 1988). 
There are also social attributes which may appeal to certain customers and not to others. 
For example, the friendliness of the adviser, their religious beliefs, and in simple terms, the 
'likeability' of the adviser (McAlexander and Scammon 1988; Wijetllake 2012). 
It is here that a further consequence of financial literacy rears its head again, due to the fact 
that an assessment of the financial adviser' s knowledge is also a further and important 
factor in adviser selection (Collett 2011 ; McAlexander and Scammon 1988). One way to 
partially assess this knowledge is via the advisers' aforementioned credentials, but in 
addition the customer also has to interpret whether the experience and working knowledge 
of the adviser provides sufficient assurance. But, if the customer' s own interpretation of 
that level of knowledge is limited, then those customers are particularly vulnerable. This is 
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also exacerbated with customers who have lower levels of wealth and/or financial 
knowledge, and are more likely to rely on social rather than peer-related or knowledge-
based attributes when assessing adviser worth. Of course, the need to make some sort of 
assessment relates not only to levels of knowledge, but also to the ethical quality of the 
adviser as well. 
There is an appreciation on behalf of advisers of their core need to establish and maintain 
good communication and relationships over time, in order to develop sufficient levels of 
trust (FSA 2009; Iannicola and Parker 2010). As such advisers anticipate and plan for 
numerous interactions with their customer over time, not just an initial consultation 
(Wijetllake 2012). Such interaction would likely go beyond merely professional 
consultations to encompass wider social connections (Pompian 2008, cited in Hunt et al. 
2011 , p. 70), which again leads into the ready source and value of personal referrals and 
recommendations of friends and family, as these social circles likely overlap for many 
people. 
2. 5. 2. 4 Reasons for avoidance 
There are also many reasons as to why individuals might not seek out professional financial 
advice. Once more the issue of financial literacy may have a paii to play, with low levels 
leading many people to undervalue the role of financial advice (MacDonald et al. 2011 ). 
Furthennore, consumers may be intimidated by jargon that they do not understand 
(Ia1micola and Parker 2010), or they may consider that they can manage their affairs better 
by themselves (Greenwald et al. 2006, cited in MacDonald et al. 2011 ). The latter point 
may particularly relate to males rather than females , due to the cultural and/or self-imposed 
expectation that men should be able to manage their lives sufficiently well without outside 
help (du Plessis et al. 2010). 
A lack of financial literacy can also exacerbate infonnation asymmetry that would naturall y 
exist between an expe1i and a layperson in the nom1al course of events (Black et al. 2002). 
Unfortunately, thi s can mean that there is greater vulnerability to predatory practices 
(lannicola and Parker 2010) , or even at a more benign level it may mean that consumers 
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cannot differentiate between objective advice and a deliberate sales pitch (Collins 2010). 
Thus, in addition to being useful for an individual directly, higher levels of financial 
knowledge and literacy may also be useful in allowing greater engagement with 
professional financial advice (Iannicola and Parker 2011). 
Of course, reasons for limited uptake of professional financial advice also reside within the 
industry itself, rather than originating from consumers' attitudes and circumstances. 
Notably, the expectation of consumers is that by turning to professional advisers they will 
improve their financial health. But contrary to this, conventional financial planning can lead 
to the consumer being in worse financial shape, often through advisers taking a simplified 
approach to planning to ensure customers more easily and quickly navigate through the 
planning process (Kotlikoff 2006, 2008). This can occur through asking consumers to set 
their own consumption preferences rather than the adviser helping them to set appropriate 
goals which allow them to maintain a stable standard of living (smoothing their lifetime 
consumption). Other downsides of advice can be that behavioural biases can exacerbated 
rather than mitigated (Mullainathan et al. 2012)42, and more critically, sometimes the 
advice offered from financial 'experts' is conflicting, contradictory, and in some cases 
plainly wrong (Brown 2008). 
Another reason is that the actual process of seeking financial advice may be a barrier, either 
directly because of anxiety about the process itself (Gerrans and Hershey 2012)43, or 
because money issues are seen culturally as a private matter (du Plessis et al. 2010). 
Additionally, those of lower wealth tend not to be pursued by financial advisers in 
general44, leaving this significant segment of the population with more limited opportunity 
to access professional financial advice. 
42 As one example, one issue consumers have is the need for a more honest presentation of scenarios whereby 
the downside of decisions are highlighted rather than just the upside (deVries 2009). Presenting just the 
upside can exacerbate optimism bias and overconfidence, and limit a more critical assessment of options. 43 
"Barriers may exist that may prevent individuals from seeking financial advice. Evidence from health 
services suggests that individuals may fail to seek professional advice in situations where it can reasonably be 
expected to help them. One reason is anxiety about the medical consultation process itself and the disclosure 
and evaluation process it involves" (Gerrans and Hershey 2012, p.37). 
44 In the US context, "only 11 % of financial advisers are interested in providing advice to clients with less 
than a quarter-million dollars in assets" (Ianni cola and Parker 2010). 
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In terms of numbers of people who consult professional financial planners, An ASIC 
survey of 1,200 investors in 2007 indicated that 15% of Australians consult a professional 
financial adviser as an investment infonnation source, although in response to a 
hypothetical scenario, 28% said that they would do so (ASIC 2008). An ASIC executive 
indicated in 2009 that "the figures vary but between 22 per cent and 34 per cent of people 
would see a traditional financial planner"45 . 
2.5.2.5 The issue of trust 
The issue of trust clearly has a big part to play in whether financial advice is pursued or not. 
Morris (2010) reports that as a profession, financial advisers are ranked below pJ-lannacists, 
doctors , dentists, accountants, bank managers and lawyers in the area of ethics and honesty. 
Undoubtedly then, there are challenges facing the industry as a result of low levels of trust 
(Greenwald et al. 2006, cited in MacDonald et al. 2011; Hunt et al. 2011; McKee 2010). 
Part of this is due to unprofessional actions that some advisers admit they have willingly 
done (Murphy and Watts 2009), which is one reason for recent Australian legislative 
pushes for advisers to be legally obliged to put their clients' interests ahead of their own 
(Collett 2010). 
Furthermore, a raft of publicity surrounding various financial disasters in recent years has 
brought these issues even further into the public sphere46. In the Australian context, the 
collapses of Stonn Financial, Opes Prime, Westpoint and others led to an influx of 
complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS)47 (Knight 2011 ), and through the 
subsequent adverse media coverage and commentary this has heightened distrust in the 
industry (Kliplin 2010; Santacruz 2011). Such publicity in general increases the fear for 
consumers that they could be taken advantage of by an unscrupulous adviser, thereby 
undennining trust further (Ianni cola and Parker 2010). 
45 AS IC Strategic Policy Executi ve, Canberra public hearing of 24 June 2009 , Parliamentary Joint Committee 
on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inqui ry into financial products and services in Au stralia '. p.2 1. 46 We note. of course . that unethical actions and the presence of scams and swindles in the financ ial context 
are not just recent occ urrences ( 1cAlexander and Scammon 1988). 
47 FOS is an industry body for consumers to reso lve complaints. It is made up from a membership base of 
financial institutions (http: /www.fos.o rn .au/centric/home page.jsp). 
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An associated factor is the existence of conflicts of interest. These are inherent in many 
professional capacities48 , and in the context of financial advice the focus has been 
predominantly on the issue of compensation for the adviser (Bearden 2001). A financial 
adviser can be compensated in various ways such as salaries, explicit fees from the 
customer to the adviser, and/or commissions. Commissions are usually a percentage of 
some measure of the transaction (size of investment, or premium), and are generally paid to 
the adviser from the provider of the underlying product. These may be initial payments, or 
regular payments, or both. It is claimed that commissions give greater access to advice for 
those that could otherwise not afford it, but that over time, the presence of commissions can 
significantly inflate the overall cost of advice (Collett 201 0; Collins 2010). 
The conflict arises from the fact that with commission arrangements, the compensation for 
the adviser arises from the sale of products. This can incentivise advisers to sell products 
with the highest commission structures, in direct contrast to what consumers may actually 
need - the provision of unbiased advice (Bentz 2001 ; Collins 201 0; Iannicola and Parker 
2011). As one example, a shadow shop of advisers released by ASIC in 2006 showed that 
advisers transfer their client' s superannuation savings between superannuation funds , solely 
for reasons of commissions and of little benefit to the client (Collett 2011)49. A significant 
source of general mistrust then lies with consumers not believing that their best interests are 
being served, as a result of compensation arrangements (Collett 2010; FSA 2009; Iannicola 
and Parker 2011 ). 
Such perceptions are also influenced by the structure of the industry - advisers can be 
considered ' independent ' or non-institutional operators, versus ' aligned ' or ' tied ' to a 
financial institution such as AMP, AXA, the banks or other businesses50 . Approximately 
75% to 85% of financial advisers fall into this latter category, meaning that for these 
advisers a dual role exists of giving advice and selling products of any associated 
48 For example, one study indicated that one in four physicians experienced a conflict between helping 
patients and protecting their own income (Jaklevic 1997, cited in Bearden 2001 , p.27). 
49 Furthermore, consumers were six times more likely to receive bad advice when their adviser was paid 
higher commissions to move the consumer to a different superannuation fund (Collett 2011 ). 50 Executive Manager, Guardian Financial Planning, Melbourne public hearing of 26 August 2009, 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inquiry into financial products and 
services in Australia ', p.86. 
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institutions. Notabl y, this can create '·potential conflicts of interest that may be inconsistent 
with providing quality advice and these conflicts may not be evident to consumers'' 51 . 
As a result, a perception exists that an adviser cannot both sell a product and give unbiased 
advice. This is a particularly strong view amongst those who have not yet used professional 
financial advice (Iannicola and Parker 2010). The use of fees as compensation instead of 
commissions potentially better aligns the interests of advisers and consumers (Collins 
2010), and this is certainly the motivation behind recent reforms in the Australian market52. 
Nevertheless, it is important to note that in some cases the concerns about commission-
incentivised behaviour and product pricing may be overstated (Collins 2010), with 
consumers not necessarily against being charged reasonable amounts for quality advice53 . 
Furthermore, a danger is that debate(s) about compensation arrangements can replace the 
more important issue of the quality and value of advice being given (Kachor 201 0a). 
2. 5. 2. 6 Difficulty of assessing value 
An important factor in this discussion is the difficulty in demonstrating the value or 
otherwise of financial advice, for which there are many reasons. Advice itself is essentially 
a credence good with its subsequent quality being hard to assess (Bluethgen et al. 2008), 
and this is exacerbated by the complexity of the underlying issues that financial advice 
pertains to (FSA 2009). 
One major issue in discussing the quality of advice is the temporal nature of outcomes 
arising from that advice. The long term implications of appropriate financial planning are 
significant and given the associated aspect of risk, thi s can mean that a focus on short term 
financial benefits can be inappropriate (Collins 2010). However, this itself opens up a 
number of issues. Very poor advice and deci sions can certainly lead to significant losses 
and poor outcomes in the short term, and these should not merely be waved away due to a 
51 ASIC public submiss ion [3 78) to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Serv ices ·Inquiry into financial products and services in Austra lia· : AS IC deputy chairman. Canberra public 
hearin g of24 Jun e 2009. Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services · Inquiry into 
financi a l products and services in Australia· . p.25 . 
5
" These are the Furure of Financial Advice (FOF A) refom1s. whi ch are di scussed further in chapter 3 . See 
http: fu rureo fad , ·ice. treasurv. 2:0 , · .aw content!( ontent.aspx') doc= home . htm. 
5
' In fac t. Gino (2008 . c ited in Hung and Yoong 20 10) c laims that indi vidual are significantl y more recepti ve 
to ad, ice that they pay fo r. rather than adYice they get fo r free. 
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fall back on ' it is the long term that matters ' . And, it can also lead to spurious claims about 
the effectiveness of advice and quality of decisions, notably due to the cherry-picking of 
convenient data54 . 
But, it is undoubtedly the case that even when high quality advice may have been given, 
there may not necessarily be evidence in the short term of the quality of that advice. 
Whether it is the purchase of a product whose quality is not immediately obvious (Bentz 
2001), or whether advice is given to forego current consumption (if indeed this can 
overcome the bias of hyperbolic discounting), it can be difficult from the consumer' s 
perspective to assess whether advice is sound within short time frames (Iannicola and 
Parker 2011)55 . This issue of time also applies to the adviser's own learning where they 
may only get limited feedback themselves (Barberis and Thaler 2003), due to the need for 
long time periods to give evidence one way or another of decisions taken. 
Not only time, but also the nature of financial outcomes does mean that the outcomes 
arising from advice is necessarily one of probability, not certainty. In the context of 
institutional portfolios but nevertheless extended here for our purposes, Hedberg (1973) 
humorously points out that quality measured solely by a single result involves uncertainty 
"in a field where chance can, for a time, make a hero out of a fool , or a goat out of a 
conscientious analyst" (p.24). In other words, sometimes given advice may work out well , 
and sometimes it may not. 
Hence it is the case that there are many, hard-to-assess factors when considering the quality 
of financial advice. The worth of advice can be abstract (Iannicola and Parker 2010), not 
always visible to the general public (Kliplin 2010), and in general, the assessment of value 
generally has to involve a qualitative judgement (Weatherhead 2009). As such, this means 
that the value of financial advice can be relatively intangible to some consumers 
54 For example, " it would not be unreasonable for many intelligent people who get most of their financial 
information from financial programs to believe there are very few financial professionals who lose. With so 
many possible measures of performance, it is difficult not to find one that looks good. One of the authors was 
presented with the record of a noted investment professional which showed below-average performance over 
the past 1, 5, and 10 years. Performance over the past 15 years, however, was above average. This was 
described as being noteworthy evidence that the professional was not interested in quick results but was 
investing for the long term" (Allen et al. 2000, p.429) . 
55 Indeed, "financial advice is not like hiring a plumber, in which the immediate and concrete benefit of the 
service is a fixed sink. Instead, the benefits of financial advice are delayed" (Iannicola and Parker 2010). 
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(Wijetllake 2012)56, and this quality assessment is complicated further when detern1ined by 
a consumer ' s own subjective judgement57 . 
2.5.3 The regulatory environment58 
The basis for the regulatory system of financial services providers in Australia is centered 
on the 1997 Financial System Inquiry (FSI) , otherwise known as the Wallis Report 
(Treasury 1997). The underlying assumption of its recommendations were that the most 
efficient allocation of resources across the industry would be through the free market - one 
where competition and innovation would direct and rationalise the range and cost of 
services, products and overall capital allocation over time. The FSI also recognised that 
some institutions are of ' systemic' importance to the functioning of the eco;1omy as a 
whole, and as such should be subject to closer regulatory control. 
Hence, the financial sector more or less is broken into two segments. One segment includes 
institutions considered to be of ' systemic ' importance and include deposit taking entities, 
life and general insurance companies, and superannuation providers. These institutions fall 
under the prudential supervision of the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) 
and as such so do their licensing and reporting requirements, and standards around capital 
adequacy. The priority of such prudential supervision is to ensure confidence that their 
promises to investors and policyholders are met. 
56 
" If clients can touch it, feel it or see it, they know exactly what they' re buy ing and immediate ly many 
purchasing concerns disappear. But in professional advisory services, you never have the advantage of 
allowing the client to ' kick the tyres ' the way sell ers of products do" (Wijetllake 2012 , p.24) . 57 For example, it may be a good piece of advice to invest in cash for some given set of reasons and goals, but 
a investor may be disgruntled in ten years when they ask, " if onl y I had invested in shares . . . " . There are ways 
around thi s with documenting the original decision and conducting an explicit finan cial needs-analys is, but 
neverthe less if advice is measured sol ely by the in vestor's assessment of the result at so me time in the future, 
and this is taken as the measure of the quality of the original advice, then this is not necessaril y a fa ir 
assessment of the quality of the original advice. As an additi onal anal ogy, with profess ions such as medi cine 
there is good practice which nevertheless can result in undesirable outcomes, but there is al so practi ce whi ch 
can be professionally negligent. In financial affairs, it may not be straightfo rward fo r a disgruntled c li ent to 
differentiate between the two . 
58 The discussion in thi s sec tion is based on our understanding of the 1997 Financial Sys tem Inquiry (FSI) , the 
Corpora tions Ac t (200 1) (Commonwealth of Australia 200 1), and the Financial Services Reform Act (200 1) (Commonwealth of Australia 2005) . It is supplemented by info rmation provided on the websites of the 
Austra lian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) and the Australi an Prudential Regul ati on 
Authority (APRA) , as we ll as by the public submiss ions of ASIC and the Treasury to the Parli amentary Jo int 
Co mmittee on Corporati ons and Financial Servi ces 2009 ' Inquiry into fin anci al products and services in 
Austra li a·. 
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• fhe second segment relates to the remainder of the financial services sector, and includes 
l !ntities such as finance companies, financial advisors, stockbrokers, fund managers, unit 
l rusts and other market-linked product-providers such as debentures, mortgage trusts and 
l mlisted trusts. These entities fall under the supervision of the Australian Securities and 
1 nvestments Commission (ASIC). Hence, in terms of overall regulatory oversight, APRA 
l md ASIC operate as a 'twin-peaks' system. 
\.s a significant point of difference to the supervisory requirements offered via APRA, the 
ole of ASIC is based on a conduct and disclosure regime, which at its heart is there to 
5nitigate the information disadvantage that consumers could otherwise face when dealing 
a 
avith this segment of the market. A major rationale for not having every entity under 
\PRA-like prudential regulation is due to the costs involved, which would ultimately be 
,assed onto consumers. Such costs can be direct (such as meeting stringent capital 
dequacy requirements), or indirect via impacts such as potential restriction of competition 
nd innovation. As such, the aim of regulation in this segment is to ensure the efficient, 
onest and fair operation of those entities. The promotion and enforcement of such aims 
an happen via a multitude of actions59, but the key ones of interest are those associated 
rith licensing, conduct and disclosure requirements. 
~ey legislative pieces include the Corporations Act (2001) and the Financial Services 
.eform Act (2001 ). As the central legislative piece regarding financial service law in 
.ustralia, the Corporations Act (2001) regulates the activities of companies, as well as 
artnerships and managed investment schemes. It is administered by ASIC and provides 
ey obligations and requirements that must be met by any financial service or product 
rovider in Australia including registration, reporting, and responsibilities of directors. 
'hapter 7 of the Act deals specifically with financial services and markets, including the 
censing regime and the requirements relating to conduct and disclosure. 
For example, the administering of consumer protection laws, applying minimum standards of competency 
1d ethical behaviour so that customers have fair service by appropriately qualified people, and ensuring 
:cess to effective and appropriate complaints handling procedures. For an overview of ASIC 's current 
mctions, see http: //www.asic.gov.au/asic/asic.nsf/byheadline/Our+role?openDocument. 
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The Financial Services Reform (FSR) Act (2001) introduces a more unifom1 approach to 
the licensing system, rules around disclosure, and code of conduct obligations for financial 
service providers. Through this it aims to assist and give confidence to decision making by 
financial service consumers by promoting fairness , honesty, professionalism, order, 
integrity and transparency in the financial services and product market, whilst still 
encouraging efficiency and innovation. Like its forerunner the Wallis Report, the FSR 
regime is based on the belief that market efficiency will drive the best outcomes in tenns of 
overall provision of financial services, and as such, minimal regulatory intervention is seen 
as an appropriate approach. 
2.5.3.1 The licensing regime 
Any entity (individual or company) which provides a financial service60 must be licenced 
with ASIC via an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) . This licence infers 
various responsibilities on the licensee including responsibility for those who, whilst under 
the licensee ' s control and direction, are involved in providing the service for which the 
licence had been granted. This includes acting honestly and fairly at all times, adherence to 
licencing conditions and financial laws, maintenance of competency to provide the services 
promised, having adequate risk management systems and resources6 1, having appropriate 
compensation arrangements, and also, where services are provided to retail clients, having a 
complying dispute resolution system in place. 
Exemptions do exist under this regime, and this is typically when someone is an ' authorised 
representative ' of an AFSL holder. The AFSL holder may have employees assi sting it in 
providing financial services, and under such exemptions each such individual is not 
licenced explicitly by ASIC, but as noted above the AFSL holder is held responsible for 
their conduct. A rationale for such exemptions is to increase the number of financial service 
providers, where for various reasons many may not want to obtain an individual AFSL62. 
60 This includes, amongs t other things: giving advice on, dealing in , or making a market in financial products. 61 Unl ess it is an APRA-regulated entity which then has greater protecti ve prov isions. 62 T here are approximately 3 ,300 entities that are authorised to prov ide personal advice including advice on 
products (inc lud ing securities , deriva tives , superannuation, general insurance, li fe insurance, and deposit-
taking fac ilities) (St. John 20 11 ). Overall there are approximate ly I 8,000 financial planners and 45 ,000 
authori sed representatives (CEO , Fin ancial Planning Assoc iati on, Canberra public hearing of 28 August 2009 , 
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An AFSL must be granted upon certain criteria being satisfied63 , and as such, the grounds 
to refuse a licence are limited to the non-fulfilment of those criteria. This means that the 
AFSL regime is effectively a 'gatekeeping' mechanism which checks the competency, 
integrity and resources of those entities at the time of application, effectively setting a 
threshold at entry for providing a financial service. 
2.5.3.2 Disclosure 
Where an adviser is recommending a financial product to a customer, the disclosure aspect 
of the regulatory regime focuses on the product detail and appropriateness, the capacity of 
the adviser in giving advice, and the influence of remuneration and other benefits that may 
influence the giving of that advice. The purpose of such disclosure is to allow the customer 
all that they need to know in order to make an informed decision. 
Such disclosure is intended to overcome one notable issue in the realm of the financial 
services industry - that of infonnation asymmetry between those in the industry and those 
who are customers. By being transparent about all relevant factors to the giving of advice, 
the customer is theoretically in a position to be able to assess advice given in the light of 
other influences - most obviously issues of remuneration, but also, for example, by 
comparing to the characteristics and features of other products which may not have been 
recommended. This form of disclosure sits well within a framework founded in the virtues 
of efficient markets, because arguably it is offers a low level of intrusion and friction in 
respect of the operation of that market, whilst still (arguably) giving the customer 
information to make an informed decision. 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inquiry into financial products and 
services in Australia ' , p.27). 
63 Such as ASIC not being unsatisfied as to the applicant's fame or character, and have no reason to believe 
that licensee obligations under the Corporations Act will not be complied with. 
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Disclosure in a formal sense is predominantly given through three main documents64 : 
• The Financial Services Guide (FSG). This provides information about the nature of 
the services being offered, and provides details relating to the payment for such 
services. 
• The Statement of Advice (SoA). This is differentiated by whether general advice 
(not considering the customer's personal circumstances) or personal advice (this 
considers the customer's objectives, financial situation and needs) is being given. 
• The Product Disclosure Statement (PDS). This outlines key infonnation about the 
financial product. 
This documentation must be given to a retail client in certain situations, with the content 
required to be clear and concise, yet still comprehensive and relevant to the customer ' s 
needs. 
2.5.3.3 Overall intent 
Broadly, the overall intent of the regulatory FSR licensing, conduct and disclosure regime 
is intended to strike a balance between consumer protection and the capacity for markets to 
innovate and deliver efficiency, flexibility and variety to the end customer. Crucially, this 
means that the regulatory settings in the non-APRA regulated segment does not guarantee 
that market and institutional failure will not occur, nor that financial promises will always 
be met. Risks exist for the customer because they can choose a product or suite of products 
which are unsuitable for their circumstances, including those with high risk features that 
they may know little about, or are not in a position to manage effectively. 
In tenns of where personal financial advice has been given, the requirements and indeed 
obligations on the adviser boil down to three key elements expressed in the Corporations 
Act (200 l ), s945A( l ). These are to: 
• Understand the customer's relevant personal circumstances in relation to the advice 
being given; 
64 Detailed discuss ion of these aspects of disc losure is provided in Treasury 's public submission [388] to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inqui ry into financial products and 
services in Austral ia·. Only a brief summary is presented above. 
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• Give careful consideration to whether the advice 1s reasonable m all of the 
circumstances obtained above; and 
• Ensure that the advice is appropriate to the customer, given those circumstances. 
In other words, an adviser must know their customer, know their product, and ensure that 
the product is appropriate for that customer. The basis for such advice must be 'reasonable', 
appropriate and provides an obligation on the adviser to specify advice specific for the 
particular customer. 
2.6 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we outlined the system of 'pillars' in place for retirement savmgs and 
provision in Australia. Importantly, this system is not static but exists in a historical 
context, with ongoing changes apparent such as the move from DB to DC superannuation 
schemes. 
The current system provides many challenges for individuals. The availability of many 
competing choices, the individualisation of risk where longevity and health risks are of 
particular concern, and an increasing reliance on non-governmental institutions in general, 
presents a level of complexity to individuals that they may not be well equipped to handle. 
Major risks exist for individuals around the levels of savings needed and the perceived 
pressure to self-fund one's retirement, and these risks are exacerbated by levels of financial 
literacy which may not be adequate to deal with the complexity at hand. Such levels of 
financial literacy also influence and are influenced by a raft of behavioural factors which 
are attracting increasing attention and interest. We present such factors in three groupings: 
those arising from an environmental, a social, and a personal context. 
The subsequent need for financial advice is apparent, and various sources of such advice 
exists. In particular, we gave attention to the professional advice industry, providing an 
overview of its history and rationale, highlighting that issues of trust and engagement exist. 
The particular difficulty in assessing 'value' of advice was highlighted. 
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This chapter concluded with an overview of the regulatory environment for financial 
provision and security in Australia. A ' twin-peaks ' model is in operation, with the ASIC-
regulated sector essentially underpinned by a belief that market efficiency will deliver the 
best outcomes in aggregate, over time, across society at large. In this context, the regulatory 
tools of licensing and disclosure are seen to be sufficient to deliver appropriate outcomes in 
tenns of overall costs and benefits. 
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Chapter 3: An Australian Financial Storm 
3 .1 Introduction 
"As long as the music is playing, you 've got to get up and dance. We' re still dancing" : so 
said the then president of Citibank in July 200765 . Of course, what soon followed was a 
number of defaults on loans across many financial contracts, significant falls in equity 
markets, the failure of a number of financial and investment firms, and significant personal 
losses for many individuals worldwide. This period, its circumstances, and its aftermath, is 
now colloquially referred to as the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). 
Although at a macro level Australia was impacted less by the GFC than many other 
countries, the impact nevertheless was material and is still being felt in many circles. The 
Australian Securities Exchange fell more than 50% between October 2007 and February 
200966, which resulted in losses for those with direct holdings, but also for those with 
exposure via superannuation funds. In addition, the failure of listed companies such as 
Centro, MFS, Allco Finance, ABC Leaming and Babcock and Brown, compounded such 
losses for many individuals (Ralston 2009). 
A major additional impact in Australia has been the collapse of several financial product 
and services providers, resulting in many thousands of people losing their life savings, 
house ownership, and any semblance of financial security. Many of these investment 
companies offered complex and/or leveraged products (such as Opes Prime67 and Storm 
65 Cited in Smelt (2010, p.230) . 
66 The value of the ASX All ordinaries Price Index was 3296 in February 2009, down 51 % from its value of 
6779 in October 2007. See http://www.asx.com.au/research/historical_ equity_ data.htm . 67 Opes Prime specialised in the borrowing and lending of securities. At the time of its collapse in March 
2008, it had more than 650 active client accounts and creditors were owed about $630 million (Chappell 
2010) . Investors took out margin loans on the security of their shares, thinking they had ownership of these 
shares. However, these shares had been transferred to the broker in exchange for the loan, and when the 
broker breached their arrangements, the shares were sold by the banks, often at the bottom of the market, 
without the investors' knowledge (Spigelman 2010). The appointed administrator later claimed that there was 
a "tangled web of subsidiaries and related companies", resulting in "probably the most complicated legal 
matter that I've been involved in . . . everyone had a different view" (Urban 2010). 
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Financial), whilst others offered managed investment schemes (such as Timbercorp and 
Great Southern). In some cases these collapses involved fraud (such as superannuation fund 
Trio Capital), whereas others have been claimed to primarily involve a failure of ' product' 
(such as Westpoint68 and numerous managed investment scheme collapses). The collapse of 
Stonn Financial, in contrast, is claimed by some to be a failure primarily of financial advice 
(Taylor 2012a, 2012b). 
Given its distinctive features , this chapter considers the collapse of Queensland-based 
Stonn Financial in some detail. Our intent here is to describe perceptions around the overall 
circumstances of the collapse, and as such, much of the following material is necessarily 
based on media sources69 . However, balance is given where possible with the few academic 
and professional sources that are available, as well as the accounts of other parties such as 
Storm' s administrators (Worrells 2009). 
3.2 Storm Financial 
3 2 1 0 . 70 . . verv1ew 
Storm Financial was a Townsville-based financial planning business71 which as at August 
2008, was in a seemingly healthy position. Total investments under management were 
$4.86 billion, spread across approximately 14,000 clients. Some 3,000 of these clients had 
taken out margin loans as additional leverage on their overall investment, with these loans 
contributing approximately $1.8 billion of total funds. However, with the onset of the GFC, 
fund s under management began to fall rapidly such that by the end of October 2008, total 
investment value had dropped to approximately $3 .5 billion (Worrell s 2009). 
68 Westpoint Co rporation was a West Australian-based financ ial firm specialising in pwperty development. It 
collapsed in 2006, with approx imately 4 ,000 investors los ing a total of $300 million. Of particular note was 
the " in credibl e devastation .. . be ing wrought on famili es as a result" (Kohler 2006). 69 Some of these media sources cite material that we al so later cite in its original fonn (such as contributi ons 
to a Parliamentary Inquiry) . The utility of using those views which have predominated in the public domain is 
to g ive an indication of the environment (both real and perceived) that ex-Stonn investors have fo und 
themselves in since the collapse. Furthermore, the continuing nature of impac ts and legal disputes assoc iated 
with Storm 's co ll apse means that medi a so urces g ive a very access ibl e fonn of relevant in fo rmati on relating 
to the co llapse and its aftennath . 
70 In add ition to the discussion which foll ows, the website fo r Stom1 financial is convenientl y archi ved at 
http ://web.archi ve.org/web/?0070828204959/www.stormfinancial.com.au/index. php fo r further reference. 71 Stom1 F inancial was previously known as ' Cass im ati s Sec uriti es ' which was es tabli shed in 1994, which 
then later changed to Ozdaq Securities , and then to Storm Financial. 
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Subsequent events over the final few months of 2008 led to ASIC beginning formal 
investigations in December 2008, the entry of Storm Financial into administration in 
January 2009 72, and the subsequent placement into liquidation on 26 March 2009. The total 
losses accruing to Storm's clients has been reported to be in the region of $3 billion 
(Raggart 2009b; St. John 2011; Trenworth 2010; Washington 2010a), although this figure 
is disputed73 • 
As well as the loss of investor funds, many clients lost their homes and total life savings, 
and others are still in limbo (as at mid-2013) as to their status due to ongoing legal issues. 
The scale of and trauma involved with the demise of Storm Financial attracted much media 
attention at the time and also since then74, and its collapse has been highly significant on a 
national scale as well as for those individuals involved. 
3.2.2 The Storm Model 
3.2.2.1 Strategy and product 
The basic model used by Storm was to encourage investment in Storm Australian Index 
Trusts, essentially a 100% Australian equity-based indexed furid. The source of the funds 
for this investment choice came from some or all of an individual's own savings, the 
withdrawal of superannuation funds, the selling of other assets, a mortgage against the 
investor's primary residence, and then a margin loan against the accumulation of these 
amounts to provide additional funds and leverage 75 . 
Loans against an investor' s own home were provided by the maJor banks, but most 
prominently by the Commonwealth Bank (CBA) and Bank of Queensland (BoQ). The net 
72 At that time it owed its main financier the Commonwealth Bank of Australia (CBA) $27 million (Worrells 
2009), plus other debts. 
73 ASIC (2012c) claims that "the total loss suffered by all investors who borrowed monies from financiers to 
invest through Storm to be approximately $832 million ... ASIC does not know of any reliable source for the $3 billion loss figure" . 
74 As an example of some reporting, a variety of labels such as "Australia ' s champion wealth destroyer" (Barry 2011) have been used frequently to describe Storm 's collapse. 75 This last source of credit has been described more exasperatedly as borrowing "yet more funds" (Smith 
2009, p.528). 
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proceeds of such loans were used to purchase units in the equity investment, for which the 
investment vehicle was usually provided through Challenger or Colonial First State. The 
additional margin loans were usually provided by subsidiaries of the CBA or Macquarie 
Bank (Barry 2009; Ferris 2011). 
The strategy to both (re)mortgage a previously unencumbered home and also take out a 
margin loan has been referred to as 'double gearing' (Ferris 2011), or ' leverage on 
leverage' (Smith 2009) . Individual margin loans were semi-secured from the credit 
provider 's point of view, with individual investor's units in the Equity Trusts being pledged 
as collateral (Ferris 2011). In a rising market, returns on the equity investment would be 
more than sufficient to pay for interest on the mortgage and margin loans as well as provide 
for the lifestyle requirements of investors. In fact it seems that this was the case for most 
investors for some time leading up to the GFC (Smith 2009). 
Margin loans had allowable loan to value ratios (L VR) as high as 80% to 90% (Barry 
2009), though the initial setting of the LVR was more often around 55 % (Vogel 2012) 76 . 
Over time investors were encouraged to increase the absolute size of their investment, in 
line with increases in the values of both the equity investment and house value (Barry 
2009). In fact, no matter what happened in equity markets, the advice appeared to be such 
that more equity investment was always beneficial 77. This, of course, meant that the size of 
investors ' loans also increased78 . 
Ferris (2011) highlights that lessons from history are not readily learned, in that the Stonn 
model had a predecessor with National Mutual ' s Negative Gearing Package some twenty 
years earlier. A similar model applied then also, of mortgaging a home to access funds for 
investment, then via a Citibank-provided variable-interest line of credit, and often marketed 
76 The 'general in format ion ' for ex Stom1 investors at http ://www.s icag. info/i ndex fil es/Page 154 I .htm g ives 
further detail. 
77 Indeed , " if the stock market then fe ll by 10% they were to ld to put in more cash and buy more shares, 
because shares were cheap. If the market rose by I 0%, they were told to borrow more money and buy more 
shares to max imi se th e ir ga in s" (Barry 20 11 ). The di version of fund s explicitly to th e Storm-badged equity 
investment was also framed in tem1s of property itself not be ing seen as a safe inves tment (Fraser 20 12). 78 One such example is a Townsville coupl e where the husband was the main earner with an annual income of 
$ I 7,500 from part-time work. Yet despite this, the ir borrowings and exposure to the stock market increased 
11 times in 25 months to have a share portfo lio of $2.26 million, funded by a debt which accrued interest of 
$ 19 1.800 per year. and from which over time $ 152 ,000 in fees were paid to S torm (Barry 20 11 ). 
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to those on low incomes and with limited resources. During the property crash of the early 
1990s property values fell , interest rates on loans increased, and income fell. The rapid 
increase in debt levels and forced sales of homes makes the Storm situation "depressingly 
familiar" (Ferris 2011). 
3.2.2.2 Investors 
The investment strategy offered by Storm may well have suited certain groups of people at 
particular stages in life - for example, those on high marginal tax rates, those with the 
means to cover periods of negative cash flow (particularly in the early years as the initial 
commission to Storm Financial was 7% of the value of any new equity investment), those 
who were prepared for and able to meet margin calls i£'as they arose, and also those who 
were experienced investors and who understood the risks involved (Ferris 2011). However, 
most investors were not necessarily experienced in financial matters, and were in or were 
just about to enter retirement (Smith 2009; Washington 201 Oa/ 9. Hence, the overall Storm 
model has been likened to a ' one-size-fits-all ' model of financial advice (Washington 2011) 
whereby predominantly elderly investors borrowed money against their house and took out 
margin loans to invest in equities80 . 
The motivation of investors to get involved with Storm has naturally been the subject of 
much speculation (for example, The Australian 2011). Whether investors believed that 
Storm' s approach could fast track their way to great wealth or at least far more wealth that 
other strategies could deliver, or whether they had more straightforward and modest goals, 
is discussed later in this thesis. 
3.2.2.3 The Role of the Banks 
The provision of services by the involved banks was clearly an essential cog in the Storm 
model, whether it was via the provision of mortgage loans, margin loans, or as the vehicle 
79 Allan Myers QC, legal counsel for ASIC, described the typical Storm investor as "not experienced in 
financial matters but comfortably off, having a home that is not mortgaged or mortgaged to a modest extent, 
plus other assets such as superannuation" ( cited in Fraser 2012). 80 In other words, " index funds and high leverage, for all customers" (Smith 2009, p .535) . 
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for equity investment. The CBA and its subsidiaries had the most significant involvement 
of all the banks, through CEA-provided home mortgages, Colonial Geared Investment-
provided margin loans, and Colonial First State-provided equity investment services 
(O'Shaughnessy 2009; Worrells 2009). 
However, several points of contention have arisen with regard to the involvement of the 
banks within the Stonn model, and these have been (and still are as at August 2013) subject 
to legal dispute and action. The accusations have included blank loan applications being 
filled in either by Storm's advisers or elsewhere81, the overstating of income, the over-
inflation of asset (property) values, all leading to what is politely tenned a relaxing of 
nonnal lending standards (Barry 2009; Ferris 2011). The role of some banks has been more 
provocatively claimed to be the 'sting' in the tale of Storm Financial (Fanning 2009). The 
charges are not without foundation as some banks have acknowledged some responsibility 
arising from deficient lending practices (Ralston 2009), and an anonymous fonner senior 
bank employee urged Storm clients to go to the Financial Ombudsman Service with 
complaints (Raggart 2009a). Some of these accusations are not necessarily unique to 
Storm82 but its impact on the scale of Storm's demise has been picked up by many 
commentators83 . 
81 Accord ing to lawyer Stewart Lev itt, "we know what's in yo ur records is often falsified , often by Storm 
planners or by bank officers" (cited in Wilson 20 12b). 
82 Indeed, the artific ial inflation of a borrower's income or assets by some party other than the borrower 
applies " far wider than the Storm Financial crisis , consumer advocates have warned" (Klan 20 l 0). 
83 A range of spec ific and general allega tions are highlighted by a wide range of commenta tors. For example, 
borrowers' s ignatures be ing witnessed on ho me loan doc um ents in towns that the borrower has never vis ited ; 
substanti a l overstatement of investors ' ability to make loan repayments ; bank branches resembling an endl ess 
cash mac hine; money be ing thrown at Stonn clients even though otherwi se " in late 2007 , 2008 yo u couldn 't 
even get an overdraft"; and " unbelievable sweetheart deals" being struck such as $ 10 milli on margin loans 
without credit checks (Beaman 2009; Klan 20 10; Raggart 20 10; Ral ston 2009 ; Washington 20 11 ). Speci fi c 
cases include a war veteran on a disabi lity pension of $850 per fortnight who could nevertheless access a loan 
of $ 1.2 million due to an annual income of $99 ,996 being on his bank records, despite hav ing no co ntact with 
the bank (Raggart 2009a); and a Brisbane investor wi th an annual income of $24,000 who was granted a $2 
million line of cred it to in vest in Stonn, trapping her in "a dreadfu l debt spiral '' (Marx 20 12a). Washington 
(20 11 ) describes th e s ituat ion pointed ly as " the epitome of banks in leag ue with a fin ancia l pl annin g industry 
that had run out of contro l'· , wi th any thought th at the banks took a prudent approach "demo li shed'·. 
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3.2.2.4 Marketing 
Like any business that believes it has something worthwhile to sell , Storm had a number of 
approaches to winning the trust of potential investors. Firstly, in order to portray its 
approach to becoming 'successful' as legitimate, one method was to associate with 
successful objects - well known people, and tangible and immediate rewards. For example, 
pictures of Storm management with James Packer and former US president Bill Clinton 
were referred to (Fraser 2012). Other marketing featured prominent Australian sportsmen 
(O ' Shaughnessy 2009). Trips overseas for clients also occurred (Smith 2009), including 
Alaska, Canada and the Mediterranean, although it is noted that investors paid for the 
majority of their own costs on such trips. 
Another way to portray success and confidence is growth and expansion, and naturally 
successful business models do grow and attract further business. Storm's ambitions in this 
regard included the purchase of additional financial planning firms (and hence their 
networks, advisers, and clients) throughout Queensland and Sydney in 2007, and the 
building of a new headquarters office space in Townsville over 2007 /2008. Additionally, 
Storm attempted a market listing in late 2007 (O ' Shaughnessy 2009), but poor investor 
demand resulted in that failing to proceed. 
A third and perhaps most influential approach was through personal assurances, which 
undoubtedly is a powerful influence in many settings. In the case of Storm, the persuasion 
was such that many investors continued to pursue Storm' s suggestions and advice over 
extended periods of time (Barry 2011)84. Repeated assurances are of course often 
engineered to generate trust - and investors were repeatedly told not to be concerned about 
their portfolios, leading to a heavy reliance on Storm's guidance (Marx 2012b). In 
particular, many investors claim that they were explicitly told that there was little chance 
that they would lose their home (Ferris 2011). Part of this assurance was via the appeal to 
diversification - that investing in index funds diversifies away the risk associated with a 
84 One example is a Townsville resident who earned $46 ,000 per year and owned a house valued at less than $400,000, but ended up with $1.8 million of loans to fund his share portfolio . He commented that "from day one they [Storm] told me it would fund itself. .. that's what they told me" . Over his ten years with Storm, he paid $700,000 in fees and interest to Storm and the banks (Barry 2011) . 
- 78 -
specific stock and that this made the overall model more assunng (Smith 2009). The 
interview transcript of Ellen Fanning (2009) with Stonn's founder Emmanuel Cassimatis 
reiterates the assurances given to unequivocally trust Stonn: 
FANNING: You kept saying to your clients, "Trust us . Trust us" you kept saying. 
CASSIMATIS: Yes, I did. 
FANNING: We'll do the worrying for you. 
CASSIMATIS: Yes, I said that. 
A fourth approach and also influential arose from what can be tenned ' Institutional 
assurance'. The fact that Stonn had a close relationship with reputable financial institutions 
(indeed the largest bank(s) in the country) who were happy to offer, support and finance 
loans and investments in equities, would have been comforting to many investors (Ferris 
2011). Indeed, it was comforting to Storm's founders themselves85 . An additional source of 
comfort for investors would have been that many of Storm's advisers had master's degrees 
in finance, thereby assuring as to their education credentials (Fraser 2009). Furthennore, 
having an Australian Financial Services Licence (AFSL) from ASIC and that Stonn 
advisers were accredited with the Financial Planning Association (FP A) also gave 
assurance to prospective investors86. 
In addition, potential investors were required to go through a process of investment 
education prior to any application to banks for investment loans. This involved attending 
several hours of educational seminars and meetings, a process which could take up to six 
months. According to one fonner Storm adviser, this process was to ensure that investors 
were well educated and had a good understanding of all aspects of the investment (Dias 
2009). Ferris (2011) again compares this to the National Mutual business of 20 years ago, 
where potential investors were given whiteboard presentations (albeit brief) "which, 
clearly, many of them did not understand". With Stonn however, the educational seminars 
85 
"We assessed the institutional risk, and the way we handled th at institutional risk was to speak to the large 
corporations like CBA - we thought that they were trustworthy and in the end , we found that corporati ons are 
trustworthy, but individuals in those corporations are not" (Emmanuel Cass imati s, cited in Skene 2011 ). 86 
·'Eleven FPA members were authorised by Storm Financial , out of 34 authorised representatives or 
employed advisers . Stom1 employed 150 staff in total" (Financial Pl anning Association of Australia public 
submission [277] to the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inquiry into 
financial products and services in Australia ' ). 
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were lengthy and had supporting written material, including 100-page long statements of 
advice87 "which, clearly, many of them did not understand". 
3.2.2.5 A Selection of Public Criticisms 
A major criticism of Stonn's approach has been the use of a 'one-size-fits-all' strategy 
whereby the same model of advice and product was given to investors, regardless of their 
personal circumstances (Barry 2009; Ferris 2011; Smith 2009)88 . It is important to note 
however that that although Storm's investment offering clearly involved a high degree of 
risk by any reasonable measure, the inappropriateness of this is not perceived necessarily as 
the product itself in isolation, but the matching of the product with those for whom it was 
unsuitable89 . For example, those with low incomes would be at the mercy of adverse 
interest rate movements on the loans, and particularly for those who had ceased work, this 
risk was exacerbated (Smith 2009). Furthermore, despite a long term investment horizon 
being more appropriate for Storm's model of high levels of debt in conjunction with large 
up front commissions, the target market was predominantly retirees or those close to it. The 
additional high levels of gearing on that debt make for a risky overall concoction, yet such 
highly geared strategies were recommended to those who could ill-afford it (Ferris 2011). 
And, even if all the above criteria were satisfied by a particular investor, that investor 
should also have a high level of knowledge of the intricacies and detail of the overall 
strategy. Yet this too was unlikely in many cases, particularly with respect to the risks 
posed by the leveraging strategy (Smith 2009). 
The fact that Storm's founders and ex-Stonn advisers are also suffering due to their own 
personal losses has also strengthened the criticism in some quarters of the inappropriateness 
of the advice90 . The suggestion and adoption of a certain level of risk tolerance and appetite 
87 However, although some risks were given in wntmg, these were "apparently undermined by verbal 
assurances from the trusted Storm advisers. The Storm investors were repeatedly assured that their homes 
were not at risk" (Ferris 2011). 
88 As Barry (2011) succinctly points out, "elderly couples with little or no income were loaded to the max 
with debt and persuaded to put their houses and super on the line". 
89 Indeed, Ferris (2011) highlights that Storm' s product was sold to people who did not fit the profile that 
would be most suitable for the risks involved. 
90 
"It is important that you know that the founders of Storm . . . along with most advisers and key staff, are all 
in the same boat as some of our clients. We have all followed the same investment and lending within our 
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by a potential investor is not made more appropriate or credible, simply because the adviser 
has adopted this for themselves91. In fact, doing so does not heed relevant legal and 
professional guidance to ' know the client' and ensure the tailoring of advice specifically to 
that client. In this sense, it is an ironic twist on the earlier point that via personal assurance 
(in this case, through Stonn advisers themselves taking their own advice) the product can 
be made more appealing, when on closer inspection this is actually very misleading in the 
financial context where investors are not homogeneous agents . 
Smith (2009) discusses in some detail the consequences of Storm's complex package of 
decisions being targeted to those who were not in a position to understand the detail. She 
highlights that when confronted with such complexity relating to the making of decisions 
with uncertain outcomes, people are generally more likely to take an intuitive_sho1i-cut and 
simply resort to trust. Decisions may also be based merely on whether the investor relates 
to or likes the adviser. Furthennore, if the marketing strategies have essentially been 
designed to engineer trust, then the acceptance of risk can unfortunately be fait accompli 
for many. Such a reliance on trust alone can mean that there is less scrutiny, fewer 
questions being asked, and less testing of what is being said by the adviser (Smith 2009)92 . 
Whilst Stom1's extensive education process may be claimed to address these issues, the 
counter claim has been made that risk was downplayed, by not demonstrating the downside 
of gearing and double gearing strategies in the detail to which advantages were 
demonstrated. Indeed, it would reqmre a highly diligent investor to scrutinise and 
understand the details of risks which are often found buried in long, detailed statements of 
advice (Smith 2009). Hence even when there is teclmical disclosure and education in the 
portfolios, have our homes mortgaged and have suffered the decl ines in the markets due to the financial 
cri s is ... while this is no consolation , we are sure it proves we have not acted differentl y for ourselves . Being in 
the front line of co urse makes us the first casua lties" (Emmanuel Cass im at is, cited in Raggart 2009c). 
91 Indeed, " whil st it 's not unreasonab le for th e baker to say that he eats hi s own bread it is c learl y incons istent 
for a financial planner to give all hi s clients a similar and very ri sky strategy even if it is the same one he has 
adopted for himse lf'" (F inaM etrica 2009). Or as lawyer Stewart Levitt more pointedly sta tes , " they drank their 
own poi son'· ( cited in Raggart 20 I 0) . 
92 An example of a change in ri sk-related decision making is that of one Sydney investor who retired in 2005 
and on the advice of a financial pla1mer, invested his savings in a conservati ve annuity pension whi ch paid 
approximate ly $500 a week. When this same planner j oined Stom1 soon thereafter , the investor placed 
$ 180,000 (newly borrowed aga inst hi s previously full y owned unit), $350 ,000 in life savings , and a $700 ,000 
margin loan, into I 00% equity. His financial position after Stom1 collapsed was $ 12,000 of savings, and the 
continuing liability of the $ 180 ,000 mortgage (Washington 2009b ). 
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sense that it was presented by Storm, this was no assurance that this was an appropriate 
way to meet the needs of individual clients and their particular circumstances93 . Others 
have compared the education process to a well-oiled machine which was based on over-
optimism about inevitable and ever-increasing equity values (Allan Myers QC, legal 
counsel for ASIC, cited in Fraser 2012). And although it is the case that many investors 
should have or could have known better, many would not have had the wherewithal to 
appreciate the true pros and cons of the strategy being sold to them (Washington 2011 ). 
3.2.3 Events of the Collapse 
According to the administrators (Worrells 2009), Storm was well placed financially as at 30 
June 2008, with revenue increasing 57% on the previous year (to $69.9 million), and profit 
increasing 263% on the previous year (to $37.5 million). At that time it had net assets of 
$13.7 million as well as cash and equivalent resources of $24.9 million. Furthermore, at 
that time the relationships with its bankers and clients was reportedly strong, and growth 
and income for the business was expected to continue to be strong. And yet, soon thereafter 
Storm Financial collapsed. 
3.2.3.1 Market risk 
There is little doubt that the market risk associated with massive falls in equity markets was 
the major factor that started Storm' s slide towards collapse (Smith 2009; Worrells 2009)94. 
However, the impact of the falls in equity values was exacerbated by the borrowing against 
family homes and the additional leverage used (Butler 2011). Essentially, the leveraging 
magnified the losses, driving many loans into margin call territory (Barry 2009)95. October 
2008 was a key month in that many Storm investors signed authorisations to sell their 
shares and convert to cash, based on written advice from Storm (Smith 2009; Washington 
93 As Smith (2009) further states, "these circumstances present a textbook case of the limits of disclosure in 
retail investing markets" (p.545). 
94 As Smith (2009) highlights, "that alone would have done them damage. Quite clearly the impact of the 
GFC was significant on equity values, and for Storm investors the value of assets held dropped to such a 
degree that margin calls were likely" (p.517). 
95 Or as Smith (2009) describes it, "the market risk was exponentially increased by the fact that they had 
borrowed money to invest, in some cases twice over" (p.517). 
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2009a). This left many with debts via margin loans, and this became the source of many 
complaints to ASIC which began investigations soon thereafter. 
3.2.3.2 Approach to Commonwealth Bank 
In November/December 2008, Stonn sought to increase borrowings from CBA to enable 
further financial assistance for clients, and thereby continue the business (Worrells 2009) . 
This included a request to consolidate all investor debt in a single facility for repayment 
over a three to four year term (Barry 2009). However, this was turned down by the CBA, 
reportedly because Stonn had already been pronounced insolvent, although the 
administrators more cautiously reported that it was due for reasons they "assume had to do 
with CBA's perceptions of Storm' s inability to provide adequate security and/or to 
adequately demonstrate a capacity to repay the amount sought" (Worrells 2009, p.20) . 
Whatever the detail, rather than extending further loan facilities to Storm, CBA instead 
called in an outstanding loan96 . 
3.2.4 Issues around Margin Calls 
A significant and additional issue concerns the notification of margin calls to investors. 
Many investors were not contacted by either Storm or the margin loan provider when their 
specific L VR was breached for the purposes of making a margin call. Much has been 
reported and speculated about this lack of opportunity, especially because many of these 
investors may well have been able to pay the margin call had they been notified (Barry 
2009). Instead, portfolios were sold at prices which were at or near the bottom of the 
market, without the knowledge of investors, hence turning a paper loss into a reali sed loss 
at a severely adverse time of market performance. The first that many investors knew of the 
subsequent liquidation of their investments was mid-December 2008 (Barry 2009; 
Washington 2009a). At thi s time many investors found out, often as a total surpri se, that 
now not only were their investments wiped out but they now also owed significant sums to 
the margin loan provider in order to clear the subsequent debt97. 
96 Raggart (2009b) described thi s as th e CBA "unceremoniously" dumping •·its one-time favoured partner'·. 97 Debts in man y cases were ·'more than 20% of the total loan amount' · (Washington 2009a). 
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3.2.4.1 The Fault of the Bank? 
Many allegations have been made that the CBA and its margin-lending subsidiary, Colonial 
Geared Investments (CGI), were the main responsible parties who failed to give investors 
the opportunity to meet margin calls on their portfolios (Fanning 2009; Sexton 2012). 
Furthermore, even if the opportunity was intended, significant operational deficiencies 
appear to have made it unworkable at any practical level for the number of investors 
involved (Smith 2009). It is also claimed that the data on CGI's website as well as 
electronic data feeds to Storm on individual investors ' positions were inaccurate, and that 
the pro-activity of the CBA to correct this or to contact investors directly about their 
positions, rather than via Stonn, was limited (Raggart 2009b; Sexton 2012). 
3.2.4.2 The Fault of Storm? 
The CBA's view was that as the sole manager of its clients' margin loan accounts, Storm 
itself had the responsibility to ensure that margin calls were advised and acted on 
(O ' Shaughnessy 2009). CBA claimed that this approach was standard practice and the 
same as used with other financial groups, of which none experienced the breakdown 
concerning the notification to clients (Barry 2009). According to Storm' s liquidators, Storm 
did not have the capacity (or intention) to closely monitor and managing investors ' debts 
and portfolios (Ivor Worrell and Raj Khatri , cited in Washington 2010a)98 . 
3.2.4.3 Uncertainty 
We do not (and cannot) resolve the actual lines of responsibility here99, and the uncertainty 
involved has been highlighted by others (Barry 2009; Ferris 2011 ; Washington 2009a)JOo_ 
98 Fanning (2009) reports that " it became apparent that Stonn Financial ' s response to size and duration of the 
market fall was seriously inadequate. CGI formed the view that Storm Financial was no longer fulfilling its 
role in relation to margin calls", and so "CGI was forced to step in to ensure all margin calls were addressed 
in full". Furthermore, " if this had not happened, Storm Financial clients would have accumulated more losses 
as the market continued to fall " . 
99 In this respect, the view of the administrator is informative: these issues "will require detailed and sustained 
inquiry, perhaps with the assistance of the courts, before a final judgement can be made" (Worrells 2009, p.6). 100 Washington (2009a) states that the issue "has not been clearly answered by Colonial Geared Investments 
or Storm Financial", and Barry (2009) highlights that "Storm said bank information during this time was 
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What is apparent however is a strong perception amongst many investors that the margin 
loan provider was to blame for this lack of notification, whereas others lay blame with both 
Stonn and the margin loan provider. 
3. 2. 4. 4 Consequences 
Wherever the ultimate responsibility lies, the end result for many investors was devastating. 
Those not receiving and therefore not having the opportunity to respond to margin calls 
were left with significant shortfalls on those margin loans, and with Storm and the CBA 
unable to agree terms for continuation of the business, losses were consolidated and 
investors were left "high and dry" (Ferris 2011 ). 
It is apparent then that Storm's collapse arose from a number of factors. The administrators 
point to the influence of the drop in equity values, the advice proposition, the process 
around margin calls, and subsequent actions by Storm and its directors (Worrells 2009). 
Smith (2009) agrees that an accumulation of factors were responsible ("as with most 
catastrophes"), but more specifically highlights the vulnerability associated with risks 
arising from the leveraging strategy. Smith (2009) also highlights the issue of 'provider 
risk ', which was apparent in two ways in this context. Firstly, if Storm ' s advice was indeed 
inappropriate, then due to its collapse there would subsequently be no recourse for 
compensation for losses from Storm. Secondly and importantly, the closing of the 
investment vehicles by the entities that promoted them meant that fund assets were realized 
at low values, ensuring losses were realised that may have otherwise note occurred if the 
funds and individual positions had survived and had a chance to regain in value over time. 
Hence, references to and critiques of the appropriateness of Storm's advice 10 1 is seen as 
slightly spurious to the crux of the matter at least in the mind of many investors - they were 
not given an opportunity to right their positions, despite being entitled to do so. 
outdated while the banks said Storm were unresponsive with margin loan queries'·. Ferri s (20 11 ) simp ly 
asserts that the lines of responsibility were blurred. with -- confusion about who was responsible for what'· . 10 1 For examp le: ··The les son from these corporate collapses including Storm Financial. .. is that , to a 
significant extent. the underlying cause of the co llapse was a poor business model , which depended on asset 
pr1ces continuall y ri sing and debt markets remaining open and liquid, and was exacerbated by an economic 
shock such as the globa l financial cri sis·· (Treasury 20 11 ) 
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3.3 Fallout of the Collapse 
In addition to the major traumatic impacts on investors, a number of other impacts have 
arisen. These include the removal of various bank staff102, impacts on Stonn employees, 
reactions from government, and also a variety of legal actions. 
3.3.1 Storm Advisers 
In terms of Storm' s financial advisers, some have been expelled from membership of the 
FP A (Kachor 2011 ). ASIC banned one adviser from providing financial services for two 
years and another for four years, due to the provision of inappropriate advice, the making of 
false and misleading statements, and not understanding to an appropriate level the nature 
and risks of the product(s) that they were advising on (Lyell and Timms 2011 ). ASIC also 
enforced two other advisers to undergo professional education (Raggart 2011). One 
impacted adviser, Ms Carey Fraser, gave an interesting perspective on Storm' s business 
model, as revealed by an interview transcript: 
FANNING: Emmanuel Cassimatis might admit his failures now but six months or so back, 
he wouldn't hear a word of it when one of his top sales people, Carey Fraser, tried to warn 
him that clients were in too deep. 
FRASER: And I just learnt not to question things too much. 
FANNING: Sounds like you learnt the hard way? 
FRASER: Yep. 
FANNING: You're really uncomfortable talking about Emmanuel Cassimatis, aren't you? 
FRASER: Yeah, I'd rather not comment. 
FANNING: Do you feel guilty about it? 
FRASER: Yeah, I feel guilty. I feel ashamed and I just, I just... Honestly, I just don't have 
the words any more. I want things to be so much different. (Fanning 2009) 
102 As one example, see the transcript of ANZ' s deputy CEO at the Melbourne public hearing of 26 August 
2009, Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services ' Inquiry into financial products 
and services in Australia ', p.43 . 
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3.3.2 Government 
Following Storm ' s collapse, the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and 
Financial Services (PJC) established an ' Inquiry into financial products and services in 
Australia ' in February 2009 103 . This Inquiry was set up to report "on the issues associated 
with recent financial product and services provider collapses, such as Stonn Financial , 
Opes Prime and other similar collapses" (PJCI 2009). The tenns of reference for the 
Inquiry were wide ranging, with the ability to consider and make recommendations on 
many aspects of the financial services industry. The findings of the PJCI were released in 
November 2009, with 11 key recommendations that touched on issues of regulation, 
training, education, professional standards, and adviser remuneration 104 . The Chairn1an of 
the PJCI was Bernie Ripoll , the Labour MP for Oxley. 
The P JCI was not a judicial body and could not make judgments about unlawful conduct, 
but rather it was concerned with legislative changes and improvements to the current 
system to mitigate the possibility of such things being repeated again. Nevertheless, as well 
as the fonnal recommendations made, the overall findings highlighted that several factors 
were likely contributors to the scale of losses suffered by Storm investors. These factors 
included the inappropriateness of Storm' s advice to many investors, and breakdowns in the 
handling and resolving of margin calls (Balogh and Chalmers 2009). 
Hence, the PJCI did bring the role of the banks into the spotlight, with the CBA in 
particular coming "under fire" for its conduct in various aspects of Storm ' s business 
(Trenworth 2010). With respect to the issues around margin calls, the general conclusion 
drawn (though not in any sense of fonnal findings of the P JCI) was that indeed the margin 
calls were mishandled, with both Storm and the CBA likely at fault. Such conclusions were 
tempered somewhat by the contradictory testimony and evidence from investors, the banks, 
and Stonn themselves (Bernie Ripoll , cited in Balogh and Chalmers 2009). As such, there 
103 Henceforth referred to as the P JCI. 
104 The tem1s of reference fo r the PJCI, and the recommendations made, are included as Appendix A. 
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was general disappointment amongst many investors that the banks were not found 
culpable for the collapse105 . 
3.3.2.1 Reactions to the PJCI recommendations 
Many commentators claim the recommendations of the PJCI did not go far enough 1°6. Such 
critiques included the absence of protection for everyday people from "vested interests" 
within the industry, and the perceived futility of the ability of regulation to make 
individuals act in a particular way, whether they be good or bad (West 2009)1°7• Others 
voiced concerns about additional costs resulting for the financial planning industry, which 
would have to be passed onto customers. Against a backdrop of low demand and affordable 
access to financial advice, such moves could therefore harm access even more108. 
3.3.2.2 Future of Financial Advice Reforms 
Following the recommendations of the PJCI, the Australian government proposed and, 
following further consultation, confirmed a range of reforms for the financial planning 
industry. Key 'Future of Financial Advice' (FOFA) reforms include: 
► A prospective ban on up-front and trailing commission~ and like payments for both 
individual and group risk within superannuation from 1 July 2013; 
► A prospective requirement for advisers to get clients to opt-in (or renew) their 
advice agreement every two years 109; and 
105 Instead, they "found themselves having to be satisfied with the fact that some of the most senior executives 
of the banks involved in the Storm Financial collapse were subject to extensive cross-examination" and that 
they could themselves "air their grievances before the committee under the protections afforded by 
Parliamentary privilege" (Taylor 2009). 
106 An example of a somewhat pointed critique is that "the recommendations of the Ripoll inquiry radiate 
barely a ripple across the fee-deep ocean of financial advice. This report carries all the weight and ferocity of 
a wet lettuce" (West 2009). 
107 A further perception of limits with regulatory solutions is that "there will always be spivs, stockmarket 
cycles and fancy structuring to maximise fees and exploit loopholes" (West 2009). 108 However, the Institute of Actuaries essentially rejected complaints about advice becoming more expensive: 
"the (advice industry) has to stand on its own two feet ... people need to understand that this is the cost of that 
advice." Furthennore, "advice is expensive .. . and not required by the 90 percent of people whose best 
investment advice is to pay off the mortgage or put money into super. However, people who do need it ought 
to be able see what that advice is" (cited in Barry 2009). 
109 This means that every two years, investors who pay advisers an asset-based fee will have to ' opt in ' to the 
advice. If they do not opt in, the asset-based fee will cease to be paid to the adviser (Collett 2011 ). 
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► The introduction of a statutory fiduciary duty for financial advisers requiring them 
to act in the best interests of their clients. (Commonwealth of Australia 2011) 
Additional reforms included the banning of ' soft ' dollar benefits over $300 being paid to 
advisers, the banning of ' volume' rebates (commissions) being paid to adviser dealer 
groups, and an enhancement to the powers of ASIC in relation to the licensing and banning 
of individuals (Chaaya 2010). The goal of these reforms is to improve the quality of advice, 
provide additional protection for investors, and promote trust and confidence in the advice 
· d I 10 m ustry . 
As expected with such reforms, the response from the financial services industry has been 
mixed, with much dissatisfaction centred upon the ' opt-in ' requirement. The F.P A considers 
that this requirement is cumbersome and unnecessary for both advisers and clients, but 
despite such reservations, it welcomed the clarity that accompanied the release of the FOFA 
(Risklnfo 2011). A major concern of the Association of Financial Advisers (AFA) is the 
potential for increasing the already heavy compliance burden, thereby diminishing adviser 
profitability (AF A 2011 ), and also that legislation is biased towards some segments of the 
industry at the expense of others. The Self-Managed Super Fund Professionals Association 
(SP AA) also opposed the opt-in requirement, whereas the Financial Services Council 
(FSC) was more positive towards it. The greater certainty offered by the FOFA refonns 
was also noted by the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA) (Risklnfo 
2011). 
The banning of commissions in all its guises to all but risk-only insurance products (such as 
tenn life insurance) has been presented as a key step to a better industry for the 
consumer
111
. Others also agree with moves to make remuneration arrangements explicit and 
clear, as well as moves to give consumers an explicit choice whether to continue to access 
11 0 This last point is seen as especially important by those within the industry, with the additi onal observation 
tha t regul ation by itse lf cannot "address the low level of trust among non-advice users; it is up to the industry 
to put se lf-interests aside and ensure a consistent message about the value of advice is presented to 
consu mers' · (Kliplin 20 I 0, p .23). 
111 Shorten (2 0 I 1) c la ims that ·' these reform s will see Australian inves tors receive advice that is in their best 
inte rests, rath er th an be ing directed to products as a result of incentives or commiss ions offered to an advi ser" . 
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and pay for advice on an ongoing basis 112• However, although the Institute of Chartered 
Accountants in Australia (ICAA) agrees that the reforms will help remove conflicts of 
interest and improve the overall quality of financial advisory services, it also cautioned that 
the reforms still had limitations. In particular, this concerns clarification around what 
constitutes a fee (when expressed as a percentage of funds) and what constitutes a 
commission113 (ICAA 2010). The ICAA also continues to call for a focus on the key 
drivers of quality in the context of financial advice, including higher education standards, 
the incorporation of practical and ethical components within such education, and 
importantly, "an overarching culture of operating in the public interest" (ICAA 2010). 
3.3.3 Legal Fallout 
A number of legal actions have been threatened, have occurred, or are still taking place 
since Storm's collapse. Storm itself was reported to be seeking recompense from the CBA 
for personal as well as business losses (Barry 2009; Hughes 2010). ASIC decided in 
November 2010 to pursue civil penalty proceedings against Storm Financial, with the major 
charge that by providing negligent and commoditised financial advice which was not 
tailored to each client's circumstances, Storm' s executive directors breached their duties. 
ASIC also charged that Storm' s statements of advice contained false and misleading 
information (ASIC 2012a; Sexton 2012). 
There have also been compensation or resolution schemes set up by some of the banks 
(most publicly CBA). Despite this, ASIC is or was also suing the CBA, Macquarie Bank 
and the Bank of Queensland for compensation on behalf of Storm clients, due to their 
involvement in what they consider amounted to an unregistered managed investment 
scheme (ASIC 2012a). Additionally, a private class action against the CBA has been 
brought by another group of investors, via the legal firm Levitt Robinson. To date, the 
banks have incurred significant compensation costs, reputational damage in many quarters, 
and the possibility of protracted legal action. 
112 Furthermore, "good advisers will still be able to generate tangible benefits for consumers due to the 
significant choice and complexity of the Australian financial services market as there is no one size fits all 
answer to people ' s affairs" (McKee, cited in IAAust 2010). 
11 3 The ICAA' s point was that the application of percentage-based fees in some situations is simply 
"commissions by another name" (ICAA 2010). 
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3.3.3.1 The CEA Resolution Scheme 
The CBA set up a resolution scheme in June 2009 for many of its Stonn clients. In doing so 
it acknowledged its own role involved the bank "to some degree", but not in a directly 
accountable manner (Sexton 2012) . The scheme was brokered by legal firm Slater & 
Gordon, which represented upwards of 1,500 clients (Rich 201 0; Trenworth 201 0; 
Washington 2010c) 114 . 
The terms of the resolution scheme were announced in February 2010 (Raggart 2011 ), and 
although the specifics for each individual client would be confidential, some of the 
proposed details have emerged. The bank would return an amount of up to 90 per cent of 
the equity held by an investor in their margin loan portfolios when they first went into 
margin call (plus an allowance for interest) (Rich 2010), and/or where a loan was given 
based on an inflated home value, that loan would decrease to an amount that should have 
been granted. Furthermore, for any investor found to have their income level inflated, their 
loan would also be reduced with some subsequent interest payments refunded (Klan 2010). 
The total cost to the CBA of the resolution scheme was approximately $132 million (ASIC 
2012a). 
The proponents of the compensation scheme labelled it as "a unique deal", "historic", and 
an example to other institutions of how to solve such issues (Slater & Gordon spokesman, 
cited in Trenworth 2010) . The main rationale for such claims is that the deal , in addition to 
being a ' first' , was also ' fair ' and ' fast ' . In terms of fairness , the CBA themsel ves claim 
that the scheme represented its commitment to put right what had been done wrong 
(Raggart 2011 ). Furthermore, the scheme had other elements in place that the CBA 
highlighted would provide further protection to those who would accept it 115 • The benefit 
of delivering a fast outcome for investors was also highlighted , by both Slater & Gordon 
and the CBA. For example, a Slater & Gordon lawyer involved in the scheme warned of the 
114 So me other banks ( o the r than the Bank o f Queensland and M acquarie Group) also offered compensat ion 
sc hemes. For exampl e NAB was reported to have ·'wrinen off hom e mortgages and paid out milli ons of 
do ll ars to victims .. (Gi llh am 2011 ). However these were much smaller in scal e compared to th e C BA - fo r 
exam pl e. ANZ's scheme re lated to ·'more than 100 c li ents' · (Washington 2010c). 115 Thi s inc luded . fo r in vestors. th e ·'ri ght to make a co unter o ffer to any bank proposal and to have the ir case 
cons idered by th e independent panel if they wish''' (Raggart 2011 ), with th e ind ependent panel consistin g of 
"eminent retired j udges .. (Spi gelman 20 10). 
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dangers of litigation which could take years, with no guarantee of a better outcome116• One 
Townsville couple who accepted the resolution scheme consider that it achieved "amazing 
results by having outcomes just a year after the crash", despite their own losses running into 
millions of dollars (Raggart 2009b) 117• 
However, there is also substantial angst amongst ex Storm investors regarding vanous 
aspects of the resolution scheme, with many "deeply aggrieved" despite entering the 
resolution process (Washington 201Ob) 118 . One specific charge against the scheme is that it 
is actually not a fair deal, due to the rationale for the amount being offered. In terms of the 
known detail about the amount of compensation, lawyer Stewart Levitt claims it is not 
enough, due the resultant growth investors would have participated in had their shares not 
been sold (Rich 2010) 119• The scheme is also claimed to only address hardship, rather than 
compensation (Raggart 2011 ), which is viewed as troublesome even given the pragmatic 
necessity for a trade-off between timeliness and the amount of compensation offered120. 
One further view of note comes from the Storm Investors Consumer Action Group 
(SICAG) 121 co-chairman who asserts that many investors are angry and/or resigned, and 
consider that offers under the resolution scheme are not high enough (Kachor 201 0c). 
116 He claimed that "both sides will walk away with a limp" via any "litigation Annageddon" (Hughes 20 I 0) . 117 The benefit of ' fast' also echoes claims from the Opes Prime saga. The two principal lenders (ANZ and 
Merrill Lynch) sought to resolve their exposure at an early stage by establishing a settlement fund (Spigelman 
2010), and with urging by ASIC, a settlement was reached with creditors. The alternative of litigation, 
according to the insolvency specialist John Lindholm who was appointed administrator, was that "we would 
have been clogging up the courts ; and it would have dragged on. A lot of those investors couldn't wait five 
years to get their day in court" (cited in Urban 2010). 
11 8 For example, one Storm investor who chose not to enter the resolution scheme stated that the scheme "may 
be more about buying a way out of a problem as cheaply as they can without the scrutiny of the judicial 
process" '. Furthennore, the CBA "has made it quite clear they want everyone to think they are truly sorry for 
something they haven't actually nominated what they are sorry for" (Raggart 2009b ). 11 9 Indeed, Stewart Levitt reported "overwhelming disaffection" from several meetings with Storm investors (Raggart 2011 ). 
120 Nevertheless, "any resolution scheme must involve the willingness of claimants to compromise in 
exchange for achieving early finalisation and closure and removing the risks inherent in court proceedings, 
[but] the extent of such discount needs to be realistic, having regard to the scope of each individual 's 
grievances" (Levitt Robinson 20 I 0c ). 
121 SICAG is a collective group of impacted ex Storm investors, which was set up on 20 January 2009 in 
Redcliffe, Brisbane. The initial meeting of 400 "disaffected investors" that led to SICAG ' s inception was held 
"to discuss possible action to recover losses as a result of recent actions/inactions of banks and other 
organisations", and it was formed "to seek justice (and restitution) from a banking and financial services 
industry that has been able to get away with murder! " (see http://www.sicag.info/index files/Page344.htm) 
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Another aspect of the scheme which has been questioned is the overall process used. One 
Stonn investor (a Barrister) stated in an open letter to SICAG members that both the 
process and agenda of the scheme do not seem to have been run in the interests of investors 
(Goodridge 2010). A particular issue of consternation was the limited time available for 
investors to make decisions whether or not to accept the scheme, with many only having 28 
days to decide (Goodridge 201 0; Kachor 201 0c). Given that most investors were retired and 
had just gone through traumatic financial events, many may well have felt that there was 
little other option other than to decide on a course of action within the limited timeframes 
offered (Levitt Robinson 2010b) 122. Given these time pressures, concern was widely 
expressed that offers were being accepted due to desperation and duress (Kachor 201 0d, 
2010e; Levitt Robinson 2010c) 123 , though such claims regarding the pressuring of investors 
were refuted by the CBA (Hughes 2009). 
Whatever the merits or otherwise of the scheme, the human response is understandably 
mixed but the sense of dissatisfaction appears to predominate for many of those close to the 
coalface. Indeed, the time constraints involved suggest that investors may not have been 
able to truly consider what the most appropriate action was for their own individual 
circumstances and situation, a concern highlighted by SICAG (cited in Kachor 2010c) . 
Ironically, a resolution scheme which offers more or less a one-size-fits-all proposal in 
terms of process (whether that be motivated by issues of equity, convenience, business, 
expediency, pragmatism, or some combination of those things) strangely echoes major 
pitfalls of Storm's own advice model. Given that shortcoming of Storm's model , it would 
be even more poignant for investors to consider their own circumstances in some detail , in 
relation to offers under the resolution scheme 124 . 
122 Similarities w ith Opes Prime are once more echoed here. Charlie Gallow of litigation funder IM F 
expressed concern that clients had no role in the settl ement negotiations, despite being " the people wi th the 
c lai ms and they were en titl ed to be compensated' ' . Indeed, " they felt tota lly di senfranchi sed by the process'·, 
and according to Nathan McMahon, an Opes Prime investor, creditors were ultimately forced to accept 
·'something unpalatab le'·, given the apparent alternative of lengthy and costl y legal action (Urban 20 I 0). 123 As such , many investors subsequently " may regret having felt forced into making qui ck decision s on 
matters of vital importance affecting their own and their fa mil y ' s future quality of life" (Lev itt Robin son 
2010b). 
124 PJCl chair Bernie Ripo ll MP suggested as much when affi nning that " in th e end it is up to individu als to 
ascertain whether that resolution scheme and the offer that is pro vided to them is sati sfactory ... it's very mu ch 
individua l, it's very much like getting financial planning advice , it really needs to be uniquely fo r that 
individual person'' (c ited in Kachor 2010c). 
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3.3.3.2 Class Actions 
The CBA resolution scheme has clearly generated some controversy, to the extent that a 
class action against the CBA was and is being pursued by a number of ex Storm investors. 
The legal firm Levitt Robinson filed a class action in the Federal Court of Australia at 
Sydney on 1 July 2010 (Gillham 2011), with support from various parties (such as retired 
federal court judge Ron Merkel). This class action was to run alongside ASIC' s against the 
CBA and other banks. The motivation for the class action can be succinctly summarised as 
follows: 
We would have thought that the "churning" of increasing borrowings, double-gearing, 
excessive valuations, relative disregard for serviceability considerations, the failure to draw 
bon-ower' s attention to the risks of their high gearing, including to their non-Storm assets , 
the mismanagement of Storm accounts throughout most of 2008, and the Bank ' s profligate 
lending policy towards Storm investors, even while it was exercising prudence towards other 
non-Storm customers, during the period of the onset and deepening of the Global Financial 
Crisis , could all amount to unconscionable conduct. (Levitt Robinson 201 0a) 
Essentially, those involved in the class action believe there has been a severe and tangible 
breach of trust by "some of the most important pillars of our financial system" (Levitt, cited 
in Wilson 2012b ). Thus, given the dissatisfaction with many elements of the resolution 
scheme, the class action is to "put flesh on the public apology" offered by the CBA (Levitt 
Robinson 201Oc)1 25 . 
3.3.3.3 ASIC 's legal proceedings 
ASIC' s legal pursuit of the CBA for compensation on behalf of Storm investors ceased on 
14 September 2012 when it announced that a settlement for further, out-of-court 
compensation had been reached (ASIC 2012b ). ASIC highlighted that this settlement did 
not infer that CBA was liable in any way, which was reflected in the terms of the agreement 
125 
"I am not proud of the relationship that we had with Storm . .. to those of our customers who have been 
impacted by shortcomings on our part, I am sorry and apologise to them on behalf of the Commonwealth 
Bank" (CBA CEO Ralph Norris , cited in the Brisbane Courier Mail on 28 October 2009). 
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(ASIC 2012c). This compensation payout to Stonn investors is to total approximately $136 
million, and will be made in addition to the approximately $132 million already paid in the 
earlier CBA resolution scheme (ASIC 2012c; Marx 2012c). Again, the settlement amount 
agreed was met with some skepticism by investors (Marx 2012c). 
ASIC ' s justification for the merits of the settlement, like the earlier CBA resolution 
scheme, was based on being a "timely, fair and certain outcome for Stonn investors" (ASIC 
2012c) 126. ASIC ' s chainnan stated that the outcome was fair and significantly was also 
timely, an important consideration given that many investors are elderly and not helped by 
spending extended periods in court (cited in Klan and Walker 2012) 127. 
3.3.4 Perceptions of ASIC 
The significant role of ASIC throughout the financial services industry presents one 
obvious and further aspect of Storm's collapse -the role of the regulator before and after 
the collapse, and the perceptions of others about its role. Furthennore, in the minds of many 
investors, the actions of a government regulator also by extension reflect on the government 
itself. It is difficult to provide balanced views on ASIC's role(s) as negative views tend to 
predominate in the public and media, but nevertheless, as the focus here is on perceptions 
and implications of Storm's demise, we explore a range of reasons stated by many investors 
which have resulted in them feeling alienated and frustrated with ASIC ' s role. 
3. 3. 4.1 ASIC 's role pre-collapse 
One strongly held perception is that ASIC could have done more to prevent a collapse. A 
major reason for this perception is that Stonn was reviewed by ASIC the year before the 
collapse, and at that time no public concerns were raised (West 2009; Wilson 2012b ). A 
126 As ASIC further states, the "objective of obtaining compensation for Stom1 investors has been achi eved . .. 
without the need for a long, costly legal process that brings with it a level of uncertainty", and furthennore , 
"Storm investors can be confident we wou ld not have agreed to a settlement unless we thought the 
compensation was appropriate" (AS IC 2012b) 
127 The benefit of timeliness is naturally a tang ible one for many investors. Indeed such settlements do not 
operate in a vacuum of other press ures and realities, with the presiding judge in ASI C's case against the CSA (Justice John Reeves) warning of the difficulty accommodating a trial running beyond December 20 12 (Rawlins 20 12). However, this is potentially another source of fru strat ion for some investors, for whom 
·justice· may be as much a concern as ' timel y compensation ' . 
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stronger claim was made by Storm's Emmanuel and Julie Cassimatis, who stated that 
Storm was repeatedly reviewed by ASIC officials, without ever raising concerns (Sexton 
2012) 128 . Whether any concerns about Stonn prior to its collapse were able to be acted upon 
or not, ASIC's pursuit of the banks and Storm after the collapse hasn't necessarily inspired 
confidence regarding its role. Indeed, ASIC's post-collapse legal actions, although based on 
their claim that the banks did not exercise sufficient due diligence 129, has potentially only 
served to accentuate the perception that ASIC acting in advance of the collapse was a 
realistic option. 
In ASIC ' s defence, Bernie Ripoll stated that although Storm was audited and compliance 
checked by ASIC prior to its collapse, there would likely not have been any concerns that 
Storm was breaching legal responsibilities 130• However, the legal niceties of the limits of 
regulatory intervention are most likely lost on many investors, with the more concerning 
issue being a perception that ASIC has a poor track record in respect of preventing 
corporate disasters (West 2009) 131 . 
Lawyer Stewart Levitt broadened the net of responsibility for a lack of action prior to 
Storm's collapse, stating that the government also bears some responsibility alongside 
ASIC for not keeping both Storm and the banks in check (cited in Wilson 2012b). An 
additional factor impacting the perception of ASIC's role prior to Storm's collapse arises 
from the initial granting of an AFSL (licence) to Storm, which has further tested the faith of 
many investors in the licensing regime and by association, the role of ASIC. 
128 The Cassimatis's also claim that Storm was reviewed by external auditors, solicitors, bankers, insurers and 
academics, none of whom told them of "any systemic problems of the nature and scale" alleged in ASIC's 
case against them (Sexton 2012). 
129 In respect to whether investors could afford the loans, whether investors were sufficiently warned of risks, 
and also the closeness of the relationship with Storm (The Australian 2011). 
130 
"There was not necessarily anything wrong with the organisation as it stood on paper, or in its systems, or 
the checks and balances that go with determining whether or not the organisation was meeting its obligations 
under law" ( cited in Kachor 2009). 
131 West (2009) states further that despite the limitations of audit and compliance checks, "common sense 
might have prevailed. It was clear that a model which aggressively pursued the leverage of elderly clients 
with little or no income was flawed and bound for disaster". 
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3.3.4.2 Post-collapse responses 
The time taken for ASIC to pursue the banks after Storm' s collapse has also provided 
further frustration for investors. Legal proceedings against the CBA, Bank of Queensland 
and Macquarie Bank began nearly two years after the collapse (ASIC 2012a), although 
proceedings against Storm began earlier. One Storm investor made his frustration known in 
the interim period, writing to ASIC's chairman to state that "the time for investigation must 
surely now be over. The time for action is long overdue" (Washington 201 0a). 
A range of reasons have been suggested as to why ASIC's actions were sluggish in the eyes 
of investors. One major reason was that ASIC believed that the banks would settle out of 
court (ASIC 2012a; Barry 2011). It was also claimed that ASIC's lawyer in c;harge of the 
investigation walked out during the investigation due to his desire for a tougher approach, 
and furthermore according to one commentator, "the wheels at ASIC grind exceedingly 
slowly" (Barry 2011). 
A further area of discontent is the perception that ASIC's dealings with Storm ' s advisers 
after the collapse has been weak. One ruined Storm investor questioned why his adviser 
wasn't banned for life, due to the adviser's role in "destroy(ing) hundreds of clients". His 
frustration stems from the perception that all ASIC did was merely "rap her over the 
knuckles with a feather" (Raggart 2011). 
3. 3. 4. 3 Unsatisfactory deals? 
ASIC 's out-of-court settlement in late 2012 with the CBA has been met by a mixture of 
what have become common reactions in many aspects of Storm ' s collapse: resignation 
and/or resentment 132 . One investor involved in the Levitt Robinson class action labeled it 
"disgraceful", with disbelief regarding ASIC ' s approach to settle such a significant collapse 
for , essentially, "a pittance" (Klan and Walker 2012). 
132 Indeed, many investors ·'fee l betrayed and will refuse the offer. Others say they' ll be forced to take 
whatever they can gef". One in vestor stated that " I think it's typ ical of ASIC. They'll get into something, go part the way through it, and then they'l l find the easiest way out and make an agreement with the devil '. (Smail 2012). 
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The extent of dissatisfaction for many investors may well be related to having high 
expectations of what ASIC was believed to be pursuing and achieving133 . In defence of 
ASIC's decision to cease legal action against the CBA, ASIC's chairman stated that the 
goal of a court process was to achieve an outcome, which is what ASIC has delivered (Klan 
and Walker 2012) 134 . 
3 .4 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we presented an overview of the collapse of Storm financial. The general 
investment model offered by Storm was to invest into equities by using funds sourced from 
superannuation and other savings, the selling of other assets, where possible a mortgage 
against the investor's primary residence, and then an additional margin loan against the 
accumulation of these amounts to provide additional funds and leverage. The support of 
associated institutions such as banks was essential to the overall strategy, and was a key 
source of assurance for many individuals to proceed with Storm. 
The catalyst for the collapse of Storm was undoubtedly the severe falls in equity markets 
throughout 2008, exacerbated by the high leveraging of many investors. However, a key 
and contentious issue surrounds the non-making of margin c~lls for numerous investors. 
This significantly increased and consolidated losses for many individuals, with little 
recourse or opportunity for individuals to correct their position and keep their financial 
fortunes alive, even though many would have had the means to do so. The relative 
responsibility and culpability of Storm and the credit provider(s) in this matter is 
contentious and remains unresolved. 
The fallout has been significant since Storm's collapse, with much public criticism of 
Storm's model emerging in the media and via a related Parliamentary Inquiry. This 
13 3 Indeed, lawyer Stewart Levitt claimed that "this shows ASIC is bereft of sincerity when they claimed they 
wanted to get a declaration from the court to set a benchmark for bank conduct" (cited in Klan and Walker 
2012), and that "they said they were bringing these proceedings to set a new moral and legal bar for the 
provision of financial services and products in Australia" (cited in Wilson 2012b ). 134 We leave a final word for now with a 76 year old Storm investor who had to return to work after Storm's 
collapse. He asked whether ASIC's chairman "would have made this deal if his wife, his children or his 
siblings were in it like we are. I bet you he would not have" (Smail 2012). 
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Parliamentary Inquiry also gave rise to regulatory changes to the financial advice industry. 
More widely, a number of legal actions are still ongoing, there has been severe c1iticism of 
many of the credit providers involved including the moves of some to offer compensation 
and resolution arrangements, and the role of the relevant government regulator ASIC 
before, during and after the collapse has been scrutinised. Such events are in the context of 
many thousands of investors suffering significant financial loss, for which the implications 
for many would be nothing short of traumatic. 
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Chapter 4: Consequences of Financial Loss 
4.1 Introduction 
A range of events and circumstances can impact on an individual ' s wellbeing. This includes 
traumatic events such as those leading to post-traumatic stress syndrome, the impacts of 
natural disasters, personal addictions, and health issues, to name but a few. There are also 
events that can lead more directly to substantial financial loss or stress, such as job loss, and 
as was the case with Storm Financial, the failure of an investment vehicle and the 
subsequent loss of monetary savings. Surprisingly, given the artificial nature of money 
merely as a medium for exchange, the impact of adverse financial events or circumstances 
are considered extremely damaging even when compared to other events of a more physical 
or relational nature. Indeed, a US study suggests that the financial stress associated with 
filing for bankruptcy can exceed other traumatic events such as the death of a close friend 
or separating from a spouse (cited in Warren 2007). 
This chapter reviews some of the impacts on an individual with regard to a selected range 
of traumatic events and circumstances. This range is certainly not exhaustive or 
comprehensive, but merely serves to illustrate the variety of impacts that can occur. This is 
also done to appreciate that some impacts can be generalised across a range of traumatic 
events, and leads us to consider the specific impacts we might expect to emerge from 
events or circumstances leading to financial loss, including those arising from events and 
circumstances that could be considered traumatic 135• 
This chapter also reviews the factors that appear to be influential in shaping the magnitude 
of any impact, firstly for a selected range of traumatic events and circumstances and then 
for those specific to personal financial affairs. This includes those factors in play at or close 
135 Indeed, in response to the GFC, "reactions were immediate, intense and emotional, as is typical when people are confronted with a traumatic experience" (Gounaris and Prout 2009, cited in Iannicola and Parker 2010). 
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to the time of the loss event, as well as considering the temporal dimension where the 
ongoing impact of the loss event may be mitigated, managed or elevated over time. This 
too is considered first in the general sense, and then more specifically in the context of 
personal finance. 
It is also of significance that different impacts are not unrelated, as the following from 
Warren (2003a) highlights: 
Most [academics and other experts] have one highly focused area of expertise, and 
they usually write articles and hold forth on the talk shows about one specific category 
of calamity. But families don ' t experience risks in neatly segmented boxes . Whether 
they give it much thought or not, they live under the shadow of multiple dangers. A 
woman could lose her job, she could be struck with a devastating illness , her marriage 
could turn sour, and her parents could grow too feeble to care for themselves - and it 
could all happen at the same time. There is no law requiring that these disasters be 
polite enough to wait until the previous one is resolved before a new one wreaks 
additional havoc. Moreover, one disaster often triggers another. A layoff may leave a 
family without health insurance, increasing the exposure to an exorbitant medical bill. 
Similarly, a job loss may actually lead to divorce. 
For this reason, a particular focus is presented on the impact of health, especially mental 
health, because this is one impact which influences all others. 
4.2 Impact of Traumatic Events and Circumstances 
Any stressful set of circumstances, including traumatic events, can impact in ways which 
are nuanced in depth and effect. Furthennore, the types of impact may be highly context-
dependent, making them complex to describe. Indeed, there are many aspects to consider 
when discussing such impacts, such as the private, reflective, social , physical , emotional 
and financial worlds of an individual. All will be addressed within this chapter. 
There are a number of direct impacts on someone who has gone through a traumatic 
experience. Shock, horror, fear, distrust, stress, withdrawal , and a profound feeling of loss 
can predominate in many contexts. Many of these impacts can be compounded by ongoing 
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reactions to the original experience, for example those war veterans who suffer frequently 
from nightmares, flashbacks, and other reflective behaviours that continue to shock and 
traumatise those who have been exposed to the horrors of war (Corbin and Strauss 2008). 
Furthermore, many such veterans tum to drugs and alcohol to blot out these episodes. 
In an early description of post-traumatic syndrome, Kelly (1981) highlighted a series of 
sequential impacts on those who have experienced serious accidents. When severe enough, 
the ability to work is affected which can lead to financial disadvantage and loss, and 
consequently impaired career advancement and fulfilment. The control of one' s temper, 
one' s libido, and any sense of "domestic happiness" can also be impacted. What this 
unsurprisingly results in is resentment, particularly where the accident is caused by 
someone else. Furthermore, this resentment is compounded if the reactions of medical and 
legal professionals is not empathetic, or indeed if such reactions portray disbelief at the 
severity of the impact on the victim. A further exacerbation occurs if moral disapproval is 
conveyed regarding any moves to seek compensation for any resulting financial loss. 
Major impacts on those admitted to hospital with chronic physical ailments are also 
informative (such as severe back pain sufferers, as studied by White 2003). One notable 
impact is a loss of control. The loss of familiar roles which formerly gave a strong sense of 
identity can throw an individual into confusion and self-doubt, as they are forced within the 
hospital system to depend on the hospital ' s own schedules and ways of doing things (White 
2003). When contrasted with their former role as a comparatively independent employee or 
household member136, this was seen to be very depowering. 
A further relevant influence is any stigma associated with the condition itself. Media 
reinforcement of back pain sufferers as people who exaggerate their own condition and 
pain, or as people who are lazy, can both initiate and compound such stigma. An example 
of such stigmatisation is the frequent portrayal of back pain sufferers being on some form 
of compensation, but then carrying out activities (such as lifting heavy objects) which 
leaves the observer in no doubt that the claim is fraudulent. Such stigma not only impacts 
136 Or more generally as an " independent, self-reliant, self-assured adult" (White 2003) . 
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the sufferer themselves, but also others around them 137 • Associated with stigmatisation are 
the perceptions of others, colloquially described as ' everyone else knows best ' . Back pain 
sufferers often perceive that others regard them as being incapable of seeking viable 
mainstream and alternative care. Even if a friend intends well by suggesting the latest fad 
' cure' , this reinforced sufferers ' feeling that others do not empathise with, understand or 
believe the extent and difficulty of their ailment. Such perceptions and comments can arise 
despite the sufferer ' s treatment with pain management specialists, and the trying of many 
traditional and alternative therapies (White 2003). 
From this brief consideration, it is clear that important impacts of traumatic circumstances 
are direct physical and emotional aspects, and also a wealth of secondary or derived 
impacts. These include relationship and relational difficulties, a loss of control over what 
was fonnerly able to have come control exercised, a stigmatisation for what one is going 
through, and an awareness that others consider your circumstances could be so much better 
' only if you were to do or see things differently. 
These impacts can also be exacerbated by the response of others, particularly those who are 
considered to have some degree of collective concern, care and compassion - this could 
mean family members and friends , but also professional people who have roles in assisting 
people in such circumstances 138• It is also no large stretch to say that the views and 
assistance of collective society as a whole, most pointedly represented by fonnal 
government and its associated services and roles , could also be an influential factor in the 
nature of post-event impacts. 
4.3 Financial Loss 
The following discussion focuses on impacts associated more directly with financial loss . A 
definition of financial ' trauma' is omitted for the simple reason that it is not a tenn that 
assists later di scussion - our major concern is with aspects of loss, which some may regard 
as traumatic some of the time under some certain set of circumstances, but others may not. 
Ll
7 In pa11icular, ·'children often taking on the ro le of parent and with fami ly members often needing to seek 
the hel p of a psychologi st" (White 2003 , p. 25). 
1
-
18 As a leading suggestion, let us suggest that lawyers and financial professionals such as advisers and bankers could be influential in the context of financial loss. 
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For example, to most people the loss from one' s wallet of a $50 note may be very 
annoying, whereas losing $100,000 from one' s investments may represent a devastating 
loss. But it is also worthwhile to consider other aspects of these losses. For example, the 
relative loss of $50 to someone who has little, may be more traumatic than a loss of 
$100,000 for someone who has plenty1 39. A further factor is not merely a comparison of 
relative and static wealth, but also one ' s expectations. For example, the baby boomer 
generation has been described as having relatively high expectations for a certain living 
standard, the provision for which has been impacted by the GFC and as such has caused 
notable angst (CEPAR 2012). Thus for this particular cohort, significant losses might be 
considered as traumatic by any reasonable understanding of the term. 
An additional factor determining the degree of impact or trauma may relate to the 
circumstances of the loss. Being robbed of $50 in a dark alley would obviously result in 
trauma of various kinds, but the financial aspect of that loss may be minor. But, forgetting 
to pick up the $50 note from the cafe table may well play on one ' s mind in terms of the 
financial loss - possibly even more than losing a much higher sum on an investment that 
one was well briefed about in terms of the risks involved, so that the possibility of some 
loss was not unexpected. Indeed, a financial ' loss ' can arise from a pay rise not granted, a 
vocational choice not turning out as expected, a robbery, being cheated by a friend , being 
involved in a scam, a gambling loss, an investment mistake, being let down by poor 
professional advice, having good professional advice but the market just happens to work 
against you, a simple oversight, the promise of a windfall that wasn ' t, and so on. Each one 
of these circumstances, even for identical losses in terms of absolute dollar values, may 
generate quite different impacts for individuals. 
It is apparent then that any discussion of financial loss is likely to be complex and involved 
on multiple levels. It is likely to be dependent on the severity of loss in absolute and/or 
relative terms, as well as the circumstances surrounding that loss, including whether others 
were involved in that loss occurring. It also may not be easy to neatly categorise factors and 
outcomes of financial loss, meaning that the exploration of relevant themes and findings is 
not a straightforward exercise. 
139 Or as a further example, " low-wealth seniors are especially exposed to the consequences of bad decisions 
since the utility of each dollar is relatively greater than someone with higher wealth" (MacDonald et al. 2011 ). 
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4.3.1 Sources of financial loss 
One starting point for a discussion of financial loss is how losses occur, including from 
where and what they arise. Given that financial loss may arise from multiple sources, this 
section summarises these sources into three general categories for the purposes of a brief 
overview. These categories are the individual , the market, and misplaced trust. 
4.3.1.1 The individual 
As discussed in chapter 2, financial literacy in Australia and beyond is generally perceived 
as being inadequate. This can give rise to financial losses where investment scams, let alone 
a more nuanced view of risk and return, are not perceived as such 140. This in itself may be a 
concern, but of greater concern to many observers is the combination of this with 
consumption and lifestyle expectations that are perceived as being umealistic 141 . Where 
such expectations fuel consumption choices and thereby investment decisions 142, Gruber 
(2005) argues that any moves that assist individuals to spend beyond their means and then 
have protection against the consequences is inappropriate. In contrast, others disagree that 
excessive over-consumption is necessarily the core problem 143. 
Regardless of one ' s views on lifestyle and consumption choices as a catalyst for financial 
risk and potential loss, any stigma attached with ' everyone else knows best' when someone 
encounters financial loss and any perception that one's losses are at least partly due to 
consumption and lifestyle choices, are important influences on anyone suffering from 
financial loss 144. 
140 Indeed, people ' s se lf-assessed ab ility to protect income is considered to be overstated , inferring a grea ter 
susceptibility to being caught by an investment scam (FLF 2007). 141 Gruber (2005) refers to "society's desi re for a constantly rising standard of livin g". 142 
' In vestment ' here describes a wider realm that mere ly portfoli o or monetary choi ces, such as: what housing options are chosen, what household goods are purchased, what modes of transport are selected, what 
voca tional choices are pursued, what credit facilities are entered into at the household level such as credit 
cards and mortgages, and so on. 
143 For example, Warren and Tyagi (2005) state that " the over-consumption myth may be littl e more than a fa iry tale". In do ing so , they prefer to contextua li se the crit icism of hou sehold ' s consumpti on choices in more politicall y-l aden term s: "So long as Americans can be persuad ed that fa mil ies in financial troubl e have onl y 
them se lves to bl ame, th ere wi ll be no demand to change anythin g'·. 144 Indeed, such sti gma and perception ·' has the power to maroon fa mili es- both emotionally and financiall y -just when they most need support" (Warren and Tyagi 2005) . 
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4.3.1.2 The 'market' 
Recent years have demonstrated an extreme outworking of 'market risk', which at its most 
straightforward premise is represented by the fact that the value of something can go up or 
down over time. Undoubtedly the impact of the GFC was severe, to the point that it was 
"the most significant economic event since the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in 
the 1970s" (Quiggin 2011 , p.355). As such and in the context of retirement provision for 
the baby boomer cohort in particular, the source of losses from the market is significant 
because their anticipated retirement lifestyle and expectation is primarily self-funded 
(CEPAR 2012). 
The 'market' may also more broadly encompass the fact that financial loss can arise from 
job loss or retrenchment. And, even though vast swathes of the middle class by definition 
are not chronically poor, nevertheless Warren (2003a) states that although the risks facing 
US families today are the same kind that other generations have faced, the odds of these 
risks playing out in tangible terms have increased 145 . 
4.3.1 .3 Misplaced trust 
In addition to earlier comments about the process, culture and perception of financial 
advice, it is noteworthy that a financial product itself may be a cause of financial loss. Very 
few products are likely to be appropriate for all people, and when a product turns out to 
have been an inappropriate choice, the trust in the product provider can prove to have been 
misplaced 146• 
Furthermore, it takes someone to recommend or sell a product, and as trust is a key factor 
for getting involved in many products and investment options, that someone is frequently in 
145 Along with job loss, Warren also cites the economic fallout from medical problems, and the risk of divorce 
as relevant factors . 
146 For example, Warren (2007) states that "for a growing number of families who are steered into over-priced 
credit products, risky subprime mortgages, and misleading insurance plans, trust in a creditor turns out to be 
costly" (p.9) . 
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a position of trust 147. This aspect of trust may not just be regarding someone's ethical 
disposition, but also would implicitly be in their level of skill and knowledge. Indeed , 
Kotlikoff (2008) compares financial planning to brain surgery in tem1s of its required 
precision: "small mistakes and the wrong tools can just as easily undennine as improve 
financial health" (p. 71 ). As such, trust is an aspect of human experience which would likely 
be impacted when significant financial losses eventuate. 
4.3.2 Impact of financial loss 
This section discusses the main areas of impact that might be expected to be associated 
with financial loss. A consideration of these areas can be done through looking at different 
levels of impact on an individual. Some of these areas are fairly straightforward and as such 
will only be briefly touched on, whereas others are more nuanced and as such will be 
discussed in more detail. 
4.3.2.1 Direct Financial Impact 
The most obvious direct financial impact relates to the scale of the actual losses involved. 
There are many recent cases of entire life savings being wiped out (Urban 2010; Warren 
2007), but also of significance are cases that fall short of such totally calamitous 
circumstances. 
In such cases there are various measures that can apply, such as financial stress, income 
poverty, subjective poverty, expenditure poverty, relative deprivation, as well as 
approaches concerned with ' social exclusion ' (Marks 2005) 148. The dominant approach in 
Australia for studies of poverty is relative income poverty, where a poverty line is 
considered to be half the median disposable household income. Also of interest are 
' financial stress ' measures, which can be defined in tenns of financial behaviours at the 
14 7 For example, lannicola and Parker (20 I 0) report on the "several poor and immigrant communities [that] have suffered by being sold inappropriate products by trusted members of their own social networks". 148 Such approaches broaden "the concept of poverty to include social relat ionships and participation" (Marks 
2005, p.3 10). 
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household level 149 . If two or more of these behaviours have occurred within a certain period 
of time, then this is defined to constitute 'financial stress ' (Marks 2005). One such example 
of financial stress has of course arisen from GFC-related investment losses for many 
retirees, who now face the prospect of their retirement income being significantly reduced 
(Smith 2009). 
4.3.2.2 Housing 
A related aspect of financial loss is the specific impact on one's housing situation. In the 
case of Opes Prime's collapse for example, many families were forced to sell their houses 
(Urban 2010). The loss of one' s home is also highlighted by Warren (2007) as a major 
impact on families arising from adverse experience with certain financial credit products. 
The loss of one' s home (either after a significant loss when alternative arrangements for 
keeping one' s home have been exhausted, or suddenly through a forced sale) has various 
impacts and implications. There are immediate cashflow implications which are certainly 
not trivial, if someone is now forced to rent rather than having previously owned an 
unencumbered house. There is also an emotive impact of leaving one's own home, together 
with the loss of associated memories and meaning, often under duress. A further financial 
(and emotional) impact is that it is primarily through housing that bequests are left to other 
family members (Banks 2010). 
4.3.2.3 Emotional 
According to Mundis, "a personal financial cns1s 1s first an emotional blow .. .it is 
tremendously disorienting, it is frightening" 150. Reactions can involve some or all of shock, 
anger, guilt, emotional distress, confusion, resentment, numbness, disbelief ("it can't be 
real" and "why has this happened to me?"), despair, guilt ("I've disappointed my family"), 
149 Seven behaviours are listed by Marks (2005): Not paying utility bills on time, not paying mortgage or rent 
on time, pawning or selling something, going without meals, unable to heat the home, asking for financial 
help from friends or family, and asking for help form welfare or community organisations. 150 Jerry Mundis was a former business editor of the New York Times who suddenly faced "$50,000 in debt 
with no visible means to repay it" ( cited in MacDonald 2002). 
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a perception of being isolated from others, embarrassment and shame (Better Health 
Cham1el 2012; Gounaris and Prout 2009, cited in Iannicola and Parker 2010) . A range of 
emotions have been to the fore as a result of recent economic tunnoil , with a mixture of 
"optimism and hopelessness, panic and fear", and notably, this has been the case not just 
for investors, but for financial advisers as well (Gounaris and Prout 2009, cited in Iannicola 
and Parker 2010). 
Another aspect of financial loss concerns one's sense of control and/or hope for the future. 
Descriptions of "bleak retirements", "broken lives" and a "sense of loss related to dreams 
and plans for the future" convey an outcome of helplessness and powerlessness (Better 
Health Channel 2012; Warren 2007). Furthermore, reflecting in hindsight on what has 
happened can actually compound this sense of powerlessness 151 • 
4.3.2.4 Relationships 
Unsurprisingly, increased pressure on household finances and financial behaviours can lead 
to severe challenges on the quality of relationships (lannicola and Parker 2010). This is 
most obviously shown within marriages which can become troubled (Warren 2007), even 
to the point of ending (the case of Opes Prime again, Urban 20 l 0). Often this is due to 
anger resulting from financial loss, which can be directed at family members (Better Health 
Channel 2012), and/or through increased fighting (Warren 2003a). 
Further insights into the impact on relationships come from an example of pathological 
male gamblers. Ciarrocchi and Reinert (1993) summarise a number of studies which 
considered the experiences of wives of pathological gamblers, and in doing so highlight 
several relevant issues . In particular, the circumstances of financial losses can be highly 
traumatic and cause much anxiety, primarily because the onset of calamitous financial 
losses can be very sudden and unexpected from the point of view of the spouse 152 . 
151 Thi s is often throug h thoug hts such as " I wish I' d done thin gs differentl y" (Better Health Chann el 2012) . 152 In contrast to o ther addicti ons, the addiction of gambling operates on credit, which can lead to the hiding 
of financia l problems by gamblers. Thus, the resultant trauma can be very hi gh because of th e "severe level s 
of uncontro llability and unpredictability ' · from th e po int of view o f the spouse (C iarrocchi and Reinert 1993). 
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A further lack of control for those around the gambler occurs when treatment is sought and 
steps are taken towards recovery. This is because all that can be offered is a level of 
support, but effectively without any control in the situation 153 • Of course by staying with a 
recovering gambler, a wife is (re)committing herself to a relationship which may not 
deliver much in the way of material resources for many years. This causes further distress 
as there is then little potential for "recreational, independence, and cultural pursuits" in the 
foreseeable future. Consequently, the combination of these factors means that the wives of 
pathological gamblers may experience a recovery developmental lag when contrasted to the 
gambler himself (Ciarrocchi and Reinert 1993). 
4.3.2.5 Trust 
As suggested in section 4.3.1.3, a decrease in levels of trust is a highly likely outcome of 
financial loss. This can be manifest in various ways and can be directed towards various 
parties. The GFC has brought such outcomes to the fore, in particular a decrease in trust in 
the financial services industry and especially professional advisers (Iannicola and Parker 
2010) 154. Naturally enough, this lack of trust is no secret with many financial advisers 
aware of it as a significant issue facing the industry (Fairfax NZ News 2008). 
This lack of trust in the financial services industry has arguably been exacerbated by the 
lack of protection offered with financial collapses. For example, St. John (2011) describes 
shortfalls in relevant compensation processes, with some cases where compensation has not 
been able to be sourced even when there is an entitlement to it. In such cases, significant 
recompense has therefore not eventuated and this can accentuate the resultant impacts for 
individuals. The lack of delivery on compensation arrangements when these arrangements 
themselves would have been portrayed as a safeguard for investors making investment 
decisions, is hardly an advertisement for trust in the system. 
153 The lack of control in the outcomes of such treatment is described from the point of view as the supporting 
person(s) as "going along for the ride" with "no hands on the steering wheel" (Ciarrocchi and Reinert 1993). 154 Iannicola and Parker (2010) go as far to state that "consumer trust of financial services professionals is at 
historically low levels". 
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Another aspect of trust concerns the rebuilding of investment nerve following a loss. For 
those who have suffered significant losses but still have some financial savings left, 
convincing them to re-engage with the industry is no small task. Some highlight that an 
inability to re-engage can further exacerbate the impacts of existing losses by being too shy 
of all future risks, thereby reducing income and future returns to a greater degree than 
otherwise (Fairfax NZ News 2008) 155 • 
Furthennore, it is often not just the financial services industry that is the target of lower 
levels of trust. Also possible is a loss of confidence and faith in various institutions, 
including the government. This is potentially all the more raw where various institutions, 
leaders and government were formerly perceived as trustworthy and actually only exist as a 
functional entity due to the trust placed in them. Additionally, as seen in previous 
discussion regarding emotional impacts, it is possible that a lower level of trust in oneself 
can result as well. 
4.3.2.6 Justice 
Further reactions to financial loss can involve anger, both at oneself as well as being 
focused outwards towards an organisation such as an employer, or a professional such as a 
financial adviser (Better Health Channel 2012). Thus, where losses have eventuated due to 
the involvement of someone other than self, a "burning desire for justice" can result 
(Fairfax NZ News 2008). 
4.3.2. 7 Relativity 
A further aspect of interest relates to the social circumstances of the loss. Feeling like you 
are the only one to have suffered a loss can exacerbate the emotive and relationship 
impacts, whereas knowing that others have suffered too can actually be a source of comfort. 
This is possibly due to the resultant awareness than one does not feel alone in their loss 
(Better Health Channel 2012), as well as a possible protective effect whereby one ' s 
circumstances may not seem as bad as that of others (Sargent-Cox, cited in CEPAR 2012). 
155 Fairfax NZ News (2008) cites the perspec tive of financial adviser Sheryl Sutherland. 
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4.3.2.8 Physical Health 
There are various aspects relating to the impact on physical health. There is little doubt that 
financial strain in general can exacerbate physical problems, often due to lowered access to 
health care services. Any associated health problems can then also lead to further financial 
strain if reducing one ' s ability to work, which clearly impacts current as well as future 
earnings (Kim and Lyons 2008). For those who are retired, a reduction in the ability to 
work is not as relevant, but what is influential is that savings previously accumulated can be 
depleted quickly. Furthermore, many studies show that "financial problems are linked with 
declining self-assessments of health, diminishing ability to care for oneself, and generalized 
demoralization" (Thorne et al. 2009, p. l 00), suggesting that physical health problems can 
further morph into problems concerning mental health as well. 
4.3.2.9 Mental Health 
A particularly significant feature associated with financial loss concerns aspects of mental 
health. Adverse financial circumstances are frequently linked with mental health issues, 
such as stress, anxiety, depression, and psychological distress ( du Plessis et al. 201 0; Hunt 
et al. 2011 ; MacDonald 2002) 156 . 
Reactions to sudden financial losses can be described over multiple levels. For someone 
who had lost a small portion of their wealth, they would simply suffer some form of stress. 
A second level would certainly again involve stress, but where the losses become more 
significant, reactions could include anxiety and a decrease in self-esteem. A third and more 
serious level would see more acute symptoms including depression, "a lack of a sense of 
purpose in life, and panic attacks, and in the worst cases, thoughts of suicide" (professional 
counsellor Anita Bocchino, cited in Fairfax NZ News 2008). 
Depressive reactions to financial shocks are perhaps very expected and normal responses, 
and for some "it's normal to feel like you just want to go to bed for the next five days" 
156 A recent example is the reported increase in levels of anxiety and depression among older Australians as a 
result of the GFC which as previously noted, relates to the pressure of the "self-funded nature of their 
retirement", combined with "expectations of a high standard of living" (CEP AR 2012). 
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(Mundis, cited in MacDonald 2002). But being in bed doesn ' t imply rest of course, and 
indeed difficulties in sleep and an inability to relax are two symptoms of anxiety and 
depression (Better Health Channel 2012). Other warning signs of such conditions include a 
difficulty in carrying out everyday activities such as going for a walk, preparing meals , and 
conversing with others ; having emotional problems such as being angry, initable or 
intolerant around other people; feeling overwhelmed and not able to cope; and also the use 
of alcohol or drugs. Notably, a key point is that any change in circumstances (particularly 
financial) where one is not able to exercise much control over that change, can increase the 
risk of anxiety and depression (Better Health Channel 2012). 
The symptoms above and the overall lack of control over one ' s affairs can be exacerbated 
by an increasing sense of hopelessness and loss. The sense of loss associated with financial 
loss is often in the context of dreams and plans for the future (Better Health Channel 2012) 
- which is, after all, what gets many people out of bed and off to work each morning. 
Indeed, Banks (2010) points out that with financial loss it is not just a loss of wealth that is 
of interest, but also the resultant effects on expectations and plans for later life. As such, 
financial loss may well be distinctive in that it generates impacts that are more reflective 
and mentally damaging than with various other disasters. In many circumstances associated 
with such losses, the individual may blame themselves directly, or regret their trust in some 
other person or object of assurance, or be angry at some wider institution. In this context 
the loss of what has been planned and worked for, and where in hindsight there was a 
realistic possibility that this loss could have been avoided or should not have occurred , can 
lead to such strong emotive responses. This might be far more marked than with, for 
example, financial loss resulting from an earthquake or robbery, which may generate a far 
more fatalistic and less reflective response. 
A sad and extreme outworking of impacts on mental health is the tragedy of suicide. This 
too is not uncommon with circumstances surrounding financial loss, with thoughts about 
suicide a common sign of extreme anxiety and depression (Better Health Channel 2012) . 
MacDonald (2002) cites a case of suicide due to indebtedness, and a tragedy of Opes 
Prime· s collapse is the account of a client who also took his own life (Urban 2010). 
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4.3.2.10 All linked together 
Naturally enough, the impacts discussed above do not neatly fall into independent and 
isolated descriptions which have no bearing or influence on other impacts. By way of 
examples, we briefly highlight a small selection of how various impacts can influence 
others in the aftermath of financial loss. The example of Mundis is again of interest: 
This devastating condition sucks the joy out of a life. It wrecks marriages, it gets adult 
children into fights with their parents, and the stress takes a toll on one physically and 
emotionally, too. That shows up at the office or on the job. Accidents are more likely to 
happen. ( cited in MacDonald 2002) 
The virtual inevitability of financial ruin for pathological gamblers also evidences the inter-
relationships of various impacts, with studies showing elevated rates of marital difficulties 
and other problems which include physical ailments, depression, guilt, confusion and 
isolation (Ciarrocchi and Reinert 1993). Needless to say, the compounding effect of several 
factors occurring at once significantly impacts an individuals' well-being even more (du 
Plessis et al. 2010). 
The story of a New Zealand couple who invested in a failed prQperty developer (Blue Chip) 
gives interesting insights that tie together many of the impacts discussed above. The result 
of borrowing heavily against their home to purchase an apartment was a debt incurring 
repayments of $5000 a month, and the likely loss of the home. By way of extended 
example the views and experience of this couple are quoted here (sourced from Fairfax NZ 
News 2008). Firstly, in terms of what the financial loss felt like: 
" It feels just like it felt when my mother died," [Judy] said . Many might recoil at the 
comparison how could the loss of mere money be like losing a parent? But .. . the physical 
and emotional responses to both can be identical, says Margaret Agee, from the University 
of Auckland, an expert in grief counselling. "We commonly think of grief as being 
associated with death, the death of people we love, but in fact, grief can be the response to 
many life experiences that involve loss or extreme change," she said. The assumed societal 
hierarchy of grief the death of a family member trumps the death of a pet, for example can 
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result in what Agee calls 'disenfranchised griefs', such as the reaction to extreme financial 
Joss. This leaves sufferers confused about whether they are justified in their reactions , and 
lacking recognition, empathy and understanding. 
In tenns of reactions to the loss: 
Reactions to the financial pressure have been physical and emotional. .. Judy is plagued by 
obsessive thoughts, with her mind returning again and again to the financial situation . .. a 
racing mind has led to sleeplessness, and she now uses sleeping pill s. "Your mind is so 
activated with stress. Some nights I didn't sleep at all before I got the tablets. My mind would 
go over things . I got really, really tired ." Some physical symptoms are no surpri se like the 
headaches that now plague her more frequently. Others were "My hair stopped growing. It 
took three months before I had to have another hair cut." Bruce repo11s an extreme loss of 
appetite . "You sit down to eat, but the food just looks unappetising, and you just don't feel 
like eating," he says. 
Finally, in tenns of how different people might react to such a loss: 
Judy thinks men experience grief at financial losses differently to women. Bruce sought 
solutions until he was mentally exhausted. Such obsessive thinking is common, but at least 
showed he was not depressed, according to his doctor. At 70, he tried going back to work 
milking a large dairy herd, but broke down physically after a week, arriving home shaking. 
" It was exhaustion and stress, I guess" Judy said. Men of a certain generation are also more 
likely to bottle up their feelings, something Judy has strived to ensure did not happen . "My 
husband would have been like that, but I feel we haven't done anything wrong. He feels like 
he has let me down as a husband because we may lose our house, which is the only thing we 
have. " Bruce does find it harder to talk about his own feelings. He does feel that he should 
have been strong enough to say no to the Blue Chip hard-sell , but pities couples where blame 
poisons what is left of life. 
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4.4 Coping with Traumatic Loss 
4.4.1 'Recovery' 
Common terms used to describe what can happen to people after some major event are 
reconstruction, restoration, rehabilitation, restitution, and recovery, but each of these terms 
can mean different things in different contexts (Quarantelli 1999)157. The term most closely 
related to the principle of indemnity within a financial and insurance context is 
' restoration', which in simple terms means putting back into nearly the original form 
whatever existed before the disaster158 • 
The term of most interest to us is that of recovery. This refers to bringing a post-event 
situation to a reasonable level of satisfaction or acceptability, which unlike restoration, is 
not explicitly or necessarily referenced to the level in existence before the event 
(Quarantelli 1999). As such and given the scale of financial losses suffered by those 
investigated in this thesis, recovery is not only a more realistic situation in the long run than 
restoration, but it may also be more observable than restoration in the time frames 
considered. 
However, restitution is also of interest, especially given the aforementioned desire to seek 
justice following financial loss. Restitution is similar to restoration but more as it relates to 
the rightful claimants of owners and their former state of affairs , and is commonly pursued 
through legal means (Quarantelli 1999). Given the structure of trust and importance of 
social relationships within the financial services industry in Australia, we might expect to 
see various degrees of restitution being sought and being of some importance to many 
investors - even if they fall short of complete restoration itself. Indeed, pursuing justice 
may lead to a situation where justice is seen to be done, but on a cautionary note this may 
not generate any sense of closure nor bring recovery about on its own accord 159. 
157 Indeed, such terms "are not always pointing to the same thing or process", and in particular for the tenn 
'recovery ', "there is not even much agreement on the specific term, word or label to use, or if the different 
concepts used have reference to the same or different kinds of phenomena" (Quarantelli 1999). 
158 Alternatively, "re-establishing prior or pre-impact physical and social patterns" (Quarantelli 1999). 
159 Indeed, "justice done might be nice, but it is not going to deal with the anxiety and stress people are going 
to be suffering" (Fairfax NZ News 2008) . 
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4. 4. 1. 1 Lessons from veterans 
The qualitative review and study of Corbin and Strauss (2008) regarding a war veteran 's 
approaches to coping with his experiences gives some general insights for us to consider. 
Quite clearly war, with its death and destruction, is far more involved, raw, tragic and 
traumatic than even the most severe financial loss. And although financial losses can also 
lead to tragic impacts on human lives, it is not on the same destructive, widespread scale as 
with war, so no attempt is made to draw parallels between the two. However, that does not 
mean that these experiences are not useful to draw insights from. 
One coping strategy is through the process of 'hardening' where one learns to not "feel 
things so deeply" . To allow such emotion in would disrupt the ' protective shield ' that some 
people construct to partially mitigate the horrors of war. Other strategies include making 
light of one' s situation via humour, a distancing from what one is surrounded by, and the 
redefining of moral values to match and fit in with the new experience or situation 160 . Post-
war, a strategy to get on with life was to do things that had been planned whilst at war, in 
order to provide "something to hold on to" . As such, making plans for the future and 
hanging onto them in challenging times is considered as another survival strategy (Corbin 
and Strauss 2008). 
Corbin and Strauss (2008) also describe ' walls of silence' that exist around war 
experiences. One such wall is the external one, "between the self and the outside world", 
where veterans do not want to talk about their experiences, particularly with those 
considered outsiders 161. Poignantly, reactions to the disturbing experiences of war were 
made all the worse when the soldiers came home and received a reception that served to 
isolate them further 162 . A second wall of silence is the internal one, "built around the 
experience itself' . This wall is maintained by avoiding outlets such as books, movies, 
conversations with others, and generally keeping busy so that memories are not revi sited. 
160 This essentiall y is a justifica tion that certain actions taken in war either by oneself or by others are 
considered morally reasonable , under the assertio n that " hey, thi s is war'' , even if those actions would not 
have been taken otherwise (Corbin and Strauss 2008 , p.174) . 
16 1 This gave ri se to Corbin and Strauss's difficulty in recru iting partic ipants fo r interviews, with one 
respondent saying that '' l can· t ta lk about Vi etn am to my wife , why would I ta lk to you?" (p. 184). 162 Indeed and as such. ·'they don ' t even like talking among themselves" (p. I 84) . 
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These strategies again were to ensure that the protective wall put up around oneself could 
not be breached. 
4.4.1.2 Factors in recovery from natural disasters 
Also of interest are those factors which are influential in post-event recovery. To glean 
relevant insights, we refer to Quarantelli (1999) who reviewed many studies relating to the 
experiences of individuals, families and households following the occurrence of natural 
disasters. A summary of the major themes relevant to our context of financial loss is given 
below. 
Most major themes relate to the social context of an individual, which is unsurprising given 
the social nature of humans. However, social aspects of both the impact and the recovery 
process are apparent in many forms. The first is that for most victims, the major source of 
help in recovery are relatives and kin, often through the assistance of housing. This is 
helpful and welcome in itself in the short term 163 , but is also beneficial due to the avoidance 
of difficulties associated with multiple moves after a loss event, for which those who have 
lost a home find it increasingly difficult to cope with. In this context, the period after a loss 
event and the associated recovery responses can matter as much as the loss itself. 
Furthermore, although recovery through family and kinship support is usually the most 
tangible and useful to disaster victims, there are nevertheless families for whom recovery or 
otherwise will depend predominantly on institutional rather than other sources of help 
(Quarantelli 1999). 
A second aspect relating to the social context is that the extent of recovery often reflects 
how one was before the event, particularly in terms of social connectedness and 
awareness
164
. In particular, a foundational factor in resilience has been suggested as "the 
resources available to individuals through their social networks" (Dynes 2005, cited in 
Aldrich 2010). This is supported by household studies of the Kobe earthquake in Japan 
163 Although Quarantelli (1999) does state that "while short run sharing of housing with others is acceptable, 
serious stress in relationships occur if common quarters are shared for extended periods of time" . 
164 Indeed, "just as in everyday life some social units are in more formal and informal interaction patterns and 
networks than others, the same occurs in the post recovery period" (Quarantelli 1999). 
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which indicate that those citizens who were more active and participatory in the community 
had better recovery experiences than those were less involved (Tatsuki 2008, and Tatsuki 
and Hayashi 2002, cited in Aldrich 2010) 165 . Quarantelli (1999) categorises "single persons, 
older women, the homeless , or nonreligious people in an area with strong religious 
affiliations" as those who may not be included in recovery efforts as much as others 166 . An 
outworking of this can also be at a very practical level, such as some social classes may 
know where to go for help and assistance more than others 167 . 
A particular feature of the social context is the protective role of marriage 168. The benefits 
of such a protective benefit with marriage can arise due to the ability to derive two incomes 
rather than one, and also that marriage may well be associated "with a set of attitudes and 
behaviours that reduces financial disadvantage" (Marks 2005, p.319) 169 • 
Quite clearly positive outcomes can arise from an involved and social recovery effort. As 
well as the obvious economic and financial benefits, at a social level relationships can be 
strengthened within families and also with other families who are either assisting or are 
recovering themselves. This can be partly due to what Quarantelli (1999) terms the 
'emergent quality' of disaster responses, which is the appearance of new ways of doing 
things, and could include the creation of new groups with collective concern for victims. 
Nevertheless, such improvements in social relationships can be temporal and even give rise 
to later hostility, and naturally enough not everyone will perceive the changes in the same 
manner. Undeniably however, social networks and connectedness are key factors in overall 
recovery. 
Another important factor in recovery is the stage of the life cycle that a victim 1s at. 
Generally, those who are older are less likely to recover to a position that is close to their 
165 Or as Quarantel Ii ( 1999) puts it, " in general, those outside of the everyday mainstream remain outside in 
the post recovery period". 
166 By way of fu11her exa mple , " some families from tightly integrated ethnic groups do so much better in 
recovering than other family units who are less linked into extended lcinship patterns" (Quarantelli 1999). 167 Even down to the detail of " knowing how and where to approach bureaucracies, fillin g in fonns and doing 
other paperwork, etc'· (Quarantelli 1999). 
168 
·'And to a lesser extent de facto relationsh ips'· (Marks 2005 , p.319) 
169 Although Marks (2005) discusses general financial disadvantage rather than specific recovery from a 
natural disaster, the points made nevertheless have some traction in our context also , in that where references 
to subj ec tive poverty and financial stress are made, these are relevant regardless of the source of poverty. 
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pre-impact level ( everything else being equal), due to both economic and psychological 
factors. For example, difficulties can exist for older persons to rebuild their homes due to 
problems in accessing credit, or due to strongly felt self-perceptions that they have less 
remaining years in life than others to be able to do so (Quarantelli 1999)170. 
Another factor echoes earlier comments about the relativity of impacts. With respect to 
recovery after the event, Quarantelli (1999) states that the level and quality of assistance 
received is often evaluated in comparison to what others have received, and that "the more 
there are disaster victims the more probable is this relativistic attitude likely to prevail". 
The significance of 'symbolic recovery' rather than economic recovery is also highlighted 
by Quarantelli (1999). For, although a great deal of material property and financial means 
can often be recovered, this differs in significance and importance to restoration of lost 
symbolic possessions 171 . This suggests that the loss of a home for whatever reason can have 
a significant impact on wellbeing due to its symbolic nature as well its sense of security and 
achievement, in addition to the more direct physical and financial consequences of housing 
prov1s10n. 
4.4.2 Emotional recovery from financial loss 
-
The range of strong emotional responses that can occur implies that for many people, 
tangible and significant help is needed in order to cope with loss. In this regard, this section 
briefly describes some advice from counsellors and mental health advocates, specifically 
relating to financial loss. 
A starting point for recovery is finding someone to talk to, whether that be a friend or a 
professional (Better Health Channel 2012; Fairfax NZ News 2008). This can help both the 
victim and others understand what has gone on and come to tenns with the situation, 
release emotions that would otherwise be internalised, allows openness about what has 
happened rather than hiding it, and simply gets support around the individual to mitigate 
170 To reiterate an earlier point, "this is simply another way of saying that not all socioeconomic losses are 
equivalent even though in financial terms the figures may be roughly comparable" (Quarantelli 1999). 
17 1 Such possessions include " important family remembrances such as photographs or the old tress that will 
never exist again in the front or back yard" (Quarantelli 1999). 
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the stress that would be occurring. Such communication with others can of course be far 
more targeted, such as discussing specific issues with counsellors, or exploring ways to 
reduce stress with medical professionals. The latter can especially be necessary for the time 
period immediately following a loss 172 . Communication with others does not have to be 
verbal either - writing things down can help as well , either to prioritise concerns to be 
addressed, to convey thoughts with others that are too difficult to express verbally, or 
purely as another emotive outlet for oneself. 
Physical activity is also considered important, along with sensible and balanced dietary 
choices. This not only keeps the body in a better physical state to deal with stress, but also 
can head off further deterioration in terms of mental health which may otherwise result 
from poor self-perceptions and frustration with oneself. Needless to say, the limiting of 
drugs and alcohol intake with their mood altering and depressant qualities is ideal. Patience 
is also an essential factor as any major loss will involve long recovery times, and reminding 
oneself of how previous hurdles have been overcome is also considered helpful. Conversely 
however it can be difficult to avoid becoming obsessive about what has happened (as 
evidenced by some having a ' burning desire ' for justice), with such obsession unhelpful but 
nevertheless possible at either end of the spectrum of responses 173 . A further helpful 
response is being proactive about involvement and interaction with others in a meaningful 
way, particularly where the financial loss also has an associated loss of social contact 
(Better Health Channel 2012) 174. 
Some may also find it helpful to mentally tum-around their circumstances, by looking for 
positives out of the experience (Better Health Channel 2012) 175 . Alternatively a reframing 
of one ' s situation can be helpful as no matter what has been lost, "there will still be things 
in life left for a person" (Fairfax NZ News 2008). Whilst this advice is based on 
straightforward observations which are self-evident to even the most casual observer and 
172 As highlighted in Fairfax N Z News (2008) : "Physical symptoms caused by stress are rea l. Take them 
se ri ously. Seek he lp fo r ways to overcome them" . 
173 For example, constantly ch ecking one ' s financial s ituation or at the oth er extreme, tota lly ignoring the 
financia l probl ems now being faced . 
174 As one example of difficult financia l circum stances, for many peopl e " the most diffi cult part of j ob loss or 
retrenchment is the loss of a sen se of ' contribution ' and lack of interaction with friend s and coll eagues in a 
work env ironment .. (Better Health Channe l 201 2) . 
175 Or seeing the current situati on as ·'an opportunity to re-evaluate your goals and perhaps take on new 
cha! lenges .. (Better Hea lth C hann el 201 2) . 
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may have been of much use to many people, in the context of earlier discussion this runs 
the risk of being perilously close to exacerbating some of the adverse impacts of loss. For 
example, the perception felt by back pain victims of ' everyone else knows best ' is arguably 
relevant here. As such, for many who have suffered substantial losses, such advice may not 
be helpful for some stages of the recovery process, especially if the circumstances of the 
loss have caused significant mental angst. 
4.4.3 Financial recovery from financial loss 
It does not need an expert view to observe that there are two general ways to improve one' s 
financial position. One is to increase income, the other is to decrease expenditure, and there 
are lots of ways or strategies publicly available for people to consider either or both of these 
aspects of personal finance 176. The main thrust of advice in this area is to be deliberate and 
planned in what one does, especially in the aftermath of a significant financial loss 177 • The 
following sections describe the main approaches that can be taken. 
4.4.3.1 Increasing Income 
Increasing one ' s income can of course be easier said than done, but if additional jobs 
(generally, odd-jobs such as landscaping) can be taken, or _ if one' s profession allows 
consulting or free-lance work, then this is helpful. If not having work is an issue, then the 
use of social networking sites, employment agencies, and word of mouth amongst friends is 
an obvious starting point. Getting an initial opportunity may even be assisted by offering to 
take a lower salary than other candidates. Examples of other ways to raise funds in the short 
term include the selling of household items no longer needed, taking in a paying renter or 
boarder, or selling a car for a cheaper option. 
Rather than looking to earn more sooner, it may also be useful to plan to work for far 
longer than previously considered. This appears to be a growing phenomenon in Australia 
with 13 per cent of Australia' s 2.6 million full-time workers over the age of 45 now not 
176 For example, one source (http://www.wikihow.com/Survive-a-Personal-Financial-Crisis) brings together 
lots of common-sense choices to help out in such times. 
177 As Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) state, "experiences such as large wealth or income losses seem to push 
people toward more planning" (p.506). 
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ever planning to retire (Burke 2011) 178 . A study of the retirement attitudes and intentions of 
Australian higher education workers suggested that many had postponed retirement 
decisions in recent years due to falls in superannuation savings (deYries 2009). However, 
not many of the research participants in this study were particularly worried about their 
ability to provide for the essentials of life in the future, so the select nature of this study and 
its participants is noted 179 . 
An impo1iant point is to seek advice regarding entitlements and available support services. 
These support services can of course be specifically financial in nature, and may include 
professional financial advisers. This may be useful in overcoming a reluctance to 
incorporate some appropriate level of risk into future investment choices. Thus, if the 
appetite and trust can be formed to visit professional financial advice again, this may be of 
assistance. 
4.4.3.2 Decreasing Expenditure 
Three main areas of expenditure are considered in this section. The first of these is debt 
obligations. Where these can be prioritised, then those debts that could lead to foreclosure 
or repossession should be the first to be addressed - for example, a home mortgage 
(MacDonald 2002). Next in line should be debts incurring interest, in order of interest 
burden. If the levels of debt and interest are such that obligations cannot be met, then 
contacting rather than running from creditors and being open with them is recommended , as 
is avoiding charges associated with any broken contracts. Indeed, claiming some control 
over one's situation may involve pro-actively contacting a creditor, as many organisations 
will have procedures in place to help those who are going through a period of financial 
hardship (Better Health Channel 2012). This may allow the negotiation of lower payments 
or even a moratorium for a sho1i period , giving time to seek other ways to improve one's 
178 Furthermore. --almost a quarter of a million people who had previously retired from the labour force had 
either gone back to work or sa id th ey were planning to look for work in the future '·. Of th ese people. the 
maj ority were women .. and they cited fin ancial need as the most common reason fo r their return from 
retirement .. (Burke 20 I I). 
179 Notabl y. given the self-se lection of academics into roles of genuine personal interest, "re search 
parti cipants did not appear to be overl y concerned by the economic downturn with modifi cat ions to retirement 
expectati ons more about working longer .. and indeed, many ·'commented that the economic environm ent had 
provided th em with a legit imate reason to keep working'· (deVries 2009). 
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financial circumstances. Of course, if the financial loss has itself involved the loss of a 
home, then this removes a key asset which could have conferred flexibility to keep other 
fi · 1 · fl I 80 mancia opt10ns a oat . 
A second area of expenditure that can be reduced concerns the basic essentials of living -
housing, transport, food and clothing. If circumstances demand it, older individuals could 
consider living with adult children or in some other workable living arrangement (Kim and 
Lyons 2008). This is an example of the pooling of intergenerational resources, which is 
common and acceptable within the family context of many cultural practices 181 . Of course 
the roles can be different here within young adults falling back on parental assistance in 
times of need as well 182 . Transport costs can be reduced by carpooling and taking public 
transport where practical. Food costs can be reduced by not eating out and making changes 
to grocery shopping habits, including shopping at discount supermarkets and utilising store 
brands. For clothing, various purchases can likely be postponed for many months for many 
families, though of course growing children do pose a particular challenge. Shopping at 
second-hand stores may alleviate this particular pressure, if further shopping is required. 
A third area of expenditure concerns the categorisation of wants and needs, or equivalently 
non-essential items and essential items183 . Taking stock of non-essential expenditure might 
yield examples such as memberships to fitness centers (which ~can be replaced by running, 
walking, and a host of other free activities), entertainment clubs with regular costs, music 
lessons, holiday plans beyond what is now affordable, and so on. Most likely many of these 
can be cut without too much pain, if not without some psychological cost. The select group 
of higher education employees in the study of de Vries (2009) did not in general perceive 
cutbacks in this area to be a significant hardship however, and intended to find "creative 
180 Notably however, "you should only consider a home equity loan as a last resort - and only if you are 
certain that you can improve your situation in time to avoid losing your home" (MacDonald 2002). 
18 1 For example, " it is common in some traditional cultures for elders to live with, and be financially 
supported by, their adult children" . Furthennore, "it is also feasible and reasonable that there is an expectation 
of inheritance when children accept the risk of supporting parents and a desire to pass on an inheritance by the 
fiarents" (MacDonald et al. 2011 ). 
82 Indeed, changing "intergenerational familial economic relationships" mean that "when young adults 
experience financial struggles, they often rely on their parents for help because parents usually have more 
assets and fewer expenses" (Thome et al. 2009, p.88). 
183 Indeed, "a fmancial crisis is a quick and painful way to learn the difference between wants and needs" 
(Mundis, cited in MacDonald 2002) . 
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ways to enjoy living with less money (such as ' cheap ' seniors activities)", and to still enjoy 
travel but on smaller budgets than before. 
4.5 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we gave a brief overview of traumatic events and circumstances, in order to 
present a range of impacts that might be expected to occur on individuals. A variety of 
emotional and social impacts can be expected, which in tum can be exacerbated by 
financial vulnerabilities that might also have ansen. Importantly, the reaction and 
perception of others are also highly influential in impacted individuals, including those of 
professionals, as well as society at large. 
Where the traumatic events and circumstances are more directly of a financial nature, there 
are additional complexities that are important. For example, the severity of loss in absolute 
and/or relative tenns, and the circumstances surrounding that loss including whether others 
were involved in the occurrence of that loss. Indeed, losses can arise from various sources 
such as individual choices, the workings or volatility of the 'market ', or misplaced trust in 
others. 
Where significant financial loss does eventuate, there are obvious direct financial impacts 
but of particular significance are the impacts involving emotional wellbeing, relationships, 
and trust in a range of parties. This in tum can lead to a detennined pursuit of perceived 
justice. Impacts on mental health frequently arise from adverse financial circumstances, 
with stress, anxiety and depression not uncommon amongst many in such circumstances. 
Such mental health impacts further exacerbate other impacts, particularly emotional 
wellbeing and relationship / social interactions. Suicide is also an extreme but sadl y not rare 
possibility. 
Recovery from such circumstances is not straightforward and a wide range of experiences 
are apparent. Social connectedness with others is seen as an extremely significant factor, 
and for many people, tangible and significant help is needed in order to cope wi th loss. 
Much advice exists for ·recovery' (but not for ' restoration ' ) in solely a financial sense, but 
given the possibility of sign ificant mental angst wi th such circumstances, ' recovery ' in a 
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non-financial sense is unlikely to be formulaic across all impacted individuals and may well 
be the more difficult to address. In other words, severe financial loss is likely to have an 
impact well beyond a loss of money. 
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Chapter 5: Data and methodology 
5 .1 Introduction 
Answering our research questions requires a qualitative approach and as seen in chapter 
three, by referring to high profile collapses we can begin to formulate a response via the 
analysis of various reports and commentary of others. But to develop this further, we 
consider additional data sources such as interviews, observations, transcripts of public 
hearings, public submissions to the PJCI, and other documents and correspondence. 
Through such interviews, observations, and analysis of documents, a detailed picture can be 
gleaned of various individuals ' perspectives regarding financial loss . Achieving such a 
picture is a common goal of much qualitative research (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Also 
fairly typical of qualitative research is the breadth of data sources used (Freeman et al. 
2007), and the presentation of findings in a highly descriptive manner (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007) 184 . 
In this chapter we describe the various data sources available to us , and then present a 
detailed description of the overall methodology used to engage with and examine this data. 
This includes procedures and approaches used to affirm the themes and findings that arise. 
We begin however by giving an overview of qualitative research, as it pertains to our 
particular research questions. This includes a discussion of theoretical perspectives, design 
strategies including the utility of a case study approach, and a description of the overall 
approach adopted . 
184 Funhem10re. ho,,· people actually beha,·e in a financial etting necessaril y requires a descriptive approach 
(Baker and ·ofsigner 2002) . 
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5.2 Qualitative research 
A primary goal of this thesis is not necessarily to be able to generalise any findings to other 
contexts, but firstly to accurately report and summarise what the data infers in this 
particular context. We accept at outset that achieving answers to relatively broad questions 
may be nuanced, highly-context dependent, and even present inconsistencies 185 , but see no 
reason why the different experiences and responses of each individual should be, a priori, 
more useful or credible by being able to be generalised 186 . Of course, where patterns or 
consistencies are found, this is worthwhile (Stake 1995), and it may be that generalizations 
or assertions can be offered which in itself will be useful (Freeman et al. 2007). This, of 
course, will assist us with our secondary goal. But, we accept the realistic point made by 
Shank (2002) that 'meaning' in examining such questions within a qualitative framework 
may present an incomplete picture. 
We also acknowledge that what is drawn out from the data is necessarily (and 
unashamedly) reliant on interpretation (a point highlighted by Marshall and Rossman 2010) 
- both ours in terms of the choice of research approach taken and analysis of data, and also 
those of the research participants themselves. The nature of each interpretation, of course, 
may be quite different for each participant (Denzin and Lincoln 2005) 187, and as such a 
requirement for good research in this context is to not jump to a particular interpretative 
conclusion too quickly (Shank 2002). 
None of this need detract from the utility of any findings, but what it does prioritise is the 
presentation of a clear framework and design which shows that a systematic inquiry has 
taken place. The need for an ordered and coherent investigation is highlighted by many 
researchers as key to being the ' quality' in qualitative research (Patton 2002; Piantanida 
185 Or, as Shank (2002) puts it, "our picture of anything is always too simple ... we want instead to develop a 
more complex picture of the phenomenon or situation. Only, we prefer not to call it complex. We prefer terms 
like "rich", "deep" , "thick", "textured", " insightful", and, best of all , " illuminative"" (p . 7). 
186 Some may baulk at such an admission, and for the actuarial reader this may also raise questions. After all, 
the actuarial approach in the face of much variability between individuals is to select reasonably 
homogeneous groups for important functions such as underwriting (even to the extent of medical loadings 
being a set multiple of ' standard ' health), pricing, understanding the risk profile, reserving, and so forth , on 
the basis that this is reasonable given a large enough portfolio of policyholders, in association with other risk 
management strategies also being in place. 
187 Denzin and Lincoln (2005) go as far to state that "there is no single interpretive truth . .. there are multiple 
interpretive communities, each with its own criteria for evaluating interpretations" (p.26). 
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and Gannan 2009; Shank 2002), since this demonstrates how conclusions are reached, 
thereby allowing others to assess research adequacy and trustworthiness for themselves 
(Rossman and Rallis 2003). We begin with a discussion of potential theoretical bases and 
approaches for pursuing such a systematic study. 
5.2.1 Theory in a qualitative research context 
What ' theory ' actually means depends on the context in which it is used . Thomas (1997) 
gives four broad meanings to the tenn 'theory ' : 
1. The opposite of practice, where theory is thinking and reflecting, as opposed to doing; 
2. A hypothesis ; 
3. A way to develop an explanation; 
4. Ideas formally expressed as statements that are falsifiable 188 . 
Shank (2002) describes a theory as a fonnal account of meaning which is useful by 
allowing us to make sense of complex phenomena. In some uses of theory, in particular 
where research questions allow quantitative approach to be used, testable hypotheses can be 
derived from that theory so that there is a clear link between what can be explained, and 
what can be predicted. In the realm of research that is more qualitatively focussed, a raft of 
theoretical bases and approaches exist. A selection of those of interest is presented below. 
Table 6: Theoretical perspectives in qualitative research 
Theoretical Perspective Central Questions 
Reality Testing What's really going on in the real world? What can we estab lish 
with some degree of certainty? What are plausible explanations 
for verifiable patterns? What's the truth insofar as we can get at 
it? How can we study a phenomenon so that our findings 
correspond, as much as possible, to the real world? 
Constructionism/constructivism How have the people in this setting constructed reality? What 
are their reported perceptions, truths , explanations , beli efs , and 
worldview? What are the consequences of their constructions 
for their behaviours and for those with whom they interact? 
188 Thi s of course is the genera l case of ' scientifi c theory ', a meaning of theory addressed by Kuhn , Popper, 
and others. 
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Narratology/narrative analysis What does this narrative or story reveal about the person and 
world from which it came? How can this narrative be 
interpreted to understand and illuminate the life and culture that 
created it? 
Grounded theory What theory emerges from systematic comparative analysis and 
is grounded in fieldwork so as to explain what has been and is 
observed? 
Source: Patton (2002, pp. 132-133) 
A grounded theory approach resides within a ' bottom-up' rather than ' top-down' 
perspective to drawing insights and conclusions from data. A ' top-down' perspective 
requires the adoption of a belief or approach about the research questions and resultant 
data, in advance of any analysis. This is in order to draw out findings that fit within a 
coherent framework of existing knowledge and approaches. In contrast, a ' bottom-up' 
perspective refers to the formulation of theory or a coherent framework that arises after or 
through examining the data. In other words, the difference between that and a ' top-down ' 
approach reflects the timing of when the researcher brings a level of intellectual 
organisation to the data (Thomas 1997) 189. The ' bottom-up' approach has virtually become 
the flagship for theory-oriented work in qualitative research, but both approaches can be 
complementary and can work hand in hand (Gibson and Browi:i 2009). 
5. 2.1.1 Shortcomings 
An obvious question to ask is whether we need a theoretical approach or basis to conduct 
this research. This is a common question for those undertaking social research, and an 
appropriate response is that it depends on the context (Gibson and Brown 2009). Firstly, a 
reference to or basis on theory can in fact be unhelpful in various circumstances. In the 
context of grounded theory, having a theory pre-specified in advance of data analysis (in 
the form of already identified variables or categories prior to engaging with the data) can be 
189 As Thomas (1997) states: "In most theorizing one might say the presupposition exists, while what occurs in grounded theory might be called ' postsupposition ' and an iterative visiting of the data to refine the theory" (p.81) . 
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constraining, and a poor choice risks irrelevance to the data under investigation (Gibson 
and Brown 2009). 
A further critique concerns the oft-held requirement of theory to generating academic 
legitimacy or credibility (Thomas 1997). Thomas (1997) highlights views of French social 
theorist and philosopher Michel Foucault that unusual and different opinions, as well as 
local and specific knowledge could be considered more. Thomas further highlights specific 
concerns with an overemphasis on theory: 
• Only certain kinds of endeavour in ( educational) inquiry are reinforced, and the 
legitimacy of atheoretical kinds sidelined; 
• Theory operates as a force for conservatism, by stabilizing the status quo 190 which 
merely encourages particular ways of thinking and discourages diversity of thought; 
• Theory is anchored to past ways of doing and seeing things, even to the point of 
forcing the theory to 'work' 191. 
Nevertheless, having a theoretical basis can offer opportunity for more insightful 
engagement with data, with the absence of either a reference or incorporation of theory 
often leading to merely descriptive and sometimes impoverished analysis (Gibson and 
Brown 2009). We clarify our approach shortly. 
5.2.2 Design strategies 
A ' naturalistic inquiry' approach which uses 'emergent design flexibility ' involves not 
being locked into rigid design strategies in advance of the actual research and analysis 
(Patton 2002) 192 . This is considered highly appropriate in many situations, particularly so 
when the focus of the research is not to test or extend existing or theoretical hypotheses, but 
rather to investigate some matter in as much depth as the data allows. Indeed, good and 
useful research is not necessarily characterised by formulating specific questions and 
190 This is via the "c ircumscription of thoug ht within a hermetic set of rul es , procedures and methods" 
(Thomas 1997 , p .76). 
191 According to Thomas ( 1997), theory " pays too much heed to that which is establi shed" (p.88) and it 
·'creates a · tran s-historical strait-jacket ' into which the evidence of hi sto ry is coerced" (p .98). 
192 Patton (2002) states that although ·'the design will specify an initial focus , plans for observations, and 
initial guiding interv iew questions, the naturalis tic and inductive nature of the inquiry makes it both 
impossible and inappropriate to spec ify operational variables, state testable hypotheses, or finali ze either 
in strumentation or sampling schemes. A naturali stic des ign unfolds or emerges as fi e ldwork unfold s" (p.44). 
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hypotheses in advance of the research, but it does require careful selection of case material 
to best meet the research goals. As any case selected for qualitative research is part of a 
wider set of possible cases, there should be a link between the phenomenon being studied 
through a particular case or cases, and how or where the particular details of that case sits 
within a larger context193 . For example, with a grounded theory approach, insights from the 
research should have their foundation in the details of the cases being studied themselves 
rather than having questions specified in advance, allowing an examination of major 
themes that emerge from the data directly (Patton 2002). This emphasises the importance of 
case selection within a qualitative framework. 
5.2.2. 1 The Case Study Approach 
Quantitative research typically utilises the law of large numbers to select either random or 
representative samples, from which inferences and probabilities can be deduced about a 
wider population. Indeed, the utilisation of representative data sets of respondents from 
panel data has characterised recent research by behavioural economists (Weber et al. 2011 ). 
The purpose of such research is to allow generalisations to be made, and as such if the cases 
are neither representative, nor random where case numbers allow, a problem emerges when 
trying to generalize theory from this (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). 
In contrast, if the objective is to derive as much information about a given problem or 
phenomenon within the context of the complex workings of the real world, the most 
appropriate approach may not involve selecting a representative case or a random sample. 
Rather, because of the required emphasis on placing findings within this real world context, 
the specifics of particular cases are paramount (Denzin and Lincoln 2005)1 94 . Such research 
may require in-depth consideration of causes and associated consequences of a problem or 
issue, so that an important criterion for case selection is its utility in generating such 
193 Marshall and Rossman (2010) give the example of a doctoral student in economics "who demonstrates that their qualitative case studies of five families ' financial decision making are relevant for understanding larger forces in the marketplace ... the case studies are significant because they illuminate in detail larger economic forces while focusing on individuals". The utility of this is that that the particulars of any study "serve to illuminate larger issues and therefore hold potential significance for that field" (p.7). 194 Stake (1995) also stresses this point: "Case study research is not sampling research. We do not study a case primarily to understand other cases. Our first obligation is to understand this one case" (p.4 ). 
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insights . Selecting cases to emphasise representativeness are unlikely to produce these 
kinds of insights, as 'typical ' or 'average' cases are often not as rich in inforniation 
(Flyvberg 2006). Clearly then, a case does not always need to be chosen to be 
representative of some population (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) 195 , and where the goal is 
not necessarily to generalise, but rather to consider a real world problem on its own merits , 
purposely selecting particular cases is more appropriate (Patton 2002). 
Choosing an appropriate case or cases is infl~enced by various factors and it is important to 
note that having just a single case to study is not unusual , as long as that case is chosen 
appropriately (Patton 2002) 196 . An appropriate choice should be that which best helps 
pursue the research goals or maximises the potential for learning (Stake 1995). Patton 
(2002) uses the term ' information-rich ' to identify those cases that are appropriate for 
study, with such cases generating much data about issues of central importance to the 
purpose of the research 197 . 
Such a case study would typically exploit the opportunity to be highly revealing in tenns of 
a particular phenomenon, an extreme example of a particular problem or issue, or if it 
conveniently presents an opportunity for research access that would not nonnally be 
available (Yin 1994, cited in Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Rather than pursuing typical 
or average cases, extreme cases can reveal more information relating to the research 
goals 198 , the events around the case may be quite dramatic and so interest and motivation is 
high, and the nature of such cases means that they illustrate things often overlooked in more 
typical case studies (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007; Flyvberg 2006; Stake 1995). 
Identifying such a case as being ' paradigmatic' for learning is not necessaril y 
straightforward however 199, but at this time we assert that 'we will know it when we see 
195 Or as Stake ( 1995) puts it , "good instrumental case study does not depend on being ab le to defend the 
typicality of it' · (p.4). 
196 Furthermore, " single-case studies can richl y describe the ex istence of a phenomenon '· (S iggelkow 2007 , 
c ited in Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007 , p.27). 
197 Hence the term " purposeful samplin g" (Patton 2002, p.46). 
198 This is " because they activate more actors and more basic mechani sms in the situation studied" (F lyvberg 
2006, p .229). 
199 American philosopher Hubert Dreyfus revea ls some of the difficulty with the se lec ti on and justifica tion of 
paradigmatic cases, which he sees as central to human learn ing: " You j ust have to be intuitive ... it is a bi g 
problem in a democratic society where people are supposed to justify what their intuitions are. In fact , nobody 
really can justify what their intuition is. So yo u have to make up reasons, but it won't be the real reason s'· 
(personal communication ( 1988) , ci ted in Flyvberg 2006 , p .232). 
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it' 200 . A further factor is the limitation of research time and access (Stake 1995). In other 
words, the case of choice needs to be not only accessible, but in a manner which is as 
tractable as resources allow. 
Typically case study research can be taken in unexpected directions (Stake 1995) and there 
is a heavy reliance on the interpretations that participants and researchers bring to bear 
(Flyvberg 2006). Both of these factors can lead to the critique that such research can be 
' subjective' (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007) and merely 'stories' (Shank 2002). However, 
many authors address these concerns. In a methodological context, showing a close 
adherence to the data can demonstrate that findings and resultant theory building can be as 
objective as is appropriate (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007), with such adherence often 
shown via examples of raw data, such as extended narratives and quotes. However, such 
narrative can also be seen as a drawback, but where substantial narrative is presented (due 
to the difficulty in summarising the complexities of the real lives of participants, rather than 
for the sake of verbosity), this can be more positively viewed as the case uncovering a 
"particularly rich problematic" (Flyvberg 2006, p.237). Where narratives and presentation 
of raw data leads to the charge of the research being just 'stories', Shank (2002) highlights 
that where these stories are coherent and reliably based on observations and other data 
collection, then this itself is a useful insight201 . 
In sum, a case study approach within a qualitative framework offers the opportunity to 
discover useful insights about the complexities of the real world, within the bounds of the 
stated research goals. This can be done systematically, orderly, and notably using a variety 
of data sources, lending credibility to the overall approach and resultant findings. The 
choice of an appropriate case is that which allows maximum insight to be generated about 
the goals of the research, and this requires knowing in detail the particular circumstances of 
the case. This is also so that if implications for a wider context are made, the researcher and 
readers are then aware of the limitations of such implications (Patton 2002; Stake 1995). 
200 With our defence that if United States Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart can use this phrase on serious 
matters in court (see http ://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/I know it when I see it) , then we can use it also. 20 1 Shank (2002) actually states this more purposively than our more guarded summary: "if we fmd certain 
accounts and discoveries and observations and happenings all fit neatly together into a lawful and coherent 
story, then we have uncovered a powerful source of order in the world" (p.15). The overall point however is that "story is the enemy of chance" (Shank 2002, p.15) . 
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5.2.3 Adopted approach 
The research questions stated earlier are the focus for thi s study. To the extent that a 
theoretical basis or approach assists us in pursuing such questions and gives explanation to 
the findings that are uncovered, then that is clearly worthwhile. However, rather than giving 
attention to whether or not we should name an explicit theoretical base, the utility in 
considering the question of such a basis at this stage is how elements of different 
approaches can be useful for the collection and analysis of data202 . Our approach then is not 
concerned with theory as ' the opposite ·of practice ', nor hypotheses or falsifiable 
statement(s) to be tested, but more a way to engage with data and develop an explanation 
for what emerges from interpretation of that data203 . 
We consider that an approach utilising elements of grounded theory offers us a useful 
guide, to the extent that from data collected and analysed in a systematic and opportune 
manner, we observe patterns, and make sense or offer explanation of those. Elements of 
narrative inquiry also feature in this research which like grounded theory, does not start 
from explicit theoretical assumptions (Flyvberg 2006) . Whether this generates ' theory' in 
the sense described by Eisenhardt and Graebner (2007) and others is not the central goal 
here, but certainly an approach grounded in the data of this study is the key foundational 
step we take. 
Stating that this study will be based or grounded in the data is not merely intellectual 
politeness towards previously described approaches (or more correctly, groupings of 
approaches, as for example, grounded theory itself can infer a range of meanings204). 
Rather, it highlights that every qualitative study is unique, necessitating the need for an 
approach which although systematic, is necessarily also unique. As such, mechanically 
choosing a method from a list of available options is not appropriate205 , and given the 
202 A point similar to that ra ised by Gibson and Brown (2009) who hi gh I ight the " worry" of many researchers 
about the " requirement of having ' a theory', which can sound rather daun ting" (p. 13) . Rather than seeing it is 
'daunting ', we prefer to categorise this concern as ' di stracting ' . 
203 G ibson and Brown (2009) further state that " theory is a practical activity and a way of thinkin g through 
probl ems or of looking at thin gs in different ways ... theory is a resource for doing things with data" (p. 19). 204 Grounded theory "can re fer to something extremel y specific and to nothing much in particular, depending 
on how it is being used" (Gibson and Brown 2009 , p. I 3). 
205 Ind eed, ·'no rig id rules can prescribe what data to gather to investigate a particular interest or probl em. 
There is no rec ipe or formula in making method s deci sions" (Patton 2002 , p. 12). 
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emergent nature of research when dealing with human subjects, specifying the detail in 
advance of each step especially with regard to later interpretation is not appropriate either 
(Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Rather, we seek data that is available and informative, and with 
that data, bring to bear a se1ies of analytical tools that make sense of this unique data set 
(Becker 1998, cited in Denzin and Lincoln 2005). 
The collapse of Storm financial offers a unique opportunity in this regard, with respect to 
our research goals. The magnitude of losses suffered, the wealth of publicly available data, 
the willingness of investors to share their stories further (as described shortly), the relative 
geographic concentration of investors in Queensland, and the relevance of the collapse to 
Governmental reforms and the financial services industry lends itself to a potentially 
information-rich case study approach which is both tractable and motivating206. A further 
advantage of this case study in particular relates to the reality of what has unfolded. That is, 
real people have made real decisions in the real world, and suffered real losses, which is a 
contrast to much research (both qualitative and quantitative) in the financial services 
industry which often bases surveys, questionnaires, and other data sources on hypothetical 
rather than real actions207. 
Hence, this case study allows us to respond to the main research question ( either directly 
answered, or indirectly inferred from the data) in a manner which is consistent with 
elements of a narrative approach (Flyvberg 2006). Building 'theory' in the epistemological 
sense, as inferred from the data and interpretation, is not a goal, but offering additional, 
informed and evidential commentary on wider issues is seen as achievable and useful208 . 
Due to the wealth of data available with Storm's collapse, this case study also allows the 
possibility of data saturation, which is consistent with the concepts of a grounded theory 
206 Whilst a case study approach is not the only way to pursue our research questions, given that "the choice 
of method should clearly depend on the problem under study and its circumstances" (Flyvberg 2006, p.226), then the match of research goals with the unfortunate impact on investors and the public circumstances of the 
collapse, gives an unusually close alignment of ' research goals' with 'available case study'. 207 Many such studies ask questions like ' What would you do if...?' , or ' In this situation, suppose that. .. '. There is value in such questions and certainly "such survey data should be seen as an additional and 
complementary source of data", but also noted is that "hypothetical actions are hypothetical, and some might argue that such data reflect cheap talk" (Weber et al. 2011). 208 Flyvberg (2006) states that "in the study of human affairs, there appears to exist only context-dependent knowledge" (p.221 ), and furthermore, "predictive theories and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search for predictive theories and universals" (p.224). 
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approach (Gibson and Brown 2009). This involves the analysis getting to a stage where 
nothing new is being added, but rather a routine reaffirmation of what has already been 
discovered. 
What we pursue then is a case-study approach which has a basis in elements of grounded 
theory and narrative analysis (as just two ' headliner' approaches) , though the detail of the 
approach taken to obtain and work with each source of data is specific to each source and 
described as such, where relevant. The main data sources for case studies in general are 
interviews, observations, and document analysis (Denzin and Lincoln 2005), although m 
our case there is much variety in what is available. These sources are described shortly. 
5.2.3. 1 A cautionary note 
Given the understandably emotive issues arising from an involved look into the lives of real 
people faced with a significant traumatic event, we caution here what this research is not 
intending to resolve. One interpretation (and a superficial one, in our view) of the 
circumstances and fallout from Storm' s collapse might suggest that it is an example of 
investors who knowingly took on high risk and lost due to the unfortunate timing of having 
their leveraged strategies decimated by the GFC. However a more considered examination 
of the collapse might likely tell other stories, as indicated in chapter three. We consider that 
neither a superficial reading nor an extended examination of the particular events 
surrounding Storm' s collapse will add benefit to the goals of this research. Indeed, the 
various judgements about Stonn ' s collapse that reside in the public domain may present 
varying degrees of truth or accuracy, but our focus is on the impact on real lives and 
offering some insights based on thi s, rather than ascertaining actual responsibility for the 
collapse209 . Hence, we take an approach that is deliberately sparse with judgements about 
209 The chair of the PJCI , MP Berni e Ripoll stated that " this inquiry is not a court. W e are not here to judge. We are not here to pass judgment. W e are not a court. We are a parl iamentary committee. We have a certain range of powers. We are inquiring very broadly into financial products and services" ( PJ C I public hear in g in Cairns on I September 2009 , p . l ). He later hi ghlighted that it has not "been poss ibl e to reso lve the contradictory evidence received from Stonn investors, the banks that provided margin loans, or Stom1 Fi nanci a l themse lves" (c ited in Balogh and Cha lmers 2009). If the collec ti ve investiga tion of one am1 of the machinery of government is unable or unwilling to draw lines in the sand in tenns o f responsibility, there is littl e that we can add to thi s w hen focu si ng on other aspects of Storm 's collapse. 
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responsibilities, but do report and comment enough on these issues to provide context for 
individual perspectives, thoughts or feelings that emerge in relation to the research goals. 
But, this does not mean we leave our own perspective at the door entirely, for that in itself 
does not make for better qualitative research (K vale and Brinkmann 2009; Magolda and 
Weems 2002; Stake 1995). Indeed, the combination of opportunity and responsibility for 
any researcher infers that judgements, even in an advocacy sense, should not be shied away 
from (Magolda and Weems 2002; Stake 1995)210. What is important though is that any 
views being offered on the more controversial aspects of Storm' s collapse, within the 
context of our research goals, should be given in a way which lets the reader draw their 
own conclusions as well. Naturally enough, if enough people say similar things about some 
version of events, then that may well be telling the reader something more than otherwise 
would be the case. 
5.3 Data 
5.3.1 Data Sources in Qualitative Research 
A range of data sources are used within qualitative research, with the availability of each 
source dependent on each particular study. The range may include the analysis of many 
types of documents, such as observational, historical , interactional, and visual texts; 
cultural texts, memorabilia, artefacts, productions and artistic works; personal accounts 
such as personal diaries and letters ; official records and commentaries found in newspapers, 
annual reports, correspondence, memoranda, minutes of meetings, and other official 
publications and reports; and organizational, clinical, or programs records (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005 ; Patton 2002 ; Stake 1995). An additional source are those things that the 
researcher is proactively involved in developing, such as interviews, introspection, field 
notes, observations, conversations, photographs, recordings, and memos to the self (Denzin 
and Lincoln 2005 ; Patton 2002). Surveys can also feature as a source of data (Patton 2002), 
with increased usage and interest in recent years in behavioural finance and personal 
210 
"It is better to give the reader a good look at the researcher. Often, it is better to leave on the wrappings of 
advocacy that remind the reader: Beware. Qualitative research does not dismiss invalidity of description and 
encourage advocacy. It recognises that invalidities and advocacies are ever present and turns away from the 
goal as well as the presumption of sanjtization" (Stake 1995, p.95) . 
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finance (Baker and Mukherjee 2007; Neuhauser 2007). Also of impo1iance is the personal 
experience and engagement of the researcher themselves2 11 . 
In particular, personal interviews have many benefits, and are part of the methodological 
approach adopted by many studies in the area of personal financial plaiming and 
experience212 • One benefit is the potential to explore issues in depth2 13 (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner 2007; FSA 2009; McAlexander and Scaimnon 1988 ; Patton 2002), and notably 
when these issues concern real life rather than hypothetical experience (FSA 2009). 
Interviews are also particularly useful when the phenomenon in question is rare or occurs 
infrequently (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). This largely stems from the ability to take a 
flexible approach when interviewing, by adapting to the individual (and potentially novel) 
case. This allows a focus of effort to occur on those themes or aspects of the case that 
emerge as important, as the interview itself occurs (McAlexander and Scaimnon 1988). An 
outcome of this is that the interviewees are given the opportunity to desc1ibe the world as 
they see it, without the restriction of standardised questions or categories that may be a 
prominent feature of other approaches such as surveys and questionnaires (Patton 2002). 
Patton (2002) sees the ' pigeon holing ' of responses as highly counterproductive, to the 
extent that the real stories and perceptions held by individuals may not get an accurate 
h . . h h 2 14 eanng m ot er approac es . 
However, statements made in interviews can be ambiguous and contradictory (K vale and 
Brinkmann 2009). We note however that this can be a feature of many data sources in 
qualitative research, and in fact an advantage of an interview is that ambiguity in responses 
can be clarified at the time, depending on the knowledge and attention of the interviewer. 
This as well as the overall success of an interview is also dependent on the degree of 
rapport and ope1mess between the interviewer and interviewee. Other critiques of an 
2 11 Patton (2002) states thi s as a hi ghly relevant data source, as " th e researcher has direct contact with and gets 
c lose to the people, s ituation , and phenomenon under study; the researcher 's personal experiences and in sights are an important part of the inquiry and critical to understanding the phenomenon" (p.40). 2 12 For example, FSA (2009), Into (2003) , McA!exander and Scamm on ( I 988). 213 Particularl y to achieve insights into " people ' s experiences, perceptions, op inions, fee lings , and knowledge" (Patton 2002 , p .2 1 ). 
2 14 Peterson et a l. (20 I 0) cite the anthropologica l s tudies of Mudimbe ( 1994) and Maso lo ( 1988) who see loca l people themselve s as legitim ate producers of knowledge, urg ing others to " let narratives stand on loca l people 's own terms and fall out a long lin es of demarcation that local peop le themselves choose, rather than 
seeing knowledge as being defined on ly as an ·objective product of the expert"' (p.9). 
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interview approach are an associated lack of scientific rigour in that the findings may not be 
reproducible (K vale and Brinkmann 2009) and that there is often a clear bias with 
responses that are given (McAlexander and Scammon 1988)2 15 . With respect to the former 
charge, an approach does not have to fulfil positivist criteria to be useful, and for both 
charges, with regards to our research goals it is a positive feature that we capture the 
emotive, circumstantial and temporal aspects of financial loss, which may be neither 
reproducible nor neutral by any definition. Nonetheless however, the issue of bias in 
responses is important and is addressed shortly. 
With regards to the case of Storm, a wealth of qualitative data exists in the public domain, 
including a range of industry and media opinions, comment and stories, the findings of the 
PJCI, the non-confidential submissions made to the PJCI, and transcripts of related public 
hearings. These public data sources are described in more detail below, as well as the 
additional data, including interviews, that have been sourced privately. 
5.3.2 Our Data Sources 
5.3.2.1 Submissions to the PJCJ 
The PJCI included the opportunity for any interested person(s) to make a submission to the 
committee. As such a number of submissions were made from a range of interested parties, 
including financial advisers, related professional institutions and associations, government 
agencies, and individuals of whom many were directly impacted by the events leading to 
the PJCI. A breakdown of these submissions is below: 
215 The point made by McA!exander and Scammon ( 1988) is reasonable in that interviews can "provoke a 
'knee-jerk ' reaction that the data are biased in which impression management and retrospective sense making 
are deemed the prime culprits. The prototypical reader asks, Is the theory just retrospective sensemaking by 
image-conscious informants?" (p .188). 
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Table 7: Breakdown of Submissions to the PJCI 
Type of Submitter Number of Number 
submissions of pages 
Impacted investors from Stom1 Financial 168 763 
Other investors 74 310 
Financial Advisers / Planners 43 486 
Financial Services Professional Organisation / Institute / Association 21 378 
Individuals not identifying as investors 12 51 
Private businesses related to financial services 9 65 
Corporate such as bank / credit provider / insurer / margin lender 8 264 
Ex-Stonn employees 5 72 
Other2 10 16 490 
Confidential217 42 Not known 
Total 398218 2879 
Source: Submissions are available at: 
http: //www.aph.gov .au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/Senate Commi ttees?url=corporations 
ctte/fps/submissions/ sublist.htm>. 
Given the case study approach we have adopted and the focus on the impact on investors, 
the 168 submissions from Storm investors constitute a major (but not exhaustive) part of 
what we later refer to. All submissions constitute a fonn of survey, not as a representative 
pool of investors in general , but a select group of those who are interested in the purpose of 
the PJCI2 19. The associated bias of any views is viewed as providing context for any points 
216 This includes consulting and legal firms, information, advocacy and service organisations, academics, ASIC, the T reasury, the Finance Sector Union, and one politician (the Hon Dr Bob Such). 217 To quote the PJCI : "The Committee routinely makes submissions public during the inquiry, including by pos ting them on the internet. However, the Committee will consider requests to keep a submi ssion 
confidential. Please indicate very clearly on your submission if you want it to be kept confidential. It is helpful to the Committee's considerations if you al so provide a brief reason for thi s request", available at 
www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/Senate Committees? url=corporations ctte/fps/info. ht 
m, accessed 1 I January 2011 . 
218 In addition, there were a further 37 supplementary submissions, 2 submissions as a fonn letter concerning the ro le of CGI / CFS / CBA in Storm, and 5 submissions as responses to adverse or other comments made in 
other submi ss ions (thi s latter point reflecting th e PJC's statement th at "some submi ssions to this inquiry 
refl ect adversely on another person, organisa tion or business. The Committee, through the Secretariat, will 
endeavour to contact these individual s, organisa ti ons or businesses to alert them to such comment and provide them with an opportuni ty to reply"'). 
219 Nevertheless. the vo lume of submissions is noted. Indeed, Bernie Ripoll stated that ·'we have rece ived 
more than 400 submissions to the inquiry, which is the largest number of submi s ions thi s committee has ever 
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made rather than a problem per se, so that rather than considering how to draw out the 
objectivity of any points made, we consider the subjective and personal perspectives about 
the human side of personal loss as informative in addressing the research goals. 
Public submission 154, from consulting firm AEC Group Ltd, reported results of a survey 
of SICAG (see footnote {121}) members concerning various aspects of their involvement 
with Stonn. One survey of 421 members was carried out in April 2009, and a second 
survey with 314 responses was conducted soon thereafter. The summary statistics arising 
from these surveys are also used as contextual evidence as appropriate, and will be cited as 
such. 
It was not anticipated that the use of any submissions would generate any concerns of an 
ethical nature220, but nevertheless it was considered that avoiding an explicit focus on 
specific names and details of particular individuals was appropriate. However, although our 
focus is not necessarily on such specific details, they are not necessarily avoided either 
where their inclusion adds to the context of the point being made and/or makes for easier 
reading. Notably all submissions referred to are publicly available, so any material drawn 
from here is not based on anything that is not available to any other interested party. 
For later presentation, the citation style when needing to quote from a public submission 
will be of the form: 
I am an investor with Storm Financial. [public submission no ., from xxx] 
had and which I think is an indication of the level of interest in and the importance of what this inquiry does" 
(PJCI public hearing in Cairns on 1 September 2009, p.1). 
220 To be sure about this aspect, we rang the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services on 11 January 2011. A discussion with Mr Ian Holland confirmed that he foresaw no issues with the 
use for research of the public submissions made. However, he cautioned that if we were to later contact those 
who had made a submission (and although contact details of each submitter were withheld, as discussed 
shortly we established contact with many investors through other means), then those individuals should not be 
pressed to justify their submission or be made to feel uncomfortable about it. This caution was noted and 
nothing in subsequent contact and interviews, to our knowledge, generated any concern related to this. 
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5.3.2.2 Transcripts of Public Hearings 
Nine public hearing were held as part of the PJCI. These hearings offered an opportunity 
for many of those who made written submissions to clarify or update their comments, as 
well as engage further on certain matters. The hearings also offered P JCI members an 
opportunity to clarify for themselves the comments made in submissions, to ask questions 
that had not been answered in submissions, and to have a more dynamic interaction with 
key players and parties in the light of discussions and hearings held since written 
submissions had been made. The details of these hearings and their publicly available 
transcribed records are as follows . 
Table 8: Details of public hearings 
Number and date of Location Length of transcribed Number of parties (people) 
hearing record (pages) appearing before committee 
[ 1] 24 June 2009 Canberra 50 1 (5) 
[2] 26 August 2009 Melbourne 116 8 (19) 
[3] 28 August 2009 Canberra 89 6 (18) 
[4] 1 September 2009 Cairns 105 4 (13nl ) 
[5] 2 September 2009 Townsville 112 6(14222) 
[6] 3 September 2009 Brisbane 115 7 (10) 
[7] 4 September 2009 Sydney 120 7 (20) 
[8] 16 September 2009 Canberra 58 2 (8) 
[9] 28 October 2009 Canberra 58 2 (7) 
Total 823 43 (114)LLJ 
Source: Transcripts are available at: 
<http: //www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary _Business/Committees/Senate_ Committees?url=corporation 
s _ ctte/fps/hearings/index.htm>. 
22 1 6 of these 13 individuals spoke at an open microphone session, held after scheduled witnesses had spoken . 222 6 of these 14 individuals spoke at an open microphone session, held after scheduled witnesses had spoken. 223 ASI C representati ves, CBA representatives, and one individual appeared more than once , meaning that the 
total number of di stinct parties appearing was 40 and the number of distinct individual s was 106. 
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For the later presentation of findings, the citation style when quoting from a public 
submission will be of the form: 
I have a voice to be heard in public. [public hearing [4], p.12] 
5.3.2.3 Interviews 
As noted earlier, a collective group of impacted investors called the Storm Investors 
Consumer Action Group (SICAG)224 was formed following Storm's collapse. As such 
SICAG was an ideal point of contact to ascertain whether any ex-Storm investors were 
interested in being interviewed for this research. Prior to contacting SICAG however, ethics 
approval was obtained from the Australian National University on 8 April 2011. This 
approval required us to address a number of issues, such as proposed methodology, risks 
involved with the research, whether any incentives would be made, how consent would be 
gained, cultural and social sensitivities, and so on225 . 
We then contacted a co-chairman of SICAG (Mr Mark Weir) in September 2011, to 
ascertain interest amongst SICAG's membership. Mr Weir gave us an enthusiastic 
endorsement and as a result of his passing on our contact details and research interest, 
twelve investors contacted us for participation226 . Although given the option of face to face 
interviews or questionnaires, all twelve respondents preferred to meet in person for an 
interview. The practicalities of this were enhanced by the fact that Storm was 
predominantly Queensland based. Three further participants were later added to this initial 
twelve227 . Thus, a total of fifteen different participants (a 'participant' is either an 
individual or a couple) were interviewed. Key profiles of those interviewed and the setting 
224 See www.sicag.info . Not all ex-Storm investors joined SICAG, with co-chairman Mark Weir stating his 
concern that many investors had not come forward: "Regrettably, we did not have the benefit of a database to 
assist our initial efforts to organise the investors group ... although we succeeded in identifying the majority 
through (other) sources, we believe there remain many, who for one reason or another, possibly through a 
misplaced feeling of embarrassment or simply not having the emotional energy to do what is necessary, have 
not come forward" (Wilson 2012a). 
225 The ethics approval and associated documentation can be supplied upon request. 
226 The information letter and ethics information note sent to participants is attached at Appendix B. 
227 Two of these three additions were via referrals arising from interviews with the initial twelve. The third 
additional participant made contact after we forwarded an initial paper of interview findings to SICAG for 
distribution in August 2012. This initial paper is discussed shortly. 
- 144 -
of the interviews are given below: 
► Thirteen participants were investors with Stonn, and two had been advisers with 
Stonn (and who also were investors) ; 
► Ten interviews took place in October 2011, three in November 2011 , one in March 
2012 and one in September 2012; 
► Three participants were from New South Wales, four were from the Brisbane and 
Gold Coast regions, three were from the Sunshine Coast region, and five were from 
North Queensland; 
► Thirteen interviews took place in people ' s homes, one in a coffee shop, and one was 
by phone due to a remote location. As such, most were in a relaxed environment 
and several interviews took place over morning or afternoon tea, and on three 
occasions during or just before a meal228 . Where the interview involved a couple 
rather than an individual , often one of the couple would come in and out of the 
interview as domestic circumstances dictated ; 
► Seven interviews were with couples where both were investors, four were with 
individuals where their partner was also an investor but did not want to interview, 
two were with couples where one was an investor and one was not but both 
participated in the interview, and two were with single individuals. Thus, from these 
fifteen interviews, twenty-four individuals in all were involved in the interview 
process; 
► One interviewee was in their thirties , four in their forties, two in their fifties, ten in 
their sixties, and seven in their seventies; 
► Participants had a range of former or current occupations, including community and 
service, professional , building/manufacturing, retail and other roles. 
Given the public nature of Storn1's collapse and the exposure of various individuals through 
the range of public infonnation available, we have chosen not to specify occupations in any 
further detail than what is above, nor to disclose combinations of certain features . For 
example. for us to specify that we interviewed a 25 year old married male video store 
:!cs An approac h to inteniews with open-ended ques tions and under comfo rtable and familiar conditi ons is 
helpful (Parton 2002). 
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owner from Tully in North Queensland229 could lead to that participant inadvertently being 
identified, breaching confidentiality and potentially causing hann to that individual. 
Furthermore, for the presentation of findings in later chapters, as a general rule we do not 
explicitly identify each interviewee with all statements made by them, but we do make 
exceptions where helpful and safe to do so. For example, if our Tully interviewee stated 
that "my friends have been no help at all", and also stated that "I went and saw the adviser 
in September 2008 and he told me nothing about the risks but said to invest my redundancy 
from Big W", then identifying both statements with that one person also raises the risks of 
inadvertent harm230 . Instead, we will keep the citation style generic as per the following: 
I am an investor with Storm Financial. [interview with Storm investor]23 1 
Whilst this approach potentially removes some ability of the reader to view each 
interviewee ' s circumstances in more detail, we consider it necessary to ensure that the 
moral and ethical assertions given to interviewees about confidentiality are given 
precedence over the utility for the reader. This is a particular issue for this case study, given 
the fact that legal action is unfinished, and the large volume of public data available232 . 
Where we need to present more detail about a particular aspect of someone's experience, 
we do this explicitly at the time when that point is made233 . 
The fifteen initial interviews ranged in length from approximately 40 minutes to 3 hours 
(approximately 21 hours in total across all fifteen interviews), and all were recorded 
electronically. Within two weeks of each interview a full transcription was made through a 
229 To clarify the fictional nature of this particular description: No participants were 25 years old, none were 
video store owners, and none were from Tully, let alone a combination of those features. 
230 This harm could be to the participant, his own circle of friends , others who have not resolved their own 
situations with their bank (if for example the statements made concerned the Tully participant 's own dealings 
with his credit provider) , or anyone else drawing inferences from such statements. 
23 1 Rather than, for example: " I am an investor with Storm Financial. [interviewee number 12]" 232 Even a brief search of the PJCI transcripts and public submissions reveals some common names to both of 
those sources. If a particular investor's views are represented in more than one data source, we take care not 
to over-emphasise views of one individual or group of individuals. Rather we seek to consolidate them into 
one consistent view, or highlighted at the time of any double-up so as to not give it undue attention. This is 
not seen as a major issue. 
233 For example, the Tully participant may now avoid family occasions due to shame about his financial loss, 
which may be due to the poor reception he got from friends , and/or that he invested against his family ' s 
advice. Presenting a thread of reasoning such as this will be done when a point about (for example) social 
isolation is made, rather than by referring to earlier statements being explicitly identified with him. 
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professional transcription service234, with these fifteen interviews giving rise to 402 pages 
of recorded conversation. Over a further two week period we read through that transcript 
whilst listening to the interview again, to correct any misunderstandings or misquotes made 
by the transcriber. The updated transcripts were then sent out to each respective participant, 
so that each had a full transcript of their interview within four weeks of that interview. 
Participants could then check they were happy with the fidelity of their recollection of the 
conversation, they could add or clarify anything further that had occurred to them in 
hindsight, and also they could assess as an additional step whether they were still happy 
that everything they have said was still allowed to be used further. As a result of this 
checking process, one made minor corrections and sent them back to us, two sent back 
further thoughts , insights, and annotations within the transcript about their experiences, four 
confirmed that they were happy with the record, and eight did not reply specifically on this 
point. None objected to the fidelity of the transcript as a record. 
The original group of twelve interview participants then participated in a follow up 
interview in January 2013. Thus, there were twenty seven interviews in all 235 . The twelve 
follow up interviews were typically shorter than the initial interviews (ranging in length 
from 30 minutes to 1 hour 50 minutes, and totalling approximately 12 hours overall), as the 
initial interviews had provided much of the detail of the interviewees ' background and 
history with Storm. All twelve were again interviewed in person, in their own homes. An 
electronic recording was again taken but rather than being transcribed in full , it was used in 
conjunction with notes made during the interview as a record of salient issues arising. 
5. 3. 2. 4 Observations 
A further data source includes what can be termed ' observations ' . These include notes and 
descriptions that were recorded at interviews, relating to additional insights that were not 
captured by the interview transcript itself. For example, it may be one thing to record 
someone· s statement that their loss of money has made life difficult financiall y, but it is 
another thing to see the confinnation and extent of guttering on a house not fixed , the car 
234 With fu ll confidentiality c lauses understood and signed in advance . 235 So to c larify - the t\\ eh ·e who ini ti ally responded direc tl y via SICAG each parti c ipated in two interviews, 
and the three partic ipants who were added after the initia l twelve interviews were each interviewed once. 
- 147 -
not working, the emptying of a household as items are sold off, and so on. Observations in 
general are a useful data source to provide additional context for specific quotations and 
perspectives given by interviewees. 
Another item under ' observations ' arose from the occurrence of a public meeting m 
Townsville in October 2011. This was an update by the legal firm Levitt Robinson as to 
their class action against some bank(s), and somewhat fortuitously we were advised of its 
occurrence by an interviewee the previous day. Notes were taken at this meeting and any 
observations of use to our findings will be cited as such. 
Furthermore, the utility of and reference to the observations of others has already been 
adopted in chapter three when discussing the specifics of Storm236 . This continues within 
the analysis and discussion which follows, and provides a useful check of facts as well as 
our perceptions and interpretation of the major themes arising. 
5.3.2.5 Other Correspondence 
A variety of what we term 'other correspondence ' has also been received in the course of 
this research, and this provides a further and highly insightful data source. This 
correspondence has arisen from several sources. Firstly, from presentations made to a range 
of interested parties237, where feedback has been given and noted on the overall research 
idea, the methodology employed, and initial findings . Some of this feedback had already 
been incorporated into this thesis, and other relevant feedback will be cited as such where it 
appears. 
A second source of other correspondence arose from the production of two papers for 
Australian financial industry journals, with these papers describing some general findings 
that stood out from the early stages of the research. The journals were deliberately chosen 
236 
'Others ' here means politicians, regulators, the banks, advisers, other professional groups, investors, 
people associated with media (including television, radio, newspaper and on-line reporters) , other interested 
persons, and so on. 
237 Presentations to date have been made to ANU colleagues (2011 , 2013 ), to a conference of the US Society 
of Actuaries featuring both an academic and practitioner audience (2011 ), and to an academic, actuarial and 
regulatory audience at the University of Auck.land (2012). 
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to draw comment from their audiences of financial advisers and subsequently upon further 
circulation, impacted individuals. The first paper, ' Surprises from Storm ', was published in 
the Journal of Financial Advice in August 2012 (a copy of the paper is at Appendix C). The 
second paper, ' Aftennath of a Storm ', was published in Th e Australian Journal of 
Financial Planning in March 2013 (a copy of the paper is at Appendix 0)238 . Both papers 
were forwarded to each interview participant and also to SICAG, who then forwarded them 
on to their membership. As a result of these papers being put into the public domain 
through publication and circulation, eight financial advisers and seven additional ex-Stonn 
investors239 corresponded with us with various insights, comments and invitations to talk 
further. Where such correspondence provides additional sources for points of interest, is it 
is cited as such240. 
5.3.3 Summary 
Thus, a large variety and volume of data is available to help address the research goals . As 
the primary research question has a definite temporal aspect241 , of relevance is what time 
period each data source primarily applies to. A summary is given below for clarification. 
Table 9: Summary of data sources 
Time period that data source can relate to 
Data Source Investing Time of Stonn ' s Up to six months 3-4 years after 
with Storm collapse following collapse collapse 
Submissions to PJCI ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Hearings of PJCI ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Interviews ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Observations ✓ 
Other correspondence ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
238 Publicati on of thi s paper was delayed for so me time due to an editoria l decision to take a conservati ve 
approach, given that various matters concerning Storm Financial were (and are) before the Federal Court in 
Brisbane. 
139 One of which led to the aforementioned recruitment of the fifteenth interview parti c ipant (fo r which the 
im er. iew took place in September 20 12). 
"
40 The use of any re levant ema il correspondence as a further data source was di sc ussed with ANU 's ethi cs 
commi ttee. and subsequently approved . Thjs app rova l can be supplied upon request. 141 Indeed. asking what the impac ts are of financ ial loss is a time-dependent ques ti on, as the experiences o f 
each irn·es tor might diffe r depending wha t stage of pre- or post- collapse is being referred to. 
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There is a risk with such a summary, in that the overlapping of timelines and indeed data 
sources is never as distinct and precise as such a picture suggests. Nevertheless, it is 
presented as a guide to the relevance of each data source within the context of the overall 
research goals. 
5 .4 Methodology 
There is a three-fold challenge with using qualitative data. Firstly, to make sense of it, 
secondly, to present it coherently and in a consistent and workable manner, and thirdly, to 
ensure and then portray that the ' sense ' being made is, in fact, sensible and believable. Each 
of these three challenges is discussed below. 
5.4.1 Analysis of the Data 
Common to much qualitative research is the discovery that a raft of data can eventually be 
framed into a number of key themes (McAlexander and Scammon 1988; Patton 2002). A 
theme is not merely a description of what common points or issues have emerged from the 
data, but also reflects key factors , relationships and dependencies between those points or 
issues. More succinctly, a theme can be regarded as an insight into patterns that are evident 
within the data (du Plessis et al. 2010; Hill 2007; Patton 2002)242. 
5.4.1.1 Construction of themes 
An important question is how key themes are determined to have emerged from the data. 
This begins with ' immersion' in the data, generally by reading all materials right through 
(Corbin and Strauss 2008), with the goal to be highly familiar with the overall responses or 
statements made. This then allows the researcher to begin the process of identifying 
patterns amongst those responses that are non-trivial (Hill 2007)243 . 
242 Furthermore and on a cautionary note, although "ideas comprise something more like a pattern, a picture, 
or a story" (Bereska 2003 , p.66), these " ideas do not easily and neatly fit into the boxes constructed by 
categories ... when dealing with themes and patterns it becomes obvious that something that can be 
experienced only as a whole has been taken apart in a somewhat unnatural fashion to allow the human mind 
to get a better grasp of it" (Tesch 1987, cited in Bereska 2003 , pp.66-67). 
243 A requirement for qualitative researchers is to "learn to separate the meaningful from the trivial, explore 
patterns in the data, and then articulate the patterns they perceive" (Hill 2007, p.30). 
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Some researchers then appeal or refer to a systematic process that they used to identify the 
core patterns and themes . The unequivocal point that we take here is a requirement to be 
systematic in whatever approach is taken, rather than being concerned with whatever 
particular label is applied to this process244 . Indeed, systematic is not the same as fonnulaic, 
with the latter approach unsuitable for most qualitative research given the differences 
between any two real world cases (Anfara et al. 2002; Patton 2002 ; Peterson et al. 2010)245. 
However, taking a systematic approach allows the crucial features of theme development to 
occur, these features being interpretation and intuition. Interpretation is a feature of all 
research (Stake 1995), and the primary interpretive instrument in qualitative research is the 
researcher themselves (Freeman et al. 2007 ; Gibson and Brown 2009; Hill 2007; Stake 
1995). Patton (2002) further infers that the resultant onus on the researcher is significant246 , 
with the researcher 's own perspective on the issue or problem being studied of much 
significance (we address potential and resultant issues of bias and/or subjectivity shortly). 
Furthermore, the development of themes from such interpretation is seen as a challenging 
task (Anfara et al. 2002; Bereska 2003; Flyvberg 2006; Freeman et al. 2007; Patton 2002). 
The intuition of the researcher in conducting data analysis is also an unavoidable feature of 
qualitative research247 , but crucially it is not merely a best guess, stab in the dark, or merely 
matter of opinion (Freeman et al. 2007). Rather, the use of intuition to develop themes and 
hence summarise the key aspects of an array of data is rendered systematic and acceptable 
244 For example, du Pless is et al. (20 10) describe a "thematic analyses coding process '· with ·'a three-step 
progression and involved develop ing concepts and categories to organise data into a frame work of ideas; 
comparing data in stances, cases and categories for similarities and differences, an d uni fy ing key them es'· (p.4 ). 
245 For exampl e, .. making sense of multipl e interview transcripts and pages of field notes cannot be reduced to 
a formu la or even a standard seri es of steps. There is no equivalent of a statistical signifi cance tes t or fa ctor 
score to te ll the anal yst wh en resu lts are important or what quotati ons fit together under th e sa me theme'· (Patton 2002. p.57) : .. we share the danger of reducing th e practice of qualitati ve research (inclusive of arti stic , interpreti ve. and intuiti ve processes) to technical issues to be reso lved by cookbook methods'· (A nfara et al. 2002 . p.34): and ··we do not have adequate gu ides fo r transforming observations into asse rti ons'·. but despite 
this. ·· peop le regu larly do if. (S take 1995. p.9). 
c46 .. lt can take considerable se lf-awareness and confidence to report: I coded these 40 interviews. these are 
the themes I found. here is what I think they mean. and here is the process I undertook to arrive at those 
meanings . The latter statement call s fo r. even demands. a sense of vo ice and perspec ti ve' · (Patton 2002. p.66). 
c4" For -example. Corbin and Strauss (2008) state th~t ·'after months of gathering data. studying the data. \\T i ting memos. and doing di agrams there is th at inner se nse. or 'gut feeling · of what thi s data is a ll about . It' s difficul t to explain but the story of our participants becomes part of us ... we·ve listened to their words. 
observed their actions. fel t th eir emoti ons. taken on their burdens. and so understand what it is like for them'· (p.139). 
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by remaining grounded in, true to, or close to, the underlying raw data (Corbin and Strauss 
2008; Gibson and Brown 2009; Hill 2007). One way to affirm this is through the 
presentation of narratives and perspectives in the words of research participants themselves, 
an aspect of qualitative research also discussed in more depth shortly. Crucially, even 
though the reduction or consolidation of data into themes can be helpful, this does not 
necessarily mean that contradictory or competing testimonies have to be resolved, but 
rather such findings themselves may assist in creating a greater understanding of the case 
(Stake 1995). 
5.4.1 .2 Process with Storm Data 
A particular challenge with our study centred around the large volume of data248, the 
variety of experiences represented, the variety in methods of portraying those experiences, 
differences in the brevity, clarity, accuracy and recollection of experiences, the emotion and 
pain associated with real loss and grief having been experienced, and the paucity of any 
existing theoretical or even procedural frameworks and guidelines to refer to within the 
context of significant and sudden financial loss. On a positive note, this allowed us a certain 
freedom and flexibility to pursue an approach which best leverages the particular 
circumstances of our case. 
Our first step, prior to the fifteen initial interviews, was to read a selection of approximately 
thirty public submissions to give an idea of the impact on individuals, and ascertain a range 
of different views from different groups of submitters. Of course, no one ' group ' of 
submitters is truly homogeneous in terms of perspective and opinion, so a range of possible 
insights and categories of organisation emerged, but with some views and experiences 
being more common than others. This range of initial insights provided a basis to construct 
the indicative interview questions (which are attached in Appendix B). 
248 The transcripts of the fifteen initial interviews, the public submissions made by impacted Storm investors, 
and the transcripts of public hearings gave rise to over 4,100 pages of written material. The total of twenty 
seven interviews (15 initial and 12 follow up) gave rise to 33 hours of recorded conversation overall. 
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The interviews and analysis thereof then gave rise to the dominant themes emerging of 
control and trust (to be discussed)249. The advantage of referring to interviews as the 
primary data source and in particular to identify the main themes of the overall study, 
relates to the advantages of interviews discussed earlier - the ability to explore people ' s 
experiences and perspectives in depth, the ability to be flexible and adapt the approach 
within the interview itself, the open-ended opportunity for participants to describe their 
views, the ability to clarify ambiguous responses, and the fact that the interviews allow a 
participant's experience to be explored at multiple points in time, rather than the other data 
sources which cover a shorter time period. Hence, interviews provided an ideal catalyst and 
avenue to canvass the breadth of issues sooner than other data sources, allowing us to 
identify those things which were most important to those involved, across the longer time 
period that we are interested in. 
As well as our expenence of and thoughts ansmg during interviews themselves, all 
transcripts were subsequently read as an initial recollection and check prior to sending back 
to participants. Then upon clarification from participants, transcripts were read again to re-
familiarise ourselves with each interview and to ensure the final record was as accurate as 
possible. Later readings involved actions such as highlighting the type and volume of 
content relating to key points arising, noting down more detail key and relevant phrases and 
commentary made by participants, the allocation of key quotes / phrases and ideas to the 
overall structure we adopted , and importantly, providing context for key messages that 
were portrayed. Context here means the rationale a participant had for making a point, their 
own circumstances at that point in time, their recent experiences in social settings 
(including interactions with family, friends , other investors, professionals, and others), and 
their own emotional state (as far as we could ascertain) in making that point. Overall , some 
interviews were re-read and re-examined many times, with some interviews providing more 
insight or depth than others and so attracting greater attention for analytical purposes . 
However, all interviews had at least four complete readings, plus numerous partial readings 
249 A maj or consideration was to identify the dominant themes, and to put others aside . Hence, although 
·domin ant' does not equate to ' exhaustive ', we cons ider these themes to encompass the maj ority of important 
points that were raised , in re lati on to our research goals. As Stake ( 1995) hi ghli ghts, "a lmo st certainl y there 
w ill be many more data coll ected than can be analysed ... it is al so important to spend the best anal ytic time on 
the best data . Full coverage is imposs ible, equal attention to all data is not a c ivil right. The case and key 
issues need to be kept in focu s'· (p.84). 
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depending on points that were made. 
In addition to interviews, the availability of other and significant data sources was highly 
useful in two ways. Firstly, the additional material in submissions and transcripts of public 
meetings provided invaluable material for data saturation. This also meant points suggested 
within interviews were viewed with greater or lesser significance or credibility, depending 
on how persuasively certain perspectives were supported or countered in other forums. As 
well as this role in building and shaping the picture suggested through interviews, these 
data sources could also suggest any other features that may have been overlooked through 
the interview process. The range of other data sources such as further correspondence, 
observations, and document analysis also added insights in both of these ways as well. 
We made further use of the public submissions firstly by assessing the broad 'category' of 
each submitter (as indicated in table 7), and then reading all submissions again after all 
interviews were conducted. Upon this second reading, it was noted whether each 
submission indicated support for any major point that arose from the interviews. This took 
the form of a simple coding where a ' 1' was allocated if a particular theme was picked up 
on in a submission, and a 'O' otherwise. For example, if a submission by a Storm investor 
described an emotional impact arising from their loss, this was coded as a ' 1' which could 
then be used in a descriptive statistical overview of submissions for discussion relating to 
emotional impacts. In this sense, a coding of ' -1 ' is of little utility in our context, as quite 
obviously it is highly unlikely that any investor had a positive emotional response 
following Storm' s collapse. This similarly applies for other themes that emerged. Of 
interest however are some differences between different groups of submitters, and these are 
discussed within the overall results. Any summary statistics used within the results are not 
claimed nor expected to be robust nor be open to any more detailed statistical tests, but 
merely provide another angle of evidence and information to support, moderate or highlight 
any major points being discussed. 
Despite the volume of data, we did not utilise a specialist computer application to manage 
that data, preferring instead to read through the paper records and highlighting or making 
notes with pen or pencil as required (or Excel when dealing with the 'coding' of 
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submissions). Although there is utility of such computer applications for many researchers 
including steps around initial analysis (Patton 2002), we felt happier and more in tune with 
the data using a paper-based approach instead250 . 
In summary, we claim that themes ' emerged ' from the Stonn data in relation to our 
research goals , and that this occurred as a result of taking a highly systematic approach. 
Although the overall analysi s relied on our own sense of interpretation and intuition about 
important aspects within the data, these aspects are grounded in the data itself. How to 
show and support this claim about the themes being data-based is discussed below. 
5.4.2 Presenting the Findings 
Following the analysis of data and establishment of emergent themes, the next task was to 
present these findings in a manner that is motivating, informative and reflects the 
underlying data, with demonstrable links to that data. This process can be described as 
constructing a 'portrait ' and telling readers the meaning of that portrait (LeCompte 
2000)25 1. Alternatively, it can involve far more straightforward assertions such as that 
presented by Ruwhiu and Cone (2010) who describe their data sources, state that a 
narrative approach was taken, and then simply describe what they consider to have emerged 
from their research. 
These approaches may or may not involve the inclusion of examples of raw data, but where 
there is such inclusion, it is predominantly associated with the presentation of verbatim 
quotations from participants (Patton 2002). Doing this has various strengths and 
advantages. Firstly, where these quotes are given within an appropriate context, then the 
researcher' s interpretation of that quote is made palatable or understandable to the reader 
(Patton 2002) . The reader then al so has sufficient context to assess thei r agreement or 
otherwi se with that interpretation. Another strength is that presenting a participant ' s own 
250 T his preference is obvio usly a highly personal one, but we share the perspecti ve of Saldana (2009) who 
c la ims ·'more contro l over and ownership of th e work" (p.22), as we ll as Marshall and Rossman (20 I 0) , who perceive more •' intim ate immers ion in one ' s data" with a computer-free approach (p.2 17) . 251 To contin ue th e art isti c theme, "portra its te ll very hum an and personal stories. They also remind us of th e 
social context in which the work was pa i11ted, providing a window into the li fe and times of their subject. Sometimes they also te ll us about the arti st themse lves' · (' Portra it of a Lady ' ex hi b iti on, Muse um of Brisbane, IO October 20 12). 
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words can mitigate the risk that the depth of what is being said is unnecessarily reduced or 
represented by some categorical, coded approach that does not really capture the essence of 
what is really going on252 . This serves as a further advantage for the reader in that they can 
see the complexity of some aspect of the participant ' s contribution for themselves. In other 
words, the reader gets to see part of what the researcher has seen as well253 . 
If quotations are given with sufficient context, and in a systematic and orderly way such 
that they are aligned with overall themes or structure, then this can give rise to what has 
been termed ' thick description ' 254. Such description is of much value and has various 
associated features and advantages, including the demonstration and application of good 
interpretation, portraying decisions of people in an intelligible way, and for the reader, 
replicating as descriptively as possible what a participant has experienced (Denzin and 
Lincoln 2005; Gibson and Brown 2009; Shank 2002; Stake 1995). 
Where appropriate, qualitative research can also utilise summary or descriptive statistics. 
Notably however and particularly for the coding of submissions described in the previous 
section, often any summary data used is not of sufficient size or from appropriately formed 
selections to investigate anything further than straightforward description. As such, the use 
of such statistics is not usually to make a convincing case of the validity of any points made 
nor to substitute for the strength of descriptive analysis, but can simply be an interesting 
additional description of the repetition of certain points or actions by participants, or 
provide supplementary description where it is not possible to present all descriptive 
evidence. Summary statistics can also help counter claims that only some aspects of some 
data has been used, or that certain aspects of data have been focussed on to support 
interpretations made to the exclusion of contrary views (Maxwell 2010). Of course, 
downsides of such usage exist as well , which we aim to avoid255 . 
252 As Peterson et al. (2010) state, " including narratives recounted in peoples ' own words also tempers the 
inevitable reductionism of generalizing analytical methods that result in gross simplification of the complexity 
of everyday life" (p. l 0). 
253 As such, Patton (2002) states that direct quotations reveal "respondents ' depth of emotion, the ways they 
have organized their world, their thoughts about what is happening, their experiences, and their basic 
perceptions" (p.21). 
254 Thick description is a term first used by Clifford Geertz (1973) (Gibson and Brown 2009; Shank 2002) . 255 For example, "numbers can be used rhetorically, to make a report appear more precise, rigorous, and 
scientific, without playing any real role in the logic of the study and thus misrepresenting the actual basis for 
the conclusions" (Maxwell 2010, p.480) . 
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What is typically involved with single case study research also emphasises some previous 
points. A feature of presenting findings in this situation is to tell , where data allows, as 
complete a story as possible that relates case study details to the research questions at hand. 
Key aspects of this are to build a narrative about what has occurred, with reference to key 
participants in the fonn of quotations and any other data or evidence that is available 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). This evidence and description may be qualitative or 
quantitative, with the driver being to address the relevant research questions rather than 
being driven by methodology (Flyvberg 2006). Whatever evidence is presented, it needs to 
demonstrate that the story being told is grounded in the data (Corbin and Strauss 2008) , and 
in our case this will involve the liberal use of quotations as evidence of raw data being 
related to points made. A relevant example is the PJCI report itself, where it summarises 
alternative views with supporting quotations, and then just states that ' it is the opinion of 
the committee that. .. '. Noting that the PJCI report is not written for an academic or 
necessarily industry audience, nevertheless it does not highlight the mechanism by which it 
came to the conclusions and recommendations made. Hence, although our research 
questions are very different to the terms of reference for the PJCI, the approach we take is 
to use and demonstrate the application of a systematic approach. 
5.4.3 Affirming the Findings 
A key concern of all research is ensuring quality, rigor and validity with regards to the 
research goals and resultant findings. In particular, establishing the credibility of a 
statement that ' themes emerged' is an important task256 . Given the reliance on intuition and 
interpretation (and thereby taking the word of the researcher as to the fidelity of their 
findings) , those well versed in quantitative-based research may regard such findings as 
impressionistic and subjective (Denzin and Lincoln 2005)257. In addressing thi s concern , 
Peterson et al. (2010) caution against simply adopting or transcribing methods from the 
natural sciences. Instead, many researchers refrain from adopting certain methodological 
procedures for their own sake and consider a pragmatic approach to be more appropriate, 
where the choice of methodology is tailored for each unique study (Flyvberg 2006 ; 
256 In other words , assurance is req uired that ·' themes that emerged actua lly have some congruence or 
veris imil itude w ith the rea li ty of the phenomenon studied'" (A nfara et a l. 2002, p .29). 257 Conversely, qualitati ve researchers may regard quantitative researchers as "se ld om able to capture their 
subj ects· perspecti ves because they have to rely on more remote, inferential empirical methods and materi a ls'· (Denzin and Lincoln 2005 , p . 12) . 
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Marshall and Rossman 2010; Patton 2002)258 . As such, there is acceptance that a model of 
good research is determined by the particular research questions and available data, with 
the number of such ' good ' models potentially as variable as the number of different 
research studies (Bredo 2009). 
Given this, there is no single process or procedure to ensure whether the findings arising 
from a qualitative study are credible or not, and merely meeting a checklist of criteria does 
not make a qualitative study credible in itself (Freeman et al. 2007). Rather, different 
approaches to the research questions will require different procedures. Nevertheless, 
referring to a range of generally accepted procedures can be helpful by providing clarity 
regarding the amount and form of procedures adopted. A summary of such procedures 
discussed in the literature is presented in table 10, within a structure addressing different 
components of research quality. 
Other procedures are also mentioned in the literature, such as prolonged engagement ( one 
year or longer) in the field and persistent observation, which have particular relevance in 
the context of a geographical study (Reid and Gough 2000). These are not listed in table 10, 
which instead only presents those dozen or so procedures which our study has incorporated, 
with many of these discussed already259. To place this selection of procedures in context, 
Creswell (1998) suggests that engaging in at least two out of eight named key procedures is 
reasonable260 . 
In particular with our case study approach, the use of triangulation and member checking 
may give reasonable assurance if adopted appropriately within the overall study. Thus, we 
258 Indeed, "being pragmatic allows one to eschew methodological orthodoxy in favour of methodological 
appropriateness as the primary criterion for judging methodological quality, recognizing that different 
methods are appropriate for different situations. Situational responsiveness means designing a study that is 
appropriate for a specific inquiry situation or interest" (Patton 2002 , p .72). 
259 For example, peer review has occurred through publication of initial findings in industry journals, three 
presentations to date of the overall study, and email correspondence with various parties and professionals. 
Another example is the procedure of journal/notebook, where we took notes at all 27 interviews, and emails 
between the researcher and supervisors serve as a further record of the process used and pathway to 
developing themes . A further aspect for our study that serves as additional assurance is the public availability 
of much of the data. Whilst not necessarily a unique feature , the extent and availability of his data certainly 
confers significant support to the components of validity, reliability and confirmability. 
260 These are (a) prolonged engagement and persistent observation, (b) triangulation, (c) peer review or 
debriefing, (d) negative case analysis , (e) clarifying researcher bias, (f) member checks, (g) thick description, 
and (h) external audits (cited in Anfara et al. 2002 , p .30) . 
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provide further discussion on the features of these two important procedures, and in doing 
so also address concerns commonly expressed in such case studies - that of 
methodological , researcher and participant bias. 
Table 10: Key components and procedures for establishing quality in qualitative work 
Component of 
quality of study 
Overall rigour 
Credibility or 
internal validity 
Description 
Ensuring overall methodology is 
reasonable. 
Is the representation of experience 
authentic; how trustworthy are the 
conclusions drawn. 
Transferability or How well can conclusions be 
external validity generalized to outside the 
immediate context. 
Dependability or Are idiosyncrasies in 
reliability interpretation minimised; 
Can any variability be tracked to 
sources. 
Confirmabi lity or extent to which biases, 
objectivity motivations , interests or 
perspective of researcher 
influence interpretation 
Possible procedures 
Argue the rationale that qualitative methods 
are appropriate; 
Description of respondents ; 
Use interview quotations; 
Give details of interview practices; 
Revisits made to participants to clarify 
meanings and build rappori; 
Respondents contacted to 
interpretations (member checking) . 
Purposeful sampling; 
Triangulation; 
Peer review; 
Member checking; 
Time sampling. 
Purposeful sampling; 
Thick description. 
Mechanically recorded data ; 
Peer review; 
Triangulation. 
Journal/notebook; 
Triangulation. 
verify 
Sources: Adapted from Anfara et al. (2002) (who also cite Creswell and Miller 2000; Creswell 
1998); Bearden (2001); Marshall and Rossman (2010); Reid and Gough (2000) (who also cite 
Baxter and Eyles 1997; Lincoln and Guba 1998). 
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5.4.3.1 Triangulation 
The incorporation of more than one method, interpretative practice, or source of data is an 
important procedure in seeking validity in qualitative research. The goal is to better capture 
what is really going on with the phenomenon at hand, and each different aspect can allow 
the viewing of this phenomenon in a different way (Denzin and Lincoln 2005). Like all 
procedures, this 'triangulation' does not ensure validation in itself, but is an additional and 
useful tool to support the assertion that the overall findings are credible (Flick 2002, cited 
in Denzin and Lincoln 2005; Marshall and Rossman 2010). 
Our methodological and interpretative approach incorporates vanous perspectives -
primarily that of the researcher (but modified and impacted by that of peer reviews), the 
supervisory panel, and interviewee participants themselves. It is also evident from the 
transcripts of public hearings that there is a degree of interrogation of views residing within 
the data itself, where the perspectives of those appearing at the hearings are sometimes 
challenged or explored in more depth. This of course is also a feature of interviews, 
although in a different manner, where the interaction between interviewer and interviewee 
also influences the conversation. Thus, a tangible aspect of triangulation in our study 
resides within the data itself, with the demarcation lines between 'interpretation' and 'data' 
not as distinct as they might otherwise be. 
Indeed, this triangulation of data includes the number and sources available, but also the 
nature of how that data itself came to be. In particular, the views of individuals are 
available through public submissions, public hearings, and interviews which suggest an 
obvious triangulation of sources261 • But more subtle than this are the methodological 
benefits being conferred via the different circumstances and environments of each source. 
In a submission, someone is making an effort to write a personal contribution, with time to 
think about what is being said. In a public hearing, someone is being questioned by a panel 
of political figures in an open forum with many other people present, and engaging with 
261 As well as this, there are the other sources of documentation, observations (ours and that of others), and 
other correspondence, but we focus here on the stated three sources. 
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that panel in speech rather than writing262 . In an interview, someone 1s 111 a relatively 
informal setting in the comfort of their own home and with an audience of one. The 
questions being asked are generally open-ended, little pressure exists to answer questions if 
the interviewee does not want to , and there is safety in being able to revisit what has been 
said and recorded. So anything expressed in any of these contexts are effectively giving a 
degree of triangulation of views, via the differing methods of data collection and 
interpretation encompassed within each. Thus, even in an extreme case where one 
individual has their views represented through all three sources, there is sufficient variety in 
each method of collection which would promote confidence in the fidelity and/or 
consistency of what has been expressed. This is a particularly tangible advantage when 
dealing with the explanations and emotive states of people263 . 
5.4.3.2 Member Checking 
Like triangulation, member checking is a way to assure that a reasonable representation of 
participants' real views has been portrayed264 . In relation to interviews, the process we used 
of transcribing or writing up the interview account, and then asking participants for 
reactions, corrections, overall accuracy, clarifications, and whether it was a fair 
representation, aligns with the approaches of others (Magolda and Weems 2002; Marshall 
and Rossman 201 0; Stake 1995). Additionally, by also asking if everything in the interview 
record was still able to be used for the overall research, participants were given further 
comfort around what they would choose to disclose. Thus, a further benefit conferred by 
262 Not only this , but also there is a checking or interrogation of some views by those who fo llow other 
speakers or who have read other people 's submi ss ions. For example, when appearing before the P JC! in 
public hearing [5] , an ex-CBA manager for North Queensland questioned the wording and selection of facts 
presented in the submi ssions of others [p.76]. A broader benefi t is a lso that issues surrounding Storm's 
co llapse and the overall regulatory environment are viewed in some form from the perspectives of all those 
who appeared - priva te individual s, ASIC, banks , non-Stonn advisers, ex-S torm advisers, ex-S tonn staff, 
other financial service profess ionals, and so on. 
263 Indeed. individua ls "are se ld om ab le to g ive full expl anations of their act ions or intenti ons; all th ey can 
offer are accoun ts , or stories, about what they have done and why. No single method can grasp all the subtle 
variations in ongoing human experience. Consequentl y, qualitative researchers deploy a wide range of 
interconnected interpretive methods, always seeking better ways to make more understandable the worlds of 
experience they have studied'. (Denzin and Li nco ln 2005 , p.2 1 ). 
264 In fact , and as suggested in the previous section, member checking itself can be part of the triangul ation 
process (Stake 1995). 
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this process was the potential strengthening of the researcher-participant relationship 
(Magolda and Weems 2002)265 . 
Another benefit of this process was the additional observations, insights and interpretations 
offered by participants in relation to the interview conversation, typically via email either 
with their reply to our sending out the transcript, or sometimes other points raised several 
weeks later. A further and highly valued outcome, which leveraged off the benefit of a 
strengthened researcher-participant relationship, was the commentary, thoughts and 
infonnation sent through to the researcher on an ongoing basis as the Storm case moves 
through court and negotiated settlement(s) processes. 
It is important to also note that member checking did not result in overwhelming feedback 
in terms of volume. This is not an uncommon occurrence and aligns with others' 
experience (for example, Stake 1995). However, feedback that did eventuate was useful, 
informative and insightful in terms of research information266 . Just as importantly, it 
conveyed a sense of relationship and confidence established through the personal interview 
which, for its own sake, is a satisfying outcome267 . 
5.4.3.3 Dealing with participant bias 
The data sources we have available are clearly impacted by self-selection. Those who made 
a submission, appeared at a hearing, and/or responded to our request for interview 
participation have all chosen to make that respective contribution. Therefore, they may 
differ in attributes, circumstances and intent to those that did not. This presents the 
unavoidable challenge of a biased representation in the data. This issue is not infrequent in 
qualitative research, and even if care is taken to avoid it, it can still present itself in a multi-
faceted manner. For example, self-selection can occur (as for our study) whereby only 
265 Which, notably, " is a cornerstone of qualitative inquiry" (Magolda and Weems 2002, p.498). 
266 As Stake (1995) points out: "I impose upon the actor's time to do some of my work. The most frequent 
response of the actors to whom I have sent drafts is not to acknowledge that I have sent anything. Often, the 
account is routine, apparently not deserving a response. But sometimes I get a thorough reading, a mutually 
respectful argument, and suggestions for improvement. I think I can say that all my reports have been 
improved by member checking" (p.116). 
267 This also aligns with and supports comments made shortly concerning the adoption of an empathetic 
stance. 
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those with the available time to contribute may do so (for example, those who are retired) , 
or those who are highly emotive about the situation, or those who stand to gain from any 
potential outcomes, and so on (Dobes and Bennett 2009). 
There are three aspects of this challenge we address here. Firstly, Eisenhardt and Graebner 
(2007) highlight that a key approach to mitigate this issue is to deliberately broaden the 
participant case so as to include other (usually ' highly lrnowledgeable ' ) infom1ants, to give 
a range of perspectives. This is well meaning and applicable to many research foci, but with 
our focus on the individual impact of financial loss, our effort was therefore on those who 
had suffered that loss. Therefore, this demanded a selection of participants that were by 
definition in the category of having suffered a loss, so that we can ascertain data from those 
involved, those who know, those who are impacted, and therefore who do have an opinion. 
This extends the earlier discussion about features of a case study approach, where now even 
within the bounds of the ' purposively-sampled ' case study of Storm, investors within that 
case-study were further ' purposively-sampled' to help address our research questions. 
Notwithstanding that and secondly, the participation of two fonner Stonn advisers as 
interviewees did offer a different perspective and this was very useful to the overall 
findings . Furthennore, the investor participants themselves were not a homogenous group 
in tenns of perspective and experience. Indeed, the initial contact from one participant is 
cited below: 
I feel we have a rather different perspective on the situation having been involved with the 
Cassimatis brand prior Storm. Additionally having had a very satisfactory investment 
strategy in place {previously} using Cassimati s advice, find ourselves somewhat at odds 
with those who came into the picture since 2005-6 ... because of the above I beli eve we have 
a different story to tell - even though we try hard not to reli ve it - and I would welcome the 
opportunity to talk with you. [ email from interview participant, September 2011] 
Thus, the mix of participants provided some comfort that the research has not adopted a 
homogenous poo l with onl y one perspective to share. Thi s is also supported by the earlier 
discussion regarding the triangulation component that resides within the three most 
vo luminous data sources - the submissions, transcripts of public hearings, and interviews. 
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Thirdly, the fact that a second interview was held with twelve investors gives a degree of 
time-diversification of any emotional bias being present. Indeed, the levels of angst 
amongst the follow-up interviews in 2013 , whilst still significant, were quite different to 
that present within the initial interviews some 12-15 months earlier. In this sense, the 
revisiting of the same participants gave a greater coverage of their overall experience and as 
such, less sensitivity in the overall findings to the self-selection arising through emotive 
reasons. 
The challenge of bias resides not only in the selection of those who participate, but also 
once selected, what they might or might not disclose to the researcher. The extreme case of 
this is when participants simply do not tell the truth268 , though this is not perceived as a 
major issue for our study. More relevant are the reasonable points that have been made to 
us in various peer-review forums to date. These include a number of cautions about the bias 
in expected responses, with most points along the lines of the following: 'don' t believe 
everything the individuals tell you', ' they have selective memories ', 'yes, but they had it 
good for a long time', 'people always want to blame someone else ', 'where's the individual 
responsibility in all of this ', and so on. Similar concerns were also expressed in discussions 
with an academic colleague as below: 
These sorts of interviews give you a real post-event bias , of course. None of the investors -
particularly as they seem to be self-selecting - will tell you yes, I knew there was a risk and 
c' est la vie that it didn ' t work out. They will all say they underestimated the risk, they 
weren ' t properly advised or informed etc etc. Ideally you'd like to speak to a sample of 
investors before and after a failure.. . but obviously that can ' t be done. [ email 
correspondence with an academic economist, September 2011] 
Aside from the pragmatic insight above about the availability of participants, we note that 
all of the above objections about the dangers of exaggerations, selective recall of events 
(whether deliberate or accidental) , and partial truths that people might tell, may well be 
268 This is poignantly highlighted by the anthropologists Stoller and Olkes ( 1987), who give an extreme case 
of biased data: "When I began to write anthropological texts, I followed the conventions of my training. I 
'gathered data,' .. . I 'wrote them up' ", but the problem was that "everyone had lied to me ... the data I has so 
painstakingly collected were worthless. I learned a lesson: Informants routinely lie to their anthropologists" (cited in Denzin and Lincoln 2005, p .18). 
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applicable for many of our participants. But, they are also true of many people at various 
times, whether or not they choose to participate in such research, and that is not a barrier to 
nonetheless infer important themes. Also, many of these objections do not relate to the 
research goal of '·what happens when ... ", rather they relate to "how this came to be .. . " . 
Nevertheless, there is a link between the circumstances of the engagement with Stonn, the 
nature of the loss, and the reactions to the loss, so all cautions are taken seriously on their 
own tenns. However, we do not consider that the accepted bias in participants presents a 
barrier to drawing out major themes in relation to our research goals . Additionally, as per 
previous discussion, procedures have been incorporated to identify and mitigate such 
influence as far as is possible. 
Furthermore and on a related but more subtle note, it is not only the researcher that has to 
interpret what they see and experience, but participants also have to do so (Freeman et al. 
2007). Given that participants also are influenced by mood, experience, intention, cultural 
and historical contexts, and adopted philosophical positions (Stake 1995 ; Freeman et al. 
2007), then 'neutrality' in any insights being shared is impossible - but also not desired in 
our context. The research goals involve capturing the real world experiences, emotions, 
impact and reactions of individuals to severe financial loss - a bias-free response to that is 
not only fanciful , it is also of little use and interest. However, capturing those perceptions 
within a credible framework to mitigate some perceptions and views getting undue weight, 
is an important factor that we have given attention to. 
5.4.3.4 Dealing with researcher bias 
It is also the case that we may bring a stance or perspective which has its own element of 
bias as well. Indeed , to claim a totally neutral or objective stance in the process of data 
collection and analysis (including interpretation and intuition) would be unrealistic. The 
most obvious reason for this is that all work done has some dependency on the person 
doing it - so our own mood , experience, or intention as researchers is clearly influential 
(Stake 1995), as much as those influences relating to individual participants discussed 
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above. Furthermore, where the objects of study are also people, then this creates an even 
more personnel-dependent circumstance (Stake 1995)269 . 
However, accepting this does not mean that any research is rendered less useful, reliable or 
worthy, but it does require the researcher to be conscious of what stance they take when 
conducting that research. In particular, choosing to take a ' stance of neutrality ' does not 
mean objectivity is attainable, but it does mean that a particular perspective does not have 
to be pursued or demonstrated in advance of any research stage. So whilst the research 
process itself may twist and shape the views of the researcher, and expectedly so, there is 
still a clear commitment to remain focussed on what it is that emerges from the data itself, 
rather than seeking evidence to confirm a particular view270 . Pursuing the latter on a 
selective basis is most definitely an example of a researcher ' s bias getting in the way of 
good research, but being shaped by what emerges from the data collection and analysis is 
what would be expected to occur27 1. In fact, seeking sufficient detachment between the 
researcher and participants so as to not allow the possibility of some influence to occur 
would not constitute good qualitative research. A natural part of any human relationship is 
the existence of empathy and a cornerstone of qualitative inquiry is what the researcher 
experiences in the field , often through an empathetic stance. This can present a risk that the 
researcher' s judgement can become clouded, but the alternative of remaining detached can 
reduce understanding (Patton 2002)272 . 
269 Indeed, "many qualitative studies are personalistic stud ies. Impersonal issues applied to carefully observed 
human beings become personal issues ... some of us ' go nati ve' , accommodating to the viewpoint and 
valuation of the people at the site - then revert, reaching less in their favour when back again with academic 
colleagues" (Stake 1995 , p.46). 
27
° Flyvberg (2006) claims that a major misunderstanding "about case-study research is that the method 
maintains a bias toward verification, understood as a tendency to confirm the researcher's preconceived 
notions, so that the study therefore becomes of doubtful scientific va lue" (p.234). 271 As Patton (2002) puts it, "the neutral investigator enters the research arena with no axe to grind, no theory 
to prove (to test but not to prove), and no predetermined results to support. Rather, the investigator's 
commitment is to understand the world as it unfolds, be true to complexities and multiple perspectives as they 
emerge, and be balanced in reporting both confirmatory and disconfirming evidence with regard to any 
conclusions offered" (p.51). 
272 Patton (2002) discusses the concept of ' empathic neutrality' which "suggests that there is a middle ground 
between becoming too involved ... and remaining too di stant" (p.50) . Empathy "develops from personal 
contact with the people interviewed" and " involves being able to take and understand the stance, position, 
feelings , experiences, and worldview of others" (p.52). An empathetic stance "communicates understanding, 
interest, and caring" and can " facilitate rapport and help build a relationship that supports empathy by 
disciplining the researcher to be open to the other person and nonjudgmental in that openness" (p.53). 
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Hence, we claim to have taken such a 'stance of neutrality' with respect to the approach 
taken. Notably, this is an easier stance to assure the reader of when our goal is not to 
investigate responsibilities , but to consider perceptions and the very human side of dealing 
with loss. Once more, some assurances as to the fidelity of our approach may be 
demonstrated to some degree by showing an adherence to the data, and the production and 
distribution of the industry papers also provides opportunity for those with some 
knowledge of the events (real or perceived) to comment and provide feedback , which has 
been taken on board. 
5.5 Issues Arising 
A final discussion is presented here concerning two key concerns we were cognisant of 
when conducting and presenting this research. These are the issues of confidentiality of 
participants, and the potential for hann. 
5.5.1 Confidentiality 
The earlier description of interview participants outlined the adopted approach to protect 
the confidentiality of participants as far as we are able to. This was considered necessary 
for various reasons, not least of which the ease of which confidentiality can be breached 
inadvertently. This can happen with the difficulty associated with disguising one participant 
from another, or through the revelations from one participant about another. Yet, to present 
an accurate and insightful narrative of relevant events, this necessaiily requires a level of 
detail which may well risk breaching privacy, anonymity, and confidentiality (Magolda and 
Weems 2002; Stake 1995). 
Although University level ethical approval provides some guidance and protection in this 
regard, it can never be complete in covering all situations of research with human affairs. 
Thus, we were obliged to think through confidentiality issues carefully and then make a 
choice, not only about how to reference and cite various data , but also about what data 
should be included. As such, some quotations and conversations of interest and relevance 
are not included in the later findings , even when that quotation provided an otherwise 
insightful point , and even when the participant gave explicit pennission for it to be used . 
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This was essentially a moral choice and judgement on our behalf, and one in which we 
erred on the side of conservatism. 
5.5.2 Harm 
Related to the issue of confidentiality is the issue of potential harm, and the potential for 
harm to participants exists even when great care has been taken to preserve confidentiality. 
Harm can arise in various ways, for example: anything that is shared by participants 
essentially involves issues of personal privacy; by offering interpretations and writing up 
findings the researcher is making a choice of which version of events to adopt, or which 
perspectives to give weight to; and the very act of summing up someone's experience 
necessarily requires a simplification of that person's situation which may inadvertently be 
offensive (Magolda and Weems 2002) 273 . Difficulties and discomfort with such things is 
unavoidable in qualitative research, and part of the mitigation of this possibility for 
participants is their ability to be able to leave the research at any time (Magolda and Weems 
2002), which was also a feature of our informed consent procedures. 
It is not only participants that have the potential for harm, but also a range of non-
participants. For example, the detail revealed in one participant' s responses may 
erroneously lead someone else to identify the wrong person as the subject, in which case 
the identifier may suffer from resultant misplaced angst or -suspicion, and the erroneously 
identified person also may be impacted. A wider group is at risk also274 and in our case, this 
may be other investors, whether or not they have participated in this research. The most 
obvious example of this is the potential that some participants had to inform us of both the 
detail and process used to deal with their bank(s) after the collapse of Storm. If they were 
not pe1mitted to disclose to us any details by virtue of their own settlement (where 
applicable) , then simply reporting the fact that many people have had settlements with 
273 
"I worry intensely about how people will feel about what I write about them. I worry about the experiences 
of being ' writ down,' fixed in print, formu lated, summed up, encapsulated in language, reduced in some way 
to what the words contain. Language can never contain the whole person, so every act of writing a person's 
story is inevitably a violation" (Josselson 1996, cited in Magolda and Weems 2002, p.498). 274 As Magolda and Weems (2002) state, "qualitative research has the potential to unintentionally harm not 
only the individual respondents ... but larger social systems (e.g. , the subcultures of respondents) , many of 
whom are not part of the study" (p.500). 
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which some were happy, and some were not, gives rise in itself to further perceptions of 
inequity, mistrust and angst. 
For similar reasons, we frequently, but not exclusively, sanitise some quotes with respect to 
the names of people, banks, legal entities and other institutional parties. Clearly the risk 
with this is that an unintended party is perceived to be the party in question with regards to 
a particular quote, but we base such decisions on our primary obligation to safeguard 
research participant(s). It is also intended, in a slightly paradoxical maimer, to allow a focus 
on the effects of financial loss, and so far as this can be placed in context by referring to 
general circumstances rather than, for example, bank 'A' and lawyer ' L' and politician ' P' , 
this is what we aim for275. 
In other words, qualitative research involves risks, primarily because it involves human 
subjects and aspects of their lives which are important to them. As such, we have also taken 
a cautious approach in what is and what is not disclosed, in an effort to balance protection 
and wellbeing of participants and non-participants, with the need to give as true an account 
as possible in relation to the research goals at hand. Similarly to issues of confidentiality, 
dealing with such issues involves moral rather than technical choices (Magolda and Weems 
2002), and hence again not all quotations and conversations of interest and relevance have 
been disclosed in later findings. 
5.6 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we presented an overview of qualitative research, emphasising that elements 
of ' grounded theory ' and 'naturalistic inquiry' are useful for seeking insights into our 
research goals. They key aspect of such bases and approaches is that it gives us a way to 
engage with and interpret the data that is available. 
The collapse of Stonn financial offers an important case study in the context of our 
research goal s. An involved study into Stonn is made tractable by the magnitude and 
275 Where this does cast doubt on some unintended parties, or does leave a research participant fee ling that 
being more specific would better convey their des ire for particular detail s to emerge, we can merely o ffer an 
apo logy together with our stated rationale fo r such cho ices. 
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profile of losses suffered, and the wealth of available data, including the willingness of 
many investors to share their perspectives. 
The data relating to Storm financial is extensive and arises from multiple sources. The main 
data sources discussed in this chapter are 356 public submissions to the PJCI (consisting of 
2,879 pages of written documentation); transcripts of 9 public hearings (823 pages), 27 
interviews with 15 different participants (33 hours of recorded conversation); various 
observations from interviews, public meetings and others; and a variety of other 
correspondence with financial advisers and Storm investors. 
Our methodological approach to construct themes from the data was then discussed. We 
claim that themes 'emerged' from the Storm data in relation to our research goals, and that 
this occurred as a result of taking a highly systematic approach. The first consideration of 
possible issues arose from a selection of public submissions, which then helped shape the 
approach to interviews. The motivation associated with the convenience and familiarity of 
interviews then allowed us to suggest an initial assessment and emergence of the major 
themes, and hence an initial framework for further analysis. This allowed other data sources 
to be examined in a manner that allowed maximum utility to be gleaned from each, so that 
they provided invaluable material to either evidentially shape, correct, or support our 
perception about the major themes. This also allowed the -discussion and significance of 
these themes to be examined in more depth than otherwise. Data sources were revisited 
repeatedly in an iterative manner to ensure that as the themes developed into more involved 
statements and descriptions, the supporting points were accurate in the context in which 
they were made. Unavoidably the overall analysis relied on our own sense of interpretation 
and intuition about the important aspects within the data, but importantly, these aspects are 
grounded in the data itself. 
We then discussed how results would be presented, highlighting a heavy reliance on 
verbatim quotations from participants. The source, utility and shortcomings of some 
summary statistics was also discussed. 
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Affinning the credibility of findings is an essential part of the ·quality" in qualitative 
research and a range of possible challenges and approaches in this regard was discussed . 
We emphasised the use of triangulation and member checking as two approaches that are 
particularly tractable in this study, although other approaches have also been adopted . In 
paiiicular, approaches to clarify, accommodate and manage the unavoidable biases of both 
participants and the researcher was given further attention in this chapter. 
We concluded with a discussion on issues of confidentiality and potential hann ansmg 
from this study. This highlighted our right and choice to exercise judgement on what we 
will and will not include in our findings. 
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Chapter 6: Impacts of a significant financial shock 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the main findings of this thesis. It is structured around the primary 
research question: what are the impacts on people when they experience a significant 
financial shock? It begins by outlining a justification for the findings that follow, in terms 
of process and credibility. Although chapter five described in detail the overall approach 
and rationale for our engagement with the data, the discussion in this chapter specifically 
highlights the particular themes that emerged and how these reflect the underlying data 
itself. 
We then give an extended overview of investors ' rationale for joining Storm. This 
highlights the perceived pressure to be self-sufficient, and also the need to trust a range of 
parties when planning for the future. 
The mam findings are then presented, with the impacts of significant financial loss 
considered in three major areas. Firstly, in the personal world of emotional and health 
impacts. Although these can vary in form across investors, a consistent picture nevertheless 
emerges that personal impacts are both substantial and tangible for all investors. Secondly, 
in the realm of one ' s social world. This includes impacts on relationships, the ability to 
partake in cultural and familial roles, and changes in the way in which individuals engage 
in their communities. Thirdly, in the area of trust in many parties. This includes decreased 
trust in many institutions associated with the financial services industry, government, 
elements of some professions such as lawyers but particularly financial advisers, and 
perhaps most damagingly of all, a loss of trust in one' s own judgement and ability to 
engage with the world. 
The overall impact of these three areas is a loss of control in one ' s life choices and options. 
This is discussed in the context of the resulting dependence on others (including 
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government support) to provide for life's necessities, the devastation of having one ' s 
housing situation under threat, and an overall sense of greater vulnerability to the 
uncertainties of life. 
6.2 How 'themes ' e1nerged 
6.2.1 Overview 
As highlighted in chapter five, findings from interviews are generally used as the basis for 
describing the major themes and issues that emerge, but there is no shortage of supporting 
data to either support, modify, or suggest alternatives to what the interviews give rise to. In 
fact , where evidence from non-interview data sources supports a particular theme, this can 
be substantive enough to be at and beyond the point of saturation. 
In particular, transcripts of public hearings and submissions contain numerous relevant 
examples and as such, selected quotes from these sources are used to illustrate relevant 
points. Clearly there are a number of choices that could be made as to the use of particular 
selections, and we exercise judgement as to what is an appropriate inclusion or not. Indeed , 
the use of one ' s own ' filter ' in making such judgements about data is a key issue in 
qualitative analysis (Neck 2013). However, the arrangement of such quotes and statements 
into key themes, and then key findings , gives an explicit aggregation of underlying data 
into higher level findings that is transparent and open. Thus, such findings can be linked 
directly back to statements and insights residing in the original data itself. 
We present below tabular summaries of how this process has occurred in respect of the key 
findings in this chapter. The leftmost column lists three elements in each entry: 
► a statement that describes the point made within the data; 
► a brief quotation to show why that statement was generated; 
► a summary of the number of excerpts used in chapter six , as evidence to support the 
key statement. 
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Table lla276 : Coding of statements from data: rationale for joining 
Grouping of quotes into key statements277 Identifying key themes 
Beliefs about the age pension: ' the age pension would 
not be worth very much when I retire ' [il,p2] 
Superannuation and self-sufficiency: 'You have to be 
able to provide for yourself [i2 ,p I ,h I] Motivated to invest 
Doing a bit better: ' We wanted to live a better lifestyle 
than being a pensioner ' [i6,h 1] 
Fear: ' by the time yo u're 80, you ' ll have no money left ' 
[i3 ,ol ] 
Need to trust someone: ' I 've never been that great at 
looking at the financial side ' [i l ,p2] 
Trusted relationship: ' We paid them to do a 
professional job ' [i4,p4,h5 ,o l] 
Can trust Storm: 'They 're very careful. They were 
careful how they went into it ' [i3 ,h3] 
Big banks involved: ' the association with Stonn 
spanned several areas of the organisation' [h2] 
Investors happy: ' It was very comforting to know that 
Trust in the adviser 
we had the support of the biggest bank' [ i l ,pl ,h4] Can trust the big banks 
Storm happy: 'You trust an institution such as the 
CBA ' [h4] 
Others involved: ' I went into Storm because of my } 
friend up in Townsville ' [i5 ,h2,ol] Trust the networks 
Member of FPA: 'that was an insurance policy for us. 
We felt that they were accredited' [h2] 
Academic credentials: ' all advisors had a minimum of 
a masters degree in finance ' [il ,p2] 
Government licenced: 'When you get a tick of 
approval from ASIC, you keep working ' [il ,p2 ,bl] 
Strategy okay?: 'you will never be at risk of losing 
your house' [i2,p3 ,hl ,o2] 
Strategy suits some: 'The borrowed money is an asset 
which is used to produce income ' [i2,pl] 
Storm buy into it themselves: 'I wasn ' t flogging a 
product, I was involved in it ' [i4,h2] 
Trust the accreditations 
Trust the strategy 
We worked it out and were okay: ' We felt we asked } 
the appropriate questions' [ i2 ,p 1] Trust ofoneself 
Core findings 
Rationale exists to 
join Storm 
276 Tables (11 a) - (11 e) are modified from Anfara et al. (2002) and Neck (2013 ). 277 The legend used in tables l l(a) - l l (e) is in the format Xn, where X is the source of the data (i = 
interview; p = public submission; h = public hearing transcript; o = other) and n is the number of excerpts 
selected as evidence. For example, [i3 , p4] = 7 excerpts altogether, with 3 from interviews and 4 from public 
submissions. 
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Table 11 b: Coding of statements from data: Personal Impacts 
Grouping of quotes into key statements 
Feeling of shock: ·It was just before Christmas. It was 
horrifying' [i8,h l ] 
Feeling of numb: ' I was j ust numb fo r probably six 
months' [ i4] 
Strong sense of anger: 'They ' ve got to pay for that. 
That is just not right. ' [i7,pl] 
Fear is apparent: 'The constant fear of the bleak future 
ahead with abso lutely no financial security' [il ,p4 ,hl] 
Frustration: ' We need to be li ke a Houdini and get out 
of it somehow but we don ' t know where ' [i8,p6] 
Regret: 'But if we had done in March 2008 , what we 
intended to do ... we could see there was problems' 
[i6,hl ,o l] 
Guilt: 'we also got our adult children and friends to j oin 
Storm , leaving us feeling guil ty ' [i l ,p2,h2] 
Devastation: ' I just fe lt devas tated. Totally big hole in 
your insides. Just totall y destroyed ' [i6,p2,h I] 
Health now vulnerable: ' poss ibly the worst part is - our 
health has suffered . You never get that back' [p2,o I] 
Medication and depression: ' I have been on anti-
depressants and sleeping pills for the last 12 month s ' 
[i3 ,p6 ,hl] 
Thoughts of self-harm: 'I have found myself almost 
suicidal and understanding why people do commit 
suicide . These thoughts have absolutely terrified me ' 
[i5 ,p3] 
Identifying key themes 
Strong emotional 
reactions to loss 
Health impacts also 
result 
Core findings 
The personal 
world of an 
individual is a 
primary casualty 
of financial loss 
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Table llc: Coding of statements from data: Social Impacts 
Grouping of quotes into key statements 
Marriages impacted: ' the over whelming impact of the 
reality of our financial situation has nearly destroyed our 
marriage ' [i6,pl ,ol] 
Social circles and families impacted: ' It ' s tested. Our 
relationship, our friends who you thought were really 
staunch friends ' [il2 ,pl ,ol] 
Cultural and familial roles: 'It also stops us doing all 
the sorts of things that we had proposed to do like for 
grandchildren ' [i5 ,p 1,h 1] 
More isolated socially: ' I have to keep phoning to say 
no, and I can ' t have you even for coffee because I 
haven ' t the money to buy the food for entertaining. It ' s 
so embarrassing ' [i4,h2] 
Community contributions: ' I had to give up all 
charities . I used to work for them. I used to be in a lot' 
[il ,p2 ,h2] 
Complicated by networks: ' the concentration of Storm 
clients in regional communities has led to widespread 
community and client impacts ' [p2,hl] 
Community perceptions: ' So yes, judged very harshly 
and it was in the paper all the time about people saying 
what greedy people we were and that ' [i6] 
Needing to defend oneself: ' All we were doing was 
following the Government ' s advice. We just chose 
Storm Financial as our financial advisers . We weren ' t 
greedy ' [i5] 
Perceptions matter: ' Having to live with the 
knowledge that family and friends believed all the initial 
media reports about the Storm collapse, that made us 
clients out to be greedy and deserved of our losses ' 
[i6 ,p3] 
Identifying key themes 
Significant impact on 
relationships and 
connectedness to 
immediate social 
networks 
Wider community 
involvements impacted 
for a range of reasons 
Core findings 
The social world 
of an individual is 
another casualty 
of financial loss 
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Table 1 ld: Coding of statements from data: Losing Trust 
Grouping of quotes into key statements Identifying key themes Core findings 
Doubts about the strategy: ·the way I read it now, j ust 
now. If yo u' d ever make 12 per cent every year, you 
wo uldn ' t be abl e to pay the bloody interest back, let 
a lone li ve ' [i4 ,p l ,h1] 
Discontent in hindsight with communication: ' We 
were persuaded that you never take money out. You 
never close your portfo lio . You never pay your debt and 
yo u train yo ur children to take it on after yo u di e ' [i 1,h2] 
Perception of greed: ' that's just a greedy brazen 
stra tegy to have more fu nds under management , to pick 
up more fees ' [i5 ,hl] 
Post-collapse reactions: 'a lmost every other sing le 
adviser, scattered like rats exposed to the light ' [i4] 
Potential loss of trust in 
what Stom1 was about , 
including personnel and 
strategy 
Other advisers too: ' I will never go to a financial 
adviser aga in ' [i7,p2,hl] 
L Trust lost in financial 
_jadvisers in general 
Poor serv ice: ' I think I was on the phone eight hours 
one day just ring ing different people' [i5] 
It's not a fair game: 'So on one hand we are supporting 
the banks with our taxes while they act recklessly and 
wipe out the li fe savings of thousands' [p3 ,h2] 
Strong resentment: ' it can be safely said that all 
SICAG members now harbour a lasting distrust of the 
banking system ' [i3 ,p4 ,h2] 
Strong sense of 
distrust in bank(s) 
Not helped by helpers?: ' the solicitors didn ' t g ive a 
stuff. They were getting the ir money and that 's all they 
cared about, you know?' [i 11 ,p I] 
L_ Trust in some legal 
Srmns impacted 
ASlC's role: 'The law is pretty clear, and we would 
argue that ASIC needs to be more pre-empti ve' 
[i5,p6,h7,o I] 
Regulations: 'a key problem in our regulatory system -
the foc us on FO RM in stead of SU BSTANCE ' [p2,o l] 
Government responses : 'I thought that nobody asked 
the right questions ' [i9] 
Social Security : ' don ' t like Centre link ... th ey don ' t 
understand peopl e ' [i2] 
Does anyone care?: 'T hey are all the same, mate. T hey 
do not rea ll y care about me, I will te ll you ' [i2,h I] 
Views of oth ers about investors: ' few are prepared to 
accept the ir ro le in contri buting to their own loss' 
[i5 ,p5 ,h 1,o2] 
Individual shortcomings acknowledged? : · 1 wo uld say 
Perception of being 
let down by government, 
in many fo rms 
I was ignorant" [i I 0,p l ,h2] Impact on trust in oneself 
Proviso on personal responsibility: ' If we knew what 
to do financ ial ly we wou ldn·t have had to go to a 
fi nancia l adv isor' [i2 ,p6,h I ] ) 
Impact on oneself: ·we went from being confident , 
self-assured to being no t at a ll confide nt and unsteady 
wi th every step · [i4 ,p I] 
Significant 
impact on levels 
of trust in range 
of assoc iated 
entities 
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Table Ile: Coding of statements from data: A loss of control 
Grouping of quotes into key statements 
Centrelink signifies dependence: ' going to Centrelink 
and to that job provider, that is so soul-destroying.' 
[i4 ,p 1] 
Housing certainty important: 'This is our house. 
We 've lived here all our lives, all our married life, 
(nearly 40) years we ' ve been here and to lose that, that 
hurt ' [i7,p2] 
Uncertainty is unsettling: 'My future has been on a 
thread ever since Storms demise & it doesn't look likely 
to improve in my lifetime ' [ilO,ol] 
Health vulnerabilities: ' My other knee ... needs 
replacing as well but I can ' t afford it now . . . I can't 
afford to have my knees done now. But I don ' t know 
whether I should pull out of private health fund . It ' s a 
catch-22 ' [i5 ,p2 ,hl] 
Family vulnerabilities: 'she ' s a separated woman with 
two children and we ' re - I used that word, but we ' re 
stuck with them okay, for how long? ... we have no other 
option' [i2] 
Other vulnerabilities: 'if my car breaks down, I can ' t 
fix it. I' ve had to walk to work because I couldn't get 
my car fixed , I couldn't get a new tyre when I got a flat 
one ' [i2] 
Identifying key themes 
Dependence on others 
increases, stakes of 
losing independence are 
high 
Vastly increased sense 
of exposure to life ' s 
vulnerabilities 
Core findings 
A loss of control 
in various aspects 
of life eventuates 
A further breakdown of data sources used in discussing each major point made in chapter 
six, is presented in table 12. 
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Table 12: Breakdown of sources for each major point made in chapter six278 
Number of excerpts referenced 
Major di scussion point Interviews Public Public Other Total 
submissions hearings correspondence 
Rationale for join_ing Storm 40 21 28 6 95 
Emotional impacts 41 15 6 2 64 
Health 7 11 1 1 20 
Relationships 26 3 3 2 34 
Community impacts 13 7 4 0 24 
Background to loss of trust 10 10 1 1 1 32 
Loss of trust in Storm 12 1 4 0 17 
Loss of trust in financial advisers 8 2 4 1 15 
Loss of trust in banks 5 7 4 0 16 
Loss of trust in lawyers 9 1 0 0 10 
Loss of trust in government 9 8 8 2 27 
Loss of trust in oneself 18 14 4 3 39 
Loss of control 38 5 2 3 48 
The relatively even spread of sources for the initial discussion on ' rationale for joining 
Stonn ' is important because this establishes the basis for all later points raised. Indeed , 
comments and perspectives were frequently linked back to the trust placed m vanous 
parties and sources when individuals were considering whether or not to invest. 
Comments about emotional impacts are likely to be heavily represented from interviews if 
there is a reasonable rapport between interview and interviewee, and where suitable scope 
is given to interviewees to express such impacts . This is reflected in the 64% contribution 
of interviews to this paiiicular discussion, and similar reasons apply to the discussion 
regarding impacts on relationships . 
~
78 The total number of excerpts ( 441) summari sed thi s table does not sum to the total number of excerpts in 
chapter six ( 4 79). nor to the total of excerpts indicated in tables ( 11 a) to ( 1 1 e). This is because some excerpts 
are used to introduce an overall section, rather than a specific point in table 12, and tabl es ( 11 a) to ( 11 e) 
indi cate the frequency of sources used for main points made , rather than supporting background discussion. 
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Although five interviewees explicitly described their struggles with self-harm in the 
discussion on health impacts, we found other sources and in particular the greater potential 
anonymity of public submissions to also be informative. 
In most of the discussions around trust, the reliance across data sources were reasonably 
similar. However, similar to the 'rationale for joining Storm' discussion, the foundational 
discussion of 'background to loss of trust ' highlights a more uniform spread across the 
three major data sources. 
6.2.2 Dealing with intersections of themes 
It is a considerable challenge to illustrate points as distinct and separate aspects associated 
with loss. For example, frustration with financial loss can eventuate because of the 
motivation to provide for children and grandchildren, which in tum leads to depressive 
episodes. Attempting to categorise this as primarily concerning ' tempered expectations ' as 
an impact distinct from that of 'health' is quite artificial and does not give justice to the 
interplay between the two ( and indeed the numerous other factors that are associated with 
one's personal experiences, perceptions and aspirations). Similarly, the loss of one's house 
has obvious emotional and financial implications, together with other associated impacts 
concerning health, social isolation, and the ability to have control over one ' s life. Making 
sense of such interactions is of course a challenge that is not unique to this thesis, but our 
approach in dealing with it is to illustrate all impacts where possible within the wider 
context of the individual ' s circumstances. Although no one quote will be used multiple 
times, the similarity across some impacts for various individual experiences may give the 
appearance of repetition in some cases. This risk of repetition is considered a palatable 
trade-off with the alternative of providing a more limited context for specific points being 
made. 
6.2.3 Visual representation 
Given the substantial written data available to us, it can also be useful to consider such 
volumes through a visualisation tool such as that provided through Wordle™ 279, used to 
279 http://www.wordle.net/. 
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generate word clouds. For each of the main sections in this chapter, we offer a word cloud 
as an indication of what phrases and expressions were common across the main data 
sources used to present each section. This is used merely as a reminder of main points made 
in a pa1iicular section in a visual way, rather than relying on it as a tool of analysis . 
6.3 Rationale for joining Storm 
In order to examine what has been lost, it is inforn1ative to first consider what was relied 
upon when joining Stonn. In this context, for many investors the decision to join Storn1 was 
based on what most people base most decisions on - a combination of working it out by 
yourself, relying on the advice of others, and then simply making a decision. In a financial 
decision making context, there are of course additional influences at play - namely, the 
professional credibility assigned to the adviser themselves and as such the advice that they 
give, the reputation of related institutions, any other accreditations (professional or 
otherwise) that are presented to the potential client, the tendency for safety or caution, and 
the limited knowledge most individuals have of particular financial strategies. Thus, we 
first examine the influences that were part of the decision making process for many of 
Storn1' s investors. 
6.3.1 Motivation 
The motivation to invest with Storm, at least as attested from comments made in interviews 
and a reading of public data sources, generally concerns a desire to provide more than what 
the age pension would deliver, and to deliver it in a manner where one has control over 
one's destiny. The desire for self-reliance in retirement comes from both a belief that the 
coffers of government will not provide more than minimal assistance in the long tenn , and 
also that such self-reliance has the potential for a much better long tenn financial posi tion 
than otherwise wo uld be the case. 
6. 3.1 .1 Beliefs about th e age p ension 
One interviewee conci sely summarised the perception of many about what messages have 
been sent out in recent times concerning the age pension. Continuing poli cy concern and 
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public interest in the 'ageing' population, but particularly relating to the size of the baby-
boomer cohort now approaching retirement, has shaped the views of many concerning this 
'pillar' of their retirement expectation. 
[1] The Federal Government made it quite clear back in the early 90s I think it was that there 
wouldn ' t be enough money in the coffers to sustain all us baby boomers when we retired, 
so we should do our own thing. [interview with Storm investor] 
Variations of this particular interviewee's view are shared by other Storm investors. Either 
the age pension will not be sufficiently worthwhile, or it will not be available at all. The 
latter view may be associated with the perception that for fiscal reasons the provision of an 
age pension will be severely compromised in the future, or it may reflect acceptance that 
tightening means tests of the age pension will mean limited provision of the age pension for 
their personal situation. 
[2] There have been consistent reports that the age pension would not be worth very much 
when I retire. [public submission 147 from Storm Investor] 
[3] In 2006 we were in a position to do some investing as we had all but paid off our family 
home and had a substantial amount of good quality stocks. We had saved and sacrificed for 
-20 years to get to this position and were looking to invest to prepare for our retirement 
which was years away, but we always believed that we needed to take care of our situation 
as the pension was not going to be available for us later on in life. [public submission 199 
from Storm Investor] 
6.3.1.2 Superannuation and self-sufficiency 
Excerpt (3] above hints at a further motivation to consider engaging with Storm - this being 
taking 'care of our situation' , or in other words, deliberately seeking self-sufficiency and 
independence from government provision. One interviewee also picked up on this aspect. 
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[ 4] My Gove rnment has said to me all along, ·'You have to be able to provide for yourself. You 
need to get financial advice to be independent of the Government. That ' s a good thing to 
do··. [interview with Storm investor] 
Others further link this push for self-sufficiency to the introduction of compulsory 
superannuation. This second pillar, they believe, sent a clear message about the need to 
provide for oneself in the future. 
[5] My parents were then enticed to become financial independent through retirement and to do 
their bit not to be a burden on the Australian Government or the tax payers of the future . It 
also seemed to be the right thing to do with superannuation only becoming a reality half 
way through my Dads working life and the direction from the Governn1ent to become self-
sufficient. Storn1 Financial would look after this financial independence for the future to 
come. [public submission 16 from child of Stonn Investors] 
[ 6] They made superannuation compulsory and then towards the end of the late 90s, towards 
the end of the 90s, there was a push for people to do just that; to go out and get their own 
managed funds so that they could be self-sustained when they retire . Well , we took that 
advice. [interview with Storm investor] 
Such views are not just those of investors either - for example, the CEO of the Investment 
and Financial Services Association (!FSA) highlighted the following. 
[7] It is now a well-established policy of successive governments to encourage as many 
Australians as possible to provide for themselves in their retirement. This policy goa l was 
most clearly expressed in the decision 17 years ago to mandate compulsory superann uati on 
contributions by all working Australians. [public hearing [3] , p.49] 
6.3.1.3 Doing a bit better 
Not on ly did belief about limitations in government prov1s1on and a desire for self-
suffi ciency moti vate many investors , but as a natural human trait there was also the hope 
and expectation that investing with Stonn could serve investors better than alternati ve 
- 183 -
courses of action. However, this was not necessarily a push or drive for extravagant living, 
as many have stated relatively modest goals for their future financial affairs when engaging 
with Storm. Excerpts from three different interviews highlight these points. 
[8] We said (to our adviser), "Look, we don't want a lavish lifestyle, we just want enough 
money that we can have food on our table, go out to dinner once a fortnight or so and 
maybe a holiday every - a local holiday once every 12 months and maybe an overseas trip 
every few years sort of thing" ... we ' ve never been one for flash cars ... . [interview with 
Storm investor] 
[9] Wife: Even when we were on an allocated pension and even when you were in business, we 
weren ' t extravagant; basic type weren ' t we? 
Husband: No, I... 
Wife: Just worked hard. [interview with Storm investor] 
[1 OJ Wife: And it wasn 't as if we ever spent a lot of money or lived the high life. 
Husband: Well , the whole situation was ... we wanted to be completely independent of any 
Government requirements. We didn't want to be on the pension. We wanted to live a better 
lifestyle than being a pensioner. [interview with Storm investor] 
One Storm adviser also highlighted that for many people, there was almost a more hopeful 
element to their rationale, in that the Storm model might present an opportunity to make a 
small amount of superannuation go a long way. 
[11] Well, a lot of people, Aaron, didn't have much in the way of cash or super and so the 
figures didn't create them much of an income for quite a long time and a lot of these people 
were either pre-retirement or had just retired and didn't want to live on the old age pension, 
the pension and their meagre $75 ,000 or $ I 00,000 wasn ' t going to bring them an income 
for a long time, you know, before it built up . .. oldies are different nowadays than they were 
20 years ago when I first went into the industry. They want to live a good life because 
they ' re usually not too bad in their 60s . .. so you are looking at a long retirement. People 
don ' t want to sit at home and just live on the pension . So these dream spinners, as I 
probably call Storm now, make them realise they can take a little bit and possibly make it 
into a lot, so they can live like their friends who retired big, you know? So instead of living 
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on the smell of a shoe or an oily rag or whatever, they could live with a better income and 
do some travelling and do all the things they want to do while they ' re young. [interview 
with ex-Stonn adviser] 
For others, there was a straightforward desire to have a better income than the pension 
would provide for both them, and for resultant legacy purposes as well. 
[12] I used Stonn as a tool to supposedly better my financial future; being a physical worker in 
the Australian workforce, I did not want to be on the age pension. I would rather earn more 
than the age pension. Take a look in this room and have a look at the average age of 
everybody here. We are all baby boomers. We do not really want the pension. This whole 
thing was to set up, for every one of us, a fund that we would be able to survive on and then 
pass on to children, for those who have them. [Stom1 investor, public hearing [5] , p.67] 
[13] We were encouraged by the opportunity to do other things in our retirement. .. like do a bit 
more travel overseas. Do a lot more things for the kids, etcetera, etcetera. Those sorts of 
things . Most of the things we ' re doing and wanted to do were mainly for family rather than 
for ourselves. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
Naturally enough, some investors had given explicit thought to and were motivated by all 
three reasons of perceived limitations with the age pension, seeking self-sufficiency, and 
desiring an income higher than they were otherwise likely to have. 
[ 14] Now our idea when we retired was that we wanted to be a little bit better than being on a 
pension and you know, what (Stonn) were saying was that the average person would not 
live on a pension ... so you ' ve got to build up your portfolio that you can be self-funded and 
that' s what was our ambition . [interview with Stonn investor] 
6. 3 .1. 4 Other reasons 
The legacy issue also was apparent for other investors, but more urgently in tem1s of need 
to al so provide some security for lifetime dependents . 
- 185 -
( 15] People were investing for the benefit of their own financial security or the security of other 
family members. This was the position that we were in as we have an adult aged daughter 
with disabilities that we have to provide for and we were trying to ensure that she would 
have financial security when we're no longer here. [ email from Storm investor, August 
2012] 
Another motivation concerned that of fear or worry. For some, this arose from seeing their 
own parents struggle on meagre incomes. 
(16] Investor: We both watched our mums .. . 
Interviewer: Struggle? 
Investor: Struggle on pensions ... I just wanted a good Government job that I was interested 
in, so I could always provide for my future and be independent of the Government when I 
came to retire. [interview with Storm investor] 
Fear or worry also arose from what others would say over time, particularly about the 
perceived (in)adequacy of existing and more standard retirement income strategies such as 
purchasing and managing an allocated pension. 
(17] The only reason we (didn ' t put the super into a bank earning 6%) in the beginning, because 
that was where the money was anyway before we transferred it all over the Storm, was the 
fact that we had seen a (Queensland) Government financial adviser and he said, "Oh, by the 
time you ' re 80, you ' ll have no money left." You know, we would have gone through all 
that money because just with the cost of living. [interview with Storm investor] 
[18] He kept saying to me, " If you leave your money in allocated pension, the Government don ' t 
want you to ever leave your kids anything." That's what he kept saying. He said, "Take it 
out and put it in - you could control your own money, you ' ll never have to worry about a 
pension. You'll never have to scourge on the Government" didn ' t he? He kept saying .. . 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Of particular note is that in the excerpt above it was a Storm adviser who was persistently 
ra1smg concerns. 
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6.3 .1.5 Visual representation of Motivation 
A word cloud representation of the motivation to join Storm is as fol lows: 
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6.3.2 Trust in the adviser 
The fundamental basis underlying all successful business (and indeed personal) 
re lationships is trust. In the context of managing one's financ ial affairs , as di scussed in 
chapter 2 many people either need or choose to seek professional financial advice. As such, 
for people to pursue any advice offered, there needs to be a level of trust both in the advice 
offered, but particul arly in the person who is offering that advice. This section gi ves an 
overview of the rationale investors had to trust the adviser who they were engaged with. 
6. 3. 2. 1 A need.for tmst 
Firstl y. many individuals have highli ghted their need for financial advice that they could 
tru st. Thi s is attested to by several public subm iss ions which highlight such a need aris ing 
from their own lack of relevant knowledge and experience. 
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[19] Again I had this overwhelming lack of confidence of my ability and my knowledge. They 
were the experts and they knew what they were doing. And I must trust them. [public 
submission 266 from Storm Investor] 
[20] On many occasions we left meetings with some confusion but had faith in our advisor to act 
on our behalf, as our thoughts were "They are the professionals with the greater knowledge 
and experience, and we have to trust somebody due to our lack of depth of knowledge in 
this field. " [public submission 305 from Storm Investor] 
One interviewee highlighted their own need to seek advice, but interestingly this was not so 
much for a lack of capability to understand their options. Rather, it was from a lack of 
interest in doing so. 
[21] The reason that most of us did go to get advice - I know for myself, I am more of a creative 
person; I' ve never been that great at looking at the financial side. I don ' t like to . I think if I 
had to, I would be fine, but I don ' t like to. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.3.2.2 Trust in the relationship 
A first and foremost reason to trust one' s adviser is due to the expected professionalism 
with which advice is dispatched. Several excerpts make this very clear as a foundational 
basis for trust with the adviser. 
[22] Senator Williams: So you just trusted Storm, the banks or whoever did these applications? 
Storm investor: We trusted (our adviser) and his staff, yes. We had no reason not to at that 
stage. 
Senator Mason : So you had no relationship with the bank? You said you trusted your 
financial adviser to give you financial advice. 
Storm investor: Yes. That is what they get paid for. 
Senator Williams: . .. would I be correct in saying that you just totally put your faith in your 
financial adviser and trusted him and that was the road you went along? 
Storm investor: That is correct, yes. [public hearing [ 4] , pp.40,43] 
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[23] It was my belief that just like going to a doctor, solicitor or accountant for specialist advice, 
going to a financial planner would give me similar protection from unscrupulous practices. 
[public submiss ion 147 from Stom1 Investor] 
[24] Many times we have been asked why we trusted Stom1. We were ordinary people who 
trusted professional businesses , belonging to their professional bodies , who did a job for us. 
We never asked the dentist why he was drilling our teeth , or questioned the doctor why he 
gave us a certain type of medicine or questioned our accountant. We paid them to do a 
professional job and we thought we would get the same from Stonn as our financial 
advisor. [public submission 260 from Stonn Investor] 
[25] We liked our financial advisor and we had what we believed to be a good client/advisor 
relationship developed over the last 12 years or more years. Over a significant period of 
time she had advised our immediate and close family members and so we had every reason 
to believe and have confidence that her advice would always be tempered by a continued 
fiduciary duty to us . [public submission 307 from Storm Investor] 
[26] I mean you 've got a broken leg, you go to a doctor. You have car troub les, yo u go to a 
mechanic and if you've got financial won-ies, you to a financial adviser and you hope that 
they ' re going to do the job. [interview with Storm investor] 
The primacy of trust in such contexts is a powerful influence. As the following excerpts 
highlight, this trust can even oveITide one ' s lack of understanding of what was being 
entered into, and/or also override any concerns held. 
[27] He promised me three times that I would not be in a position to lose my home and at one 
stage I was tempted to say, ' How can yo u make a promise as grand as that?" I thought. ' He 
knows what he· s doing. He· s in the pos iti on he ·s in. ' I had faith in hi s credibility and a 
belief that he was professional and bad a moral code and that he would not li e to me. He 
promised me three times. [Stom1 investor, public hearing [5] , p.46] 
[28] Senaror William · Did you have an understanding of how the whole Stom1 doubl e geared 
investment worked? 
Husband: No. 
Wife: No . 
- 189 -
Senator Williams: So you are telling me that - as an analogy - if I was to sell you something 
like a Kenworth truck you were never taught how to drive it but you still bought it. If we 
can use that analogy, you went into an investment plan and you never had a clear 
understanding of how it actually worked. Is that true? 
Husband: This is right. We trusted our adviser and we thought his advice was well founded. 
[public hearing [4], p.58] 
[29] This just was too good to be true and I was very uncertain of the sales pitch (the adviser) 
was giving us. (My husband) said we have to trust someone with our finances , He knew 
( our advisor and) had a very good rapport with him. Just completely trusted him. He had 
come to our house on numerous occasions just to chat about Storm, to gain our confidence. 
[email correspondence from Storm investor, November 2011] 
The excerpt above highlights a further interesting aspect of trust, which was that regardless 
of doubts and even regardless of professional credentials and responsibility, the issue of 
trust sometimes boiled down to a trust in the personal relationship as well. The investors 
above confirmed this in an interview, as have others also. 
[30] Investor: (In the end) I just trusted ( our adviser) . 
Interviewer: Just an adviser trust thing? 
Investor: Yeah, because I've known him for 20-odd year_s before it. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[31] We were confident with ( our existing adviser). We had a very strong relationship we 
thought with (our existing adviser). [interview with Storm investor] 
[32] Senator Williams: Surely many of those Storm clients had long-term relationships with 
their Storm broker. They knew them personally and had confidence in them and trust had 
been built up. You probably would not blame the Storm client for trusting the broker if they 
had known them for many years. [public hearing [2] , p.93] 
The main outcome of trust in this context was the belief that the investors ' best interests 
would be the primary concern of the adviser, and that due to this, one could have 
confidence in following the advice. 
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[33] Bernie Ripoll MP: How did you feel about the relationship between you and your adv iser? 
You said it was family-like. 
Storm investor: Yes . .. he was also the adviser for my mother . .. 1 fe lt that we had a 
relationship of protection, that the bottom line was that he would always look after our 
interests. [public hearing [6] , p.67] 
[34] Essential to our relationship was complete trust and belief that her advice and judgement in 
relation to our financial affairs had been and always would be in our best interests. We 
believed that she had always sought and provided solutions that were in our best long-tenn 
financial interests and had no reason to think that the 'new strategy ' would not fall into the 
same category. [public submission 307 from Stom1 Investor] 
Notably, this trust did only relate to the initial decision to invest, but also to ongoing advice 
and persuasion to continue on with a process of borrowing more over time, as leverage 
against increasing asset values. 
[35] Investor: We were always of the belief that we wou ld maintain that ( leve l of) debt. .. but it 
didn ' t happen though . 
Interviewer: Did you know when it was being cranked up over time? 
Investor: We would go and see them and yeah, they would say ... 
Interviewer: Get you to sign stuff? 
Investor: Sign stuff; we would sign - it sounds so stupid now but we had been there for so 
long, you ' d sign the blank documents, they ' d fill them in and send them in. Because they 
got us to trust them . And (my financial adviser) was, in all honesty, almost like a friend. So 
it was very difficult to believe that she wou ld do something that was not okay, you know? 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
6.3.2.3 Trust in Storm 
Not only was trust being placed in a particular adviser, but thi s trust could either be helped 
or hindered by the wider association with Ston11 itself To thi s end, for those that did 
continue on and paiiicipate in the strategy being offered , there were various factors which 
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assured investors as to Storm' s capability and trustworthiness. The mam one was the 
substantial education process that all prospective investors had to go through. 
[36] We did eight months due diligence which included the Storm education process ... which I 
must admit was better produced and delivered than any other financial planner than I had 
been to as far as clear, concise well-presented and answered a lot of questions. It was a 
detailed process ... we had been to several other financial planners in an attempt to find 
someone offering something else. We were looking at changing financial planners and none 
of them had impressed at all. Their education processes were lackluster, half-hearted and 
more of an inconvenience to them than anything else. We got a lot of sales pitches but scant 
detail from most of them and a lot of them really did come across as nothing more than the 
old National Mutual salesmen type person. [interview with Storm investor] 
[37] It is a big part of the whole process that you go through the educational - they showed us 
the software that they had and they used. They showed statistical information. It was very 
impressive. The premises gave you confidence, (the speakers) gave you confidence. 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
[38] So it took four or five months from woe to go. It was six months. They' re very careful. 
They were careful how they went into it. You went into different groups learning about the 
different structures but a lot of it they talked about bei~g on a computer and I'm not a 
technically orientated person to be going and finding much out but I accepted what they 
were telling me. [interview with Storm investor] 
Ex-employees of Storm have also made the point that this education process itself was not 
working towards a pressured point of sale, but rather was aimed as a meaningful way to 
give prospective investors awareness of what was being offered. Prospective investors 
could then go away, investigate it further in their own time, and determine for themselves 
whether they trusted and had confidence in Storm' s strategy. 
[39] Despite the things that have been publicly stated in the media, Storm and its staff were very 
ethical and the directors believed in education and transparency. The Storm process was not 
a hard sell, nor a quick process. On average clients took 180 to 200 days to complete their 
first investment. Some clients took as long as two years before proceeding. During this 
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period they had many opportunities to discuss their strategy and have their questions 
answered. No fees were levied fo r thi s. The fees were only paya ble when the investments 
were placed. [ex-Stom1 employee, public hearing [5], p.2 8] 
[ 40] I understand that only about 25 per cent of the people who approached Stonn eventually 
became clients, and usually only after many meetings and about six months of prior contact. 
[ex-Stom1 employee, public hearing [5] , p.4] 
Additional factors that could engineer trust were mentioned by another investor. 
[41] It was just the history of their progress and their status in the business community. I am not 
in that field. I have no cause to challenge, except to believe. When you saw the office that 
was a big factor, and all these cruises that they had taken people on. All that indicated that 
they really did have the viability and the credibility they espoused they did . [Stonn investor, 
public hearing [5] , p.46] 
6.3.3 Trust in the associated institutions 
The aspect of trust in the case of Storm also extended to those institutions that were 
associated with the overall strategy on offer. This was primarily seen to be the CBA and its 
subsidiaries, Colonial Margin Lending (CML) and Colonial Geared Investments (CGI), 
however as noted in chapter 3 there were a range of other banks and service providers al so. 
In presenting the points that follow, we pick up on comments made which are most 
illustrative, not necessarily because they refer to any institution in particular. 
6.3.3. J Connection with banks 
The association between some institutions and Storn1 were clearly more than a casual or 
run-of-the-mill business relationship . Thi s is attested to by CBA 's Group General Counsel. 
[42] I th ink it is fai r to say that the association we had with Stom1 spanned a number of areas of 
our business. As you have heard , there was clearly strong invo lvement in our CGI business 
and ou r home loan business , and third ly in our wealth management am1, which managed 
the index funds - these were spec ific, Stonn-badged index funds . So the associat ion with 
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Storm spanned several areas of the organisation. I would say that that is not an absolutely 
standard arrangement. It is quite common for large organisations to have relationships with 
us in more than one area, but, in this particular case, Storm did have relationships across 
three areas. Fourthly - and, again, this is probably a little bit unusual - Storm was also a 
corporate borrower from the organisation. [public hearing [7] , p.83] 
Although the relationship with Storm differed to a ' standard model ', CBA's CEO gave his 
perspective that despite this, the relationship with Storm was not a significant one in tenns 
of the bank' s overall operations. 
[43] My view is that this was not a tight relationship. From the organisation ' s perspective - from 
my perspective, from the board of the bank's perspective - we are talking about an 
organisation where the revenue from Storm itself was less than $10 million per annum and, 
when we look at that in the context of around $14 billion of revenue per annum, this was 
relatively, in relation to the overall bank operations, quite small. [public hearing [9], p.27] 
Interestingly for a bank the size of CBA which has over 4 million active on-line customers 
alone280 , by the CEO's numbers it would take just 1,400 Storm-sized relationships to 
generate CBA's overall revenue. In other words, although contributing a seemingly meagre 
contribution of approximately 0.07% to CBA's income, given the vast diversity of CBA 
operations the significance of a single relationship like that of Storm could be understood as 
one of many millions, or one of the more significant individual ones. 
6.3.3.2 Trusted by investors 
Undoubtedly, the perceived backing or connection of Storm' s approach to maJor and 
trusted institutions was a major factor that influenced investors to proceed with Storm or 
not. The perception of a very strong association is highlighted by one investor who 
themselves was a former employee of the CBA. 
[ 44] I was not investing in Storm Financial; I was investing in Colonial First State. That was the 
Commonwealth Bank, which I had worked for for 40 years. I totally trusted the bank and 
280 http://www.commbank.com.au/about-us/our-company/overview.htrnl, accessed 28 June 2013 . 
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Colonial First State. I knew who had set up the thing . I even went to my own financial 
planner in my branch and said . ·Can I buy this product through you rather than go through 
Storm. because I ,,von ' t have to pay the seven per cent?' ·sorry . . . can ·t do it.· The reason 
he could not do it was that it was exclusively badged to Stonn Financial , so obviousl y this 
product had been set up by them exclusively for them . If the Commonwealth Bank or 
Colonial First State is going to have a product which is exclusively for this particular client, 
they must think they are a fairly good sort of operator to be able to do that for them . That is 
huge. I was investing not in Stom1 but in Colonial First State. [public hearing [6] , p .86] 
Such associations are well known to provide additional selling points for investors who 
would othenvise not be quite as sure about what they were doing, as attested to by the 
managing director of ANZ's investment and insurance division. 
[ 45] In practice we find that virtually all customers of our financial planning business are 
originally ANZ customers, because it is the relationship of trust that they have with the 
bank that causes them to seek out financial advice from us. [public hearing [2] , p.52] 
For investors in Stonn, the result of such associations was, firstly, the additional and vital 
aspect of security and safety to the option being considered. 
[ 46] And because we had a contract with Colonial Mutual ... we would be protected by being 
with strong well known financial organisations. [interview with Stonn investor] 
[ 47] Because we were dealing with such large trusted companies as the Commonwealth Bank 
and the ANZ bank, we assumed that what we were entering was all above board and safe . 
[public submission 220 from Stonn Investor] 
[ 48] Anybody with any knowledge of investing in managed fund s would have been aware that 
Co lon ial First State had been a stand-out performer over any number of years. When I 
fo und that the investment in Stom1 was associated with First State then a lot of my 
apprehensions regarding the safet y o f my port fo lio were di spelled . [Stonn investor, public 
hearing [6]. p. 75] 
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As well as safety, three associated C' s (comfort, courage and confidence) were highlighted 
by the co-chairman of SICAG. This suggests that not only did associations with these 
institutions give rise to feelings of assurance regarding the initial decision to invest, but also 
to buy in totally to the Storm model which would include a continuing commitment to 
additional loans / leverage over time. 
[ 49] Senator Mason: You say in your opening submission that a key factor in the decision by the 
majority of your members to engage in the Storm strategy was the strength of Storm' s 
connection to the Commonwealth Bank and its margin-lending division, Colonial. So it was 
a key factor in fact in choosing to engage with Storm. Is that right? 
SICAG co-chairman: It was very comforting to know that we had the support of the biggest 
bank, basically. [public hearing [6] , p.75] 
SICAG co-chairman: ... (The CBA) gave me courage and confidence that I had the implicit 
backing of Australia' s biggest bank. Stonn ' s partnership with the CBA allowed me to sleep 
at night, a luxury that I have not enjoyed now for eight months. I was proud to tell my 
family and friends that our money was safe because Storm had the backing of CBA, 
Australia ' s biggest bank. [Storm investor, public hearing [6] , p.89] 
6.3.3.3 Trusted by Storm 
It was not only investors whose trust in Storm was enhanced on the basis of the associated 
institutions. Various employees of Storm also noted this as a significant factor in the 
confidence of their strategy. Storm' s founder, Emmanuel Cassimatis, highlighted this in an 
exchange with PJCI chairman Bernie Ripoll. 
[50] Bernie Ripoll MP: So you trusted other people ' s money with somebody else 's trust? 
Mr Cassimatis: Of course. That is what you do. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: No documents, no legal contracts? I am just not sure - you based your 
trust on what? Normally we base our trust in documents. We sign a contract and understand 
exactly what happens at what point. You based your trust on what? 
Mr Cassimatis : You trust an institution such as the CBA. If you cannot trust that type of 
institution, which institution can you trust? [public hearing [6] , p.32] 
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Similar thoughts were also expressed by various administrative staff and advisers. The 
associated institutions not only provided comfort as to the fidelity of the strategy being 
taken, but also added confidence to the subsequent offering of that strategy to investors. 
[51] One of my key selling points was the strength of the relationship with Australia ' s biggest 
bank. They manufactured our products , they did the insurance, they did the margin lending 
and they did the retail lending. It was something that I had a lot of pride in . [ ex-Stom1 
advi ser, public hearing [6] , p.99] 
[52] We are all expected to understand that banks are pillars of society. When the pillars of 
society come to you and they state that this is what they can do, we are expected to believe 
that. [ex-Stonn adviser, public hearing [4] , p.29] 
[53] Given that the major banks and a lot of others were actively seeking the Stonn lending 
business we had no reason to believe that it was not considered sound and there was added 
comfort in the fact that they were willing to provide these loans. [ex-Storm employee, 
public hearing [5] , p .28] 
6.3.4 Trust in the networks 
Hoffmann and Broekhuizen (2009, p.499) claim that "consumers are especially susceptible 
to interpersonal influences when they lack necessary investment-related knowledge" . This 
may explain, in part, the finding in this section which is the value placed in the experiences 
of others known to a prospective investor. However, it does not seem that the advice and 
experience of others ' is sought out to better understand the detail of a particular course of 
action, but rather it is to gain general comfort that what is being considered is reasonable in 
a general sense. Furthennore, such influences may well be a factor for both higher- and 
lower- knowledgeable networks, as most people would place value on the opinions of 
others in some shape or fonn. 
Where such influence is influential in a lower-knowledge network, an obvious problem is 
the possibility that nobody within that network actually has the knowledge required to 
make a truly inforn1ed decision . Hence onl y one and potentiall y mi si nfonned view may 
preside throughout an entire network. 
- 197 -
Regardless of whether investors are considered lower- or higher- knowledge in the case of 
Stonn281 , the insight discussed in this section is that placing trust in one' s networks was an 
important factor in getting involved. 
[54] Bernie Ripoll MP: Obviously there was a customer base for Storm. There are people at the 
least sophisticated end but there are also people at the most sophisticated end. How does 
that work in terms of understanding? It seems that everyone got caught in the same 
problem. People have quite clearly told us: 'I really didn ' t know what was happening; I just 
trusted them' and others were qualified financial planners themselves. 
Financial planner: I do not honestly know how that would happen. In some ways - and 
someone mentioned it - it was about that network thing; you passed it on. [public hearing 
[4],p.99] 
Such trust could anse because of the perception that a friend themselves were 
knowledgeable about such things. 
[55] Interviewer: So you guys getting into Storm originally, would you like to talk about that? 
Wife: I did not want to do it. 
Husband: . . . we had a friend who had gone into it and she ' d gone around all the investment 
organisations and she felt that this was probably the best of what she could see of the lot of 
them and she was pretty switched 011... we went along to a seminar and we spoke to a 
couple of guys and before we went into it. [interview with Stonn investor] 
In other cases, friends may or may not have been knowledgeable about the details of the 
strategy (or notably, the risks involved), but they were definitely happy with their 
experience to date with Storm. These cases too were an important aspect of developing 
trust. 
28 1 Such generalisations about a relative state of knowledge are not intended as a universal judgment on all 
investors, nor even necessarily the majority - but one obvious fact of life is that for a particular context, some 
people will know more than others about it. One example is that ' very-low-knowledge ' would accurately 
describe the author in the context of understanding how a car engine works. For clarification in terms of 
Stom1 ' s context, our impression from interviews is that some investors seemed to have a good understanding 
of the Storm strategy when initially getting involved, some knew a lot of the detail of the Storm strategy but 
mainly in hindsight, and others still knew very little about the Storm strategy even with hindsight. 
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[56] I went into Storm because my friend up in Townsville ... she talked about shares and at that 
stage, I wasn' t worried abo ut doing anything like that. But then when I knew what had 
happened , I had so ld a house, two houses, I had some money. So I thought \-ve il I' d been to 
two financial advisers already and they had showed me this graph that went down instead 
of making my investment go up and so I rang my friend in Townsville and sa id , --what ' s 
this share thing that you ' re in?" She had been with them for 12 yea rs. So I felt quite 
confident knowing that she had tripled her investment in the 12 years and her daughter had 
done it too and they were managing and it was going really well. So I thought, well it 
sounds fairly confident to go into that. [interview with Storn1 investor] 
[57] My brother had been going to thi s bloke for years but he wasn't with Storm then . . . my 
brother was quite happy with him. He was impressed with him and he was making money . 
But anyway, thi s bloke apparently joined up with this Cassimatis and he ' s brainwashed 
himself into believing whatever he had been told, you know? .. . Anyway, I asked a lot of 
blokes I knew . . . a half a dozen blokes I know real good, had been with him for yea rs. You 
know, five, six, seven years and I know a bloke, a bloke I used to play football with many 
years ago. I've seen him and he said he can't go wrong .. . I remember we went for a 
dinner ... at thi s place and over a period of probably 12 months I suppose - maybe not quite 
12 months but somewhere around that 12 months, we probably went to half a dozen 
meetings ... and we thought, oh well everybody is bloody making money so we may as well 
do it too . [interview with Storm investor] 
[5 8] I had a friend who had been in it, only had joined up with them and was reall y impressed 
and very happy with the profitability of it for them and she approached me about it and I 
sort of hummed and harred and hummed and harred because I' m not a ga mbler, I' m really 
not a gambler. Anyway, long story short, I went to one of their seminars. It was so very 
convincing. [interview with Stonn investor] 
[59] Investor: In talking to other people there, they had family and friends who were with Storm 
Financial , very happily, that they felt that they had been given very good advice. 
Interviewer: A lot of positive referral from those who you knew or were associated with it? 
Investor: Yes. [interview with Stonn investor] 
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[60] Trust was a big factor, and the recommendations of friends and family contributed to many 
joining .. . I believe most or all of the Storm investors did not know they were in such a high 
loan, risk product. [ email from individual who did not invest with Storm, September 2011] 
However, the influence of networks and referrals from others is not a factor which is unique 
to the case of Storm, as attested in the following. 
[ 61] Bernie Ripoll MP: We have certainly got plenty of evidence and submissions to say that in 
fact the majority of advice that was given to Storm investors was actually from their friends 
or neighbours. That is how they actually got in. It was not from an adviser. The adviser ' s 
role was more just to sign them up. Is that your view? 
Mr Black: It is very much my view of what happens in the industry, yes. [Mr Stuart Black, 
Director/Board Member, Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, public 
hearing [2], p.81] 
In Storm' s case, however, its dramatic collapse and the significant influence of trusting 
others leads directly into personal impacts of such a collapse. This is discussed shortly. 
6.3.5 Trust in the accreditations 
The value of having some sort of professional, educational or regulatory-related 
endorsement was also perceived as a key source of trust. 
[62] We went into these investments simply to provide a more comfortable retirement and we 
trusted Storm and the banks and margin lenders to provide us with the right advice and to 
guide our decisions in providing for our future and the future of our family. These people 
and institutions were licensed and qualified to do this. [public submission 92 from Storm 
Investor] 
[63] Wife: But yeah, it ' s just the trust, trusting. 
Husband: . .. Well , that he kept going and doing all the courses. He kept telling us . 
Wife: I know that. I know. 
Husband: All the certificates he had. [interview with Storm investor] 
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[64] We rea lised we knew nothing of investing, and that is why we had gone to an accredited 
investment adviser for advice. We go to a mechanic when our ca r plays up , a lawyer when 
we are seeking legal advice, etc. One goes to the person with the correct bit of paper when 
wanting advice about stuff one knows nothing about. [public submiss ion 21 from Stom1 
Investor] 
The major fonnal endorsements mentioned as being influential were membership of the 
Financial Planning Association of Australia (FP A), academic credentials, and being 
licenced with ASIC. 
6.3.5.1 FPA membership 
The FPA is "the peak professional association for financial planners in Australia with 
nearly 12,000 members representing both individual financial planners, and Australian 
Financial Services Licensees (AFSLs)" (public submission 277 to the PJCI). It "provides 
the leadership and professional framework that enables members to deliver quality financial 
advice to their clients"282 . As such, any member carrying its accreditation is expected to 
offer assurances to those who are engaging with it. The CEO of the FPA attested to this 
expectation on behalf of Stonn investors. 
[65 ] Senator Williams: If I am a mechanic and I become a member of the Motor Trades 
Association, I can hang a badge outside my shop and people will have confidence in me. 
That is similar to your association as well , I would imaginat ion. How long was Stom1 a 
member of the association? 
FPA CEO: For 10 years. 
Senator Williams: ... Did Storm 's public ity material s proudly have the FPA logo on them? 
Have you seen any of that material? Did they use their management of the FPA as a 
marketing too l? 
FPA CEO: l think they did . A number of the clients we met with certainl y recognised the 
logo--principal member of the FP A--on the front of their office. One of the issues that has 
been raised with us is that there was a perception- and you cannot argue with thi s- that all 
"
8
" http ://wvvw.fpa .com.au/default.a p') action=artic le&ID=22382 , accessed 28 June 20 13. 
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financial planners working for Storm were members of the FP A and, therefore, there was 
confidence and trust in the brand. [public hearing [3] , pp.41-42] 
The perception was certainly shared by those investors who were cognisant of that 
membership, with a typical view being that this provided some safety in itself. 
[66] Initially, because they were members of the financial planners association, that was an 
insurance policy for us. We felt that they were accredited. [Storm investor, public hearing 
[4] , p.55] 
6.3.5.2 Academic credentials 
Academic as well as professional credentials were also seen as important for developing 
trust, with one couple making this clear in an interview. 
[67] Husband: But people that weren ' t involved in it, had never been to the school of thought 
that we were all taken to, never been or saw that a plane was on the wall of everybody in 
the University rigs and so forth and all the happy little family and this one had a Bachelor 
of Accountancy and you know, you looked at all this and it ' s like going into your doctor' s 
office and you see all these School of Surgeons, school of this and school of that and you 
think, oh well , okay this bloke must know what he ' s talking about. 
Interviewer: ... Does something hanging on your wall make you trust someone or not? 
Wife: Well, that' s true. Well, that's what Cassimatis ' mob had. They had a list of dilpomas. 
Husband: ... Yeah, they had them all on the wall, the whole wall and they paid for these 
people to go through to get their degrees and so forth , you know? ... so they ' re not silly. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Others highlighted that the actual academic credentials were m relevant subjects, at a 
postgraduate level, and from reputable tertiary institutions. 
[68] We went along in blind trust that these people knew just what they were doing as all 
advisors had a minimum of a masters degree in finance. [public submission 244 from Storm 
Investor] 
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[69] We reli ed totally upon the experience and credentials of our financial adviser who after all 
has a Master of Applied Finance Degree Ji-om the University of West Sy dney. [public 
submi ss ion 263 from Stom1 Investor] 
6.3.5.3 Licensed with ASIC 
The fact that Storm was a licensed financial provider also gave the impression credibility to 
investors, and indeed this was a point not lost on Stonn itself. 
[70] From the very first time I was advised , I was told, by my adviser that they were accountable 
to ASIC. [public submission 203 from Storm Investor] 
[71] When you get a tick of approval from ASIC, you keep working . . . that ' s supposed to be the 
watchdog. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[72] We just assumed that bodies such as ASIC and the FPA would be our watchdogs . [public 
submission 220 from Storm Investor] 
The chair of the P JCI, Bernie Ripoll MP, also confirmed this overall perception of what 
licensing can mean in tenns of a signal to investors. 
[73] There certainly is the impression that if somebody has got a license they have met certain 
standards and therefore can actually deliver a quality service and quality product through 
models that are approved. [public hearing [l] , p.8] 283 
6.3.6 Trust in the strategy 
This section further explores some features and other aspects of Stom1 's strategy which 
further engineered trust. In particular, one factor emphasised to many investors was that 
many Stonn employees themselves were investors, which was po1irayed and perceived as 
an additional basi s for credibility. 
"
8
·
1 And by way o f furth er. fo reboding comm entary: " I understand that is obvious ly no t the case. ASIC does 
not actua ll y approve th ose·· (pub lic hearing [ I ]. p .8). 
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6. 3. 6.1 Emphasised features 
An overview of the Storm model was presented in chapter 3. A very brief summary of 
Storm' s advice would be to build assets, generate income, and do this by borrowing against 
assets, but with sufficient safeguards in place. Each of these four elements were mentioned 
in various sources, and just a brief collection of excerpts is presented here to keep the 
overview brief. It is useful to note at this stage some of the language used by Storm - in 
particular, references to chickens (assets, though funded by borrowings) and eggs (income) 
were prevalent in many investors ' recollections. 
Firstly, it was portrayed as important to not reduce holdings of equity assets (and thereby 
not reduce debt as well) because this would mean fewer eggs (income) in the future. The 
shortcomings of this approach were understood by some individuals who did not proceed 
with St01m and as such, was an element of Storm' s presented strategy that they recalled. 
[74] Don ' t eat your chickens or you will have no eggs. [public submission 162 from individual 
who considered but did not invest with Storm] 
[75] Stom1 (gave) a well presented reason to take a position in the top 200 businesses or 
companies in Australia and receive benefits and dividends that exceeded inflation and gave 
better returns than the banks. Most attending were impressed. The follow up was over a 
period of months before you could invest in the Storm Product. I could say it was a very 
good brain wash of "keep your eggs so as you will have chickens scenario" [ email from 
individual who did not invest with Storm, September 2011] 
For those that did proceed, the chicken and egg analogy played out on various occasions 
over time. 
[76] Husband: They encouraged you not to just take the money out. It was always, ' Keep it 
topped up .' 
Stuart Robert MP: How did they encourage you to do that? We have heard this quite often. 
Husband: Mainly by saying that it was to our advantage to not reduce the amount we had in 
the market. 
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W{fe: It might be in the first statement of advice that it says that if you take money out and 
do not replace it then you are eat ing your chickens; you need to keep all your chickens and 
not eat them- I do not know if you can fo llow that- meaning that whenever you took 
money out, if you did not replace it, then slowly your capital would deplete. If yo u wanted 
to keep that same level then you needed to keep it replaced. 
Stuart Robert MP: Out of interest is ' eating the chickens ' yo ur words or the irs? 
Wffe: Their words. It is actuall y on that statement of advice. 
Stuart Robert M.P: They actually wrote down ' You ' re eating the chickens ' on that 
document? 
Wife: Yes. [public hearing [5] , p.65] 
The funds for increasing exposure to the Stonn-badged equity index would come from 
many sources, including investment properties, re-mortgaging the family home, and also by 
drawing down superannuation funds . This seems to have been done in many instances even 
when penalties would apply for early withdrawal of the superannuation funds. 
[77] In late 2003 our advisor encouraged my husband to retire early and add his super to the 
portfolio even though he would pay a large amount of tax - the extra shares we could 
purchase would quickly make up for it. [public submission 160 from Stonn Investor] 
Indeed, from the AEC / SICAG survey of SICAG members, 44% of respondents invested 
their superannuation with Storm, and of these, 16% invested more than $500,000 of 
superannuation and a further 36% invested between $200,000 and $500,000. So substantial 
amounts of superannuation were invested with Stonn, which is not surprising given the 
prevalence of more mature Australians as investors. The AEC / SICAG survey gives an 
indicative breakdown of the demographic profile. 
[78] o 30-49 years (22 .7%); 
o 50-59 years (29.5%); 
o 60-69 years (38 .3 %); 
o Over 70 yea rs (8%). [AEC / SICAG survey, publi c submi ss ion 154] 
In te1111 s of borrowing against the family home, Storn1 's approach was to make thi s asset 
·work· for the investor by tapping into (borrowing against) its capital value. The AEC I 
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SICAG survey indicated that 88% of those surveyed had advice to utilise their home' s 
capital value to invest further in equities. For many, it was a struggle to come to terms with 
this. 
[79] Husband: This is the only house we've ever owned. We 've been sitting here (for nearly 50 
years). It's the only property we 've ever owned. 
Wife: We built it. That was the biggest - when we first went into it, (Storm) said, "Oh, well 
your biggest asset is your house." 
Husband: We owned the house. 
Wife: We own it. 
Husband: It's sitting there doing nothing for you. 
Wife: It took me months to come to grips with doing that with the house. 
Husband: Going back into debt because you know, we owned it by this stage. [interview 
with Storm investor] 
In terms of the safeguards within Storm's strategy, investors were assured that things were 
in place, in particular to protect their house. 
[80] If the share market dropped tomorrow and we lost money on that, that was part of being in 
shares, you know? But every time we'd go in and we'd say you know, "How safe?" "You 
will not use your house. We've got things in place to - _ you know, you won't lose your 
house." [interview with Storm investor] 
[81] (The presentations did promote) the investment as a ' safe product ' managed by Storm and 
accepted by the major banks of Australia. Margins would be at a safe leverage and 'you 
will never be at risk of losing your house. ' [email from individual who did not invest with 
Stonn, September 2011] 
6.3.6.2 Okay for some 
Many investors, even with hindsight, can recall their eventual comfort with the overall 
strategy, which often came about after much investigation and thought. Thus, it is 
reasonable to say that for them, there was comfort with proceeding and as such they trusted 
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the strategy being offered. One investor referred to a lack of public criticism of the strategy 
as one factor in confinning that they could embark on this investment. 
[82] Were we comfortable with the Stom1 plan? One of the things we were comfortable with 
was we were investing in the top 300 companies in Australia ... we could no longer find any 
reason not to go ahead with it ... no one could criticise what (Stom1) was selling and no one 
did criticise what (Stonn) was selling. [interview with Stonn investor] 
Another investor considered that for his view of the risks involved, his overall financial 
situation with other assets being owned, and the approach to use index funds , meant that 
additional exposure to the markets via margin lending was well within his risk tolerance. 
[83] (From being involved in running several businesses) I know more than a little bit about 
business . This appeared to be a method of enhancing our income in a safe way - index 
funds are the safest - and some well controlled cautious margin lending ... look, nothing in 
life is without risk but we were convinced that - and had done enough research to say that 
index funds are very, very safe and very, very conservative. We ' re not trying to be greedy 
about this . We ' re not going into a scheme which is offering 55 per cent return or any crazy 
things that you see advertised from time to time. You know, if it sounds too good to be true, 
it usually is. It was nothing like that. It was to produce a return that. .. would be at market 
level. It wasn't going to be below the market or above the market, but we were assured of 
that because that ' s how funds work. Now, the risk factor that we took of course, was 
borrowing against the house and we borrowed heavily to do that and put money in to 
bolster up the margin lending element... that was a big step for us becau se we were 
absolutely free of debt at the time that we went into all of that and I suppose that you could 
argue today and people are arguing it today, that for self-funded retirees, that it ' s not a 
smart idea to put your only asset 'on the line '. But we were - well , we thought we were -
safe in the knowledge that we had other assets ; that thi s wasn ' t our only asset, which is 
probably our biggest asset but it wasn' t our only asset. We felt reasonably safe in do ing 
that. [interview with Stonn investor] 
Another investor in writing a public submission still perceived the strategy as legitimate, 
and therefore had no qualms about entering it (in 2001) and continuing to follow it. 
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[84) Something that escapes most people, especially the media is the self-funding nature of such 
an investment. If you borrow to invest say $100,000 and the interest rate on the borrowings 
is 6.5% ($6,500 p.a.), if you then receive dividends of 3.5% (usually about 4%) p.a. and a 
tax break on the borrowings of 30c in the dollar depending on the clients marginal tax rate, 
that means that the investment is neutrally geared (self-funding). All the fuss about retirees 
having no income but being able to borrow money anyway is nonsense. The borrowed 
money is an asset which is used to produce income, passive income, the best kind. THAT is 
the whole idea, to invest money that will produce a passive income. [public submission 269 
from Storm Investor] 
6.3.6.3 Not/or eve,yone 
However, plenty of criticisms of the overall strategy have emerged and these are picked up 
in more detail shortly. But at this point, a useful balance can be presented by referring to 
two examples of individuals who did not proceed with Storm' s strategy. Both of these 
individuals were concerned about what would happen under Storm's model, should the 
value of equities drop by a larger amount than what they were being presented with. 
[85) I had strong reservations of what they did not present. I did not attend any further 
presentations but did follow up with a intended interview. (At thi s interview I asked) "how 
does Storm handle a down trending market for the benefit of those who have come in at 
6000 to 7000 of the index" .... we did not proceed with the Storm Model. [email from 
individual who did not invest with Storm, September 2011 ]284 
[86) Anyway, (our financial adviser) went up and saw (our son in law) ... (our son in law) said 
what happened in 1980 ... whenever it was; was it ' 87 when the crash was? (The adviser) 
said, "Oh, I can ' t put that up." (Our son in law) says, "Well , I want to see what happened." 
So he went back the next day and he must have got the material together and went back. 
(Our son in law asked) "what happens, when that happens" ... (the adviser) said, "Oh, you 
lose everything." (Our son in law) said, "well , on your way. " [interview with Storm 
investor] 
284 This individual is also referred to in excerpts [7 5] and [81]. 
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6.3 .6.4 Storm ·s own buy in 
A significant aspect of building trust in the strategy was the fact that many of Storm ' s 
employees were themselves investors as well. This feature was discussed in section 3.2.2.5, 
and here we present evidence of how this provided trust for investors to get involved. One 
ex-Stonn employee confinned that all Stonn staff had significant buy-in about the strategy 
being offered. 
[87] The Storm investment strategy was something we all believed in, and staff and advisers 
followed it to the same degree as the clients . [public hearing [5] , p.28] 
An ex-Storm adviser further highlighted the belief that their own personal acceptance of 
Storm's strategy gave it extra credibility to investors, a point echoed by Bernie Ripoll as 
part of the evidence and hearings they encountered throughout the P J CI. 
[88] They know that 1 wasn't just flogging a product, they know I wasn't floggi ng a product , I 
was involved in it, J'm an investor as well and J think they thought because J was, that it 
would be alright for them as well. I mean I was an investor a year or two before a lot of 
them were investors, you know? ... but I don ' t know if there would be such a creature; an 
adviser who wasn ' t an investor because they could show wisdom perhaps of not going in it 
themse lves. But then I would have questioned their motivation. I would have sa id , " Were 
you okaying a flawed product but weren't going into it yourself?" [interview with ex-Storm 
adviser] 
[89] Everywhere I look I see clients sayi ng, 'No, I do not want to take that much ri sk; I do not 
want that much ; I do not need that much. ' But it is the advisers who are actually pushing for 
that- almost as if they are pushing their own value and belief set onto their clients. That 
would make some sense: they are advising others on what they believe in .. . How do we deal 
with the transfer of belief from the adviser to the client? [Bernie Ripoll MP, public hearing 
[7] , p.109] 
Such involvement and acceptance from within Stom1 clearly had an impact on increasi ng 
trust amongst investors , as attested by the following excerpts . 
- 209 -
[90] I always asked the question, "Have you involved yourself in this yourself? You know, have 
you got all your family in it?" "Oh, yes, yes, we 've got you know, our kids and all that are 
all in it" sort of thing because if they ' re not prepared to go into it themselves, well you go, 
well what's going on here, you know? But you know, we were comfortable with it. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[91] Then when we went back, the second stage is meeting with a financial adviser. .. and he had 
involved a number of his friends in Storm Financial, too, and himself. So then was another 
layer of respectability, accountability, credibility and it would comfort that this was going 
on. [interview with Storm investor] 
[92] Investor: You know other things that came into play was (that my financial planner) put his 
family into it. .. he put himself into it. He put a heap of other people into it. That was very, 
very close to him. Closer than I am. His parents. 
Interviewer: Into you mean the Storm product as well? 
Investor: Into Storm. If he had any doubts whatsoever about what was going on, he would 
not have done that. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.3. 7 Trust in oneself 
All the prev10us elements of trust are highly significant, influential and important to 
consider. Indeed, they all give context to the following section which considers a final 
element of trust in joining Storm, that being the trust of one' s own judgement. Indeed, an 
individual or couple still has to make the ultimate decision to join with Storm or not, and as 
such, an element of trusting one' s own investigations, impressions, and judgement is 
paramount. One investor emphasised the reliance on their own extensive questioning of 
their adviser, to generate trust of their understanding of Storm' s approach. 
[93] Over a period of eight months of - at some stage, would have been almost weekly meetings 
with my financial planner, I would deliver questions to him and he would respond to them 
and answer them. If I wasn't satisfied with that answer, we would go again and approach it 
from a direct direction until we did get an answer that was either satisfactory or otherwise. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
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Another investor similarly conducted extensive investigations, and came to a point where 
they were happy to commit as well. 
[94] We felt we asked the appropriate questions to verify their professionalism, such as their 
affi li at ion to a professional body, indemnity insurance, auditors, advisors , Legal 
Registration and their backing and involvement with other financial institutions . At no time 
were we given any reason to doubt this company and their ability to manage our financial 
affairs. All appeared in order. [public submission 305 from Storm Investor] 
Finally, one interviewee simply expressed their contentment with making a judgement call 
on what they were presented with. Notably, this investor had also followed the 
recommendations of many observers of the industry by consulting other advisers as well, 
(albeit about their own strategies rather than getting other opinions on Stonn). 
[95] We were heading towards retirement and we searched around for a few - went to a few 
financial advisers and it just happened to be the Storm scheme that we chose ... we just 
went along to the seminars . They conducted a couple of seminars before they actually take 
you on. That was one of their requirements and we went along to the seminars and we were 
quite happy with the plan and that 's why we chose them . [interview with Stom1 investor] 
6.3.8 Visual representation of Trust 
A word cloud representation of the trust involved when joining Stonn is overleaf: 
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6.4 What happens when people experience a significant financial shock? 
It was suggested in section 2.4.5 that there are three realms or sources of influence on 
individuals when making decisions. These sources are those from within (an individual ' s 
personal world) , those from social contexts (an individual ' s external world), and those from 
the nature of the system as a whole (the societal or cultural world). Analogous to this , we 
consider the impacts upon an individual in terms of a similar framework. Firstly, the impact 
on the personal world, which is seen to primarily be the emotive and health impacts upon 
an individual. Secondly, the impact on the social world, which is primarily concerned with 
the numerous social relationships and activities people engage in. Thirdly, and by way also 
of drawing the first two points together, we consider the impact on how an individual 
perceives, and reacts to the wider world around them. This gives particular attention to the 
framework of financial provision that all citizens exist within, but as will be discussed, the 
impact also goes beyond the cultural context of one particular industry. Significantly, this 
does suggest that the influence of the financial services industry is more than merely money 
- the impact of financial loss goes well beyond an individual ' s financial affairs. 
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As such, this represents an attempt to indicate the breadth and depth of what happens when 
significant financial trauma occurs. An informative overview of potential impacts is given 
?g-by AEC I SICAG 2009 survey results- ): 
Sell ing home to repay debts 
Cannot afford another home 
Returning to the workforce 
Taking medication for depression 
No offers of assistance from banks 
Source: AECoroup 
I 
I 
Client Hardship 
Bank Inaction 
I 
I r-----~- - - ,---- - ---r~ - --1 
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 
Percentage of Respondents 
Nevertheless, three further excerpts highlight the impossibility of being able to measure 
such human impacts. 
[96] While the financial toll has been widely acknowledged, the human toll 1s impossibl e to 
accurately measure. [public submission 276 from SICAG] 
[97] Regrettably it will probably not be possible to measure the magnitude of human destruction 
these events have caused. Desp ite whatever financial redress those involved may receive, 
they will never be compensated fully for the pain and suffering and will can-y the scars to 
their grave. [public submission 280 from Stom1 Investor] 
[98] The toll this has taken on ex-Stom1 clients wi ll never be measured . [public submission 296 
from Stom1 Investor] 
285 Ava il ab le as tab le 2.3 in public submi ss ion 154. but reproduced here with SICAG 's permiss ion . 
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6.4.1 Overview of financial impact 
We would expect that the nature and size of actual ( or potential) loss suffered would have 
an influence on any non-financial impacts as well. To that end, some information is 
available about some of the detail of the actual, direct and immediate financial losses that 
occurred. In terms of individual impact rather than a statement of monetary losses across all 
investors collectively, the AEC / SICAG 2009 survey revealed that 31 % of respondents 
estimated their losses at more than $1 m, 59% estimated their losses as between $200,000 
and $Im, and 10% at less than $200,000. 
The source of financial losses are varied, including: 
• Clients suddenly finding themselves with low values of investments and high values of 
liabilities; 
• The likelihood of foreclosure on a family home loan due to an inability to service 
mortgage payments; 
• A compounding of both home- and investment- loan liabilities because the income 
previously used to service them itself depended on investments rather than other income; 
and 
• The pre-paying of interest on investment loans and not having funds invested means 
potential tax liabilities (modified from public submission 277 from the FPA). 
Hence, the backdrop of all impacts discussed is that significant financial losses have 
occurred but their nature in terms of absolute size, relative size, source of loss, timing of 
pending liabilities, and means to meet any liabilities, will differ from investor to investor. 
Thus, interspersed with the presentation and discussion of various areas of impact are 
details of such losses - both the size, and the way in which that loss was perceived to come 
about. 
6.4.2 Impacts on an Individual's personal world 
An indication of the variety of impacts on an individual ' s personal world is given by one 
Storm investor, who stated the following in an open letter to ex-Storm investors: 
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[99] The most important issue is to acknow ledge the pain , di stress and anxiety that many, if not 
all of your members have fe lt over what has occurred to them . I am sure some people have 
suffered and may still be suffering and it would not surpri se me if a sign ifican t share of 
your members have turned to alcohol and medication to try to help themselves through. For 
myself, I went from being a very cock-sure bani ster to a very shattered person. It took me 
some months to substanti a lly overcome my depress ion. (Good1idge 2010) 
This highlights two striking features that emerged from all interviews, and also what was 
readil y apparent from the public submissions and transcripts of public hearings: the 
emotional impact of financial loss, and the impact upon one ' s mental health. Each of these 
are picked up as separate features is the following discussion. 
6. 4. 2.1 Emotional 
It is difficult to disagree with the earlier observation regarding the primacy and extent of 
emotional trauma that results from personal financial crises286 . A reading of even a small 
selection of public submissions, or transcripts of impacted investors appearing before the 
PJCI, conveys a strong emotional impact which leaves little doubt that the initial loss was 
met with strong, yet often varied emotional responses . Some 98 of the 168 public 
submissions made to the PJCI by Stonn investors referred to some aspect of emotional 
hann or trauma287 . The prevalence of emotional hann was also the case amongst 
interviewees, with all 15 initial interviews giving rise to descriptions of how interviewees 
were, and still are impacted on an emotional level. Naturally enough some interviewees 
described this in more detail than others. 
6.4.2. 1.1 Shock 
A most obvious and expected reaction has been that of shock. This was parti cularl y evident 
as an initi al reaction when many investors found out, directl y from the credit provider 
286 From sect ion 4 .3 .2.3: ·'a persona l fi nancial cri s is is first an emotional blow ... it is tremendous ly 
di sorien tin g, it is frightening'· (Mu ndi s, cited in MacDonald 2002). 
287 The strong and ex tensive emoti onal reac ti on to financ ial trauma is further indicated by submi ssions made 
to the P JC I made by non-Stom1 investors: 21 of those 74 submissions described some leve l of adverse 
emotional reac ti on. 
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rather than via Storm, that their position in the market had been sold. This was often either 
without their knowledge and after the event, or even against what they perceived as prior 
instructions and actions to convert their positions in the index funds to cash (thereby 
insulating themselves against any further losses). Indeed, 83% of AEC I SICAG survey 
respondents expected their margin loan would be covered when signing an authority in 
October 2008 (to Storm) to sell shares into cash, and that they would have some remaining 
balance left over to re-enter the market at a later date. 
Particularly galling for many was that had they been notified of the need for a margin call 
as they felt they were entitled to (whether via Storm or directly from the margin loan 
provider), then they had the means to meet that call and thereby preserve not only an 
element of their investment position, but also avoid the subsequent debt that would arise 
from being sold in a position of negative equity. 
The fact that for many this protective action was not done and that they were now facing 
the loss of significant savings (and for many more leaving a significant debt and no further 
assets), was met with a sense of bewilderment and disbelief. This is attested to in the 
following five excerpts. 
[100] Wife: When he rang. He said, "Well, how much do I need to put in?" He said, "Oh, you 
don't understand ... " 
Husband: "We 've sold out. You ' re in margin call." "Righto mate, how much do I need to 
chip in?" " I don't think you understand. We sold you out t\:vo weeks ago. " 
Wife: Oh what? Is this some sort of prank? [interview with Storm investor] 
[ 101] Interviewer: So did you get a call with the option of meeting the margin call or just you got 
a call saying ... ? 
Investor: No. We got a call saying, "We ' ve sold you down, you still owe us money." 
Interviewer: And that was from the bank? 
Investor: Yes. 
Interviewer: It must have been a shock. 
Investor: It was just before Christmas. It was horrifying. [interview with Storm investor] 
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[ 102] in vestor: I honestly believed when we signed those bits of paper in October to do the sell 
down to put us into cash that it was doing the right thing. I do my banking on my internet. I 
looked at my accounts there and said , ' Oops. ' There was a cash accelerator account that had 
been opened in my name. When I looked at it there was almost $600,000 in it. I thought, 
'Oh, they ' re doing the right thing by me. ' A few weeks later I looked there and there was 
almost $1.8 million in it . I thought, ' Jeez; they ' ve salted away a hell of a lot more. ' So I 
thought they were doing the right thing and keeping me safe. When I got that phone call on 
8 December, I almost fell out of the chair. I just could not believe what I was being told. 
Senator TYi!/iams: What did the phone call tell you? 
Investor: 'You' re in negative equity. You ' re gone. ' So my life savings had just shattered. 
My superannuation of some $800,000 and half of my house had just gone down the chute, 
and I was not told. It was like that for everybody. [public hearing [6] , p .86] 
[103] Interviewer: Did you get a phone call to tell you it all co llapsed? Like you didn ' t even get 
that? 
Husband: Nothing. 
Wife: Nothing. 
Inten1iewer: Sorry, just go back then. When did you first hear that everything had gone? 
How did you find that out? 
Wife: Because (my husband) was quite on the ball with what was happening in the world of 
finance and he would keep ringing (our adviser) and saying, what was happening? We 
actually made I think, three trips in about five days (to our financial adviser in another 
town) face to face and he still wou ldn ' t tell us . He sti ll told us eve1ything was go ing good. 
Husband: You haven ' t got a worry. 
Wife: Not to worry. He said, " If anything is going to slide, you ' re on the top of the hill. You 
won ' t - no wo1Ties ." Anyway, we finally ended up going up - it was a Friday and we 
walked in and that was when (our adviser) told us, yeah , that everything had gone ... we 
didn ' t know what to do, where to go. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
[104] Wife: I can still remember opemng that first statement that came in (the mail) that 
eve rything had been so ld and yo u kn ow, that will never leave my mind I don ·t think and 
just standing there just being so devastated. 
Husband: Because we didn ' t know. We thought - well, I can recall my comment, "Oh, 
here ·s a (statement) . This will be interesting to see just where we are .'· Boof, all go ne . 
[interview with Stom1 investor] 
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As well as shock being a direct reaction to sudden and clearly very devastating news, this 
also was associated with the details of what the sell-down of assets entailed for them in 
terms of the size of debt now applying. For many, this was a total unknown up until the 
point of loss. Understandably, this added significantly to the extent of shock being 
experienced. 
[105] I told them all along I'm a cautious investor ... they kept coming back and they ' re saying, 
"Oh, you've earned this much money. You can borrow more, borrow more, borrow more" 
and then I accidentally found out I was in $800,000-something debt that I didn ' t know 
about. [interview with Storm investor] 
[106] Investor: When we found out how much debt we carried, we were horrified because it was 
near $800,000 by the time they sold us down. 
Interviewer: And that's when you found out how much it was? 
Investor: How much we owed, yeah. 
Interviewer: You didn ' t know up until that point in time? 
Investor: No. 
Interviewer: No? 
Investor: Didn ' t really understand it I guess, that ' s the trouble. We didn ' t understand what 
margin lending was, as such. [interview with Storm investor] 
Another aspect to the emotional response of shock was the realisation of what this loss 
might mean for the individual. This aspect of shock, however, could arise some time later 
when the gravity of one' s personal situation would sink in. 
[107] For the first 12 months, I think I was just - I was probably in shock I think. It didn ' t hit me 
for probably 12 months. [interview with Storm investor] 
[108] It was such a huge shock that it ' s hard to get over. Do you know what I'm saying? That by 
the time you got over the being shell-shocked and the ringing stops in your ears like after 
the blast, it was the emotional downside then, you know, that hit you, oh my god, you 
know? I have lost like $700,000, $800,000, $900,000 of my superannuation, it's just gone 
up and my husband has lost, you know ... it will never be recouped. [interview with ex-
Storm adviser] 
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6.4.2.1.2 Numb 
One predominately short tem1 reaction to shock is the feeling of numbness to what has 
occurred. The following interview excerpts highlight that this occurred for various 
investors, arising for some from the fact they were facing a seemingly insunnountable 
crisis, and for others that it meant significant challenges and changes ahead that they were 
not looking forward to facing. 
[109] It was both an emotional and financial crisis point I suppose that happens and when it hits 
you, you get a little bit numb. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[110] When it first happened is you know, it just lays you out cold and you don 't think there ' s 
anything to live for. [interview with Storm investor] 
[111] I was just numb for probably six months. I wasn't even going to go and play golf because ... 
it was going to cost $10 for competition fees and then you have a - if you wanted to have a 
drink or something, you know, you couldn't even afford that so I didn ' t go. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
The excerpt above indicates an important point that is discussed in more detail later on, as it 
is not as trivial as a first impression might indicate. Importantly, loss is also associated with 
what a lifetime of work was intended to bring about - a ce1iain standard of living and 
options to engage in those activities and outlets which are important to them. It also 
illustrates that the initial period following a loss is traumatic in the sense it also impacts 
many other aspects of life. 
Additionally, feeling numb is not exclusively a reaction only in the short tem1 , as another 
interview excerpt attests to. Notably, thi s also relates to ongoing perceptions about a lack of 
justice being done. 
[112] I' m more numb than anything. I just cannot believe (Storm) were allowed to get away with 
it and still have not been called to task. [interview with Stonn investor] 
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6.4.2.1.3 Anger 
Another reaction to initial shock is that of anger. Not all interview respondents indicated in 
an explicit manner that they felt angry about what had unfolded, but for those that did, this 
emotion was palpable. Anger was firstly manifested in the short term, as an immediate 
reaction to their loss, and the circumstances of that loss. 
[113] I can remember ringing (our adviser) up one night as (my wife) was just distraught, sobbing 
bitterly and inconsolable, just inconsolable and I can remember ringing him up and 
basically yelling down the phone, "What the f--- have you done? Listen, what the f--- have 
you done to us?" That was a knee jerk reaction. I can say now in hindsight definitely not 
one of my finest hours. [interview with Storm investor] 
[114] (My wife) spends many hours crying and getting angry as we feel we have been completely 
and utterly conned by the banks and by Storm. [public submission 21 from Storm Investor] 
[115] When it first happened, (my husband) was ropable. If he had been able to put his hand on a 
gun that weekend and I was absolutely petrified that he would have, he would have gone up 
and shot - at that stage, he was blaming (our adviser) for it, for everything and he would 
have shot (our adviser) and shot himself and for that whole weekend - for three days , I was 
just on - like living on a knife edge. Anyway, eventually_he calmed down. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
The feeling of anger also appears to be a far longer-lasting reaction than that of feeling 
numb. This is possibly because anger is such a strong emotional reaction in itself, and as 
such, for some situations and events it is a difficult emotion reaction to move on from. The 
following excerpt refers to the same investor as excerpt [115] above. 
[116] Husband: I tell you what, if I go to a doctor and they say," . .. you 've got six months to live 
and you're full of cancer mate"; these fellows want to leave the country. I'm telling you 
now. That's how dirty I am . Same as with ... any of these blokes ... and then the law is 
absolutely s---. And then you 've got ASIC there a couple of months ago they said, "We 
don ' t know whether \Ve can spend public money on fighting this case." Now what a stupid 
bloody thing to say ... 
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f nrervieH1er: Others have sa id the same thing, it ' s okay. I want to know where yo u' re at , so 
if s okay . 
Husband: Mate, I' m dirty mate and I won ' t forget them mate . No way in the world ... I' ll 
be dirty for the rest of my life. I' m getting dirtier as I get o lder. If s not a good feeling, I te ll 
you . [interview with Stonn investor] 
A further reason for a continuing emotional reaction of anger concerns subsequent actions 
of others associated with Storm ' s demise. This is particularly so for those who have had 
problems in dealing with their own bank(s) post-collapse. 
[11 7] Wife: . . . 1 would come off the phone (to the bank). I would have to psyche myself up to ring 
again and then I would be ... 
Husband: And I would be in tears almost listening to her in there because I couldn ' t do it. 
Wife: And then I would come off the phone in tears. 
Husband: .. . They 've got to pay for that. That is just not ri ght. Whether we owe them the 
money or not, that is not the way to handle what 's going on. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
As well as anger being fuelled by ongoing experiences, it has also been sustained as more 
infonnation has come out over time about Storm and its collapse. Where this infomiation 
has been perceived to cast fault on various parties, this has brought back and consolidated 
the earlier reactions of anger. The investor in excerpt [ 113] gives a very honest account of 
hi s ongoing realisation of how it has impacted him. 
[118] lnten 1iewer: So up until about 12 months ago - six to 12 months ago, thi s was reall y 
dictating your life to a degree and rea lly .. . 
Husband: St ill does reall y, doesn' t it, I suppose? Not as much . 
Wife: I must admit every minute of the day, there ' s a - it 's a lways on yo ur mind. 
Husband: You wake up, think about it and go and (describes further anger at other parties 
involved). 
Husband: .. .l"d like to think I was bi g e nough to get on w ith it, but I think I' ll be honest 
enough to say that I don ·t let go of stuff real easy. I don' t . Once someone has wro nged me, 
they've wronged me fo r life . What I want is enough that my wife can move on, but I wi ll 
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never, ever have any respect for anyone in that industry again. That is a filthy industry. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Another investor, who was also a Storm adviser, describes their anger from finding out 
additional information regarding Storm's collapse. 
(119] What I' ve got left, I suppose, is anger and frustration and looking back in hindsight, at 
some of the things that could have happened differently ... I honestly believed, you know, 
the fact that the bank pulled the pin at that time, was so unfair because for years they have 
made millions out of the Storm model, out of the buyers ... they were there throwing money 
left, right and centre and of course, as soon as things got tight, what do they do? They pull a 
$20 million loan, which is like chicken feed. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Significantly, this adviser also expressed angst at discovering what was perceived as clear 
fault in the process around home loans. 
(1 20] What makes me so angry when I see now that some clients who got their paperwork back, 
like their bank fact find for home loans weren 't - somebody else had filled them in, they ... 
weren't even close. They had wrong incomes, they had built in incomes that they may get 
from Storm in the future as a done deal as an income. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
6.4.2.1.4 Fear 
One emotion related to that of anger is fear, and this emotional reaction too has been 
apparent. In fact, one investor was concerned because of their lack of anger, but then 
perceived this lack of anger as a cover for the more debilitating emotion of fear. 
(1 21] I had often asked myself - "Where is my anger" . I almost feared for my sanity because I 
wasn't feeling ' angry'. Until a wise confidante helped me identify that anger is also a mask 
for fear and terror. [public submission 320 from Storm Investor] 
Perhaps the most obvious rationale for fear relates to the direct financial consequence that 
have resulted, whereby future financial security is now threatened. One couple, aged 63 and 
62 and facing the loss of their home of 28 years, succinctly describe this source of fear. 
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[ 122] The constant fear of the bleak future ahead \Vith absolutely no financial security . . .. The fear 
of ·how long can we continue to work and work effectively to hold down a job'.? ... we have 
no future to look forward to - the thought of what lays ahead fills us with despair and we 
are very frightened constantly. [public submission 202 from Stonn Investor] 
The consequent lack of security from Sto1m's collapse is not necessarily the domain of the 
more mature investor however, as one investor in their forties attests. 
[123] What's this matter done to us in summary? It's introduced fear. It ' s introduced insecurity. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
A significant element of fear that it can be exacerbated when there is some degree of 
isolation in other areas of life as well. Two submissions make this clear whereby as solo 
parents, their ability to cope with the realities of life after such a financial shock is severely 
compromised. 
[ 124] I was sick with anxiety and grief, and having no partner to share or discuss my options , I 
felt scared and alone. The thought of losing my home, that I had worked 2 jobs to keep , as 
well as trying to keep up a brave front for my children and try and carry on at work as 
though nothing had happened, had taken its toll on me. I was medicated and in tears every 
day with worry on how I was going to cope, and what eventually would be the outcome. 
[public submission 283 from Storm Investor] 
[125] I have always been an independent person who was willing to work hard to support my 4 
children and myself. I only sought Social Security for one short period when there was no 
work available. None one of the most frightening aspects of this whole situation is that I 
have found my personal strength being eroded. I always prided myself that no matter what 
happened in my life I was able to be strong. [public submission 403 from Stom1 Investor] 
Isolation is also a potential factor for many who have some dependence on others for needs 
of living, for any number of reasons. One investor describes how their son has been 
impacted. suggesting that the impact of financial loss goes well beyond ' merely money ' . 
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[126] I am talking on behalf of my son (who) had an accident 11 years ago and, of course, he is 
on a disabled pension. He is 29 years old now . ... The sad thing about it is that it has wiped 
out his whole portfolio. The margin loan has wiped that out. He had to pay an extra $15 ,000 
in cash to Storm. As was the case with that other lady, we do not know where that has gone. 
In other words, he is a very frightened boy. He does not know where he is going to go. 
[Mother of Storm investor, public hearing [5] , p.106] 
6.4.2.1.5 Frustration 
Many reasons for feeling significantly frustrated have been indicated by investors. A first 
reason is simply because of what has happened and what this represents in return for a 
lifetime of working and saving. 
[ 127] But to have been so frugal all my life and then have somebody just come in. I took all my 
life to save what I had and they managed to get rid of it in 14 months. So it hurts. [interview 
with Storm investor] 
Not only is there frustration due to the manner of the loss, but the sense of powerlessness 
over being able to have any control over what was unfolding. 
[128] We now have to watch every cent we spend and are now always wondering whether it is 
even worth living once we can ' t work any more, as our quality of life will not be as we had 
planned and invested for. All the totally foreign feelings we experience every day and will 
do so forever, wondering incessantly, where we went wrong. What could we have done 
differently? What should we have done differently? And we know that there are no 
answers. That leads to even more frustration. We now sleep less and sleep less soundly, 
worrying about what is going to happen to us and what we could have done to prevent this 
from happening. The frustrating part is that we can think of nothing we could have done to 
prevent all this, as we were kept completely in the dark, and given no opportunity to fix 
anything. [public submission 21 from Storm Investor] 
Two major motivations to invest in Storm were discussed in section 6.3 .1. One of these was 
the desire to be self-sufficient in retirement. As such, with the scale of financial losses 
,I 
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involved , what has been lost is that ability to be self-sufficient, which when being a 
motivation to engage with Sto1111 in the first place, gives rise to significant frustration. 
[ 129] I have applied for the pension and will now have to rely on money from the govenrn1ent to 
live on for the rest of our lives , something I hoped I would never have had to do. [public 
submi ss ion 288 from Stonn Investor] 
[ 130] We can work for 85 years between us, never relying on any government handouts , never 
asking for anything extra, hardly ever having even a sick day, and be left now totally reliant 
on having to work until we simply are physically unable to, and then being totally reliant on 
handouts from welfare. This is not what we worked so hard for. [public submission 21 from 
Storm Investor] 
[131] lnten1iewer: What 's the main frustration? 
Wife: Having to rely on the Government. Our parents went through it. We saw our parents 
go through this type of thing; being on pensions and we sort of...we knew we were only 
going to be basic wage earners ourselves ... we said, " Well look, let ' s do something so we 
aren't going to be living on a measly pension." 
Husband: ... we were trying to not be a burden on the pension scheme later on because 
everything you looked at and we're pre-baby boomers, we're ahead of them , we ' ve got the 
baby boorners corning up our backside and it ' s not going to make it any easier for us either. 
[interview with Stom1 investor] 
For the couple immediately above, the frustration being experienced is even more galling 
given their own need and choice to be self-reliant over their lifetimes, in other areas of their 
life. 
[132] interviewer: So from planning to be in a position where you didn ' t have to rely, now having 
to rel y is a big thing? 
Husband: Oh , yea h. And whether it 's the lack of - in my case and probably my wife 's too, 
but I didn't have a very good education . I left school in grade s ix ... 
Wife: ... I j oined another organi sati on soc ially that helped me convince myse lf that I could 
se lf-teach ; that I could teach myself so I could public speak, that I could do things 
/nter1'ie il'er: So to be very self-made in all those sort of ways? 
Husband: Sure. [intervi ew with Storn1 investor] 
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Arguably then, their loss is not merely money, but also a way of engaging with the world 
and having a say in their fortunes that has been representative of their lives and identity up 
to this point of time. 
A further major motivation discussed in section 6.3 .1 was wanting the ability to derive an 
income that exceeded the age pension. The purpose of this was to give some control and 
say in one's life, and in particular give substance to hopes and dreams that one could then 
aspire to and plan for. Thus, when losses occur, it is once again not so much that money has 
gone, but more the ability to deliver and enjoy those dreams or to fulfil/continue those 
plans. One such aspiration concerned an expectation of a certain lifestyle in retirement. 
[133] Oh, terrible, terrible .... we were in debt, well and truly ... the impact was huge, mate. To 
be retired for three years and doing quite well and living the dream was our plan for 
retirement and that was to live just a comfortable lifestyle which we 've always just lived. A 
modest, but comfortable lifestyle and to be able to travel to some extent, both in Australia 
and overseas because we had (family overseas) ... So to be slugged with that, to be slugged 
with all our money, all our superannuation gone. In my case, 44 years worth of 
superannuation all gone. Gone, never to be seen again ... We had nothing and we'd also lost 
our house because our house had been mortgaged for the plan and so we were in debt to the 
(bank) for $280,000. So mate, that hurt. That hurt real bad. [interview with Storm investor] 
[134] We 'd never been anywhere. Never been out of Queensland. So when we had to retire I said, 
okay - by this time we ' d bought the caravan. We'll start seeing our holidays and so forth 
and we were going away - go away for two or three months and look we had a home to 
come back home to all the time and that was our ambition. No ambition ever to go 
overseas . . .. And so that was our lifestyle ... that was something for ourselves for working 
so bloody hard ... that all went out the window. [interview with Storm investor] 
[135] Wife: It gets a bit damn boring and disappointing and negative to know that you can ' t do 
these things. If someone suddenly says, "Oh look, so-and-so is on" at some theatre or 
whatever, show or whatever, and no1mally I would have just said, "Oh yeah, let ' s go" and 
you don ' t do that anymore. I mean you just don ' t. I mean even to go to the movies doesn ' t 
happen very often. As far as going to the expensive things, you just don ' t do it. So that's all 
- 226 -
a big di sappointment for me anyway and I get very cranky about that because it really has 
changed the li fe I believe that we should have been able to li ve at thi s stage of our life. 
Husband: . .. It changed the life that we were li ving. 
Wife: We 've a lways worked. You know, they say you work all your life and work hard and 
save yo ur money and yo u kn ow, you' ll be able to do all these good things in your old age 
and that a in ' t go nna happen. I mean, even once we se l I this house and once we do move, 
we're still go ing to be very restri cted in what we can do compared to what we would have 
liked to have done and I find that ve ry di sappointing at thi s stage of life because that ain ' t 
what it was supposed to be like . [interview with Storm investor] 
Others commented more on issues of security, particularly associated with home 
ownership. 
(136] I've got a mo11gage I' ll never pay off, I'll have to work until I die if I want to keep my 
home. I might have to sell my home very soon because I just can ' t keep the payments up ... 
yeah , it was awful. I lost - shattered, I can ' t retire. J was going to retire 18 months ago , I 
will never retire now. If I want to have my own home or have a roof over my head, I will 
never retire. [ interview with Storm investor] 
(137] Thanks to Storm and the banks involved in this fiasco our lives, dreams and comfort have 
now been destroyed . Instead there is worry and lots of hard work ahead just to own our 
home again let alone anything else. [public submission 209 from Stonn Investor] 
Another aspect of feeling frustrated concerns the motivation to provide for family and 111 
particular children, which now also is compromised. 
[ 13 8] It absolutely gall s us when people say they know how we must feel - un ti l it happens to 
them - they will never know the feeling of despair, to lose all sense of security, to lose the 
freedom of choice, the hurt , the heartache, to lose everything we have worked a lifetime for , 
the embarra ssment , any mega inheritance we had accumulated hoping to pass on to our 
family has all gone - we are just gutted. There is not a day goes by we don ·t feel the hurt. 
Waking every morning in our surroundings reminds us of our demise . [publi c submission 
267 from Stom1 Investor] 
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[139] The hardest thing as parents was to disclose our demise to our young daughters, having to 
tell them of the loss of not only our home and plans for the future but how the opportunities 
we had planned and hoped for them must change and be completely rethought. [public 
submission 306 from Storm Investor] 
A final reason for frustration was not so much what has been lost in terms of self-
sufficiency, but more immediately, knowing where to go and what to do now. This also 
conveys a sense of powerlessness - where control has gone, options are limited, and as 
such frustration increases. 
[140] So at the moment, we 've got no income or anything now. No income whatsoever. .. and 
every door shuts, we - you know, I've always found I' ve been able to get a break through 
somewhere to get some income in some respect, but every door just seems to shut. . . 
because we 've got no income, so we 've got to meet all these commitments and we 've got 
no income. So what we were doing was the little bit of reserves that we do have, is just 
eaten away. We can ' t keep going ... yeah, we ' re strangled. We 're just in a - we ' re strangled 
and we can ' t get out of the strangle. We need to be like a Houdini and get out of it 
somehow but we don ' t know where. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.2.1.6 Regret 
There are two main aspects to the feeling of regret experienced by investors. Firstly in 
relation to the decision to invest initially, and secondly in relation to not exiting from Storm 
as time went on. In terms of initially getting involved, there were two major elements 
which seemed to cause regret - one being the recommendations to get others involved, and 
the other being to not heed the advice of others to not get involved. 
[141] I cannot speak for other Storm investors, but I also got my family into it and some work 
colleagues, which I obviously totally regret now. [public hearing [6] , p.58] 
[142] I went and (saw) a relation there, I think he ' s a solicitor. So I went down and had a yam 
with him and I'm sorry I never listened to him now. He said, "Well, why would you want 
to go into debt at your age? So I never heeded him enough, you know, and like I say, (I 
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was) sti ll talking to other people and everybody was happy (with Stonn). [interview with 
S torn1 investor] 
One couple reflected on the poor outcome that they had had by engagi ng with Storn1, 
despite their perception that paying significant fees ($180,000) over a short pe1iod of time 
would have generated some benefit . The regret expressed concerned the alternative use of 
some of the funds invested, which had come from superannuation savings over an entire 
working career. 
[143] Husband: All the super I put in and I thought I could have spent the whole bloody lot 
instead of just taking it and blown it . .. I know that their fees were enonnously high. 
Wife: I know what fees we paid, all up $ 180,000-odd over the time. 
Husband: We weren ' t in it long. 
Wife: We were only in it from 2006 and that 's how much we paid . 
Husband: We thought at first , the fees are big, this is what you pay fo r a rea ll y good 
scheme and it' s goi ng to be looked after and those fees won't continue all the time, they' re 
so1i of more as up front at first. .. that was another thing, you know, you pay for what you 
get. Oh well. [interview with Storm investor] 
In this case, perhaps a shrug of the shoulders and taking a fairly fatalistic approach to the 
loss of funds is the best coping strategy available at that time. However, other investors 
expressed at not having the opportunity, wherewithal and catalyst to exit from Stonn 
earlier, or at least to stop putting in extra fund s when feeling pressured to do so. 
[ 144] We were confident about what we were told and for many years it worked very wel l and 
very safely, very good reporting systems, you know, all of that. And I mean and again , 
hindsight is a wonderful thing, but. .. we we re away for about five weeks and just before we 
went, my w ife and I were lookin g at the who le thing and said, " Look, it' s time for us to se ll 
down the debt on the house because it is not goi ng to make one iota of difference to our 
lifesty le now. We 've built up the assets further through the Stonn investments - and in 
other ways - and we should do that'· and then the market sta11ed to get a bit wobb ly so we 
sa id we· 11 do it when we get back. Too late, she cri ed. Yeah , it was all over then. yea h. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
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[145] Husband: In May 2008, our margin loan at that stage was something like $1.9 million and 
the portfolio was worth $3.3, $3.4 and we borrowed another $197,000 which was our 
prepayment of interest for 2008, 2009 and that was put straight onto the top of the margin 
loan so that changes your LVR to start with. Now that took it up three or four points and 
you know, we looked at it and (my wife) was not totally comfortable with it. 
Wife: That was the one I didn ' t want to do. 
Husband: Oh, it's not that you didn ' t want to do it. You never said you didn ' t want to do it. 
It was just we weren ' t as comfortable - you weren ' t as comfortable by borrowing so much 
to prepay that much interest ... the thought was okay, well you ' ve got to sell $200,000 
worth of stock to prepay that interest if you do it that way. But the way the market was 
going, it was still going up ... So you would think that okay, well you know, one more step 
is not going to be all that difficult to handle. No one envisaged what was going to happen. 
So yeah okay, in my mind that was the last one that we were going to - because that put our 
loan above $2 million and I thought well that's getting too big to be able to cough up 
$200,000 every year just to keep the loan going. [interview with Storm investor] 
[146] Wife: But if we had done in March 2008, what we intended to do ... we could see there was 
problems listening to radios and that and we said, "Well , let's go home, close it all up, take 
what we've got and get out." We went in, with this in mind to do it, the sweet talk that they 
do ... then when it all crashed in 2008 and December came and we went in and said, "Okay, 
this is it. We want out completely." We were doing the wrong thing. They said we have to 
sign a letter to say ... 
Husband: 1 had to even sign a statement saying what we were doing was ... 
Wife: Against their decision. 
Husband: ... against their advice. 
Wife: ... because we wanted to get out, when we wanted to get out and yeah ... 
Husband: We didn ' t have enough tissues or hankies at the time to mop up the tears either, 
you know. [interview with Storm investor] 
[147] I felt that ifl had not signed the Cheque for the $(X:XX,000) to give to (our adviser) to put 
into (the bank) we would have been a lot better off. .. things would have been safer. Then 
(my husband) blamed himself and went into a depression for 12 Months. [ email 
correspondence from Storm investor, November 2011] 
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The damaging aspect of regret was acknowledged by an ex-Stonn adviser who also was an 
investor, who outlined their choice to try to put it behind them. 
[1 48] I think life is too short. I' m not go ing to worry about what mi ght have been becau se regret 
is a stupid thing really .. . What we did and bought and then and what you think now are two 
different things ... I feel, to a ce11ain degree, you can ' t look back, you can ' t a ll the time, you 
can't be jumping at shadows and so on. You did what yo u thought was okay at the time. 
[interview with ex-Stonn adviser] 
6.4.2.1.7 Guilt 
Closely related to regret is guilt, with this reaction corresponding to a perceived 
responsibility for the fate of others. This could arise where the involvement of others in 
Stom1 came about from an individual ' s own endorsement of the strategy288. This was 
mentioned as a source of significant guilt by some investors. 
[149] (Many) family members and friends trusted my judgement and also put their money into 
Storm. I do not think that you can imagine how difficult it is for me to look these people in 
the eye after the events of December 2008. [Storm investor, public hearing [6] , p.89] 
[150] The effect on us had been major as we also got our adult children and friends to join Stom1, 
leaving us feeling guilty. [public submission 187 from Stonn Investor] 
[151] People feel morally devastated to have brought their beloved family and friends into such a 
terrible situation. This cross of financial loss is a big enough one to bear without add itional 
concerns about having recommended it to others. [Stom1 client, public hearing [ 4], p.86] 
[152] Perhaps one of the greatest tragedies of the failure of Stonn Financial was that it was a 
business which depended very largely on ··word of mouth '. recommendati ons. Parents 
reconu11ended it to their children and vice versa. Investors reco1ru11ended it to their family 
and friends. I recommended it to my brother who became invo lved , and though him to my 
step-mother. My wife reconunended it to her two brothers who almost became involved 
"" Indeed.some 75°0 of Storn1· s client base was via referral s (public hearing [5]. p.33). 
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right at the very last minute when Storm Financial was still accepting clients. In this way 
people have developed deep senses of failed responsibility in their care of family and 
friends. [public submission 115 from Storm Investor] 
One ex-Storm advisers also expressed concerns about guilt, in response to the article at 
Appendix D appearing in the Australian J oumal of Financial Planning. 
[153] Your article hit home about guilt, trust etc. I also encouraged family and friends to invest 
and some relationships will never heal/be the same. [email from ex-Storm adviser, April 
2013] 
One other investor even took a quite empathetic stance towards a friend that had 
encouraged them to invest with Storm. 
[154] The friend that sort of advised me, I don ' t ring her very much now because it upset her to 
talk to me because she knows when I first started talking to her, she felt so guilty, that had 
she not done that, I wouldn ' t have lost my money. [interview with Storm investor] 
Such excerpts highlight the guilt factor being prevalent in an environment like that 
associated with Storm, where word of mouth recommendations and assurances were 
common. 
6.4.2.1.8 Overall devastation 
Perhaps the primary overall emotive reaction has been the feeling of devastation. Rather 
than being left truly destitute in an absolute sense of the word, devastation encompasses a 
shattering of plans, dreams, hopes and aspirations for the future, which has been the case 
for many investors. Such aspects include the goals of self-sufficiency and moderately 
comfortable lifestyle expectations (discussed in sections 6.3.1 and 6.4.2.1.5), but it also 
conveys a much stronger response than unfulfilled motivations and goals. 
[155] I have met many ex-clients who are now emotionally and financially destroyed. [ex-Storm 
adviser, public hearing [5] , p.8] 
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[ 156] It is emotional devastating to lose all our life savings, our plans and dreams for the future 
and our financia l commitment to our five chi ldren. It is difficult to sleep at night knowing 
what we had worked so hard for, is no longer there . [public submission 207 from Stom1 
Investor] 
[1 57] I didn·t feel angry, I just felt devastated. Tota lly big ho le 111 yo ur ins ides. Just totally 
destroyed . [interview with Storm investor] 
[15 8] It ' s just ruined your li fe. Ruined the rest of your life vi1iually. [interview with Stom1 
investor] 
[159] We worked really hard for what we had and then all of sudden to have it j ust sto len away 
from you just overni ght was just devastating and people say, "Oh, but there ' s worse things 
in li fe. You have your health and you don ' t have no illness or whatever" but at the time, 
when yo u've worked 20 years of sav ing ... to get ahead and to do quite well for ourse lves so 
we could provide a nice future for ourselves and our (family) , and to have somebody just 
tear it away from you because of some silly greed and some stupid mistake, yeah, I was ... 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[160] These people and institutions were licensed and qualified to do this but collectively they 
have fai led and in the process have ruined us financially and emotionally. The fee lings of 
complete and utter despair from losing most of our assets accumulated over our working 
life are with us every waking moment and trying to pick up the pieces and continue on 
seems to be harder each day when you can see no light at the end of the tunnel. [publ ic 
submission 92 from Stonn Investor] 
One investor who had previously battled cancer gave an interesting cornpanson of that 
chall enge wi th that now being faced through financial trauma. 
[ 161] Husband: Very simil ar from my point of view because when I was diagnosed with the 
cancer, I found it very hard to tell people that I had cancer. The moment that I started to ta lk 
about it , I was just a blubbering idiot. Similar situat ion w ith thi s wasn't it? 
Wife: M·hm. 
Husband: With this financ ial thing. Very simil ar, very emotional , very traumatic. Pl ayed on 
vo ur mind . I'd li e awake when l was to ld I had the cancer. I'd li e a,,vake half the night and 
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wondering what the hell was going to happen. Where would I go next? What was going to 
happen with the family? What was (my wife) going to do? How was she going to manage? 
How were the kids going to - and the same thing with this other situation. Very, very 
similar. [interview with Storm investor] 
One further aspect to the emotional fallout is its temporal nature. The fact that anger, 
frustration , guilt and regret can be responses which persist beyond the short term highlights 
that victims of traumatic financial loss do not or cannot simply roll up their sleeves and put 
things behind them in an emotional sense. One investor demonstrated this in an interview. 
[162] Interviewer: Most people haven ' t liked going back and talking about this . I do appreciate 
that you 've done it. 
Husband: Well, I must admit, I'm a bit shaky at the moment as a result of what happened. 
It ' s underneath all the time. It ' s there. [interview with Storm investor]289 
However, none of this is to underplay or underestimate the enormous financial strain and 
circumstances facing many investors which may well be more akin to true destitution, as 
alluded to in another interview. 
[163] Interviewee: (At a senate inquiry) an elderly lady in her 70s was crying on my shoulder. 
Interviewee's partner: ... And that lady had absolutely zero possessions. She said she had to 
sell absolutely everything because she moved into her daughter's garage and she said her 
daughter wanted nothing in the house because she had enough of her own stuff so she said, 
" I don ' t even have anything. I don ' t own absolutely anything." 
Interviewee: It was the stripping of the dignity, of the values, that most decent people were 
brought up with. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
However, although many investors may not be destitute in the sense of lacking life ' s 
essentials in an absolute sense, neither should this be expected in a developed nation with a 
relatively advanced welfare system. Rather, the worst outcome that could be expected is 
that of devastation, which appears to be the overall emotional outcome of Storm's collapse. 
In other words, it is close to as bad as it could get in an Australian context. 
289 We observe that this interview ended soon thereafter. 
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6.4.2. 1.9 Visual representation of emotional impacts 
A word cloud representation of the emotional impacts of significant financial losses is as 
fo llows : 
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6.4.2.2 Health 
The impact on people ' s health is, by any interpretation and rationale, a prime area of 
significance and concern. One investor highlights the connection between financial loss, 
subsequent activity to deal with that loss, and overall health . 
[ 164] We are now fac ing a debt of $600,000 together with the loss of our cash to the sum of 
$200,000. At our ages (64 and 57) it is impossible for us to recover thi s amount of fund s 
and due to the personal stress of ongoing negotiations , our health is deteriorating. [public 
submiss ion 298 from Stonn Investor] 
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Not only is the direct impact on health important for its own sake, but additionally a 
meaningful participation in one' s individual and social worlds also depends on health. 
Thus if health is compromised, other areas of someone' s life can also be compromised. 
[165] Health is now the very most important thing to me. (My husband) with his health problems 
have to be addressed before we can have some life together. [ email correspondence from 
Storm investor, January 2013] 
There is an additional dependency between health and one' s financial means, due to the 
fact that partaking in the health system costs money. Therefore any financial loss can also 
impact health in a less direct manner as well, via less engagement with health services or at 
least involving a greater stress in being able to do so. 
[166] I guess in all of this, not only have our lives and plans been ruined, our healthy financial 
situation crumbled, but possibly the worst part is - our health has suffered. You never get 
that back, it just means more doctor' s visits and increased costs for more prescriptions. 
[public submission 260 from Storm Investor] 
Sadly but as a consistently recurring feature, adverse impacts are particularly prevalent in 
the area of mental health. Much of what follows makes for extremely poignant reading. As 
such, the various issues associated with health aspects are presented in as empathetic and 
straightforward way as possible. 
6.4.2.2.1 Medication and depression 
Although it is difficult to quantify exactly how many Storm investors have or are battling 
depression, and/or have taken medication to alleviate health concerns as a result of their 
financial loss, the variety of data available gives at least some indication of the impact. The 
AEC I SICAG 2009 survey reported that 27% of respondents were taking medication for 
depression, and 19% (32 of the 168) submissions made to the PJCI by Storm investors 
chose to indicate some impact on their personal health or reported the need for medication. 
In terms of interview findings, the use of medication was brought up in nine of the 15 
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initial interviews, and in eight of the 15 initial interviews the issue of severe depression and 
anxiety was broached. 
By way of companson, according to the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS), 
approximately 13 .5% of the general population reportedly suffered from depression or 
anxiety-related problems in 2011-12290 . Notwithstanding the many shortcomings of 
comparing the AEC / SICAG survey figures with the ABS figures 29 1, what is obvious is 
that mental health is a significant issue arising from traumatic financial loss. Indeed, from 
the interviews, medication relating to blood pressure, sleeping and anti-depressants were 
the required treatments , and where the issue of mental health was broached in an interview, 
some respondents spent some time discussing their symptoms and difficulties associated 
with such debilitating conditions. 
One investor described how it took some time to realise that both he and his wife were 
suffering in this manner. 
[ 167] It took a few months for it to be diagnosed; my wife was suffering very bad! y over those 
first few months of 2009. She was having these turns which she didn ' t really know what it 
was . She thought it was a heart attack at first. But anyway, in the end and that was about 
March or so, I suppose, she was diagnosed with anxiety because she had a real bad tum 
here one day ... and she ended up in hospital. No, I tell a lie . She ' d already been to hosp ital 
a few times before then, carted off in the ambulance. Once she was finally diagnosed, I 
ru shed her to the GP and she didn ' t end up in hospital that time becau se she was straight 
away put on medication and visits to a psychologist which continued for quite a while and 
she 's on the medication to thi s day . . . I had moments and I' ve never suffered a moment of 
depression in my life up until then . I never understood depress ion . Now I know. But I got 
through it okay. So yeah, huge impact. [interview with Stonn investor] 
290 Sourced from http ://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.ns£'Lookup/by%20Subject/4338 .0~20 l l -
l 3~Main%20Features~M ental% ?0and%20behavioural%2 0conditions~ I 9, accessed 29 June 20 I 3. The figure 
of 13.5 % for 20 11 - 12 was up from 11.2% in 2007-08. With the AEC/SICAG survey being conducted in April 
2009. basic linea r interpo lat ion suggests that 12.5 % mi ght be a reasonable indi cati on of the prevalence in the 
genera l populati on around the time the AER / SICAG survey was conducted. 
29 1 Not least of which invo lves se lec ti on and reporting biases, differences in data collection , likel y de finiti onal 
differences. an o lder age cohort with SICAG when compared to the genera l populati on, and so on. 
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An important aspect of mental health is how it impacts the ability to engage in other areas 
of life. In particular, investors have described a decrease in their ability or willingness to 
engage socially. 
[168] Worry & depression set in we sit around for days trying to fathom it, my wife cannot bring 
herself to go to work for fear of breaking down, every time she looks at me or talks to me 
she breaks down and starts taking valium to get through the day and more at night to get to 
sleep, still waking up at 3 :30am sobbing and crying. [public submission 223 from Storm 
Investor] 
[169] I have been completely destroyed financially and emotionally. I have been on anti-
depressants and sleeping pills for the last 12 months. My family and social life have been 
destroyed. [public submission 265 from non-Storm investor] 
[170] Investor: Nobody comes to visit and I have been on anti-depressants from the doctor. 
Interviewer: Since it all collapsed? 
Investor: Yeah. I didn ' t need them before. But even though I don ' t think about it all the 
time, it must be one of the reasons that I' m not sort of motivated and focused as I was 
before. [interview with Storm investor] 
The associated stress and need for medication also gives ri~e to more physical symptoms 
for other investors, but clearly is still related to underlying and significant stress. 
[171] My partner is now on blood pressure medication and has had to visit the doctor a number of 
times. He is not eating properly. I am kind of grateful that I am not working, really, because 
he needs someone there. He wakes up in the middle of the night with a nervous rash, and he 
just scratches into his skin. [Storm investor, public hearing [4] , p.91] 
Another feature is how different people react in different ways over time, and the various 
testimonies found in public submissions allows an overview of such different outcomes. A 
selection of three Storm investors highlights the difficulties associated with coping with 
mental health impacts. 
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[172] No peace of mind or quality of life . Constant feeling of dread , unhappiness , wony, sadness 
and betrayal completely overwhelms us. Spending more hours awake than asleep and our 
health is suffering. Feeling of unworthiness , exhaustion both from all the above and our 
jobs which are physically difficult at our ages. [public submission 202 from Stom1 lnvestor] 
[173] My health has deteriorated as a consequence of what has happened . At a time in my life 
when I should be looking forward to a well-deserved rest I find myself struggling on 
despite overwhelming fee lings of rejection and lack of support. It is as though a dark cloud 
has descended over my who le life... I have endured IO months of absolute hell , 
overwhelmed feelings of despair, and feelings of worthlessness. [public submission 403 
from Stonn lnvestor] 
[174] I have constant panic attacks and have to have anti depression tablets. To make things 
worse my husband has had open heart surgery and lost his job in May. We are trying to put 
food on the table from his small pension and my pay (I work 3 days casual a week, even 
though I have had breast cancer I do physical work so I come home crying with pain and at 
times I just feel like jumping off our patio, as long as I miss the floors beneath me I think I 
can do a good job). [public submission 236 from Storm favestor] 
In contrast, another investor too has most definitely struggled but at the time of writing a 
submission, suggested some hope for their future. 
[175] My depressive condition lasted for a little over 6 months . Thanks to my wife and medical 
advisors I am now recovered sufficiently to compile this brief submission. Only those who 
have ever had ' the lived experience' can know how bad and debilitating this illness can be. 
The related issues wi ll be with me for years and in so many ways our quality of life has 
been significantly diminished. I am just one of hundreds whose health has been seriously 
comprised arising directly from this matter. [public submission 211 from Stonn In vestor] 
With the benefit of a longer time period , one interviewed investor suggested that although 
recovery over time is possible, it is a slow journey and requires app li cation in order to 
continue to improve. 
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[176] Investor: I just wanted to go to sleep and not wake up and then I went through the whole 
emotions of how selfish I was because I had a (family) to look after. But that was the only 
way; if I was asleep, there was no pain. But every time I was awake, there was that constant 
pain whereas if I was asleep and so I was sort of drugged out for the first little while. 
Interviewer: How is it now? 
Investor: Well, I've gone off the sleeping tablets and I'm still on the anti-depressants and I 
think now that I can see (some hope) ... but every day, you wake up and you're just trying to 
think, okay today is going to be a positive day. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.2.2.2 Self harm 
The AEC / SICAG survey did not indicate any insights into the prevalence and risk of self-
harm behaviours within the SICAG membership, but SICAG testified to the following in its 
submission to the PJCI. 
[177] SICAG is directly aware that hundreds of its members have suffered psychologically from 
the collapse of Storm Financial. Hundreds of our members have sought treatment for 
depression, anxiety and related ailments and have been prescribed anti-depressant 
medication. Sadly, a significant number of SICAG members have talked openly of 
committing suicide. In one case, a couple who had lost their considerable life savings 
contemplated a scenario where they would disappear while on a snorkelling trip, leaving 
their only remaining asset - a life insurance policy - to their children. In another case, a 
young man wrestled a rifle from his father and talked him out of shooting himself. [public 
submission 276, from SICAG] 
Nine of the 168 submissions made to the PJCI by Storm investors chose to indicate that 
self-harm was an option that they had considered, or were struggling with at the time of 
writing the submission. Two of these submissions are presented to give further indication 
of the extent, and variety of the potential tragedies associated with Storm's collapse. 
[178] I am a semi-retired carpenter and could not even think about work, I could not bring myself 
to leave my wife alone for fear of what might be waiting on my return. It is a very scary 
thought to admit to a complete stranger that you have thought about opting out of the whole 
thing. [public submission 223 from Storm Investor] 
j 
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[1 79] Living alone , at times I have felt so desperate and in such despair that I have found myself 
almost suicidal and understanding why people do commit suicide. These thoughts have 
absolutely tenified me. With each day it is harder to function in the way I must, going to 
work and generally looking after myself. This whole situation affects you mentally, 
physically and emotionally and rocks the very foundations of your life. [public submission 
403 from Stom1 Investor] 
In five of the 15 initial interviews, thoughts pertaining to suicide and other hannful 
possibilities were raised as the extreme reaction to one ' s circumstances292 . The relevant 
excerpts from all five relevant interviews are presented below as self-explanatory accounts 
of each case. 
[180] We had you know, not a good place to be for five or six weeks , maybe longer. Depression . 
I' ve got down to the stage, the only place that I - the only way out of it I could see was self-
hann and I think that was in my thinking. That was the only thing I could see out it; was 
self-harm. There was no other way. I just couldn ' t see how we could survive and live any 
so11 of life other than sit there and watch the telly and it ' s in the dark because you can't 
have lights on because it's running your power bill up and all the rest of the bloody 
nonsense. And the only way out of it I could see was to end it all. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
[1 81] W(fe: You ' re so11 of in a state of shock you know, you ' re teary, you can ' t sleep and I ended 
up, for the first time in my life, with high blood pressure. 
Husband: Yeah, I'm still on blood pressure tablets . 
Wife: Which I'm now off. . . we went to a psychologist who was very good . Yeah , we didn ' t 
end up having all the visits which he said we didn ' t need . 
Husband: No, but I definitely needed that because I was looking for a way out. [interview 
with Stom1 investor] 
[1 82] lm ·estor : I"m on anti-depressants ever since . I can ' t go off them . 
ln ten •ie11·er : ... How do yo u keep go ing at work? Is that a good outlet for yo u? 
292 To specify this fu rt her and clari fy the link to the inter, iew numbers presented in sec tion 6 .4 .2.2. 1: of the 
15 ini tia l inter,·iews. 4 im olved the discuss ion of both medicati on and depression/anxi ety. 1 invo lved the 
di scuss ion of both medicat ion and thoughts of suic ide. and 4 involved the discuss ion of all three of 
medi ca ti on. depress ion. anxiety and thoughts of sui cide. 
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Investor: Anti-depressants .. . and put on a good front. .. you just put on a good front no 
matter how you ' re feeling inside ... but I have been suicidal. 
Interviewer: Was that early on, the first sort of six months? 
Investor: ... and at times later when you come home absolutely exhausted and know you 
can 't have a break, you can't retire ... there were times I used to think, I would love to get a 
tenninal disease and I would do nothing about it. That's how bad it was to think I can ' t do it 
myself but I wished a terminal disease upon myself. [interview with Storm investor] 
[183] I was very ill. .. .I was clinically depressed and under - had it not been for a very good 
doctor and a good wife, I wouldn't be sitting here talking to you now. I was suicidal and 
I' ve never been like that in my life before. But to see those millions just fly out the door 
after you ' ve worked for them for about 50 years in the marketplace and all the things that 
you're going to do, particularly for family, and the other impact was you know, I was very 
ill. Very ill for about six months and eventually got through that. .. I am still on a low dose -
much lower than during my ' black hole ' period - a very low dose of anti-depressant - and 
probably will be for the rest of my life. This simply holds ' at bay ' as it were - the panic 
attacks in the middle of the night when the thoughts of what you have lost hits you. It is a 
long grieving process. [interview with Storm investor] 
[184] (When) this first happened to us, I had very clear and compelling suicidal ideology and 
worse relating to my family which obviously is not a thing anyone says proudly or openly. 
They actively thought about not only killing themselves, their family as well. My wife was 
suicidal for months. [interview with Storm investor] 
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6.4.2.2.3 Visual representation of health impacts 
A word cloud representation of the health impacts of significant financial losses 1s as 
fo ll ows: 
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6.4.3 Impacts on an Individual's social world 
An individual 's social and personal worlds are not independent compartments of their life -
there are obvious connections between one ' s emotional state or health status, and how each 
of these influences interactions with other people. Nevertheless, this section focuses on 
findings more directly relating to how an individual participates in and is influenced by 
their social world , in the aftennath of sudden and traumatic financial loss. The relationships 
within marriages, families , and circles of friends are considered, together with wider 
cultural and fami li al roles. The impact on and of the wider community is then also 
di scussed. which in the case of Storm presents features which may have an impact that is 
stronger than those with other sources of financial loss293 . 
cq: For e:-;ample . the public ity and perception surrounding the co llapse gi\·en its sca le. and the fac t that many 
im·estors were encouraged by o thers to join. giving ri se to concentrations of in ves tors in some localities. 
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6.4.3.1 Relationships 
Relationships are a fundamental cornerstone of human experience294. The stress and fallout 
of financial loss influences all relationships, some positively and some negatively. We do 
not attempt to resolve the questions of how and why different impacts occur in any detail , 
but instead focus on what the range and detail of some of those impacts are. 
6.4.3.1.1 Marriages 
Amongst interviewees, there were various (volunteered) admissions of marriage stress as a 
result of Storm' s demise. One investor indicated that associated stress of the financial 
upheaval, whilst not the sole cause of a marriage breakdown, was nevertheless a significant 
contributing factor. 
[185] Interviewer: So since the time of December ' 08 to January '09, this is the big question; 
what's happened in your life since then and ... 
Investor: I've been divorced. Lots of stress. 
Interviewer: Related to .. . ? 
Investor: Probably the final thing our marriage could manage, yes . So there were other 
issues but the final thing our marriage could manage was ... the extra stress of this. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Submissions to the PJCI have also indicated similar stresses295. 
[186] Our life has changed immeasurably - the over whelming impact of the reality of our 
financial situation has nearly destroyed our marriage. [public submission 306 from Storm 
Investor] 
Other marriage situations, whilst not ending in separation or divorce, have nevertheless also 
been impacted in an adverse manner. 
294 Indeed, "humans are fundamentally motivated to create and maintain meaningful and rewarding social 
relationships" (Maslow 1954, cited in Hoffmann and Broekhuizen 2009 , p.492) . 295 Another investor also highlighted their various losses from Opes Prime, including "a substantial amount of 
money ... a fiance ... my job" (public submission [93]). 
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[I 87] Husband: we·ve never talked to each other so less. 
interviewer: Just both totally gutted? It ' s a pretty common thing. 
Husband: (My wife) uses her computer a bit. Like I might say, ·'Why don ' t you get on the 
computer and see what 's going on?" It ' s such an argument. She just doesn' t want to know 
about it. [interview with Storm investor] 
What followed the above interview excerpt was a conversation about what further actions 
could have or should have been taken since Storm's collapse, with the husband and wife 
taking quite different views. It would seem that the ongoing need to stay on top of what is 
happening, and make decisions about what restorative action should be pursued or not, has 
its own share of stresses and strains. This is also attested by another investor, who in their 
efforts to consider a range of options post-collapse, paid a price in terms of a diminished 
relationship for some length of time. 
[188] Husband: It is a fact, not boast, but a fact that my wife was neglected more or less for 
months . .. even when 1 was there and she was talking to me, I was thinking about other 
things. 
Wife: ... luckily I suppose for (my husband) and I; we've managed to stay together because 
I just - I needed - and (my husband) , I suppose, was my rock especially with (adverse 
reactions from our children to seeing me constantly upset). 
Husband: .. . the dynamic of our relationship has changed. Our levels of intimacy were 
virtually non-existent for a couple of years at least. We had gone from a couple that were 
every bloke's dream as far as intimacy goes. We had a very strong phys ical relationship 
and both of us just not interested, dropped off the perch , didn ' t happen . [interview with 
Stom1 investor] 
Rather than being impacted due to the pursuit of restorative actions, another marnage 
situation has been adversely impacted due to unresolved issues around allocation of blame 
for the initial decision to proceed with Stonn. 
[ 189] And you know, it caused a bit of a family rift because I went off at (my husband when it 
collapsed) and then the girls said , " Oh you know, you can ' t blame dad '. and I sa id , " Well, 
he shouldn't have li stened to (our adviser) . He should have li stened ... " - you know how the 
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wife gets on, "You should have listened to my thoughts because I was always sceptical 
of..." - it was too good to be true. [interview with Storm investor] 
This topic was broached several times in this particular interview, and as evidenced by the 
following transcript it was never too far from the surface. 
[ 190] Interviewer: ... You said you were sort of totally numb and stuff for six months afterwards. 
What sort of helped getting out of that? Or was it just as time thing? Just the time passing? 
Wife: Me. I shouted at him. 
Husband: (Laughs). 
Wife: Well, yeah ... I mean it really destroys your relationship, really. It really does and even 
to this day, I will have a bad dig at him and - because I get frustrated, I get very frustrated 
because .. . 
Husband: Yeah, you get depressed. You do get depressed. [interview with Storm investor] 
Various email correspondence also highlighted further issues and described the pain of one 
party in more detail. The general point made was that: 
[ 191] We went from relaxed folks to a couple of people playing the if only & the blame game 
not good for 2 people who had shared ( over 50) years together. [ email correspondence from 
Storm investor, October 2011] 
In the course of the interviews, for those that were married little explicit indication was 
given that a relationship had been strengthened through adversity296, but another investor 
did highlight that because they had a strong marriage beforehand, it remained strong now. 
[192] Fortuitously our marriage was pretty strong before and it ' s just as strong now where in a lot 
of other cases, marriages have broken up and divorces have taken place .. . and you know, 
all that sort of stuff. [interview with Storm investor] 
296 Some marriages may well have strengthened significantly, but nothing specific was stated to this end. And, 
of course, given the size of the financial shock it is still relatively early days in terms of the post-collapse 
events and recovery. 
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6.4 .3.l.2 Friends and family 
What stood out from interviews in tenns of the impact on relationships with friends and 
family was the vast differences in experiences. Obviously there are differences between 
every individual , but what was just as striking was that every relationship has differences 
too, and therefore each one of those relationships could be impacted in different ways. 
Some impacts could be categorised as relatively indifferent, including the impact on one 
father-children relationship. In this case, the father did regard his relationships with his 
children as very good, and this was stated as a very important factor in his life. 
[193) Father: Our relationship is very strong with my boys. But you know ... they'd be confused. 
I'm sure they ' re not sure what ' s happened and you know, dad's taken a hit. 
Partner: They ' ve probably had to adjust their lifestyle. 
Father: Oh, a lot. 
Partner: Because they had a lot easier before than they have it now. So it's been having to 
sort of stand on their own. 
Father: Yeah, and that's probably a good thing, right? [interview with ex-Stonn adviser] 
Another interviewee ' s relationship with their children could be said to be 'neutrally ' 
impacted, but mainly because it appears that the children are not involved in the impact 
anyway - either financially or possibly even emotionally as well. 
[194) My kids don ' t even understand, you know, that - they don ' t want to know mum ' s business, 
you know. Kids are like that these days ... I' ve told them it ' s happened , but they don ' t 
understand . .. you can ' t burden them with it. [interview with Stonn investor] 
A variety of very positive experiences have also occurred. 
[195) Husband: We ' ve had some family who, my god , have been kinder to us than you would 
ever hope . It is how I would expect that we would react , but I wouldn ' t expect anyone else 
to act that way. An example of it is being able to ring up my young brother-in-law and say, 
--Mate. my car· s just blown up on the highway. I don ' t want to spend that money because I 
mi ght need that. . . can I borrow your ute until I get another?'. ·'Mate, you can have the ute . 
I've got the spare one:· And the ute you see out there? In hi s mind , he has given that to us . 
- 247 -
Once we sort this out, I will make it more than worth his while. But in his mind, he ' s given 
that to us and he doesn ' t want anything for it ... he knows we don ' t spend money on 
ourselves anymore ... I' ve got a sister-in-law that would show up - would just show up here 
with bags of food. She's a single mother with her own world and problems to deal with. 
She would show up here with bags of groceries. Like it was nothing. She was just doing it. 
Wife: And we were all - (we) were always the ones who were helping the other members of 
the family, financially or emotionally or landscaping or renovating. We were the ones who 
always ... 
Husband: So the roles have changed. 
Wife: Yeah, like we' d always give hand-me-downs, our old saucepans and we got new 
ones. Things like that and then all of a sudden, it ' s really hard when your younger brothers 
and sisters are doing that to you. You feel like ... 
Interviewer: You find it hard to accept that without conditions sort of stuff? 
Wife: Yeah. 
Husband: I find it humbling. Really humbling. 
Wife: Oh, we learned to accept it because they - yeah, but really emotionally you just feel 
like when this is all through, you just want to - oh, I don ' t know how - what you can give 
them to ... 
Husband: We will - it will be made up. [interview with Storm investor] 
Notably, the husband in the excerpt above summarises his overall appreciation for support 
based not just on the physical assistance above, but also and importantly, the overall 
emotional support and lack of judgement. 
[ 196) There are a select number of people that need to be thanked for what they've done over the 
last little while and it can be as little as not judging us, not making us feel like we are idiots , 
right through to acts of kindness ... Because it ' s such a big thing when you 've been kicked 
in the guts, when someone looks at you like, "oh, you were a goose or you were greedy." 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
Other positive impacts have included very direct offers of financial support. 
[197) Wife: (My husband ' s brother) said, "Don ' t give the house away. I'll pay your mortgage 
until you can get a decent price for it." 
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Husband: Her father who was still alive then , it wasn ' t a lot of money there, but I could 
have used anything, I know. 
Wife: You know, he sa id , " Use dad 's money if you need it." You know, we couldn ' t have -
you reall y find out who your friends are at a time like that. You know, they were absolutely 
fantastic. [interview with Storm investor] 
On the other side of the ledger however, a range of negative impacts on relationships can 
and have occurred. Notably in contrast to excerpt [ 196] , negative impacts on relationships 
have arisen from very obvious and direct judgements being made. 
[198] Our family dynamic has suffered as a result of it and one member particularly, but not 
so lely, but one member of our family particularly . .. was very judgemental and there ' s been 
some attempts to rectify that but that ' s a permanent.. . divulsion of that relationship that 
can ' t be repaired . [interview with Storm investor] 
[199] I didn ' t tell all of my family and I have an aunt, my mother ' s sister, who is so angry she 
barely speaks to me .... for getting into Stonn Financial. .. she 's just really angry that I did 
that. [interview with Storm investor] 
[200] And here (these friends) are, rubbishing to me . . . rubbishing Stonn people to me and saying 
what bloody fools they were, you know, and all this and they deserve everything they get, 
you know? And from that day to this, they ' ve never spoken. Never spoken again because I 
told (my wife) obviously. [interview with Storm investor] 
[201] In vestor: My mother-in-law at the time even said , "That ' s what you get for being greedy" 
and I can remember yelling at her say ing you know, " l don ' t believe it for a second." I sa id , 
" Do we live like millionaires? Do we look like millionaires? Did we ... " yo u know, so 
yeah ... 
Inten 1iewer: So that made that tough? 
In vestor: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Friends as well? 
In vestor: Some - yeah , some. Yeah, some are pretty awful. I guess you sort of work out 
who they are then, don ' t you? [interview with Storm investor] 
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This latter point of finding out in the midst of difficult times, who one's friends really are, 
rings true for the experience of others as well. 
[202] Interviewee's partner: Like anyone that wasn't real in your life, they disappear. 
Interviewee: Yeah, even the relationships, you know. It ' s tested. Our relationship, our 
friends who you thought were really staunch friends. 
Interviewee 's partner: You know who your true friends are. 
Interviewee: And it's been an interesting exercise, you know. 
Interviewer: Fire tests everything, eh? 
Interviewee: It really does, absolutely. Yeah, and it's quite surprising. 
Interviewee's partner: Because there were a lot more people there when the good stuff was 
gomg on. 
Interviewee: Oh yeah, absolutely. Some who I thought were lifelong friends with a lot of 
character and loyalty and so on, have disappeared and others who I thought were kind of on 
the fringes have become much closer. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[203] The other sad part also was that (so called friends) that we used to be in constantly in touch 
with are no longer there, it was like you had a rare disease, funny when people think you 
have money you seem to have friends, when you lose it in bad circumstances you are 
dropped from the so called friends society. It has been a very lonely 6 years for me. [ email 
correspondence from Storm investor, January 2013] 
Changes in relationships also arise from the pressures of money and in this sense can be 
circumstances-driven, as distinct from the judgement calls and potentially convenience-
related reasons above. Changes can arise through a lesser ability to engage with former 
networks now, or from irritability towards wastage when money is tight, or from a need to 
divert time away from key relationships (for example, with children) for urgent financial 
reasons. Examples supporting each of these respective points are below. 
[204] Interviewer: Any changes with relationships with friends and the community at large and 
stuff? 
Wife: Possibly yes, because they can still do things because they ' re probably more 
financially better off. We were (holidaying) with them but it sort of.. . 
Interviewer: Too hard? 
- 250 -
Wife: .. . came to a dead end because we said no, we can ' t do that. 
Husband: We had to cut back. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
[205] (My daughter and her husband stayed with me and) they were naughty with power . .. they 
go out of their bedroom and leave a light on. I' ve had to be so careful and I' ve literally 
eaten beans on toast for meals because food wise I' ve had to be careful what I buy. 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
[206] I cannot begin to express the emotion and physical toll this has taken which all could have 
been averted with a 30 cent phone call. I couldn ' t even get a car loan now if I tried . My 
young family now does not have the advantage of my continual care as I now need to start 
again. [public submission 243 from Storm Investor] 
6.4.3.1.3 Cultural and familial roles 
A common disappointment amongst many of the more mature investors is the perceived 
inability to now fulfil roles as grandparents in the way they were hoping to. This social role 
was clearly of much importance to those who had plans in place to provide financially, 
emotionally and also with time commitments to subsequent generations. The primary 
reason that this role could not now be fulfilled was due to financial pressures. 
[207] I still enjoy my grandchildren but I - look, I ' ve just had a grandson born last month . I didn ' t 
have any money, I couldn ' t send him any money in an envelope. I bought him some cheap 
little clothes but I felt terrible, I couldn't afford to put money in the envelope. I' m actually 
into my shrapnel change now, that ' s what I' m buying a drink with or whatever; it's change 
because I - it sounds terrible, it ' s like Mother Hubbard ' s cupboard. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
[20 8] It 's ce11ainly not what we aimed to do . We had other arms too to try and set the .. . 
grandchildren off into good educations and pay, you know, and get stuff put away for them 
so that when they' re into their 18, 21 or time to go to uni or something like that, they you 
know had a good thing but that ' s all collapsed . We had to pull out of that . [interview with 
Stonn investor] 
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[209] My wife is heartbroken and sick with worry about the future for us - but more so because of 
the inability to do the things parents and grandparents like to do, want to do and carefully 
planned their finances so they could do - and that is be there for their children and 
grandchildren. [public submission 211 from Storm Investor] 
[21 OJ It also stops us doing all the sorts of things that we had proposed to do like for 
grandchildren. We had proposed to set up trusts .. . for secondary education and University 
education and we ' re unable to do that and all those sorts of things we ' re just not able to do 
now ... it's been pretty traumatic, yeah. But so for (my wife), yeah, it ' s been a very, very 
difficult time. Probably in some ways, more difficult ... all the things that we had together 
planned for (the grandchildren), is not going to happen so that ' s pretty devastating for her. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[211] How does a nanna explain to her grandson, while on an excursion to the beach, that she 
cannot afford to offer the small ice-cream treat that has always been a normal part of 
outings with nanna because she might need that dollar to keep the roof over her head? [ ex-
Storm client, public hearing [4], p.86] 
Similar comments were made about the parental role as well as the grandparent role. 
However, it is not just financial reasons that make these roles more difficult. For one 
investor who still retains some anger to Storm and the banks, his emotional state, by his 
own admission, makes it harder to fulfil such roles. 
[21 2] Interviewer: Has it impacted things like with the kids and grandkids; your whole thoughts 
about what can you do with them and that sort of thing? 
Wife: Absolutely, absolutely it has. Because you know .. . 
Husband: It ' s turned me into a cranky bastard . 
Wife: And it has too. It has . His whole personality has changed. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
Of course, it is not just the cultural role of grandparent that is important to all investors. 
Other simply feel the frustration at their lack of options to assist the family members that 
they do have. 
- 252 -
[213] Wife: We ' ve no family. I have no children . My parents, you know, are dead. 
Husband: Yeah, mine are all gone. 
Wife: (He) has no family. 
Husband: I' ve got a couple of (older) cousins. 
Wife: Yeah . I mean he has cousins and things, I don ' t. 
Husband: Yeah, second cousins and third and all that sort of thing. 
Wife: Second cousins. I mean they ' re there. But none of them ... 
Husband: They ' re not in a position to, you know .. . 
Wife: They ' re not in a position and also (he) will.. . 
Husband: The boot should be on the other foot; we should be helping them . [interview with 
Storm investor] 
6.4 .3.1.4 Social isolation 
The helplessness felt by one investor has had implications for their involvement in wider, 
social and formerly therapeutic activities. 
[214] We never received a letter. As a matter of fact , we do not know if we ever went into margin 
call. We do not know what happened. We do not know who sold our shares, when they 
were sold or why. We know that it was left until everything was at the bottom of the 
market. So our shares, which were worth over a couple of million dollars, ended up being 
worth $800,000- nowhere near enough to pay both loans. Even if we were to pay one loan, 
we would still be left with $800,000 worth of debt, no properties and no money to live on . 
Since this has all happened, my partner, who is 60 and very, very proudly played touch 
football every year until this year, has given up playing football for fear that he might injure 
himself and not be able to work. [public hearing [ 4] , pp.90-91] 
Whilst such an implication may seem a slightly trivial or simple thing to some, the social 
interactions and involvement through hobbies, passions or other outlets provides an 
essential part of any human ' s overall wellbeing297 . As well as some social limitations 
ari sing from a greater sense of vulnerability to mishaps, more direct reasons for greater 
social isolation clearly came through several interviews. For example, the loss of money 
297 Similar to that in excerpt [11 I]. 
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results in direct financial restrictions which limit participation m any manner of social 
aspects of human experience. 
[215] Husband: Some people don ' t believe us and, you know, it ' s just quite embarrassing 
actually. 
Husband: We are confined to barracks. 
Wife: We are confined. I have to keep phoning to say no, and I can ' t have you even for 
coffee because I haven' t the money to buy the food for entertaining. It ' s so embarrassing. 
Husband: We've made a decision we ' re not even going to send Christmas cards this year 
because we can 't afford to. [interview with Storm investor] 
[216] Interviewer: So since that time, so since December ' 08, January ' 09, what ' s happened ... in 
your life since then? 
Wife: Nothing much. 
Husband: Well, we 've virtually been a prisoner in your own house. 
Wife: .. .I don ' t have as many friends as I used to probably because I don ' t go out. 
Husband: Well , we don't go anywhere. The last time we went out to have a meal is for our 
(anniversary). 
Wife: Yeah, and the kids shouted us that out too. [interview with Storm investor] 
Another factor in increased social isolation also arises from financial implications, but not 
just due to personal shocks - but more the fact that the ' network' factor of one family 
member or friend getting others into Storm, has meant widespread impact amongst such 
networks. What this means, significantly, is that there is now less ability for that network 
itself to lend support to others as needed, especially in the context of maintaining necessary 
and important social involvement298 . 
[217] My brother and his partner were also in the early stages of looking into Storm Financial and 
investing. My parents were Storm Financial clients and are still working hard to try to keep 
ownership of their home. They were retired and both have had to return to work in their late 
60s. My father ' s brother and his partner were Storm Financial investment clients. They are 
also working hard to try to keep hold of their home. My step-grandmother, who lives in 
298 In other words, assuming independence between investors is not realistic. There are clear dependencies 
between different people and this is important when considering bow they react to, and recover from, such 
losses. 
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Sydney and is in her 80s, was a Storn1 Financial investment client. We do not know how we 
will get her to meet her brand new great-granddaughter, born in July . We do not know how 
to continue to get her to be a meaningful pa11 of my own children ' s lives. [ex-Storn1 client, 
public hearing [ 4], pp.85-86] 
For others, a further and even stronger factor in increased social isolation has related to 
emotional implications of Storm' s collapse. 
[218] Investor: I haven ' t got close friends . J 've got friends where I used to go dancing (but) I just 
haven ' t been focused to go dancing anymore. There's only one band I really enjoy dancing 
to and I do make an effort in going to see them ... But I haven 't felt focused in enjoying 
going out. I've had to force myself to go out. 
Interviewer: Because of the financial thing? 
Investor: ... It doesn ' t cost me anything when I go dancing. I just don ' t feel happy 
enough ... it's made me miserable so I' m not going out and about and doing what I 
generally would have done. [interview with Storm investor] 
[219] Wife: I just hibernated. I was too ashamed to go out... your lack of self-esteem; like I' ve 
put on 20 kilos in weight just through eating for comfort because chocolate will make 
something - just reaching for anything that will make me feel better and then the depression 
and then you feel like you're ... the overweight and then that doesn ' t help the way you feel 
because none of your clothes fit. You don ' t want to go to any functions because you feel 
people are judging by, "Oh god, have you seen how much weight she ' s put on?" 
Husband: You do; you hibernate. 
Wife: Yeah, your lack of self-esteem. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.3 .2 Community impacts 
Within the interviews there was not a big emphasis on community-level impacts, but rather 
the focus was more on personal , family and immediate network-related impacts . This is 
understandable in the light of the significant personal angst being experienced, and still 
being worked through. Similarly, this was generally the case emerging from other data 
sources as well. In response to one ex-Stonn client detailing such impacts (see excerpt 
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[217] above and excerpts [222] and [226] below), a PJCI member noted this lack of 
emphasis on community impacts within public submissions and public hearings. 
[220] I think you used the words 'the network nature ' of the impact of the financial crash. We 
have not really heard evidence about that, but. .. no doubt hear more about it-the fact that 
friends and neighbours and families recommended Storm to each other. That will generate, 
I suspect, other tensions. [Senator Mason, public hearing [4] , p.88] 
Nevertheless, those insights that were made in relation to the community impacts are 
considered here for four main reasons. Firstly, it is clearly important for those who raised 
such issues, whether that be for their own sense of welfare in being able to contribute, or 
more altruistic motivations, or both. Secondly, it is an issue that is exacerbated by the 
' network' effect that is a feature of Storm and this echoes and supports previous discussion 
in sections 6.4.2.1. 7 and 6.4.3 .1.4. Thirdly, impacts at the level of the wider community 
may well become a more important and noticeable feature as time goes on, if there is a lack 
of meaningful recovery for individuals - whether that be financial , emotional, health or 
social-related recovery. Fourthly, it also provides additional context for discussion m 
chapter seven, especially when examining the Australian system of financial provision. 
6.4.3.2.l Contributions reduced 
The prev10us discussion in section 6.4.3 .1.4 considered how a greater sense of social 
isolation can occur. However in the discussion below, the emphasis is more how on how 
contributions to the community can change as well. Although changes to contributions are 
not always necessarily adverse in terms of reductions, the more adverse changes are the 
focus of discussion here. One investor highlighted what their new financial circumstances 
has meant for them. 
[221] I had to give up all charities. I used to work for them. I used to be in a lot. I mean, we gave 
a lot and the people phoning to say, "Have you got any money yet?" you know? And I'm 
saying no and I' ve written to them all to say, "Take my name off' because you know, I 
cannot contribute and you' re wasting money writing and asking. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
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The ex-Storm client from excerpt [217] above also detailed the likelihood of reduced 
volunteer effort across a range of organisations that could now be expected. 
[222] Now I would ask you to consider the cost of this tragedy to the community. One of the 
things that has not come through .. . is the ruin that this has forced upon community 
organisations. I have an illustration of my point. My father is a vet. He has worked for 
many years in this field and he was and still is extremely well regarded in his profession . 
He had finally chosen to retire and devote a considerable amount of vo lunteer- that is, 
underpaid-time to the community as an executive member of the Queensland branch of 
the Australian Veterinary Association. At the time of the collapse of Stonn Financial he 
was within weeks of stepping up as the president of the Queensland AV A. He had already 
invested a huge amount of time and energy in working with that organisation with 
government, councils, other members of animal industries and the public. Very early in 
2009, my dad, with a huge weight on his heart, had to apologise to the organisation he had 
given a commitment to and tell them that he could not fulfil his commitment as he could 
not afford the financial impost nor the time that the position entailed as he needed to use 
that time to return to work and earn money to keep living. My dad was not the only one in 
this position. I know of Red Cross volunteers and community members who were readers in 
schools. I strongly suspect that there would be very few volunteer organisations in 
Queensland that are not touched by this through the loss of volunteer capacity. [ ex-Storm 
client, public hearing [4] , p.85] 
From their perspective of consistently being in touch with hundreds of ex-Stonn investors, 
statements by SICAG have also attested to this community impact, as well as statements 
from other investors and financial planners. 
[223 ] The community will be carrying the burden and counting the cost of thi s unconscionable 
conduct fo r years to come. [Co-Chairman of SICAG, public hearing [6] , p.70] 
[224] The li fe we have worked for all our lives up to very recently is shattered - that life as we 
knew it is fini shed. After 16 plus years of working with Rotary for and in a community of 
my birth and of which I love is over - no longer can I afford weekly meetings let alone 
yearl y dues... o longer can xxxx take up a vo lunteering position as he had to return to the 
wo rkforce after a short 4 month retirement. [public submiss ion 202 from Stonn Investor] 
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(225) The ensurng parn and suffering for those investors, their families and their local 
communities has been enormous and will continue perhaps for generations . [public 
submission 324 from Financial planning company] 
6.4.3 .2.2 Exacerbation from network effects 
Individuals can of course choose to reduce personal contributions to the community for all 
manner of reasons, even in the course of more ' normal' life circumstances. And, even when 
large financial losses have occurred for many people in other contexts, there can also be 
large impacts on the broader community as well. However, in Storm's case, an additional 
factor is that the 'network ' effect of friends, neighbours and family encouraging one 
another into the scheme. This can accentuate any resultant community impacts more 
severely, due to the concentration of investors in particular communities299 . This is again 
attested to by the ex-Storm client seen previously in excerpts [21 7] and [222]. 
(226) I know of an entire family on the tablelands-a retired mother and father, three of their 
adult chi ldren and their own children's fami lies-who were Storm clients. They are facing 
ruin, their farms for sale. Storm asked people considering them to talk to others who were 
current clients. People like to share prosperity and they talked positively, even in glowing 
terms, about how they felt when they were securing their future. Now, after the fact , there 
are whole families who are caught up together. They have very few frnancial reserves that 
are not caught up in this to use to keep roofs over their heads . [ ex-Storm client, public 
hearing (4) , p.86) 
Others also highlight how a concentrated impact can arise from the particular features of 
Storm. 
(227] This whole debacle has been a nightmare for us for the last 8 months . It has affected our 
extended family and friends, some of whom were also in Storm. [public submission 220 
from Storm Investor] 
299 To further echo earlier points, not only should investors not be considered as independent agents , but this 
further implies that at a societal rather than individual level , there is far less social and geographic 
diversification of the impact of losses than might otherwise be the case. 
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[228] in addition , the concentration of Storm clients in regional communiti es has led to 
wi des pread community and client impacts, affecting people ' s retirement, lifesty les, housing 
prices , and employment decisions. [public submission 277 from the FPA] 
6.4.3 .3 Community perceptions 
Linked to both social isolation and community impacts 1s how the perceptions of the 
community at large has impacted on investors. We have already seen the occurrence of 
voluntary social withdrawal arising from embarrassment, and also how relationships can be 
impacted. The impact arising from community perceptions is often an emotional one, but 
where it arises from the social culture at large, the way in which it impacts an individual is 
subtly different to emotional reactions discussed earlier. The main difference is that 
community reactions are perceived as being laden with significant and negative judgement, 
and as a result, reactions from investors are aligned with a defence of their position, and a 
degree of indignation at others casting judgement on them when they are already having to 
deal with significant hardship and emotional turmoil. Reactions to adverse community 
perceptions are not insignificant, with 11 of the 15 initial interviews giving some time to 
this issue. 
How investors have perceived wider community reactions is indicated in the following. 
[229] The thing that disturbs us psycho logically I guess; is that people think yo u' re a pack of dill s 
or they think you were greedy or you know and some people do think that. . . the media 
initially tended to pick up on the line, "Oh, you' re greedy people and stupid to be in vo lved 
in it" you know, and - we ll , that ' s the other thing that everybody - a lot of people including 
the media thought; that th is was a whole bunch of totally and utterly unsophisticated mums 
and dad s who didn ' t ha ve a clue, who got sucked into thi s scheme and again, that wasn ' t 
the case. [interview with Stonn investor] 
[230] (There were suggestions from politicians) that we were in there to make as much money as 
we could. We were all bloody gambling away a ll our investments and that's not what it 
was . It was a supera1rnuation scheme as far as I was concerned. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
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[231] Yeah, because a lot of the media reports that we read said that we were greedy and we 
certainly weren ' t greedy. We didn 't do it for that. As I said, we were really naive. We'd 
never done anything like this before, you know ... [interview with Storm investor] 
[232] So yes, judged very harshly and it was in the paper all the time about people saying what 
greedy people we were and that. I don ' t know how we were greedy but they were saying 
what greedy people we were. [interview with Storm investor] 
The awareness of community perceptions has been driven in part by media coverage, which 
in the early days following Storm's collapse was indicated as being quite adverse, but also 
through the influence of that media on other social circles much closer to home. 
[233] Interviewer: Do you feel quite judged too for making the decisions you 've made? The 
media I think has taken a particular side to it. 
Husband: Oh yeah, they just said they thought you were greedy. Well, I was far from being 
greedy. 
Wife: Yeah, and we've got friends that... ring me up and say, "Oh you know, that's what 
happens when you want too much money" and all that. [interview with Storm investor] 
[234] Investor: Even still in Townsville, there ' s a lot of misunderstanding. If you say that you 
were part of the Storm ... 
Interviewer: There' s a Storm and a non-Storm crowd now, is there? 
Investor: Yeah, and if they see the Storm thing, you can almost see the walls go up. Like oh 
god, that mob . . .. so yeah, you try and not to sort of let too many know. 
Partner of investor: There' s definitely a stigma around it. 
Investor: It is. 
Partner of investor: Oh, they were greedy. 
Investor: Yep, we ' re all put in the greedy basket. 
Partner of investor: Yeah, because we' re all greedy. 
Investor: . .. because of how it was sold in the media too, I mean some of the first headlines 
were about greed and that sort of stuff, so people just have sucked that up and they think, 
oh, they went in knowing that it was high risk. We didn ' t know it was high risk and we 
really didn ' t know what it was, you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
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6.4.3 .3.1 A defence 
Various interviewees considered it important to indicate a defence to those public 
perceptions. Given that the main negative perception has that investors were greedy, 
unsurprisingly it is this element that interviewees felt important to address . 
[235] Wife : It wasn ' t the fact that we wanted ... 
Interviewer: Excessive things and stuff? 
W[fe: Yeah ... It was all grandiose. You know, go and buy jewellery. Well , I don ' t wear 
jewellery . .. but that ' s me. You know, yeah and the only things we ' ve got on our walls is 
mainly photographs. 
Husband: All our kids . 
Wife: Kids and stuff You know, we're sort of not extravagant people really . . . material 
items aren ' t my forte . [interview with Storm investor] 
[236] All we were doing was following the Government's advice. We just chose Storm Financial 
as our financial advisers . We weren ' t greedy. All we were after was the same lifestyle we 'd 
been living all those years. We weren ' t greedy. We ' ve never owned a new car in our life. 
Never. Even when we were with Storm, we never owned a new car; always second-hand 
cars. We ' ve had the same house for (nearly 40) years. We've never gone out looking for 
new flash houses , you know? When we go on holidays, we stay in three star hotels, you 
know? We don ' t live a flash lifestyle. We weren ' t greedy, you know? [interview with 
Stonn investor] 
[237] One of the other financial - so-called gurus who I think is a lightweight; J can ' t remember 
his name .. . when it first happened he said , "You know, well these people deserve what they 
get. They shouldn't be bailed out. They were greedy and stupid to go into a scheme like 
that. " And that wasn' t us . We weren ' t greedy. [interview with Storm investor] 
Others felt it important to address another major public critique - that to enter Stonn, one 
would have to ignore well-known (albeit colloquialised) principles concemmg 
diversification such as not putting ' all your eggs in one basket ' . 
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[238] The returns were - the returns on an index fund, you will never beat the market, but you 
will never be below the market ... some people say, "Oh, you had too many eggs in one 
basket." Well, we might have had all our advisers in one basket but how many advisers do 
you have, you know? But we certainly didn ' t have all our eggs in one basket. They might 
have been in index funds , but there were a number of them and they are the most diversified 
form of investing you can possibly do, you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
This same interviewee went on to defend a further critique, that being to partake in Storm' s 
strategy, one would have to dispense with common sense. 
[239] You know, I certainly don ' t consider myse lf unsophisticated and there were bank managers, 
there was at least one or two lawyers I believe, there were many senior professionals, there 
was at least one, if not more financial advisers from other companies, who were involved, 
who saw this as a good thing and I mean, Emmanuel ... it always used to pain him to see 
that people had this huge asset in their home and were not able to do anything with it. . . he 
said, "there 's got to be a better way that people can get a better life and don ' t have to be on 
the pension" and this is a way forward to do it, you know? And I think the media - some of 
the media - I mean the original Four Comers program was, I thought, almost a disaster 
because that's exactly what they tried to do ... but then subsequently, Four Comers did 
another programme which was very good, because I think they woke up to the fact that we 
were not a bunch of unsophisticated mums and dads who had been duped into a poor 
investment scheme. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.3 .3.2 Influence of perceptions 
One reaction to such perceptions is indignation from investors, concerning why others feel 
they can make judgement on them. Primarily, this indignation arises because of the view 
that others simply cannot know or appreciate what situation investors are left in now, and 
that indeed it is not ' all their own fault'. Thus, if others cannot know, why should they 
judge? 
[240] What we actually contributed over the years by reinvestment of dividends and our cash that 
we put up at odd occasions, was $535,000. Now I find it almost offensive to hear some of 
the comments by people outside of the Storm group who think that we are some type of 
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smart Alec , greedy money hungry people. You know , you put up that much money, watch 
it all go away overnight and try not to feel angry at someone the next day . [interview with 
Stonn investor] 
[241] It hasn ' t been very good when the media write up saying, oh we ' re selfish and we were 
stupid to get involved ; that didn ' t help at all ... I don ' t think the public realise just how 
devastating it 's been and neither they should, it 's not their experience. You know, you don ' t 
know what it ' s like to get wet until you stand in the rain do you? [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
[242] Australians have no sympathy whatsoever for a financial disaster victim. It ' s the one area of 
sport where we ' re all competitors and there is no sympathy whatsoever for anyone who hits 
a financial hurdle in this country. No collective sympathy at least and you know, until you 
start explaining to people the individual wrongs that have occurred, most people are quite 
happily going to read whatever they read in the Courier Mail and take it as gospel. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
The range of impacts other than the sense of indignation include further shame and 
embarrassment leading to a further sense of isolation, a sense of ridicule and humiliation, 
and an overall sense of being hurt above and beyond what has already been endured. 
Excerpts relating to each of these respective points follows. 
[243] Being ashamed and embarrassed to move about in a community of your birth as now find 
ourselves judged as greedy, na"ive, stupid and worse . [public submission 202 from Storm 
Investor] 
[244] Public opinion has been cruel, implying that the Stonn investors were greedy. The effect of 
these comments has been utterly debilitating, to the point where we feel that nobody gives a 
damn about how thi s situation imploded, leaving trusting, hard-working people in the 
depths of financial ruin - through no fault of their own. Comments such as: - We should 
have known better; We were greedy and deserve everything we get; How could we be so 
stupid and reckless! [public submission 306 from Stom1 Investor] 
[245] In vestor: Copping an absolute barrage of abuse via the print media . 
fnr erviewer: Did you feel quite judged? 
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Investor: Absolutely . .. (we) get ridiculed by the Australian public ... humiliated in the press 
and in the media as being greedy and stupid. [interview with Storm investor] 
[246] There was a perception out there which is very, very painful and hurtful, that we were 
greedy and that is so far from the truth. What we were trying to avoid was what I have just 
gone and done with Centrelink and that ' s what everyone was trying to - they were all trying 
to be self-funded retirees, that's what we were all wanting to do, and have a quality of life. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[24 7] Wife: But we didn't - I know with (Storm), a lot of their clients went on these big holidays, 
but I... 
Husband: We didn ' t do anything. 
Wife: We were raised that you don ' t spend money for the sake of doing that and I couldn ' t 
justify going and spending $20,000 on a holiday overseas with all this just for it. So we 
never spent our money on ... 
Husband: We didn't lead the Life of Riley. You know, if you read in the paper everybody 
was on the pig's back and eating the hide and the hog and all the rest of it and we were just 
a mob of greedy so-and-so 's and that ' s the part that's hurt. [interview with Storm investor] 
Perhaps the overall impact resulting from negative community perceptions is best described 
simply as a change in life - and not for the better. 
[248] Our lives have changed completely ... Having to live with the knowledge that family and 
friends believed all the initial media reports about the Storm collapse, that made us clients 
out to be greedy and deserved of our losses. [public submission 21 from Storm Investor] 
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6. 4. 3. 4 Visual representation of social impacts 
A word cloud representation of the social impacts of significant financial losses 1s as 
follows: 
6.4.4 The loss of Trust 
Trust is foundational to conducting one's life affairs . Firstly; because humans are social 
they need trust in themselves, others close to them, and wider societal connections in order 
to function effectively and happily in the world. Secondly; because institutions, professions 
and collective organisations of various kinds are needed to assist individuals in their 
navigation of life ' s various uncertainties, trust in such entities is also essential. This 
ce1iainly applies to the context of one's financial affairs, but significantly, impacts on the 
financial realm have an influence well beyond just this aspect of one ' s life. 
The preceding findings lead us to claim that the core things that are lost when a significant 
financial shock is experienced are trust and control. Whether through emotional trauma, 
monetary losses themselves, severe direct and indirect health impacts, changes to 
relationships, or factors relating to broader social influences, it seems to be the case that 
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investors generally lose trust in many aspects of their formerly trusted world. As well as 
that, the ability to have some control on one' s fortunes and life is compromised. 
This section details how an individual ' s level of trust in various facets of their life has 
changed as a result of Storm ' s collapse, and the next section ( 6.4.5) discusses in more detail 
the issue of having control in one' s life. 
Perhaps the simplest overview of the loss of trust is given by one investor. 
[249] I have learned not to trust people when it comes to financial circumstances. [ email 
correspondence from Storm investor, January 2013] 
However, as the following discussion will highlight, the objects of distrust are many and 
varied, including Storm itself, the wider financial advisory industry, the banking sector, 
other professionals such as lawyers, government as the ultimate provider of collective 
protection and provision, and perhaps most damagingly of all, an impact on trust of oneself. 
In order to address each of these however, we first need to divert slightly to indicate a 
selection of views and perception on key areas of dispute, and therefore angst, for many 
Storm investors. These are the provision of loans to investors, the various issues around 
margin lending and margin calls, and the decisions to close the Storm-indexed funds. 
Examining each of these provides additional context for impacted areas of trusted which 
will follow, and allow a stronger link to the research question of determining the impact on 
individuals. 
6. 4. 4.1 The provision of loans 
It is generally now acknowledged that in many cases, there were some deficiencies on 
behalf of the banks in lending to Storm investors. This section briefly details these 
deficiencies, and indicates the perspectives that investors hold as a result. 
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6.4.4.1.1 Claims of loan deficiencies 
Three mam claims have ansen 111 regard to loans being granted under generous credit 
provisions to Stonn investors: the practice of lending on investment earnings; the lack of 
in-person checks of investors and/or on-site checks of homes when approving loans; and a 
general 'massaging' of loan applications. 
In tenns of lending solely on investment earnings, this was an issue raised by SICAG and 
also claimed by ex-employees of Stonn to be a responsibility that ultimately resided with 
the banks. 
[250] Their prudential lending was more or less based on whatever security was available to give 
the loan, rather than the ability to service the loan. They relied heavily on the actual income 
from the investments, especially for people who were retirees. You can see the application 
fonns, where they actually say, 'The income is zero. Independent means. ' On the other side 
it is actually showing the margin loan as being a commitment but on the servicing side, 
again, it has got zero. How can this be? That is not prudential lending. [Secretary/Treasurer 
of SICAG, public hearing [6], p.83] 
[251] l wasn't earning, l didn ' t have an income when I signed up with Storm and that was one of 
the big things. The bank knew I didn ' t have an income .... they knew I wasn ' t working and 
yet they gave me this loan and they were just taking the repayments from my investments 
with Storm which were all in shares and they shouldn't give loans on shares. [interview 
with Storm investor] 
[252] Wife: They shouldn't have lent us that money . That is the argument. We should never have 
been loaned that money. 
Husband: That ' s exactly right and they shouldn ' t have. No, look back there because it was 
all based on what we had in the shares. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
[253] We wish to emphasise that if the borrowings were reliant on income from the investments 
to support the borrowings, this was clearly made known to the Banks and they again made 
the final decision . [public submission 386 from ex-employees of Storm] 
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One investor also highlighted the fact that over time, as risks with such an approach were 
becoming tangible, this did not stop the practice from continuing. 
[254] As for the banks, where was their duty of care to their customers? They were still approving 
investment loans to be serviced by income from shares, even as the market continued its 
downward spiral. [Storm investor, public hearing [5] , p.54] 
In terms of the lack of physical inspection of a home prior to a home loan being approved, 
this has also been raised as an issue by investors. 
[255] Nobody ever came out and did a valuation on the house. They wouldn ' t know the value. 
You know, it was obviously over-valuated and so forth and they loaned more than what the 
place was worth and if it had burned down, we would have been in big trouble .. . the buck 
stops with the (bank). They were the ones loaning the money and as far as I was concerned, 
you know, if you go along and you do your own conveyancing and you go along to the 
bank and want money, you know, they decide whether they're going to give it to you or not 
regardless of what I say or what my next door neighbour says or something like this . So as 
far as I was concerned, the buck stopped with the bank albeit that they may have been in 
bed with (Storm). [interview with Storm investor] 
A broader claim was the lack of knowledge banks would have of the individual customer 
who rather than Storm itself, was actually the ultimate customer. Often this was due to no 
contact at all between the bank and the investor, a practice that was defended as not 
unreasonable by one bank, who were happy to receive information on clients directly from 
Storm. 
[256] Customers were dealing with someone that they trusted, that they were prepared to provide 
their personal information to--both their financial information and other information-and 
asked the bank to rely on that information. I do not think that is out of the ordinary. [MD 
and CEO of Bank of Queensland, public hearing [8] , p.39] 
Such practice has not sat well with many investors in hindsight, as they felt that the 
approval of a loan in itself was a degree of assurance from the bank, and that an in-person 
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interview would have provided a far more prudential and appropriate approach. As such , 
many lay blame at the feet of the credit providers. 
[257] W!fe: The fact that they did lend us the money influenced when we went into Stom1 
because .. . 
Husband: That was one of the reasons again, we decided the bank. .. 
Wife: The bank wouldn ' t lend money. 
Husband: Wouldn ' t lend, it ' s a safeguard. To me, it was a .. . I mean I remember how we 
used to get a house loan here, what you had to go through. 
Wife: . .. jump through so many hoops. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
[258] Investor: We never saw anyone from the bank. It was all done through Storm. We never 
saw one anyone from the bank. You go along to the bank and say, "Oh, I'm going to retire 
in a year ' s time but l want a $280,000 home loan" you know? Oh actually, the last loan we 
took out, we were retired. We were two years into our retirement. I'm retired , I want a 
$280,000 home loan. You think you'd get it? 
Interviewer: Mmm, not really. 
Investor: No. So yes, the banks were the biggest culprits of the lot. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
[259] I do believe that the banks have some responsibility in our demise, as not once did Colonial 
meet with us or interview us regarding our loans or how we intended- at our age- to repay 
approximately $1.6 million ... the Bank of Queensland, who mortgaged our home to the sum 
of $380,000, never ever contacted us to seek any particulars-no background et cetera-
and, to this day, we have not met with anybody from the Bank of Queensland. Had they 
interviewed us when the application was made, they would have known that our income 
shown on the application was more than double what we were getting for our investments , 
and we do not know who filled out this amount on the application, but it was definitely not 
us . [Stonn investor, public hearing [ 4] , pp.35-36] 
Relating to this last excerpt, various and more serious claims have been made as well. For 
example, false witnessing of some loan applications, false details regarding employment 
and income, and increases in loans being actioned without authority. 
- 269 -
[260) By that stage, I had the loan application documents (from the bank) and knew that our 
signatures were on that and witnessed by people that we had never met and that the 
information on the loan application was wrong and we had never signed that application for 
the loan. [interview with Storm investor] 
[261) (We) went to war with the (bank) and demanded to see our agreements. When the 
agreements came back, well the pages were just black. There was supposed to be in one 
group - there was supposed to be five pages, wasn 't there, one group of papers. We got two 
that you could read and the other three were black . . . when we eventually asked for the 
unmarked copies, they were unsigned documents and statements on them like that we were 
retired and had been retired for seven years at the time when they took out this loan and 
then further down, they said you know, (my wife) had been working for a particular firm 
for the last seven years, I'd been working ... [interview with Storm investor] 
[262] Stuart Robert MP: You indicated in your statement that your margin loan went from $2 ½ 
million to $3 million without your concurrence. Is that correct? 
Investor: Yes. 
Stuart Robert MP: How did that happen? 
Investor: I do not know. 
Stuart Robert MP: Did you give Storm Financial any authority to borrow on your behalf? 
Investor: No. 
Stuart Robert MP: So there is nothing in the (terms and conditions) that you are aware of? 
Investor: ... No. 
Stuart Robert MP: Then the only way would be that they made a loan on your behalf 
without your concurrence, which may be fraudulent-
Investor: Yes. 
Stuart Robert MP: if there is no way that you approved it or signed it, there is nothing in the 
Ts and Cs that gave them the authority and there is nothing written down that they can 
present showing they have authority to make a loan on your behalf. 
Investor: If I may remind the committee, this was only less than a year ago. I am very, very 
clear that no authority was given to Storm Financial and no authority was given to the 
Commonwealth Bank or any of its subsidiaries. [public hearing [6] , p.103] 
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SICAG ' s public submission summarises most of these concerns. 
[263] Loan applications were routinely massaged to ensure the loans met the banks' approval 
criteria. SICAG members who have successfully retrieved their loan documents - many of 
which contain blacked-out sections - have been shocked and alarmed to find serious enors 
relating to the stated annual income and in many cases personal data. [public submission 
276, from SICAG] 
6.4.4.1.2 Bank admission: standards not met 
ASIC ' s observation of the above issues is informative here, as is that of the financial 
services company AXA. Both sets of observations are relatively innocuous (and necessari ly 
vague at that stage of proceedings for ASIC), but do portray the general feeling that nonnal 
lending standards were indeed awry. 
[264] Recent retail investor losses have shown that in some cases Australian lending institutions 
may have failed to apply their usual standards in the bull market. This was particularly so 
where the retail investor dealt with the financial institution indirectly through an 
intennediary. In some cases this has resulted in higher risk lending to retail investors and 
inadequate management of existing loans. [public submission 378 from ASIC] 300 
[265] It appears that some credit providers did not undertake the nonnal enquiries required for the 
prudent provision of credit, including reasonable scrutiny of financial information to 
support the request for credit as wel l as a proper level of analysis of the borrowers ' balance 
sheet, income and ability to pay. [public submission 385 from AXA] 
These shortcomings have been acknowledged by vanous banks. A selection of such 
acknowledgements follows. 
[266] Following a two month review, ANZ has cunently identified around 160 of our customers 
who may have borrowed from ANZ to invest through Storm Financ ial. .. we have 
,oo AS IC expand further in their submission on shortcomings and extra ri sks associated with relying on an 
interm edi ary "wh o offers a large volume of business to the lending in stitution". The overall ri sk 1s 
summ ari sed as '' th e lending in stitution may fai l to focus on the retail borrower as the ultimate borrower'' . 
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determined that the lending decisions for a small number of customers did not comply with 
ANZ's credit policies and we are undertaking further review to assess whether others could 
also be in that group. [public submission 379 from ANZ] 30 1 
[267] Home Lending practices in relation to Storm ' s clients were sometimes deficient ... we 
believe our home lending policy to be broadly consistent with our peers. Regrettably, these 
policies and practices were not always followed in our Townsville area office in lending to 
Storm customers .. . the fact that a relatively small financial planner group, in terms of 
adviser numbers, could have a disproportionately large, and, in some cases, devastating 
impact on some of our customers, is deeply regretted. That one of our relatively small 
offices could write a disproportionately large amount of home loan business without 
attracting further scrutiny is a disappointing operational concern. [public submission 357 
from CBA] 302 
Furthermore, despite the Bank of Queensland' s defence of its practice with Storm in 
excerpt [256] above, it nevertheless also conceded that it too could operate differently in 
the future. 
[268] BoQ CEO: Policies and procedures are put down as mitigants to manage risks. The 
preferred model across the bank, as I mentioned to the chairman earlier, is that lending 
managers meet face to face with their clients. In respect of Storm clients, we had a written 
authority to deal directly with their financial adviser. 
Stuart Robert MP: Did that make you uneasy .. . ? 
BoQ CEO: We are reviewing our policy as a result of these findings and I am sure that we 
will want face to face . [public hearing [8] , p.48] 
30 1 ANZ acknowledged further in public hearing [2] that the ideal situation is that "you want to be able to 
understand the client ' s needs and what they are doing with the funds that they are borrowing .. . we would say 
there is a broader responsibility to the client to make sure that we do not give clients funds where we do not 
think it is appropriate" [Deputy CEO, ANZ Banking Group, public hearing [2] , p.44]. 302 Such claims were rejected by fonner CBA employees in public hearing [5] , stating that "these staff (in 
Townsville) .. . simply followed the process that was approved and referred to appropriate areas when 
required" (p.79). 
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6.4.4.2 Th e margin issue 
The issue of who should have made a margin call, when it should have been made, and why 
in the vast majority of cases it wasn ' t made, is a significant one and is given much attention 
across all data sources. For example, in public hearings [7] and [9] there is extensive 
discussion of the margin call issue with the CBA, and in public hearing [9] , there is 
extensive discussion with the Macquarie Bank. 
We cannot do justice to the full coverage of this issue here, but instead give selected 
examples to provide various perspectives, and importantly for our research questions, set 
the scene for describing the impact of Storm's collapse. As such this section briefly 
considers perceptions towards the credit provider(s), perceptions towards Stom1, and the 
implications for individuals caught in the middle. 
6.4.4.2.1 Perceptions of the role of credit providers 
According to the AEC I SICAG 2009 survey, 93% of respondents believed that their 
margin lender had a had a duty of care to contact them for the purposes of making a margin 
call. Furthennore, 25% of respondents had previously experienced a margin call , and of 
those, 63% were advised of this margin call via the bank, 33% via Stonn, and 4% through 
both. As such, there is a strong sense of disdain held towards the credit providers in respect 
of margin calls not being made, and the significant losses that followed. 
The breadth of blame allocated to the credit providers in this issue is evidenced across all 
data sources, and various public submissions from Stonn investors indicate the depth of 
feeling about the issues as well (for example, public submissions [91], [129] , [207] , [211] , 
[269] , and [356]). Public submission [281] gives the perspective of an ex-Stonn employee, 
as do the testimonies of ex-Stonn employees at public hearings [ 4] and [5]. The perspective 
of Stonn ' s founder Emmanuel Cassimatis is apparent at public hearing [6] , where he 
indicates his trust in the credit provider to contact him at the appropriate time with regards 
to hi s own margin loan. 
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Furthermore, the FP A infers a degree of responsibility on the credit providers as well. 
[269) There was a significant role played by banks with regard to the daily management of the 
portfolio at the point of margin call, the subsequent extent of exposure of Storm clients and 
the consequent impact on them as a result of market shifts . . . While we certainly 
acknowledge the role of advisers and have responded in recognition of the failure of our 
professional expectations, lenders must plausibly account for their activities with regard to 
these collapses. [public submission 277 from the FP A] 
A selection of interview excerpts also demonstrates where a strong sense of blame 1s 
perceived to lie. 
[270) My husband has always blamed the banks. He reckons ... (the margin lenders also) should 
have had more duty of care with his money. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[271) We had a negative equity of about $320,000 - $350,000 on the (margin) loan. We were able 
to find the funds to do that but that pretty well wiped out any cash reserves we had and so 
all of (the margin lender) was satisfied and of course they sold us down at the worst 
possible time in the investment cycle without any consultation - in spite of the fact we have 
a document saying they would provide us with 5 days ' notice before taking any action. 
[ interview with Storm investor] 
[272) As far as I feel, I just think that for us, the (bank) was the entity that caused all our 
problems ... they, through their. . . contract with us which was that when the L VR got to a 
certain point, they would contact us, which they never did. [interview with Storm investor] 
A further concern to investors has not just been the lack of a margin call per se, but also the 
nature of contact with the credit provider immediately following the sell down of an 
individual position. Such contact has strengthened impressions as to where operational 
failures occurred. 
[273) Not once did they contact us regarding reaching a margin call, and we were given no 
opportunity or say in the matter. The first contact we had with Colonial was on 8 
December, and by that time everything had been sold down. That, consequently, left us 
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with nothing. We had a phone call from Colonial on 8 December telling us that we owed 
them $ 16,000. The gentleman on the other end of the line sa id , ·we want that cheque by the 
weekend or by Friday,' and I sa id ' Well , I am not going to pay any money until such time 
as I get this in writing.' I received an email sho1ily afterwards. I looked at the email and 
saw that the $16,000 was not even in my name; it was in the name of another Stonn 
customer. So, obviously, Colonial were not sure who owed whom what. We did find out, 
when we received our bank statement on 12 December, that they had a debit of $15 ,000 on 
one statement and a credit of $15 ,000 on the other statement, so in fact we owed them 
nothing. It had been paid out and we were all square, but they were still chasing $15 ,000; 
they could not even look at their two accounts to see that one had a credit and one had a 
debit. [public hearing [4] , pp.35-36] 
An additional and related aspect concerns an increase in maximum L VRs on investors ' 
portfolios, which apparently occurred for many investors over time. Such an increase, if 
utilised by Stonn and the investor, clearly gives the investor less room to move should 
investment values fall suddenly - in other words, a greater risk for investors303 . A 
somewhat evasive exchange occurred in one public hearing when discussing this point. 
[274] Senator Mason: But the bottom line here is that the risk has changed and the clients-your 
clients, who have a contractual liability to you-have not been informed . That is a fact , 
isn ' t it? 
Mr Narev (Group Executive Manager, Business and Private Banking, CBA) : I am not sure 
that the risk has actually changed. 
Senator Mason : It has . The LVR has changed. 
Mr Narev: There is a question here- and I expect this will be di scussed extensively in the 
remediation process, because this is a bit of a vexed question- about whether or not in fact 
a margin call is intended as a stop loss for a customer. 
Senator Mason : Mr Narev, come on; you can do better than that. Let 's be serious . Quite 
clearly the risk has changed. It is for and against both the lender and the client, the 
customer, but it has certainly changed and the client has not been advised. I am not sure that 
is responsible, Mr Narev. 
101 Appendi x E hi ghlights the remarkable increase in variability o f potential outcomes as LVRs increase. 
- 275 -
Mr Cohen (Group General Counsel, CEA): Could I maybe make one point there. We do 
acknowledge that some of the issues around margin lending are not clear. It would be fair to 
say that that is exactly the reason why we are taking-
Senator Mason: Mr Cohen, the question is not whether they are clear; the question is 
whether you acted appropriately and prudently. You may have acted in accordance with the 
law. I am not making any suggestions there . The question is whether you acted ethically, 
appropriately, morally and prudently. 
Mr Cohen: I think that is an issue that should be and will be dealt with in the resolution 
scheme. [public hearing [7], p.70]304. 
6.4.4.2.2 Perceptions of the role of Storm 
However, it is not exclusively the case that all participants lay the responsibility at the door 
of the credit providers. An interviewee considered that Storm had duty of care over time as 
equity values tumbled throughout 2008. 
[275] Storm ' s duty of care; they should have been monitoring it more closely when they saw that 
things were going down. They should have said, "Oh well, we' ll see this and put it aside so 
you have some cash reserve" but they didn ' t. [interview with Storm investor] 
Others allocate responsibility to Storm because of a lack of plans in place to deal with the 
possibility that real events could undo investor positions, which by definition would only 
be needed at critical times. 
[276] As the market was dropping uncontrollably every day was vital for myself and other Storm 
clients to be kept informed as to the status of their investments so as to avoid a damaging 
margin call. Storm failed to acknowledge that the market could drop to such depths, and 
therefore had no strategies in place for a falling market. I believe this is the main reason 
why the Storm model failed . [public submission 287 from Storm Investor] 
In its defence, CBA claims that it was at Storm' s insistence that any margin call should 
come to them rather than the investor. Furthermore; 
304 For the record, margin calls typically do not provide a stop-loss mechanism for the investor (but this was 
not the question being asked in the conversation). 
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[277] This arrangement and Sto1111 ' s strong reluctance for us to have direct contact with their 
clients is consistent with industry practice. While we advised Stonn of margin calls, Stom1 
did not action these with its clients on a timely basis. Once we became aware of thi s, we 
made direct contact with these customers and learned of their considerable hardship. [public 
submission 357 from Commonwealth Bank of Australia] 
CBA ' s belief is that due to the severe falls in equity markets between September and 
December 2008, Storm simply "struggled to deal with the exceedingly volatile times the 
market was experiencing" (public hearing [7] , p.85). Macquarie Bank also was of the 
opinion that the process for passing on margin calls was breaking down at Storm ' s end, to 
the extent that margin calls were not being passed on at all. 
[278] During October 2008 , we became aware that there was a breakdown in margin loan call 
notifications with Storm. Storm was apparently not passing them on to their clients . We 
responded by immediately investigating the situation and by late October we had 
commenced direct notification of margin calls to clients. We continued to be in daily 
contact with Storm to notify them of client margin calls during this period, and daily 
updates on the website were maintained. The intennediated margin call process continued 
to operate satisfactorily during this period with other dealer groups that we were dealing 
with. [MD and CEO of Macquarie Bank Limited, public hearing [9] , p.3] 
In public hearing [5] (pp.74-75), a Storm investor confirmed to the PJCI that Macquarie 
Bank did make a margin call to him and as a result he contacted Stonn to make 
arrangements to cover that margin call. However, nothing happened with that instruction 
and that investor' s position was subsequently sold out with everybody else. 
6.4.4.2.3 Implications 
The difficulty in detennining the actual events from such accounts is clearly apparent305 , as 
attested by PJCI members themselves. 
305 But notably it is deemed by many to be an operational issue rather than a ri sk management issue per se. 
The Institute of Actuaries of Australi a for example stated that "thi s was probably an operational iss ue. It was 
not a ri sk management issue. I think some of the operational iss ues fell down" (public hearing [3] , p.81 ). 
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[279] What I am saying is that things are vague here. We have had the blame game to this 
committee all the way through: banks are blaming Storm for not activating the margin calls; 
Storm are saying it is the banks' fault; and the banks are saying they changed the rules 
between 2003 and 2008. They are not quite sure when they changed them. [Senator 
Williams, public hearing [9] , p.45]306 
More relevant to the research goals at hand is that in the middle of all this there are real 
people who as a result, faced significant losses. 
[280] Each party blames the other - CGI say it was Storm's responsibility to advise them of what 
action they should take in respect of the margin call, while Storm maintain that it was 
CGI's responsibility to advise us directly. In the meantime we're the poor bunnies caught in 
the middle of this Teflon-coated argument. [public submission 49 from Storm Investor] 
The margin call issue was such that 80% of AEC / SICAG 2009 survey respondents did not 
get a margin call prior to the sell down of the index fund, and that 60% had L VRs that 
exceeded I 00% before they got a call from their margin lender307 . This is despite the claim 
of many that they had agreements with the margin lender that they would be contacted 
directly as required, and that this assurance itself was a major factor in pursuing the Storm 
investment. 
[281] Investor: We were comforted by the fact that we had a written agreement with (the margin 
lender) .... that if the LVR situation did get a bit tight, we (the margin lender and Storm) will 
make contact with you and we will give you five days' notice, five business days ' notice to 
rectify any problem. 
Interviewer: That's (the margin lender' s) written advice to you? 
Investor: That's right, yes, in writing. In writing. A contract if you like between us. An 
agreement between us. It was signed by us and signed by them that we will give you five 
days ' notice for you to correct that. Now they never did call us and that's what the whole 
306 An interviewee more humorously appreciated his own futility in knowing what actually happened by 
stating: "rumour has it that the people that were looking after the margin loan sort of thing, was one bloke and 
a blue heeler dog and he got so far behind, that they just stopped" . [interview with Storm investor] 307 However, some investors who actually did get a margin call, still suffered major losses due to selling near 
the bottom of the market. For example, one investor lost their "original pre-Storm share portfolio, the extra 
cash invested into the Stonn funds , the fees paid to Storm, huge loan break fees . .. and the massive interest 
payments already made in servicing the loans. We are also left with large extra loans to repay (the funds for 
which have disappeared)" (public submission 157). 
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thing was all about. They never did and they pulled the pin and they are now saying that 
they had come to an arrangement some two years ago - two years before it all hit the fan , 
with Storm that Stonn would in future tell the clients, not (the margin lender) . If such a 
change was made we were never advised by either Stonn or (the margin lender) [interview 
with Storm investor] 
What it leaves many investors with is a huge sense of loss and distrust. One investor 
claimed that their family and friends refuse to ever deal with the their bank and margin 
lender again (public submission [91 ]), and the resulting emotional stress and frustration is 
conveyed by one interviewee. 
[282] (The bank said) we were never going to contact you. We contact Storm. We do not contact 
you. I had a margin loan with the (bank). Stonn didn't have that margin loan , I had it. I had 
contractual obligations that weren ' t met. They just sold me up without any notice 
whatsoever. No buffer call , no margin call , nothing ... " We don ' t have to." So for the sake 
of a 30-cent phone call, you sat there watching me slide into oblivion and didn ' t ring me, 
despite the fact that our contract says you will give me a buffer call. It says you will give 
me a margin call. For the sake of a 30-cent phone call , you couldn't be bothered to contact 
me, even though you knew that the Storm Financial product was geared in such a way that 
if! didn ' t correct it, I would be catastrophically destroyed. [interview with Storm investor] 
6. 4.4. 3 Closing the funds 
The final closing of Storm ' s index funds was described by SICAG as acting in in "undue 
haste amid the panic that prevailed at that time without any regard for the clients" (public 
submission [276]) . As such, their views towards the bank are naturally very strong. 
[283] It came about because those players in the game who held all of the might and power- and 
let there be no mistake to whom we are referring here and that is the banking industry-
reckless ly misused that might and power when the going got tough by ignoring the 
fundamental right s of their clients. In their omnipotence and arrogance it was as if their 
c lients did not exist. They clearly did not take into account the human consequences of their 
precipitative action to shut down the Stom1 indexed funds without warning. We simply 
became the sacrificial lambs on the altar of their own greed and self-preserva tion at the very 
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time when we needed the support of the institutions that we had trusted so implicitly to 
exercise a duty of care to their customers. As a consequence they allowed us to be totally 
destroyed. [Co-Chairman, SICAG, public hearing [6], p.70] 
The CBA gives explanations of its decision to terminate the index funds in its public 
submission [357] to the PJCI and also during the appearance of executives before the PJCI 
at public hearing [7] (p.95). We do not repeat those explanations here but simply note that 
no amount of explanation is likely to ease the impact on investors, however justified or 
otherwise those actions were. 
One further frustration has been associated with the perception that the CBA could have 
just held on for markets to improve. 
[284] If the banks had of held their nerves, the last statement that we had on our investments was 
the end of September 2008 and the portfolio at that stage was worth $2.65 million and we 
still owed at that stage, $2.1. So we had still half a million dollars sitting there. The stock 
market at that stage was down to 34 or 33. The stock market is now at 42 which is you 
know, 33 per cent up. So if the banks had of held their nerve for another couple of weeks, 
everything would have turned out alright. [interview with Storm investor] 
A response is also given by the CBA to this in public hearing [7] (p.96). Again, we do not 
repeat it here, but rather note that the sources and reasons for antagonistic views towards 
credit providers, and Storm, are many and varied. 
6.4.4.3.1 Visual representation of loan, margin loan and fund closure issues 
A word cloud representation relating to loan, margm loan and fund closure issues 1s 
overleaf: 
- 280 -
6. 4. 4.4 Trust in Storm 
From earlier discussion regarding about the rationale to invest with Stonn, it is evident that 
trust was a big factor in attaching credibility and deciding to commit to a course of action. 
One of these objects of trust was Stonn itself - as a company, a group of individuals, and a 
strategy. Post-collapse however, the prevalence of a distrust in 'Storm ' in its entirety is 
obviously high on the minds of those making a public submission to the PJCI, with 118 of 
the 168 submissions making some adverse observation about their experience with Stonn. 
Significant commentary was also made amongst other submitters: 27 of the 76 submissions 
from financial planners, non-investing individuals and financial services organisations / 
institutes / associations felt the need to also provide some comment which was negati ve 
about some aspect of Storm. 
In this section we describe investors' perceptions specific to Stonn after its collapse, and 
overlay this with various critiques and observations from others - particularly those in the 
financial services industry. This is done by separately considering perceptions of Storm 's 
strategy, issues associated with communication of risk , the greed factor, and perceptions of 
what has happened fol lowing Stom1's collapse. 
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It is important to note however that a commentary on such perceptions is not necessarily a 
judgement call on the original motivation behind Storm's approach. Indeed, despite some 
reservations about the strategy and various behavioural aspects as time went on, some of 
those interviewed nevertheless felt it important to clarify that Storm obviously did not 
intend for things to go awry, and also that the genuine motivation was for people to make 
the most of their situations. 
[285] I'm sick of people being bitter at just Stonn. It was a circumstance. Do you think someone 
who was running a company over $4 billion worth and having your own jet planes and 
everything wanted to go broke or go through this? [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[286] It always used to pain (Stonn's founder) to see that people had this huge asset in their home 
and were not able to do anything with it, through the MLCs that he worked with, you know, 
and he said, "There's got to be a better way that people can get a better life and don't have 
to be on the pension" and this is a way forward to do it, you know? [interview with Storm 
investor] 
6.4.4.4.1 Strategy 
Many aspects of Storm' s strategy are now met, in hindsight, with some scepticism. In terms 
of its investment strategy, some investors now see the model a:s unviable. 
[287] Our current situation has left us feeling betrayed and also saddened that someone whom we 
had trusted and whose advice and expertise we had for long accepted as been reliable, 
responsible and suitable for us and our client profile, took such a risk with our lives and our 
future financial wellbeing ... the fact is, we now know, the STORM created cash flows 
were: not sustainable, not viable and did not have the ability to sustain the associated 
borrowings. [public submission 307 from Storm Investor] 308 
308 This investor detailed their concern (in hindsight) with the presentation of the L YR. When informed that it 
was 61.5% (a margin loan of $1.686m and investments of $2.74m), this excluded the fact that their home 
mortgage of $380k also contributed to their investment position. Thus, their actual L YR in terms of (total 
borrowings):(investment assets) was (1.686+0.38):2.74 = 75.4%. However the margin lender would have seen 
an L YR of 61.5%, Storm may well have said that the overall debt:asset ratio was indeed approximately 60% 
if the home loan was 60% of the house value, but the vulnerability of the investor where they do not see their 
home as an income-deriving asset is more appropriately given by the LVR of 75.4%. Another investor picked 
up on this also: "Apparently, nowhere, at any time after we had completed our mortgages did Storm include 
the mortgage in our LVR, only the margin loan. Flawed from the first mortgage" (public submission 244). 
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[288) We borrowed money at 9.5 or 9.7 per cent , something like that. That money - and the 
whole situation was based on paying interest on a loan only. Right , you always had the loan 
there . But in a couple of years ' time, you would pay that off and you know , your money is 
multiplied , you know. In ten years ' time mate, I could have taken all my kids anywhere in 
the world for six months, you know? But the banks - this is the way I read it now, just now. 
If you ' d ever make 12 per cent every year, you wouldn ' t be able to pay the bloody interest 
back, let alone live. At 12 per cent, you pay the interest back and every tax time, we got 
caught; they would advise us to borrow more money to prepay interest or before June for 
the next year, you know and so this made the loan worse; more than what you had and all 
this sort of stuff, you know? And 9.7 would have had to be made to pay the bank back ... 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Significantly as well , the investor above realised that some of the unsustainability of what 
he was considering was due to his adviser pushing for a higher income in retirement than 
what he was needing, expecting or even wanting. 
[289) I think we said we wanted $40,000 a year but it was so good, he said "Oh, take $55 ,000 and 
$58,000" or whatever it was . We never had that much money in our lives, you know? 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
Another investor documented his disagreements with Storm over their push for higher 
L VRs on his own position, which he likened to "going to the casino". Yet despite being a 
strong enough character to resist this continued pressure, he could not or would not address 
other issues of concern with Storm. 
[290] Senator Mclucas: It sounds like the relationship that you had with Storm was a bit testy. Is 
that a reasonable descriptor? 
In vestor: Absolutely. We wanted to draw some money out, but we were afraid to go there 
because they would say no . 
Senator Mclucas: It is your money. 
In vestor: Yes , exactly. 
Senator Mclucas: Why did you not go and say, 'I don ' t want to have a relationship with 
you anymore . I don·t like this '? 
In vestor: Because at the time it was running reasonable . . . 
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Senator McLucas: ... I find the relationship between many of the investors and the 
organisation to be different from what I would expect it to be between an investor and a 
financial adviser. 
Investor: These people are meant to know more than we do. 
Senator McLucas: You are paying them commission. 
Investor: Exactly, and lots of it. I said in my statement, 'If you don ' t have the brains, buy 
them.' That has been my motto all the way along. [Storm investor and Senator McLucas, 
public hearing [5], pp.72-73]309 
Not all investors are disgruntled with the strategy however. Two interviews highlighted a 
perception that the strategy was appropriate for their particular circumstances, if managed 
appropriately. 
[291] Husband: Asked if we would follow the strategy again, I would turn around and say yes. 
There' s nothing wrong with the strategy. 
Wife: For us anyway. 
Husband: For us. 
Wife: For when we were involved and all that. What we don ' t know and never will know, is 
some of the people who seemed to get involved with Storm very late in the piece before 
when I - late in the piece before the crash happened, we read like everybody else - read 
about what happened to them in Townsville and a varie~y of other places and little old 
ladies signing over their lives and stuff like that. I can ' t imagine the people that we came 
into contact with, would ever do anything like that and I really mean that, because they 
seemed to be pretty genuine people and I've worked with a lot of salespeople on and off. 
But yeah, so whether some of these people were really genuinely ripped off, whether the 
people involved were people who just recently got involved with the Cassimatis group to 
make a lot of money or whatever; we will never know that and I think that's why we found 
it a bit difficult to comprehend and to believe some of the stuff that was written because it 
just didn ' t seem feasible . [interview with Storm investor] 
309 This transcript clearly indicates that the individual continued with the strategy, despite reservations with 
various aspects of the relationship. However, it also implies something even stronger for trust in the adviser, 
where despite the investor's reservations and discomfort, nothing seems to have ever been done to address or 
respond to such concerns. It is indeed a peculiar exchange, and echoes what others have said about the 
collapse of Westpoint: "Yes, the people ... want to get a maximum return, but if they are going to a financial 
adviser who has a fiduciary duty to them as their client, then what that adviser should do is advise them not to 
do it, and in fact what they're getting is exploitation" (Kohler, cited in Woolrich 2006). 
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[292] The only thing is we had some assets but didn ' t have enough income so Yve thought we had 
to pursue an area where we could generate some income and well , it 's like any scheme; I 
st ill say the scheme wasn't too bad. It provided us - monitored correctly and they liaised 
with you when the market starts to fa ll and you'd sell off some of the assets to keep it in 
cash rese rves. But you know, they didn ' t seem to do that and it was lack of duty of care. 
That 's all . [interview with Storm investor] 
Furthennore, one submitter was content with the infonnation and advice provided, and 
considered that the model itself could handle the fact that markets go up and down. Their 
main point of contention was with the fidelity of the margin lenders (public submission 
[147]). 
A selection of criticisms regarding the specifics of Storm's strategy from various financial 
planners and professional institutions is provided in Appendix E. 
6.4.4.4.2 Communication of risk 
One investor gave two highly infom1ative insights about aspects of Stom1's approach that 
concerned her. One was the lack of communication regarding what was occurring with her 
position in terms of borrowing against the home. 
[293] We were advised that, having paid off our house, we had a certain amount a month that we 
could use for investing. They called it getting equity out of our home, which at the time we 
did not realise meant that it was another mortgage. It was only some months later when we 
were applying for a credit card and it asked for mo11gage payments . I said , ·Have we got a 
mor1gage?' I actually rang the financial adviser and sa id , ' Have we actually got a 
mortgage?' She sa id , ' Yes . I' m afraid yo u have· , which sor1 of implies that she had not 
rea ll y told us that it was a mortgage . [Stom1 investor, public hearing [5]. p.54] 
What is remarkable is that this was not a one-off feature, but a continual process and an 
ongoing lack of awareness throughout the course of her investment. 
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[294] Wife: We were persuaded that you never take money out. You never close your portfolio. 
You never pay your debt and you train your children to take it on after you die. It just goes 
on. That is what they told us . 
Bernie Ripoll MP: Is that what they said to you? 
Wife: Yes. 
Husband: Yes, that is right. 
Wife: We were told that. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: Did you ever try to take some of your money out, even small amounts? 
Wife: Yes. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: You did? 
Wife: We wanted to buy our daughter and son-in-law's house, but we were told no, we were 
not to do that. We had to keep our portfolio. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: In the 10 years that you were with Storm I am assuming that you made 
more than one attempt to cash in or enjoy the benefits of your portfolio growth? 
Wife: As long as they were small amounts, that was okay. We could say we wanted a 
holiday or we had to buy a new car, but every time we actually drew from our portfolio they 
then increased the margin loan. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: You never cashed in; they just increased the debt? 
Wife: Yes. 
Husband: Yes, that is right. I just want to mention that we were under the impression that 
when they said, ' We ' ll draw down the money', they were taking money out of a slush fund 
where our funds were being stored, when in fact they were actually increasing our debt. 
That was never explained to us. [public hearing [5], p.63]3 10 
Other investors however find it surprising how others could not know the detail of their 
positions and/or ongoing performance311 • One interviewee made this clear, in the context of 
feeling frustrated that recent joiners to Storm predominantly jumped on a bandwagon of 
310 It is hard to not jump in at this point with our own opinion, as this transcript reveals one particularly 
disturbing point. With regards to never reducing debt but to pass it on inter-generationally, this quite 
obviously infers a debt in perpetuity and therefore also a creditor in perpetuity, and a vulnerability in 
perpetuity to all manner of sensitivities such as interest rate, income and investment variations, let alone 
liquidity risk. This foundational basis to have debt in perpetuity is sadly ironic given the overall motivation 
and goal of investors to gain a greater control of their lives. 
3 11 One investor says somewhat cruelly that "the Storm education process is thorough to the point where there 
could never be any doubt unless clinically brain dead how the money was invested, the risks associated with 
the investment, and the process by which the investments were purchased, managed and processed" (public 
submission 269 from Storm Investor) . 
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blame towards Storm, whereas he felt that the credit provider(s) were far more responsible 
for the position that investors found themselves in. 
[295] I don ' t see how people can ever say they weren ' t aware, they weren ' t informed or they 
didn ' t understand ... if they had of gone to any of the major investor update seminars that 
were there, they would have known. They would have known and they would have 
understood . . . and they came in - I think they came in with the opinion that Storn1 was the 
responsible entity and Stom1 did the wrong thing by them . Stonn did the wrong thing. The 
people in Storm should have told them more. The people in Storm should not have let this 
happen . Well J' m sorry, if Goldman Sachs or whatever else goes belly up, there ' s damn all 
Storm can do. [interview with Storm investor] 
Nevertheless, with regards to the specific issue of risk around the home, 89% of AEC / 
SICAG 2009 survey respondents did not feel that they were told of the risk that their home 
could be lost if share markets dropped. 
6.4.4.4.3 The greed factor? 
There are many facets to any discussion of greed. However, we do not dwell on them long 
here in respect of Stonn itself, because the impact on trust is well established by other 
points, and a further extended discussion merely adds to the level of saturation on that 
which is already established. Furthennore, it is difficult to point to a specific feature or 
event and say that was due to 'greed' , unlike, for example, being able to establish that 
aspects of Storm ' s model caused excessive risk for some investors. Therefore any 
discussion of greed is necessaril y couched in very opinion-based tenns. Nevertheless, two 
interview excerpts summarise the main aspects of greed that played out for the experiences 
of two investors. 
[2 96] They ' ve got to live too, I guess, but the more they could screw out of yo u and it didn ' t 
matter at the end of the day if you left yourself short, but they were happy because they got 
a big thing. You know, they didn ' t s it back and say, "You know, I think that 's too much . I 
don ' t think you can extend yo urse lf that far. " That never, ever happened to us. [interview 
with Storn1 investor] 
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[297] Why didn't I just walk away from it? I suppose what it comes down to was we had a 
relationship with our financial adviser. .. but I can also say now that as a financial planner, 
he failed. He failed to fully do the due diligence on the company that he was going in with. 
He saw an opportunity to make vast sums of money, which the planners of Storm were 
making, significantly better sums than what they would do under any other and that was -
and I can ' t blame him for that, you know? We don ' t go to work because we love it. We 
don't go to work as a financial adviser to make other people rich. He goes to work as a 
financial planner because he can make significant sums of money, drive the car he wants to 
drive, live in the house he wants to live in, in the suburb he wants to live at and there is no 
way in the world I would criticise any person for that. Society can probably question itself 
if they ' re the right motivations but he was just human . That's the temptation . .. he 
succumbed to that temptation and that was a mistake. [interview with Storm investor] 
The former perspective is also highlighted by the weight of testimony heard via the PJCI, 
which led to the following observation. 
[298] There seems to be no exit strategy. So somebody might come in and say, 'I want enough to 
retire on.' Surely that would be a set figure: ' I need $1 million,' let us say, to take an 
arbitrary figure. But once that target of $1 million is reached, like a lot of people in Storm, 
they do not exit-they say, 'Now it is $2 million,' 'Now it is $4 million,' 'Now it is $8 
million '-there is never an end point where they can actually say, 'This is fine; I now have 
enough to live on in my retirement. ' [Bernie Ripoll MP, public hearing [7], p.109] 
The link of this strategy to an implication of greed is given in a frank admission by an ex-
Storm adviser. 
[299] Interviewer: It was always more leverage up? 
Interviewee: Absolutely. Not once. Now that ' s just a greedy brazen strategy to have more 
funds under management, to pick up more fees. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Interestingly again however, not all felt that this was the motivation. The following excerpt 
concerns the same investors who were happy with the Storm model in excerpt [291] above. 
j 
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[300] Husband: One of the saving graces of the Storm scheme and what made it so much 
different and so much better than any other scheme was there were no trailing commissions . 
There were no ongoing charges or our investment funds. They were Stom1 managed funds 
in Stonn badged funds . But there were no - every cent that we got out of it , was reinvested. 
There were no ongoing charges . 
Wife: There was upfront. .. 
Husband: You knew when you committed to a step, that if you were going to put in another 
$120,000, they would get something like $8 ,000 out of that. Now that $8 ,000 went to them 
as administration costs of everything going forward. l don ' t know and I can ' t say, but 1 
don ' t believe that within the Storm organisations, that any of these - any people that we 
dealt with, were getting enormous personal commissions out of what we were paying. 
Wife: No, we don ' t know. We don ' t believe so. 
Husband: I don ' t know the an-an gem en ts within Storm; whether or not there was any 
incentive for particular Stonn personnel to push and push and push. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
Whilst many would take umbrage with the perception above regarding the relationship 
between commission, administrative expenses and profit3 12, further evidence for the view 
expressed in excerpt [299] about the motivation for more funds under management comes 
from the following. 
[301] In vestor: So when I claimed my super I lost a certain amount because of the period of time, 
my age. But I was advised that wouldn ' t matter because I would make that up pretty 
quickly. And the fee structure with Stom1 Financial was very, very high , but the way they 
explained that, it was one-off payment, that you would be with them for this long period of 
time, they would be managing it. I got a year. 
Interviewer: So they encouraged you to draw down your super for the purpose of investing 
in their product before the age of 60, for example, that was ... ? 
lnl'estor: Yes. [interview with Storm investor] 
.1
12 And of note. the issue of the commiss ion levels is not an aspect of Stom1 that we di scuss in detail , with the 
paper att ached at Appendix C addressing thi s to the ex tent we consider necessary here. 
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The above excerpt also reiterates the earlier example in excerpt [77] regarding the early 
withdrawal of superannuation for investment in the Storm model, even when that 
withdrawal attracted taxation penalties. 
6.4.4.4.4 Post-collapse reactions 
If it is the 'putting right that counts ', then this aspect of trust in Storm has played a part is 
shaping attitudes of further mistrust amongst investors. A disappointment in one' s own 
personal adviser was expressed in several interviews. 
[302] The biggest disappointment I have in (our existing adviser) these days is after investigating 
the matter, is that he and almost every single other adviser, almost every other single 
adviser, scattered like rats exposed to the light, when this went bad. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[303] Interviewer: How about (any) of the advisers? Have you talked ... ? 
Investor: They don ' t .... they've gone, yeah. Non-existent. You can ' t contact them. They 
just stay out of the picture and this is the hurtful part, they talk you into doing all these 
things and they 've not rung to apologise or say sorry and it became, after six months of 
visiting and seeing people, you become sort of - it's a very strong friendship you get and 
you feel so let down. I mean it wasn ' t them per se that took my money, but you feel so 
cheated and violated by what they 've done and I don ' t think on those lines too much . 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[304] Interviewer: So when you signed up, you were thinking at the time; not quite comfortable 
with this? 
Wife: No. 
Husband: Well, I was. 
W[fe: (My husband) was comfortable but... 
Interviewer: Because of the trust issue? 
Husband: Yeah, yeah. 
Wife: .. .I wasn ' t. I wasn' t ... I'm very cautious . .. I was always dubious. But I thought, oh 
well, he ' s trying to think of our future so I' ll go along with it but then I thought about it; 
you know, I can ' t go blaming (my husband) and then I blamed myself. . . then I thought, no, 
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I' m blaming (our advi ser) because he played us commg 111 for coffee here and say111g 
different things and chatting, you know, like a nonnal chat and I just felt.. . 
Husband: As soon as it went bad, he dumped us like a ... 
Wife: Yes, never spoke to us. 
Husband: Although he spoke to me the other day and I wouldn ' t speak to him. 
Wife: No, (my husband) wouldn ' t speak to him. 
Husband: 1 know what I' d like to do to him . 
W[fe: And that ' s what hurt too the most. [interview with Storn1 investor] 
Along similar lines, one ex-adviser expressed the following. 
[305] I have to be candid and put on the record that I' m disappointed that a lot of the advisers 
have walked away from the clients and that sits uncomfortably with me. You would expect 
that if. .. a meeting is on and they made their living for a long time looking after those 
attendees, I would have thought that the advisers have a responsibility to attend that 
meeting. Maybe I' m wrong on that. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
6.4.4.5 Trust infinancial advisers 
It is perhaps inevitable that a collapse on the scale of Stonn would have wider ramifications 
in terms of trust. In fact , although most submissions to the PJCI from Storm investors 
focused on more immediate issues and problems than wider issues of trust in financial 
advisers beyond Stonn (as these submitters were far more focussed on Stonn-specific 
issues at that time313) , the interviews allowed us to dig into broader issues of trust three to 
four years after the event. We find some differences between investors, with most quite 
adamantly declaring their trust in all advisers has gone, but some still would and do engage 
in this sphere. Both ends of that spectrum are discussed in this section. 
The inevitability of wider elements of di strust was highlighted in one submi ssion: 
.m Exceptions do ex ist of course, with, for exampl e, publi c submiss ion [21] explaining how distrust in Stom1 
extrapo lates to other advise rs, and public submi ss ion [245] express ing frustration with how an engagement 
with a financia l planner never provides an answer, but just a need to make more decisions for which they feel 
ill-equipped to do. 
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[306] When Storm fell over the blame game started and with so much mud flying around it was 
inevitable that the whole financial planning industry would be blamed for the behaviour of 
one group. [public submission 251 from Financial planning business] 
And, on a more resigned note, the Association of Financial Advisers noted that: 
[307] The failure of Storm, and others, opened the floodgates to a flurry of views and abuse and 
the maligning of an entire profession. In essence, the past 12 months has been open season 
on financial advisers, who have been blamed for almost every ill of the global crisis. [public 
hearing [7], p.27] 
And, although submissions to the PJCI from Storm investors were not in the right 'space' at 
that time to annotate beliefs about the wider advice industry en masse, many submitters 
who were investors in non-Storm outlets certainly were. Some 40 of these 74 submissions 
indicated a distrust or negative commentary about some aspect of the wider advisory 
industry, whether that be their own specific adviser or just broader perceptions. Thus, levels 
of trust is most definitely an issue for the industry, and one we explore here. 
6.4.4.5.1 General distrust 
The interviews give an ideal opportunity to have investors talk about their perceptions of 
advisers and other industry professionals. One area of mistrust that interviewees spoke 
about was the money factor that they now believed motivated advisers. 
[308] And the worse part about it in hindsight you know, you trust these people that you 've never 
met in your life before. You only go on all the friends that I had to say that they were 
making money and you give them your whole lifetime savings and you don ' t know them 
and you don ' t know what they' re doing with it . .. the other thing that upsets me with these -
these financial advisers; they're only an in-between man, hey? They' re only a - this is what 
I reckon, anyway. They ' re just leaching all your money. They farm out - then they farm 
out your money to (the bank) or in this case, Storm bloody - anyway, it was all controlled 
by the bank, anyway with .. . some other bloody thing, you know? And they farm it out to 
those blokes, so they get a cut, the financial bloke gets a cut, they get a cut and they just 
leave it there. [interview with Storm investor] 
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[309] Keep one thing in mind - that these blokes aren ' t do ing it for nothing . T hey ' re lookin g after 
their own backsides, their own interest, whether they be a used car sa lesman, whether they 
be a real estate agent, whether they be a financial adviser, whether they be an insurance 
sa lesman: it' s number one first and the bigger thin g that they can - well the more money 
they can get out of you, the bigger and fatter their wallets are goi ng to be. So you know , 
whil e the road to heaven is paved with good intentions, there 's always potholes in that road 
too . T hat's all I can say. [interview with Storm investor] 
[3 1 OJ Investor: We have nothing to work with and I wi ll never go to a financial advi ser again. 
Never. No . So we j ust continue on the way we are . Do our own thing . 
In terviewer: So between financial advise rs and lawyers , you don ' t hold much ... c red ibili ty in 
these professions? 
Investor: Not at all. No. They' re all out to feather their own nest, well and truly. They ' re 
just interested for the money. No help whatsoever. [interview with Storm investor] 
For another investor (a married couple) , it was not so much a money motive that bemused 
them, but repeated bad experiences with advisers. They had been with four different 
advisers for the significant part of their working lives, and three of these had, they felt , 
significantly let them down (including Storm). As such, their perspective was more one of 
bewilderment than anything else. 
[3 11] Husband: So we were convinced that wherever we went, of all these financ ial institutions , 
I'm convinced not one of them are any good. 
Wife: They' re no good . 
Husband: Every one has fai led that we've been in . Every one. Every one. 
In tervieH"er: Have you been to any since then? 
Husband: Nope .... I' ve so rt of spoken briefly to one o r two indirectly but I haven ' t sa id 
what - I have nothing to lodge anyway. But I' ve got no faith in them at a ll because I don ' t 
think - the best one is yourself and we had of stu ck to that.. ... . we wo uldn 't ha ve been in any 
position - but I don ·t find any of them any good; that I' ve struck . But there mu st be some 
that are. but I haven ·t struck them . [interview with Storm investor] 
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For three further interviewees, there was nothing specific that they could convey, it was 
simply a case of just not trusting anyone anymore, and/or now not accepting anyone ' s 
suggestions with regard to any financial matter. 
[312] I don ' t trust [financial advisers] , I don ' t trust them anymore. I don ' t trust anybody with my 
money anymore. Now I've got nothing. I've had people approach me about it and I've just 
gone, well I've got nothing, I' ve got nothing of any interest to you. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[313] Interviewer: Have you talked to any - have you taken any financial advice since Storm 
collapsed? 
Husband: No, I just don't trust no one. 
Wife: Nope, don ' t trust anyone. I don ' t even trust (my husband). When he goes to shop, I 
say, "Where 's my change?" [interview with Storm investor] 
[314] Interviewer: Have you taken out financial advice since it all happened? 
Wife: Yes, I did ring a fellow that. .. 
Husband: I don ' t trust them. 
Wife: When it first happened, I think - oh, somebody, whether it was ASIC or whatever, 
there was a group of financial planners offering free advice that you could ring up and I 
rang one and his advice was to sell the house immediately _for whatever you can get it, no 
matter what it is and get on with your life, even if you 've got to rent something and I 
thought, no, I'm not going to give in that easily. [interview with Storm investor] 
An organisation such as the FP A in theory would add trust to a prospective adviser/client 
relationship, and indeed the discussion in section 6.3 .5.1 showed that such credentials were 
a factor in developing trust in Storm' s advice. But, the FPA too finds itself in a challenging 
position of dealing with consumer trust as well , as despite Storm being a principal member 
of the FP A, in the eyes of investors this did not convey any benefit to them and in fact 
potentially served to give a false and unwarranted sense of comfort. 
[315] Storm Financial may as well have been a member of the local RSL club for all the FPA 
endorsement means. Financial Institutions should not be able to claim to be members of the 
FP A as if it means there is some protection offered to clients. Their endorsement is 
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misleading. In December Jonanne Bloch from the FPA appeared on the Sunrise TV 
program stating that potential investors should look for financial planners who have a good 
track record, who are members of FPA and have ASIC endorsement. Well we ticked all 
those boxes and still ended up losing everything. [public submission 220 from Stonn 
Investor] 
The FPA's own public submission to the PJCI [277] indicated that "S torm completed 
annual audit reviews, and no complaints had been lodged with the FPA that resulted in any 
disciplinary action until late 2008", but other submissions questioned the role of the FPA 
(for example, [ 154] from the AEC consulting group) in not taking a more pro-active role 
with Storm prior to its demise. Of the 168 public submissions by Stonn investors, 12 
indicated some questioning or discontent with FPA's role, and there were 2 ( out of 43) 
submissions from financial planners also expressing some general disappointment. 
6.4.4.5 .2 Regaining Trust 
The need to re-establish and build trust in the industry is well acknowledged and accepted, 
with several submissions from financial planners conveying frustration and disappointment 
that their industry throws up cases like Storm (for example, public submissions [56] , [257] 
and [332]). The downside for the industry is that such cases cast most other advisers in a 
bad light as well, and this swamps their belief that many people do get good advice, get 
good outcomes, and are happy with the ongoing relationships that they have. 
[316] I think we should also be mindful to accept that in the vast maj ority of cases the trust that 
has been placed in financial planners has been well placed and that the advice that has been 
given has been appropriate and clients are better off for it. We firmly believe that and can 
show strong evidence fo r that. Where it has gone badl y wrong where clients have been 
significantly affected is a significant tragedy fo r them and it is a very poor issue for the 
industry in terms of our reputation. [CEO of MLC Limited, public hearing [2] , p.13] 
[317] What I find interesting is how such abberative behaviour from a s in gle group ... could have 
such a big impact on the entire profession/industry. The impact implies that this behaviour 
was widespread within the industry (hence the need for FOF A), which is patently not 
correct. [email from financial adviser, August 2012] 
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[318] How many ' Storms ' are there out there? How many one-size-fits-all practices exist? In my 
experience, these practices are the exception, not the rule. [Managing Director, Professional 
Investment Services, public hearing [7] , p.111] 
Of course, this provides quite a contrast with the views of impacted investors, and re-
engaging those specific investors is no small challenge. An adviser from Cairns describes 
her own experience of dealing with Storm investors after the collapse. 
[319] I guess I am part of what is the collateral damage of Storm-that is, I am actually a 
financial planner. I have heard what a lot of these people have had to say today and my 
heart goes out to them. Not only that, a lot of planners in Cairns have been supporting a lot 
of ex-Storm clients .. . I know there are some financial planners who had a lot of very 
difficult and tragic cases .. . Of the clients that I am dealing with at the moment, some of 
them are what I would call ' rescueable'. We are doing a lot of work to try to get them back 
on the track, but I do not think I will ever get-well , hopefully, I will have their trust, but I 
suspect it is going to take a very, very long time to do that. [public hearing [4], p.93] 
The encouragement for the industry is that there are Storm investors who will re-engage 
with the industry, albeit tentatively at first. In other words, although many investors on the 
other side of a collapse like Storm will not work with an adviser again, this is not a 
universal outcome. 
[320] I would be very careful. I mean there are very few that I would trust because I think that the 
education for people in the financial advice area is still not good enough and I think I could 
sit for the FPA or whatever it is and pass without any swatting. It ' s too easy and I think 
that that needs to be tightened up but no, I think there ' s a place for it. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
A question naturally of interest then is what determines who does and doesn' t trust a re-
engagement with the industry. Two interviewees have actually done so, one due to a strong 
relationship with the local adviser, and the other one because they are now more assured 
and comfortable with their own sense and knowledge of risk tolerance - and clearly are 
fortunate enough to have the means to begin re-investing again. 
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[321 ] I am actually back with (our local adviser) because (they ' re) a very good sounding board 
for me ifl have issues. [interview with Storm investor] 
[322] My partner and I have invested in a small investment loan which is on a margin basis so 
that bank .. . is working with us on that and they were really good in that they sat with us 
and spoke about where we were comfortable with our loan sitting and I was very adamant 
that it would never get above that half point. That whatever I owe, I have double that of my 
own money. So that whatever is sold down, I still have capital left ... So they ' ve been really 
good in setting that up for us and they communicate a lot with us, so it's been really good. I 
did it through my tax accountant who also oversees a financial planner, so I 'm very 
carefully - much more careful with - and more involved in the whole process. [interview 
with Storm investor] 
6.4.4.6 Trust in the banks 
It seems that disenchantment, anger and a variety of very strongly held perceptions of the 
banks represents the epitome of Storm's collapse. In fact, 127 out of 168 public 
submissions by Storm investors referred detrimentally about the role of banks and credit 
providers - remarkably, this is more than the 118 submissions that were adverse towards 
Stonn. And it is not just a Storm issue either - 45 of the 74 submissions from investors 
other than Storm similarly spoke against their experience or perception of banks and credit 
providers, more than the 40 who had criticisms of advisers. 
The most relevant impact of this is a severe loss of trust in what should otherwise be a 
cornerstone institution in one's financial affairs. Much of this loss of trust in the case of 
Stonn is attributable to the discussion in sections 6.4.4.1 , 6.4.4.2 and 6.4.4.3 , but also of 
just as much importance are events that have occurred since then. A detailed discussion of 
the actual events is spurious to our research goals, but the briefest of overviews is offered in 
order to add further context. 
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6.4.4.6.1 Putting it right 
In section 6.4.4.1.2 the acknowledgement of some bank(s) that they have made mistakes in 
some aspects relating to Storm was a precursor to providing individualised assistance, or 
larger scale resolution scheme(s) under certain conditions for applicable investors. Such 
efforts to "put it right"314 have no doubt been met with a variety of responses: relief, 
grudging acceptance, or a further sense of injustice at what has transpired. 
As discussed in chapter 3, the CBA resolution scheme in particular has had a varied 
reception. Of significance was its use as a flagship for the bank' s stated concern for its 
customers and the emphasis placed on it in public fora. Indeed, statements concerning the 
resolution/remediation scheme were made on 29 occasions by senior CBA executives over 
the two public hearings [7] and [9]315 , and 14 of these concerned the utility of the scheme in 
addressing a particular issue or concern316 . 
We consider two major elements of post-collapse actions as relevant to the issue of trust. 
The first concerns the service received by investors, and the second relates to the overall 
perception of care. 
6.4.4.6.2 Service and care really counts 
Most people can recall when they have received poor service from others, and perhaps even 
recall when they have received good service as well. The service that sits in investors' 
minds, at least to the extent that some have revealed in publicly or in interviews, concerns a 
consolidation of frustration and distrust through poor service. 
3 14 For a convenient citation of a convenient expression, these were the words of the CBA CEO in relation to 
Storm investors (public hearing [9], p.24). 
3 15 Including the exchange we labeled ' evasive ' in excerpt [274]. 316 Many inferences are possible from such repetition, and we draw two: one, that investors would be relying 
on the timeliness, comprehensiveness and fairness of the scheme to assist their own recovery, and this 
inference certainly seems to be the intent of the bank in giving it such precedence at a Parliamentary Inquiry; 
and two, some investors might feel frustrated from such an Inquiry whereby they do not get answers to 
genuine points of concern that they had. These points are discussed in more detail shortly. 
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For those investors who have been financially and emotionally capable of dealing with their 
credit provider(s) again, frustrations with service have primarily arisen when trying to find 
out further infonnation or settle some outstanding affairs. Pa11icularly galling is that the 
losses suffered meant that the onus was on the investor to be pro-active in chasing up things 
(whether it be some positive bank account somewhere amongst the carnage, or important 
paperwork, and so on), despite perceiving that they had little control in being in the position 
that they now find themselves. 
[323] We had this money with (the margin lender) and it was supposed to be transferred over to 
the (bank) ... into a cash account and we were given no information. We didn 't know where 
it was. We rang (the bank); they had nothing. I ended up ringing (the margin lender) . I think 
I was on the phone eight hours one day just ringing different people until we actually finally 
tracked the money down. [interview with Storm investor] 
[324] Wife: With (the bank), I couldn't get to talk to anybody and that was the really, really 
frustrating part. 
Husband: They acted dumb. 
Wife: Yeah, nobody knew anything about it, you know. 
Husband: Sto1111? You ' ve had Storm damage have you , you know? [interview with Storm 
investor] 
This couple above had extended issues in dealing with their bank31 7. As well as the 
difficulty in getting in contact with the right people to talk to , when that did occur, the 
resulting conespondence did not help the investor's state of mind. 
[325] Wife: We suddenly then hear from (the complaints division of the bank) . She had just found 
our letter. .. she rang ... I had a long conversation with her and she ended up - oh , horrible 
(person) , ended up saying - what did she say to me? Something about, "You sound like a 
very intelligent person . How come you got caught up in something like Storm ?' ' Can you 
317 This couple showed us the documentation of at least 21 extended phone ca ll s over a 10 week period , with 
one series of phone call s in one day in Apri l 2009 invo lving conversations with 9 different bank officers and 
ringing 5 different phone numbers. The end result was ringing the complaints division and being told that the 
bank officer ·'would look into my complaint and ring me back. She didn ' t'·. Another ca ll was made 4 days 
later and an assurance g iven that the investor would be rung bank - she wasn ' t. Nine days later, the investor 
rang again and the bank offi cer could not find any record of previous phone call s despite there being at least 
20 phone call s over th e previous 10 weeks. Needless to say, " these exchan ges .. . . caused imm easurable 
di stress··. 
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imagine? This is the complaints resolution .. . and I said, "Well , the bank supported 
them." ... then she emailed me about something and I emailed back something about I 
found it very hard the fact that you didn ' t get the letter and then I got a nasty email back 
saying how dare I insinuate that you didn't believe her, that she didn ' t get the letter. She 
was just horrible to deal with, really horrible. [interview with Storm investor] 
As such, the reaction of the husband regarding such exchanges and treatment was succinct: 
"it makes my blood boil" . Such difficulties with post-collapse service from credit 
provider(s) accentuate the already-strong perception that ultimately, a customer is merely 
an economic agent, rather than a real person with real needs. This is a part of the overall 
experience which has been particularly hurtful. 
[326] The way we were treated by the (bank); that's where our house was loaned, was absolutely 
appalling. They would not even talk to us. I said to them, you know, "What's going to 
happen? Where do we stand? Are we going to lose our house?" They said, "Well , if you 
don ' t pay your margin money, you' ll lose your house" and I said you know, "Where are we 
going to live?" Couldn ' t give as---, was the reply. [interview with Storm investor] 318 
[327] It all relates down to money and they don ' t care about us . We ' re not people to them; we're 
just names on a piece of paper. Well, that 's how they 've made us feel the last three years . 
We're just numbers and that's really hard too when you've always tried to be good to 
people and do the right thing by strangers and people and all of sudden to be treated like 
scumbags, that was really hard ... we 've always done the right thing. We 've always been on 
time with our repayments and you know, to all of a sudden have 20 years banking with 
(them) and all of a sudden, just to be thrown out with the garbage, it was like we don ' t 
understand and it was awful. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.4.6.3 Hang on a minute 
Investors also commented on what they perceived as a damaging irony in what has 
unfolded with respect to the credit provider(s). In October 2008 the Australian Government 
318 This investor also stated that "I still don ' t know whether (Storm) is to blame or whether the banks are to 
blame" for the overall collapse. This highlights that for this investor, the post-collapse treatment is a 
significant influence on current perceptions of the bank, not necessarily the allocation of responsibility for 
previous actions. 
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Guarantee Scheme for Large Deposits and Wholesale Funding was announced, and this 
scheme fonnally commenced on 28 November 2008319 . With the goal to promote stability 
in the financial system as much as possible, this gave a protective element for the majority 
of the recipient banks ' liabilities320 . The fact that some of the major participating banks in 
Storm then had this guarantee, but then also played a part in its demise, was not lost on 
many investors. For example, ex-Stonn advisers and directors picked up on this in public 
hearing [6] , and others noted it in submissions. 
[328] When times got tough for the banks, the Commonwealth Government gave their full 
support to the banks by guaranteeing deposits. When times got tough for Storm, the banks 
withdraw their support. [public submission 296 from Storm Investor] 
[329] Our Banks - including the Commonwealth Bank of Australia have been supported by our 
Government with Deposit Guarantees. This backing comes from taxpayer ' s fund s - our 
taxes . So on one hand we are supporting the banks with our taxes while they act recklessl y 
and wipe out the life savings of thousands. [public submission 211 from Storm Investor] 
SICAG members in particular voiced their frustration and dissatisfaction with this twist in 
the credit provider(s)'role in Storm's affairs. 
[330] The Australian Government can and did rush to the aid of "The Four Pillars" during the 
latter part of last year by guaranteeing funds and borrowings to ensure a fundamentall y 
strong banking system. At the same time those very same banks failed dismally to accord 
the same latitude to the "mum and dad" Australians who guaranteed the banks' securi ty! 
[public submiss ion 276, from SICAG] 
[331] T he major banks are aptly known as the ' four pillars' because they underpin our nation 's 
economy. This was made clear earlier this year when our Prime Mini ster and Treasurer 
used taxpayers· money to shore up the banks during the worst of the credit cri s is. We 
ordinary Australian taxpayers stood by the banks during their hour of need. Surely it was 
' 19 
-' See http ://v.n.vv.1.guaranteescheme.gov.au . 
3
"
0 Hogan (2009) offers a c ritique of the scheme, questioning in parti cul ar potentia l hazards arising from such 
segmentati on of the market. P JCI member Senator Wil liams also commented on the associated issue/i mpact 
of competit ion in public hearing [8]. p.53. 
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not unreasonable to expect that the banks would do likewise in our hour of need. [Mr Noel 
O'Brien, SICAG Co-Chairman, public hearing [6], p.89] 
[332] We fervently trust that the all-powerful banking industry might come to understand the 
power that they exert in society and that that must be matched by commensurate 
responsibility to behave with a conscience and a duty of care towards those to whom they 
owe their existence in this society. Ironically, these are the same ordinary Australians 
whose taxes were used to protect the banks against the icy winds generated by the current 
global financial crisis. [Mr Mark Weir, SICAG Co-Chairman, public hearing [6], p.70] 
6.4.4.6.4 Overall perception and depth of feeling 
The strength of feeling is such that for many, the collapse of Storm is significantly about 
the role of the banking sector, more so than Storm itself321 . Again, this perception is not just 
due to events of the collapse itself, but also the treatment and actions since then. 
[333] You know, this isn't about some ... bloody financial company falling over, this is much, 
much filthier than that. Yeah, he' s a_, he made a mistake, he got can-ied away and he 
was probably a liar and a cheat and not a very nice person . That' s nothing compared with 
what's been happening to us since. Nothing, you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
This is evident from a number of publicly available data sources, of which one in particular 
is given below. 
[334] What I find the most disturbing about this whole situation is the complete contempt the 
banks seem to hold for their clients. Firstly, . .. to completely deny all responsibility for the 
situation clients find themselves in. Secondly, to only admit liability in the face of 
overwhelming evidence, as per the ongoing investigations ... Thirdly, having admitted to 
being partially responsible for client ' s situations, instead of trying to help rectify the 
problems it in itself caused, the (bank) used its position and client's desperate financial 
situations to stealthily encourage clients into signing away their legal rights by signing 
321 Indeed, "the ramifications of the Storm Financial collapse have been significant and have moved from 
concerns about the conduct of the firm itself to wider issues involving the financial planning industry as a 
whole and the role of the banking sector" (Washington 2011). 
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deeds of arrangements containing the very minimum amount of financial compensation 
possible. All of thi s under the guise of assistance with "financial hardship for clients of SF". 
I find this totally repugnant and wicked to the core. This may be legal but it is most 
certainly not ethical. [public submission 165 from Stonn investor] 
Indeed, where investors have perceived adverse responses from institutions following their 
own financial losses, a severe distrust in those institutions results322 . Such responses serve 
to leverage any feelings of ill-will , particularly where a degree of fault and a lack of care is 
perceived by the aggrieved party. Various investors made such perceptions abundantly 
clear, with these perceptions strongly exacerbated by post-loss responses: 
[335] I just cannot see why people in executive high positions of great corporations should get 
away with blatant lies to and deception of ordinary people. ASIC has started moving along, 
we have got SICAG involved and everyone is united . But we were stomped on at the 
beginning and told to forget about it. That is where it would have stayed if this had not 
occurred. [Storm investor, public hearing [6], p .62] 
[336] It would be nice to think that large institutions could remember that the names on the 
documents belong to real people and start showing some duty of care to the people they 
deal with. [public submission 230 from Storm Investor] 
The result of all this is certainly not a favourable one for any party involved, and can be 
summed up as a significant, pennanent and strongly felt distrust of the banking sector. We 
give a selection of excerpts below, from different sources, to convey the breadth and depth 
of the results of such perceptions. 
[337] I will NEVER trust banks or financial advisors EVER again. [public submission 165 from 
Stonn investor] 
[338] As a resu lt of the Stom1 Financial experience and the conduct of the banks, it can be safely 
said that all SICAG members now harbour a lasting di strust of the banking system, the 
322 This is significant given the observations of Bums (20 11 ), whereby customer loyalty is conso lidated and 
even enhanced by businesses addressing and fi x ing mi stakes, ra ther than never making mi stakes . 
- 303 -
investment advisory and financial planning industries. [public submission 276 from 
SICAG] 
[339] I naively trusted Storm and the banks to look after me. When the share market got the 
staggers late last year and the global financial crisis hit this country I was wrong and I am 
now paying dearly for my misplaced faith .... However I can say here categorically today 
that nothing will ever restore my faith in the Australian banking industry. [Co-Chairman of 
SICAG, public hearing [6] , p.88] 
[340] Husband: Well, there ' s a residual affect for us. You give us all our money back now, I can 
tell you one of the big problems we ' re going to have is what do we do with it? 
Wife: Who do you trust? 
Husband: l mean I wouldn ' t put it anywhere near a bank again .. . (the banks) may have a 
legitimate business and they may be overall somewhat honest, but their dealings with the 
pensioners and the elderly particularly in this matter and the handicapped or disabled, has 
been an absolutely appalling disgrace. [interview with Storm investor] 
[341] I've always banked (with them) since I was five years old and I've sort of stuck with them 
only because it's convenient. I don ' t trust them and they want you to go into al I these 
schemes; no, I won ' t... I do not trust any bank anymore. [ interview with Storm investor] 
6. 4. 4. 7 Trust in lawyers 
There was little in the way of adverse commentary towards lawyers in the PJCI public 
submissions made by Storm investors. In fact, at that stage of proceedings, there was much 
hope that actions involving lawyers, in particular pending resolution scheme(s)323 , would 
soon deliver some appropriate restitution for investors. 
[342] As we explained earlier, it will be (the lawyers) that will help us get to the bottom of the 
sordid acts of the (credit providers) and their partner Storm Financial - we just don ' t have 
the smarts to work it all out. [public submission 306 from Storm Investor] 
323 As noted earlier, much emphasis was placed on resolution schemes by the CBA in particular. However we 
note that not all comments that follow related specifically to one course of action, and we endeavour to keep 
the details as general as possible so as to emphasise the impact of distrust and disappointment, rather than the 
specific details for those reactions. 
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But for many investors, as suggested in the overview of Storn1 ' s collapse in chapter 3, their 
views seem to have changed in the course of time. In fact, the role played by lawyers in the 
afte1math of Storm's collapse was commented on in 10 interviews, and generally in 
adverse tenns. Most commentary was very critical , some was slightly more guarded , and 
some was more resigned. The two main aspects discussed in interviews concerned the 
process involved in seeking 'resolution ', and also the outcomes received. 
6.4.4.7.I Process 
Some early concerns about resolution schemes were raised by SICAG members in public 
hearing [6] (p.80), mainly in tenns of the process being used. For those interviewed, these 
early concerns grew into much greater concerns later on, with the benefit of time to reflect 
on actions taken. The views of five different interviewees illustrate this point. 
[343] I wouldn't have trusted (the lawyers) as much . I just felt that I had too much faith in what 
they were doing, however at the time there was no other option available... I just don ' t 
think they would stand up in a court of law given the duress people were under, the lack of 
independent advice they received. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[344] (These lawyers were) very much getting a clear run on it and that was a source of 
frustration to me. [interview with Storm investor] 
[345] As far as (the lawyers), I think they 've sold out to the banks to a certain degree given they 
haven ' t pushed hard enough for some of the outcomes. [interview with ex-Stonn adviser] 
[346] Investor: I didn't feel they were acting in our best interest. At first I did , but after a while I 
realised no. 
Interviewer: What changed your mind there or your perspective there? 
Investor: They gave up too quick. They collapsed and became - at first it was like, yeah, 
we ' ll support yo u, we'll get yo u what you dese rve, blah, blah , blah , and then they just caved 
in real quick and I' m thinking - I' ve become very suspicious then ; whose side are you 
really on? [interview with Stonn investor] 
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[347] Investor: (The lawyers are) being paid by the banks to solve a problem that the banks have 
on behalf of the Plaintiffs. I' m sorry that doesn 't compute. [interview with Storm investor] 
One further interviewee, who accepted a settlement through a resolution scheme and does 
not necessarily (though not completely) regret that choice, nevertheless was more guarded 
in his assessment of the overall process 
[348] Overall I'm not as critical of (the lawyers) as a lot of people are . I mean there are lots of 
things that I thought were wrong particularly in the early stages; every time (one lawyer) 
opened his mouth he would be talking about that bad Emmanuel Cassimatis and that 
naughty Storm. In my view, the first words out his mouth every time, particularly when 
you're speaking to the media, it should have been about the naughty banks .. . not about 
Storm. What's the point? Storm is gone. Storm is dead. Made dead by the banks. There ' s 
not a cracker to be got out of Storm. The only way we ' re going to get any money out of 
this, is through the banks and they are the ones who were finally in the line to be culpable .. . 
he ' s also working for a bunch of people who have been devastated and he should have been 
thinking, in my view, more of them than he was thinking of the banks and if that wasn ' t 
going to work, well barrel out of it and run a class action. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.4.7.2 Outcomes 
Another interviewee (not cited in section 6.4.4.7.1 above) who accepted an offer through a 
resolution scheme was somewhat resigned in their own outcome. Yet, in recognising the 
benefit of having some compensation, they nevertheless considered that the circumstances 
they were in were not ideal to be making big decisions about acceptance or otherwise of 
any offers. 
[349] Investor: (The resolution scheme) did get us some recompense, I guess, a small amount .. . I 
guess it was better than nothing and even though it was done, you almost felt forced to - I 
mean I'm not blaming (the lawyers) for that; that was do that or don ' t but we don ' t care 
which it is. You know, sign that or don 't. 
Interviewer: So how do you make a decision on that then? How did you make a decision at 
the time? 
Investor: Well, it's better than nothing. [interview with Storm investor] 
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Others are far more critical of the overall outcomes for investors . 
[350] I'm in touch with a lot of people who have signed off on those ( lega l settlement) schemes. I 
haven ' t yet met one that 's satisfied. I' m not saying there aren ' t some that aren ' t satisfied, 
but I personally haven ' t met one that genuine ly said , "This is a good deal for me. I' m going 
to accept it and get on with my life ." [interview with ex-Stonn adviser] 
We observe further that from attending the public meeting of Stonn investors with lawyer 
Stewart Levitt in Townsville in October 2011, that there were a number of questions 
regarding previous settlement(s) accepted through other schemes. The feeling of frustration 
with those outcomes was obvious. 
Yet another interviewee voiced a more general and implied critique of their experience with 
legal niceties involved in the post-collapse dealings with banks. His actions to seek some 
relatively minor recompense on an associated matter was not for the financial aspect, but as 
a way to assure himself he had some control by exercising a matter of principle in relation 
to what he and his wife were going through. The trivialness of the response did not reflect 
well in his subsequent regard for the legal professionals involved. 
[351] Husband: I thought I' d maybe send (the bank) a bill for $2,000 ... to the headman , the CEO, 
what's his name there? I can't remember . .. I sent him a personal letter saying you owe me 
$2,000 because this money that went missing, by the time they put it into the bank ... 
Wife: That ' s what it would have made. 
Husband: At 9 point whatever (percent) they give me money, I said at the same rate of 
interest that you charge me, I' m charging you for the time you held that money. ln this 
modem age with computers, you should have been able to do it with the press of a button . 
Anyway, I got a letter from the (lawyer) man saying, "Oh, we can get it for you . But once 
we get it for yo u, you' ll never be able to sue them again ." So I said , " We ll stick it up your 
a---. " It ' s not go ing to make me or break me, $2,000, but it was the principle of the th ing, 
you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
What this all leads to for many is the unfo1iunate outcome that again, a lack of trust in 
another aspect of professional services that is foundational for modem life. This was further 
attested by the expe1ience of two more investors, both of whom had engaged directly with 
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their bank(s), and then also had legal representation (whether through formal resolution 
mechanisms or other means) at some stage in the process324. The first investor was still 
dependent on this legal representation at the time of the interview. 
[352] Husband: Another one we found out you don 't trust. 
Wife: So we talked about it, didn' t we? And this was another wrong move. I thought here I 
am ... 
Husband: And I thought, you put it in the hands of some experts who surely are on our side, 
they put themselves forward as being. 
Wife: ... but looking back on it, I' d come all that way on my own. I think I'd have been 
better to have kept going- we'd have been better to keep going on our own. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
The second investor to have engaged with their bank by themselves differed to the one 
above in that they ended up doing the majority of the engagement by themselves, through 
to the point of a resolution. Similarly to the views on financial advisers, the whole process 
left them wondering as to the point of engaging with professionals in the first place. 
[353) And by that stage, yeah we were happy because we had our house back by that stage, 
because before all that and over the six or eight months, I had been negotiating with the 
bank myself... so I was negotiating with them and telling them lies and anyway, yes, finally 
we signed off. .. but the solicitors didn 't give a stuff. They were getting their money and 
that 's all they cared about, you know? So no one cares about people really, they just want 
the money. [interview with Storm investor] 
6. 4. 4. 8 Government 
Given the significance of financial losses suffered under Storm and the strong resulting 
emotional response, we might expect also the perception of any other involved parties to be 
similarly strong as well - and this includes that of the government. However, perceptions of 
government do not arise solely from impressions of elected representatives, but from a 
range of other sources as well. Of relevance here are those things associated with the 
324 Neither of these investor 's views were previously presented amongst excerpts [343] to [351 ]. 
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functionality of government which includes the general regulatory setting, the role and 
action of regulators , and also the service and effectiveness of other agencies such as 
Centrelink. Perceptions of central government also arise from any political interest and 
comment on Stonn ' s collapse, as well as the process and outcomes of the P JCI. 
All of these areas lead an individual to fonn an impression of 'government' , and with such 
multiple influences involved in shaping own views, different people can have quite 
different experiences and as such, quite different perceptions as well. This section considers 
the views of government in an overall sense, by sequentially considering the various anns 
of government involved in investors ' lives in the afternrnth of Storm. This leads to the 
overall key perception that fonns as a result tin the minds of individuals - does government 
care about them, and their fortunes? 
6.4.4.8.1 The ASIC factor 
It was seen in section 6.3.5.3 that having an ASIC-approved license gave a degree of 
assurance and comfort to investors when considering Storm's strategy. The shortcomings 
of placing inappropriate trust in a financial strategy as a result of this , in the context of the 
Australian regulatory framework, was highlighted in public submissions. 
[354] It is a requirement that product disclosure statements be lodged with (ASIC) . Often many 
consumers assume, inco1Tectly, that thi s means ... the investment and the organisation has 
been vetted by ASIC. [public submission 404 from National Inforn1ation Centre on 
Retirement Investments Inc] 
[355] I believe that the maj ority of consumers would be under the, sadly mi staken, impress ion 
that an ASIC license is a sea l of approva l that a business is reputable and safe to deal with. 
[public submission 197 from Opes Investor] 
[356] A li cence is not an endorsement by ASIC of a li censee ' s business mode l, its quality of 
service, or of the products sold or services offered by the licensee. [public submiss ion 388 
from The Treasury] 
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[357] We thought the regulators would be aware of the kind of advice that Storm were applying 
to their clients. We were too trusting, it seems. [public hearing [4] , p.55] 
As such, a degree of frustration and bemusement is shared amongst Storm investors as to 
what ASIC actually can and cannot do, and what is actually does in the market. Such 
frustration resides across several areas of where investors believed ASIC had, and has a 
role: licencing, leading to a knowledge and therefore implicit approval of a business model; 
ongoing surveillance of financial entities; the possibility of market intervention for the 
purposes of consumer protection; and post-event responses. Indeed, 3 7 of the 168 
submissions by Storm investors spoke to some aspect of ASIC which they felt was 
inadequate (whether perceived or real). It is obviously a feature of regulatory bodies that 
they take the brunt of some angst in and across the market325 : 29 out of 74 submissions 
from non-Storm investors, 11 out of 43 submissions from financial planners, and 20 other 
public submissions spoke of various perceived shortcomings as well. 
Several interviewees and additional correspondence attested to this range of frustrations , 
mainly emphasising the perceived inadequacy of a regulatory body (and system) which 
does not take action when in hindsight, investors believed that it could and should have. 
[35 8] ASIC, it was only about three or four months, they'd com~ up and done an audit on Storm 
and gave them a clean bill of health. They were asleep at the wheel too. You know, they 
were driving there with the handbrake half on and half off and they gave them a clean bill 
of health. [interview with Storm investor] 
[359] Where is a body that you can really go to, an objective body that you need? And ASIC 
really is a toothless tiger, really. It is viewed that way. [interview with Storm investor] 
[360] I think the whole thing has given everybody a wakeup call and we need better - we need a 
better body than ASIC. ASIC doesn ' t have any teeth of it. [interview with Storm investor] 
325 As highlighted by one financial planner: " It is not my intention to damn ASIC with faint praise but . .. 
ASIC are caught too often between; acting in a way that can be described as "too vigilant" and accused of 
stifling competition in economic boom times, (and) acting in a way that can be described as "not vigilant 
enough" and accused of not protecting the consumer when products or markets provide unexpected or even 
unfavourable outcomes when the economic boom times are over" (public submission 168 from Financial 
Planner) . 
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[361] believe that ASIC didn ' t monitor this investment scheme as they should have either. 
mean obviously they had to - reports had to be submitted or they had to seek reports every 
so often and obviously they were just accepting as it is, instead of - you know, now they 
can see that there was a problem and they ' re investigating everything. Well , I think it 
should have been - I think they should have been on the ball earlier. [interview with Stom1 
investor] 
[362] I think they ' re a toothless watchdog and I think they 've done not enough to protect those 
consumers. I think governments are full of hot air. Sorry, I know you work in the capita l of 
hot air. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 326 
[363] Losing my home of 37 years . .. I was lucky a former (colleague) put me up living in his 
garage for 9 month; as they didn't have a room inside the house, using an old outside dunny. 
It was impossible to get rental as I had almost no income and no credit records as I had 
never had cash flow problems, not even to buy a car. I am currently on a pension and living 
in a Public Housing apartment, relying on ASIC (again , I mean where was ASIC - the 
watchdog - before it all happened!) [ email from Stonn investor, August 2012] 
Another investor highlighted the connection in their view between the perceived trust in 
licensing arrangements, and the implication that this trust extrapolated to govenunent as a 
whole. 
[364] They are the regulators. They gave Storm Financial a licence to offer financial advice. They 
gave Stom1 Financial the Australian Government stamp of approval. We were in fact let 
down by the Australian Government in this case. [public submission 220 from Stonn 
Investor] 
ASIC provided clarification of its role and actions in public fora. These clarifications, also 
serving as a defence of various claims made that are summarised by the above excerpts, 
centred firstly around the role of the licensing regime in place. 
326 To take a further point from thi s pa11icular comment (o ther th an the obv ious ' touche '); it does confi rm our 
suggestion that · government" is a broad tem1 whose influence and projection of worth occurs in many form s. 
In thi s case, AS IC is directl y related to ·government ' . 
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[365] All that licensing does is to set the minimum requirements which must be met. At the end 
of the day, under our system the boards and management have to run these things and make 
money for their investors. [ASIC Chairman, public hearing [8], p.25] 
[366] The role of the licensing regime is not necessarily well understood by retail investors. There 
may be a perception amongst some retail investors that an Australian financial service 
license means that the service provider has been approved by ASIC or that the license is in 
some way an endorsement of quality. [Senior Executive Specialist, Strategic Policy, ASIC, 
public hearing [1], p.7] 
[367] The license ... is really an entry point, a registration licensing point so that you know the 
people are there and that they have met the minimum standards that the Corporations Act 
requires. That is as far as it goes. [ASIC Chairman, public hearing [1], p.8] 
Secondly, in terms of whether ASIC 'approves' business models: 
[368] Consistent with the economic philosophy underlying the FSR regime, ASIC does not take 
action on the basis of commercially flawed business models. [public submission 378 from 
ASIC] 
[369] ASIC is an oversight and enforcement body in the conduct and disclosure regime. It is not 
supposed to intervene in the operation of the market. It is not there to prevent business 
failure or loss to retail investors. It cannot and does not take action merely on the basis of a 
flawed business model. A flawed business model has been characteristic of a lot of the 
business failures recently. Responsibility for flawed business models lies with management 
and the board of a company. [ASIC Chief Economist, public hearing [1], p.5] 
And thirdly, in response to its ongoing surveillance activities and intervention: 
[370] ASIC believes it responded appropriately to the concerns raised and surveillances 
undertaken in relation to Storm. ASIC has considered these concerns and surveillances in 
the context of market events in 2008 and changes in equity value experienced by the Storm 
investors. Overall, ASIC confirms its belief that there was no evidence on which ASIC 
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could have and should have taken action to close down Stom1. [public submission 378 from 
ASIC] 321 
[3 71] The barriers to entry on licensing are quite low, so the ability to take people out of the 
market and revoke licenses is quite limited. [ASIC Chainnan, public hearing [l] , p.7] 
Nevertheless, alternative perceptions exist that some elements of ASIC ' s oversight could be 
different. A concluding excerpt showcases this view. 
[372] The law is pretty clear, and we would argue that ASIC needs to be more pre-emptive. We 
are not simply here to criticise ASIC . There are many people who may well have missed 
the opportunity to proceed in the last couple of years on enforcement matters. We are very 
strongly of the view that ASIC has the ability to proceed to exercise its powers under this 
section of the act, and we would encourage ASIC to do so. [CEO, Investment and Financial 
Services Association Ltd , public hearing [3], pp.51 -52] 
6.4.4.8.2 Regulatory environment 
There was little attention given to the general regulatory enviromnent in interviews, and 
also in publicly available data there is relatively minor mention of this by Storm investors. 
Just 13 of the 168 submissions from Stonn investors raise it as a point of concern or failure, 
whereas nearly 25% (15 out of 64) of submissions from financial planners and financial 
services organisations / institutes / associations do make some (adverse) comment. This is 
not unsurprising, as the attention of investors in tenns of any governmental perception 
would be more focused on what they see as tangible to them - ASIC, Centrelink and the 
PJCI. 
Other than extended (and impo1iant) commentary around remuneration and responsibilities 
of advisers , the commentary around the regulatory enviromnent of interest to our research 
questions is generally focused on the issue of fonn versus substance. This issue was hinted 
m One financial planner hi ghlighted to th e PJCI so me support for ASIC 's fidelity in surveillance operations: 
·· J can assure the Committee that ASIC does not treat thi s process with scant regard. Indeed the phrase ·'nit 
picking·· cou ld be app li ed with much justification. If Storm Financial Planning was in some way not meeting 
its legal obligations I am very comfortable to ass ume ASIC would have found it'· (public submi ss ion I 68 
from Financial Planner) . 
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at in the previous discussion about ASIC. In particular, the perceived predominance of form 
over substance in the current regulatory settings is described by various financial planners. 
[373] Storm Financial also seems to be a an excellent example of a key problem in our regulatory 
system - the focus on FORM instead of SUBSTANCE. From what we have heard, Storm 
Financial produced large Statements of Advice which had the required FORM of a 
Statement of Advice - but it seems like it was poor advice. The FORM of the advice 
obviously did not protect the consumers. Therefore the regulatory focus was on the wrong 
issue. Clearly the regulatory focus needs to be shifted to the quality of the advice. The 
excess focus on FORM has added cost to consumers and largely has provided no consumer 
benefit. Worse still, the focus on FORM rather than SUBSTANCE has allowed many to 
create the appearance of quality where in fact there was none. So the focus on FORM 
actually contributes to the consumer being misled and deceived. [public submission 154 
from Financial Planner] 
[374] Advisers believe that ASIC will hit the "little man" the adviser who errs by failing to 
provide documents in an order or in a time frame rather than to consider the actual advice 
given and how it is appropriate. The regulatory system seems to concentrate on the 
'correctness' of how the advice is delivered rather than on the appropriateness of the advice. 
It seems to me that problems arise when the advice given is inappropriate. The North 
Queensland cases would not have happened if there was more scrutiny by the regulator 
about the advice itself, about how the advice satisfied the needs of the customer, about 
whether the level of borrowings being reported were appropriate and necessary to achieve a 
stated objective of the customer, rather than about the compliance to a process. [public 
submission 135 from financial planner] 
Other public data gives similar critiques, including a discussion with CPA officials328 , and 
an individual investor who did not invest with Storm who highlighted that "prevention and 
deterrence is not an option under the current regulatory regime"329. Further feedback also 
stated concerns with this aspect of the current regulatory regime. 
[375] ASIC with many of their activities of recent times have chased the technicality of 
compliance rather than quality of advice... ASIC even stated that they had done recent 
328 Certified Practising Accountant (CPA) discussion with PJCI members, public hearing [2] , pp.60-71. 329 Public submission [265]. 
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audits of Stonn because they were concerned about their practices but did nothing because 
they were compliant (big deal). (email from financial adviser, April 2013) 
6.4.4.8 .3 The PJCI 
For those interviewees that had followed the PJCI, there was a general feeling that whilst 
it provide some benefit as a forum for various people to be heard (whether in person or via 
a submission), it was not likely to provide tangible and beneficial changes overall to 
individuals or in a regulatory sense330 . In particular, where interviewees initially saw the 
PJCI as a means for some degree of personal restitution, their views were naturally in a 
negative light and goes some way to explaining overall perceptions. This was particularly 
so where investors considered that the role of credit provider(s) should have been subject to 
.c · 33 1 1ar more scrutmy . 
(376] I thought that nobody asked the right questions . . . there was one stage where they let the 
banks off very lightly ... I did think that they did go easy on the banks . .. (it achieved) 
nothing of value for the victims of this financial disaster. [interview with Stonn investor] 
(377] Ah (the PJCI), it 's a lot of rubbish. Waste of time. Too late for us. [interview with Stonn 
investor] 
Some investors begrudgingly accepted that some effort had been made, but at the end of the 
day, this may or may not help overall. As such, views were mixed on its utility in forming a 
better advice industry. 
[378] But I didn ' t think it achieved very much at all , frankl y. I mean I think that in tenn s of some 
of the legislative requirements in relation to the responsibilities clearly being defined 
' ·
10 Surprisingly given their experience wi th S torn1 , very few even commented on the commi ss ion and 
fiduciary duty aspec ts o f the PJ C l" s recommendations. Thi s is parti a ll y exp lained by a rea li zat ion th at the 
P JCI was not a fo rum to prov ide recompense and therefore a lack of interes t soon resulted ; a lack of interes t 
and unders tanding of the nuances of the industry regardless of the P JCI: a perception that any changes by 
·governm ent" wou ldn 't work anyway: and th e allocation of energy into gettin g on w ith li fe in some way. 
' ·
11 The PJC r s additi ona l and 10th tern, of reference, to •' investigate the invo lvement of the banking and 
finance industry in providi ng finance for investors' · (see Append ix A). was introduced 3 weeks after the initial 
tern1s of reference were re leased . 
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again ... that sort of thing. I'm sure there are some legislative things out of that, that are 
going to protect a few people in the future. [interview with Storm investor] 
[379] What progress has it achieved? What's it achieved? Nothing has been achieved, has it? You 
know, he's made a - you know . .. changing the laws; a lot of good that's going to do. He's 
more or less made them hamstrung - the advisers - so I don't know. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[380] We throw out the baby with the bathwater and there are a lot of people in the financial 
services that feel they don't want to be in it now. [interview with Storm investor] 
[381] What they do is create - they create challenges for people in the financial industry to have 
to work around so that they can make the same money as they're making now and that's all 
they care about. [interview with Storm investor] 
In keeping with a building and in some cases pre-existing scepticism of governmental 
overview and efficiency, other views showed a resignation to and perception of 
bureaucratic process being the order of the day. 
[382] And you know, I would say it's a typical Government report that will gather dust and really 
will not make any significant difference, yeah. [interview w_ith ex-Storm adviser] 
[383] But as for this Parliamentary Inquiry that they already - the result was too quick for a start; 
it only went for a few months. You know, they got those submissions and had a - they did 
nothing. What have they done to stop this happening in future? Sweet bugger all, eh? 
[interview with Storm investor] 
[384] I saw a heap of jobs being created for mates because they're going to have a committee for 
this and a working group for that and another committee for this and I know that's the way 
politics works. [interview with Storm investor] 
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6.4.4.8.4 Centrelink 
Many investors needed to engage with Centrelink after Ston11 ' s collapse to firstly seek 
social security payments, and sometimes to access advice as we11 332 . This engagement was 
a significant issue for those interviewed, for two main reasons. Firstly, the seeking out of 
social security is clearly associated with having little control over one ' s situation, and this 
is particularly upsetting for those who have always sought to be self-reliant (and indeed , 
was a motivation for joining Storm). This issue is discussed further in section 6.4.5.1. 
A second reason is that investor's expenences with Centrelink reflect closely an 
individual ' s perception of the role of government in their lives. Indeed, their expectation 
and receipt of service from Centrelink further shapes further one 's perception of not just the 
role, but also the utility and worth of government. Not all interviewees had bad experiences 
with Centrelink, but as can be expected given their initial reactions and state of mind in 
seeking support, the prevalence of negative recollections tends to reign. 
One investor conveyed their frustration at how they were treated, and that this resolved 
them to not be in a position to engage again. 
[3 85] One of the worst experiences has just been recently ... I had been going on my savings and 
suddenly I realised I had so little. So I had to go to Centrelink ... and from that , I had to go 
to a job. I' 11 just get you the letter, actually. One letter. I can ' t believe they can treat people 
like this. The person I saw at Centrelink .. . he had a computer in front of him . He didn ' t 
really acknowledge me as a person ... he looked at the computer, he asked questions , I gave 
him the answer. Then he just said , "Oh, well that' s it" and I just got up and walked away. I 
thought, I' m not go ing to let that happen again. [interview with Storm investor] 
A second example showcases not only a dissatisfaction with communication regarding 
basic queries , but also how this implies another negative in their experience to trust the role 
of government. 
m 25% of AEC I SICAG survey respondents were relying on Centrelink benefits at the time of the survey. 
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[386] Husband: We can't get a pension and we're too old to get a job. So I' ve asked Centrelink, 
"What are you going to do about us?" and "Oh, we can ' t do anything." I said, "Well, how 
are we supposed to live?" 
Wife: They told me to go to get the vouchers from St Vincent de Paul or the Salvation 
Army. I don't like Centrelink ... they don't understand people. They don't understand ... 
Husband: ... And when we applied for the pension, we also attached a note to them asking 
them if there was any chance of employment because we know that they run seminars on 
investments and all that sort of thing; we asked them. We haven ' t even had an 
acknowledgement. 
Wife: No, and they don ' t acknowledge; Government officers. 
Husband: You just get ignored. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.4.8.5 Does government care? 
The previous sections lead to the most straightforward issue to emerge - the perception of 
whether government, as a whole, is really a concerned entity in the welfare of impacted 
individuals. And, despite the associations of ASIC, regulations, Centrelink and 
Parliamentary Inquiries with overall governmental responses and roles, the direct action or 
inaction of central government and elected representatives as individuals indeed has a big 
influence in overall perceptions of whether government has genuine concern or not. One 
investor could not contain their strong feelings about the matter. 
[387] For our politicians to have sat by quietly and pretend that nothing is happening is 
despicable. I'll never vote for a major political party ever again because I've asked for their 
help as an Australian citizen and got nothing. Not even a polite refusal. Nothing. [interview 
with Storm investor] 
This investor clarified and expanded on this point somewhat, voicing further incredulity at 
why government wouldn't be more concerned with such events. 
[388] Husband: I think quite clearly, there's a couple of things that really stand out, Aaron, and 
one is the deafening silence from Federal politicians on this matter. Absolutely deafening. 
Any politician who has made any comment, other than the (PJCI) of course, is (a 
Queensland politician), who clearly came out and compared us to a bunch of lotto ticket 
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buyers who didn ' t win and wanted the ir money back . Other than that , we got nothing from 
Federa l po liti c ians at a ll. There ' s 13,500 Australians have been di saffected ; 3,000 
Austra li ans by v irtue of the term that they are an investor ... so there ' s two of us; yo u' d 
have to think most of these people are couples at least, have had their life savings 
categorically wiped out , catastrophically wiped out. Their chi ldren will not get their 
inheritance. 
Wife: They 've had to turn around. 
Husband: The banks will get it. 
Wife: And get - rely on the Government, for Centrelink. 
Husband: They ' ve gone from se lf-funded retirees to ... 
Wife: Asking for a pension. 
Husband: Can J have some money and by the way, I don ' t have my health in surance 
anymore so I' m going to be rely ing on the hospital system and I can't afford to pay rent, so 
you ' 11 need some rent assistance as well. Not one Federal politician has turned around and 
gone, "F------ hang on, what's happened here?" Not one. [interview with Storm investor] 
Perhaps the best summary of the matter comes from an investor who appeared at public 
hearing [5]. His exchange with the PJCI summarises many aspects here: from receiving 
what he perceived as clear messages to become self-reliant he sought a way to do that; then 
for lots of reasons that option came crashing down; then the reality that as an individual he 
resides within a wider systemic, political and financial context is totally inelevant to him; 
then the perception is strong that the over-arching care of government is not there for him. 
It is not difficult to infer that hi s trust in government is gone - but more poignantly, it is not 
merel y an institution itself he mistrusts , but most likely, a weakening of trust in avenues of 
collective care (of which the ' government ' should represent the ultimate deliverer). Thi s, 
ironically, may well drive him and others even more to isolation and a belief that self-
reliance is the onl y way to ultimatel y survive and provide333 . 
[389] Investor: There was no greed involved in my stuff The government said they were go ing to 
can pensions and J did not like superannuation because they kept changing the rul es every 
year, so I went into that investment with Storm . 
Mr Bernie Ripoll MP: Who told yo u the gove rnment was go 111 g to, as yo u say, ' can 
pen sions·? 
111 
. k d . I 7 
· · · A matter p ie e up 1n c 1apter . 
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Investor: Remember when they brought in compulsory superannuation, they said that they 
were going to phase pensions out. That was their words. That was when I decided that I 
have got to look after myself. 
Senator Williams: It was the Hawke-Keating government that brought m compulsory 
superannuation. 
Investor: I do not care who it was. They are all the same, mate. They do not really care 
about me, I will tell you. [public hearing [5], p.109] 
6. 4. 4. 9 Individual 
The issue of individual responsibility for getting involved with Storm was discussed in 
some depth in 13 of the 15 interviews. There was an appreciation and acknowledgement 
that there are two general and competing views concerning the individual's role with 
investing in Storm. 
[390] You must not blame yourselves. You acted entirely prudently. You did not make rash 
decisions. You placed yourselves in the hands of a licensed fmance adviser and you acted in 
accordance with the advice that you were given. You did not do anything wrong. 
(Goodridge 2010). 
-[391] The clients also benefited greatly from a advice/business model which provided returns 
which were beyond those offered under general industry practices. To this extent they 
sought gains that were beyond normalised returns and it is likely that a number of clients 
were drawn to the Storm model as a consequence of the higher than normal potential for 
returns . Where this is the case, a certain level of client responsibility must also be taken. 
[public submission 336 from Financial planning company] 334 
334 Nevertheless and as an important point to note, this particular submission actually put more onus overall 
on the adviser than the individual. Indeed, comments about individual responsibili ty do "not serve to abdicate 
either Storm' s or the financial advi ser 's responsibility to provide appropriate advice which was suitable to the 
client" , in particular with regard to seeking gains beyond 'normalised returns ' (i.e . ' greed '). Furthermore, 
"neither the system nor regulation has the capacity to legislate away greed . This is true for everyone involved in the value chain, the Licensee, its advisers, the banks (in their lending practices) and clients. However it is important to note that it is incumbent on all ' educated ' parties within the value chain to take a fiduciary 
responsibility to act in the client ' s interest with the generally financiall y uneducated investor" (public 
submission 336). 
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The di scussion of responsibility was, in some cases, then linked to an impact on trust in 
oneself following Storm 's collapse. This section considers the various views on the level of 
indi vidual responsibility involved, and of more direct relevance to our research goals, the 
impact of this on trust in oneself. 
6.4.4.9.1 The views of others 
The views of those in the industry, outside of Stonn, provide important context to any 
discussion of how much responsibility lies with an individual in committing to a financial 
strategy. From both their own experiences more generally, as well as their own perceptions 
and of issues specific to Storm, there is a clear acknowledgement that an individual investor 
is as much a part of a decision to invest as any other party involved - but with some 
provisos (as suggested in footnote {334} ). 
[392] While everyone would like to be compensated for losses incurred, few are prepared to 
accept their role in contributing to their own loss ... retail clients need to be more 
accountable for their own affairs. [public submission 351 from ex-director of stockbroking 
and financial planning company ]335 
[393] No matter how much infonnation and education we provide, and how much clients confinn 
that they have understood this , - when markets fall - there is always a percentage of clients 
who will " re-write history" and advise that in fact they never understood the risk involved 
and had they done so - would have behaved differently. [public submiss ion 284 from 
Financial planner] 
An ex-Stonn adviser also expressed similar thoughts , in focusing on the fact that 
individual s had opportunities to know exactly what they were getting into. 
[394] People had to sign , " I have read every page." So yo u can ' t go back and say, " I didn ' t know 
thi s" ... at the end of the day, yo u' ve got to say there is not just one person in thi s. It ' s the 
m But similarl y echo ing the perspective in excerp t [391] / footnote {334}: neverthe less , "acco untability is in 
part reduced when they seek and pay for professional adv ice (and) of greater concern is the number of poorl y 
qua lified / ex perienced advisors who are not capabl e or do not act in th e best interest of th e ir clients" (public 
submission 35 1 ). 
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person who signed off on it; you, myself or whatever. The person who didn ' t manage it as it 
should have been managed and the banks and the greed of some of the institutions that 
could have managed it better. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
It was also discussed in section 6.4.3.3 that investors had a clear perception that others from 
outside of Storm viewed them as greedy and indeed, others attest to the possibility that this 
may not be an unreasonable view in some cases. 
[395] We need to know why they were willing participants to undertake high risk when it was 
unnecessary. The unpalatable truth may be they were greedy and believed there was an 
opportunity to make a lot of money quickly. Unfortunately many undertake risk without 
accepting the responsibility this entails .... Financial advice and disclosures can continually 
be upgraded. At the end of the day however, a fundamental question is how do we protect 
people from themselves. [public submission 104 from private individual] 
[396] The single strategy was to double gear into a vanilla index fund - there was actually no 
financial planning advice as far as I can see. This implies that the investors were blinded by 
the potential returns from a single investment strategy without any consideration of the 
risks involved. From my experience, investors become deaf when you start to talk about 
risks and hyper-sensitive when you start to talk about returns. In this way, it is easy to see 
how gullible people can be as greed trumps fear right up until the point of realisation of 
losses. [ email from financial adviser, August 2012] 
[397] This sad story is all about greed and ignorance .. . the individual clients, who lost in some 
cases everything, were the eventual victims but should they have taken some responsibility 
for their decisions. Greed was clearly a major motive, seeing friends, family etc getting 
massive returns above what was normal and reasonable made common sense take a back 
seat. Have we not heard "if it sounds too good to be true it probably is" . [ email from 
financial adviser, April 2013)336 
However, rather than fall back on simplified labels, others have the view that the 
motivations were not so clear-cut in terms of ' greed' , but rather relate to individuals having 
336 However, this same adviser also observed that " in a way some of the financial institutions were also 
victims but CBA as an example used the Townsville manager as an example for all Australia for his loan production. Product provider greed took over!" . 
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unrealistic expectations, undertaking inappropriate actions to meet those expectations, or 
perhaps even having (unrealistic) hope that they could make something out of meagre 
savings. The views of professional financial planners, some of whom actually had contact 
with Storm investors pre- and post-collapse, are particularly illustrative here. 
[398] I have had exposure to several "Storm affected" clients. One who asked for my review of 
the recommendations in a Storm SoA, and in spite of my own recommendations , proceeded 
and suffered losses. They have now returned to engage my services and we are proceeding 
happily, albeit with lessons learned. Another two came to me after the closure of Storn1, and 
while I initially assisted with their stated desire to stablili se their losses, both tern1inated my 
engagement within months when I fell short of their expectations of my ability to recoup 
their previous losses and generate the returns promised by Storm ... what I have learned is 
that any client with unrealistic expectations (however acquired) is not worth assisting. 
[public submission 349 from Financial planner] 
[399] Through the years leading up to the collapse of Storm, we had discussions with Storm 
clients who were referred to us. On each occasion we warned them of the risk that we saw 
in their strategies and advised that were they to engage us as their adviser we would adopt 
more conservative strategies. Each one of these clients gave us the same response " thank 
you - but we will stick with what we are doing because we are making so much money 
from it". This history is not provided to belittle the situation faced by many people who 
have suffered significant losses from the collapse of Storm - or to suggest that al l of these 
investors were so inclined. It is provided to illuminate the fact that, when it comes to 
investments, despite the best intentions, education, inforn1ation and regulation there will 
always be an element of people who will do foolish things with their own money. [public 
submission 284 from Financial planner] 
[ 400] The average person today retires with somewhere between $150,000 and $200,000, besides 
their own home. So, despite what people may think, it is still fairly low. And then they 
chase income ... People chase income but do not understand the risk . They are put in that 
position because they need it to live. So what might be appropriate advice and what they 
want in the way of income stari to decoup le . . . what we have seen and consider- and not 
onl y in this financial crisis but al so in past financial cri ses-has been the level of ri sk that 
people are prepared to take on. In a bull market, when they are talking across the fence to 
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their friend about how much money they have made it is amazing how people 's levels of 
risk grow. [Managing Director, Professional Investment Services, public hearing [7], p.115] 
[401] And I'm sorry to say, greed overtook most people. You know, because the figures looked a 
lot more enticing I suppose, when you use a property as equity as well ... well, you see 
greed has a funny way of - not greed so much, you know, sudden hope that maybe they can 
get out of this very ordinariness of their retirement. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
This last excerpt relates to an adviser who further critiqued some aspects of the recollection 
of some investors - and that this aspect of "re-writing" history (to reinforce the use of the 
term in excerpt [393]) relates also to their overall experience with Storm. 
[ 402] From like 2006, all the early clients, they lived off the hog of the land while it was going .. . 
those are the things that people did, but you don ' t hear about that. You don ' t hear about the 
fact that when things were going well, they were spending far in excess of the dollars that 
were coming in as well. [interview with ex-Storm adviser]337 
The obvious point to make here, of course, is that with Storm having such control over the 
overall strategy of any individual, any implication as to excessive or unrealistic use of 
funds or indeed expectations, reflects on Storm as much as on the individual - and perhaps 
more so, given the insights in footnotes {334} and {335}. Nevertheless, the enticement of 
either great wealth or at least returns greater than could be obtained elsewhere was 
acknowledged by some investors themselves. One interviewee in a quite straightforward 
and non-defensive manner explained her acceptance of the possible returns. 
[ 403] The other financial companies were showing a graph that took my assets away and their 
graph was showing my assets increasing and as my friend had tripled hers in 12 years , I 
thought well, that ' s a pretty good way to go. [interview with Storm investor]338 
337 For example according to this interviewee: "In a lot of cases, they talk about, "Oh, we 've lost $700,000" or 
something. In fact. .. in a lot of cases, they may have withdrawn $200,000-odd over those two years for 
purchases of cars, trips, giving their kids money. You never heard about that" [interview with Storm investor]. 
338 Thi . h . h . s 1st e same mvestor as t at m excerpt [56]. 
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Similar sentiments were also expressed earlier by another investor in excerpt [57]. One 
further investor expressed his belief and concern that many investors did indeed suffer from 
ll 1. · · 339 tota y unrea 1stlc expectat10ns . 
[404] Husband: Out of this, it is shown the naivety of a lot of people in Australia ... who can ' t see 
anything more than a quick buck. People came into Storm thinking they would get a quick 
buck; the same way as the home insulation scheme that failed , brought everybody out who 
was going to make a quick buck .. . it brought out, to my way of thinking, one of the worst 
sides of the Australian psyche. 
Wife: But you can ' t say that... 
Husband: No, no, but it has. Look at the people - the people who are screaming the loudest, 
are the people who came in at the last when everything was going good, expecting to make 
a quick killing and be set up for life. [interview with Ston11 investor] 
6.4.4.9.2 Acknowledgement of individual responsibility 
The investor perspective on whether they considered themselves ' greedy ' or not was 
discussed in the context of community perceptions in section 6.4.3.3.1. Of more relevance 
here are those admissions to individual failings or shortcomings that investors do actually 
hold to be true, in hindsight. The first of these concerns an admission that their knowledge 
of what they were getting into was simply not adequate. 
[405] Husband: See, we weren ' t educated enough to know enough about it, really . I' d never been 
educated in stocks and shares ... 
Wife: I would say I was ignorant. 
Husband: Well , I was definitely ignorant. 
Wife: And I would look at it and say, "Oh yeah , hmm" because I had no idea. [interview 
with Stonn investor] 
3
·
19 And notabl y. this in vestor did not ho ld Stom1 culpable in any significant way for the ir own substantial 
losses. 
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[406] Stuart Robert MP: Were you ever briefed on who was responsible for a margin loan? Were 
you ever briefed on what a margin loan was? 
Investor: Yes, I was, but it was very overwhelming. It was a bit like information saturation. 
I was still grappling to understand that and the whole picture. It is probably very clear and 
succinct to you, but to people like me it is not. That is why I paid them to do it. [public 
hearing [5] , p.50] 
[ 407] Investor: You weren 't encouraged to (participate in your financial wellbeing) at Storm. You 
weren ' t encouraged to participate in your own decisions because they would you know -
they show you a lot of graphs and they show a lot of things that looked good and then just 
sign there and we'll fix the next step up. It became almost robotic. You 'd go in, you'd sign 
your documents, they ' d give you this much to read, you know, and I would get inches 
worth of paperwork and you'd sign it and that was it and then you'd be doing whatever they 
felt was the next step, so yeah. 
Interviewer: Who 's going to read that anyway? 
Investor: Well, you can 't. You couldn't read it. I've got the documents there if you want to 
see any. They are enormous and very difficult to read. Like I said, full of graphs and very 
legal terms that you just - a normal person probably couldn 't read . 
Interviewer: That 's what you have an adviser for; to tell you about it. 
Investor: Yeah, and they would point to it and show you what they meant but you know, 
how much did we understand? Probably not enough. And we never went to get a second 
opinion at any of those stages. We didn 't know that we needed to. l think that 's the ... 
Interviewer: Well, if it makes you feel any better, which it won't, even those that did, it 
hasn't impacted them much differently anyway. 
Investor: No. I know a few people that were very astute businessmen and women who have 
been caught up in it all and it is because you trusted them, I think. I think you just trusted 
them to be doing the right things, yeah. [interview with Storm investor] 
[408] Wife: You know, how could I have been so stupid to have done this . 
Husband: We 're both reasonably intelligent people but not financially astute . 
Interviewer: ... You kept increasing your loans over time340 . 
Wife: Yeah, we did. When we decided to go in it , we did what they said to do. 
340 To clarify, this question was not asked as accusingly as the transcript reads it to be, and was not taken in an 
offensive way by the interviewees. 
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Husband: We sa id , ' 'You ' re running it for us" ... as I sa id , I couldn ' t argue against them 
other than gut feel ing that you know, that just was not good but I couldn ' t make a financial 
argument and they could. 
Wife: I wasn' t happy with that, really, you know particularly. But I thought, no we ' ve made 
this decision, we ' re do ing it, you know. If anything goes wrong, we can ' t say, well we 
didn't fo llow their advice, you know? lsn ' t that stupid when you look at it, you know? It ' s 
stupid. [interview with Stonn investor] 
As well as simply not knowing enough, many investors now consider themselves somewhat 
gullible about what they were being told, and as such simply made a bad choice about what 
they thought they knew. Given the prevalence of this view being held in hindsight by 
investors , several interview excerpts are given below - all are from different investors and 
none are the investors in excerpt [ 408] above. 
[409] How could I have been so stupid to have fallen for their con? It ' s a se lf-bashing thing I 
suppose. How could I have been so stupid to have allowed myself to get involved with 
them? [interview with Storm investor] 
[410] But a lot of the people were their own worst enemies as well. .. including myse lf. I' m 
saying because I was a client. We bought the dream and it was presented in a very, very 
conservative way. [interview with ex-Storm advsier] 
[411] I mean I' ve never owed anybody any money to anybody in my life and I' ve always had 
fa irly sound judgement but in this in stance, obviously I didn ' t. [interview with Stom1 
investor] 
[ 412] I made a bad choice. It 's almost like hav ing been to pri son for murder. How stupid could 
you be and that's what you get for being greedy and I' ve heard that a lot; that ' s what you 
get fo r being greedy. I don' t believe I was greedy ever. [interview with Storm investor] 
[ 4 13] So yes , I think - and it is not putting all your eggs in one basket, and I grew up knowing 
that, but that ' s vi11uall y what we did . [interview with Stonn investor] 
[414] I think there ' s a lot of people to blame including ourse lves fo r being so stu pid . [interview 
with Stom1 investor] 
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This perception of being gullible did not just relate to initial decisions, but also to events 
later on. Notably, this was even applicable at the critical times when markets were crashing 
in late 2008. 
[415) How gullible can you be? We were of the belief-'we' being the clients and 'we ' being 
Storm-that the bank was going to stand by us and help us ride it out. Call me a fool if you 
like. With other companies outside of Storm, their clients were getting margin calls at 80 
per cent. We were hearing this through the industry and through contacts. We were thinking 
to ourselves, 'How lucky are we that we are still in there with a show with Storm.' That is a 
true story. [Co-Chairman of SICAG, public hearing [6], p.81] 
This may, however, be partially explained by previous discussion concerning the belief of 
investors that they had protective measures in place as well as having advised of decisions 
to sell some of their equity position into cash (see section 6.4.2.1.1 ). 
As well as an explicit admission by some of not knowing enough, this was sometimes 
linked down to a general apathy or laziness about taking greater care with one 's decisions. 
[ 416) The first thing is to take an interest in your own financial affairs. I let far too much slide by 
because I was ignorant, lazy or just too busy or pre-occupied to take the time. Eventually. 
things will start slipping by you that will impact on the way you can afford to live. That's 
worth keeping in mind, even when your life remains mostly in front of you. [public 
submission 20 from Storm Investor] 
[41 7) Wife: I think I can ' t believe how stupid and naive I was because I... 
Husband: I can ' t believe how stupid that we were. 
Wife: But we ' re lazy. If you trust somebody to do it for you, you just do what they say .. . I 
wouldn't have done it if it had been a financial adviser that I didn ' t trust. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
Notably, this last point (also suggested by the investor in excerpt [ 406]) suggests that 
alongside clear acknowledgement by investors as to their role in the decision to proceed, a 
proviso also exists. This is that although naivety, gullibility, a low level of knowledge and 
even a general laziness may be part of the equation in some cases, this nevertheless does 
- 328 -
not do away or downplay the significance and enabling feature of the core rationale to 
proceed - that being trust. 
6.4.4.9.3 Yes we made mistakes but. . . 
Public submissions [9], [21 ], [ 165], [285] , and [307] are just some of those that express the 
view that although investors acknowledge some of their own shortcomings similar to those 
expressed above, these are secondary to the fact that they had placed trust in a financial 
adviser to guide them appropriately. Two of these submissions showcase these views, as 
does the experience of another Storm investor who appeared at a P JCI hearing. 
[ 41 8] I admit I made the tragic mistake of not obtaining independent advice about SF at thi s time. 
How were clients supposed to know the underlying truth? I am a machinery parts specialist 
NOT a financial expert, this is why we were paying SF such hjgh fees. [public submission 
165 from Stonn investor] 
[419] We have been treated as though we should have known what was going on as well by other 
professional people. If we knew what to do financially we wouldn't have had to go to a 
financial advisor. [public submission 9 from Storm Investor] 
[ 420] Like the majority of victims caught in this financial disaster, we were made vulnerable by 
our desire to be independent in retirement. .. we trusted these financial advisers to answer 
our questions honestly, but they did not. [public hearing [5] , p.54] 
Some of those interviewed held similar views, by seeing the issue of misplaced trust as a 
corollary to their own shortcomings. Neither of the following interviews are represented in 
excerpts [409] to [414] above. 
[ 421] Husband: Oh, the only mistake that we made, really we made, we picked the wrong bloody 
financial adviser, really and trul y. 
W(fe: Yeah, we did too . [interview with Storm investor] 
( 422] If we made a decision on a particular line of act ion, it was done with the best infonnation 
that we had . Now if we were told lies and i1rnuendos and rnistruths and we made the 
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decision on those lies, mistruths and innuendos, you know, where do you stand? [interview 
with Storm investor] 
For others still, the issue of personal responsibility is tempered with even wider issues of 
mistrust - not just the adviser, but also other associated parties. These perspectives mirror 
those in earlier sections, but are included here to highlight how many investors view their 
own responsibility in context of the responsibilities of others. 
[423] Only a naYve person would believe that they weren ' t responsible for taking their own risks, 
and for the unexpected downturn in the market. Everyone I know that has been affected 
admits this, and takes responsibility for their own decisions. What we want to know is, why 
were NONE of the safety mechanisms that were in place triggered by the very institutions 
we were dutifully making monthly repayments to, which resulted in these losses being 
exacerbated to the point where recovery for most people was unachievable? [public 
submission 91 from Storm Investor] 
[ 424] It seems all the professional money people have prostituted themselves at the expense of the 
consumer. Our biggest error seems to have been to trust that the planners, bankers and 
lenders were all ethical. They are not. [public submission 179 from Storm Investor] 
[ 425] With the information that has subsequently come to light, myself and many others are 
questioning how could so many, hard working, forward thinking people, seeking only to 
provide themselves the means to a comfortable self-funded retirement, have got it so 
wrong. Perhaps if we had known, as we now do, that ASIC had been monitoring Storm 
Financial for some time, and that complaints had been received, then we may have been in 
a position to question and seek alternatives. [public submission 224 from Storm Investor] 
A summary of the context that many investors see their acknowledged responsibility 
residing within, is given by one investor. 
[ 426] Let me summarise our conservative approach to this investment. 
ASIC. Checks Re Ozdaq/Storm. Clear. 
FP A Checks Re Ozdaq/Storm. Clear. 
Investment vehicle. Australian Shares via Index Funds - Conservative and Passive. 
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From Storm we had a --guarantee" in writing plus many verbal assurances that we would 
never lose our home or investments. 
Warren Buffet. Recommends Index Funds again and again for Non Professional investors. 
Colonial Margin Lending. Large, reputable (we thought) Margin Lender. 
How much more could we have done?? (public submission 211 from Storm Investor] 
6.4.4.9.4 Impact 
Thus, different views can be taken on not just the responsibility that investors should or 
shouldn ' t bear, but also on the relative importance of that responsibility in the light of 
others ' responsibilities as well. Therefore, perhaps a dichotomous choice between "the 
individuals are to blame as well" versus " the individuals are not to blame" misses the point 
here. Rather, for our research goals, the point is that regardless of where the largest slices of 
the responsibility pie reside, it is the impact of individual responsibility and failings on the 
welfare of investors themselves that is key. This is important because investors are not 
merely economic agents of academic interest, but are real people with real concerns and 
problems who are the neighbours, friends, family and acquaintances who make up the 
society we all live in. 
The important insight that then arises is that although the epitome of Stom1' s collapse may 
well be the strength of feeling and mistrust towards firstly the credit provider(s) and Stonn 
itself (and by association the wider financial services industry), perhaps the more damaging 
aspect is a loss of trust in oneself. Significantly, the feeling of angst and regret about 
investment failings may well be stronger the more significant the role or responsibility 
taken by the individual - in other words, where some degree of personal responsibility is 
accepted, the resultant impact of loss is all the more magnified341 . 
Various insights as to such impacts on an individual ' s personal outlook and ability to 
function in all aspects of life are given by several interviewees and also in public 
submissions. 
341 Indeed, •• if s not so much about the pain of making a loss, but rather th e pain of being responsible for 
makin g th e dec ision·· (Van Mun ster 20 11 , p.29). 
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[ 427] Interviewee: It ' s the loss of dignity. The stripping away of trust, you know, the life out of 
people has been sucked, you know the glint in their eye, the cheeky wise-cracky great 
attitude, life ' s good type mentality has really been sucked out of people who ... would wise 
crack, that are jovial and ... 
Interviewee's partner: They 've lost their spark. 
Interviewee: Yeah, absolutely. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
[ 428] We went from being confident, self-assured to being not at all confident and unsteady with 
every step. [interview with Storm investor] 
[ 429] The inner recognition that I just could do nothing about this - that my instincts had failed 
me - even though I had thought about and checked on and researched Storm for 18 months. 
[public submission 320 from Storm Investor] 
As such, one impact is directly upon one ' s ability to deal with the surrounding world . The 
following excerpt from an interview with a couple occurs after an extended conversation 
regarding their current situation, during which time their body language and overall 
demeanour was very despondent. 
[ 430] Interviewer: You guys just feel helpless don 't you? 
Husband: Yeah. 
Wife: We are helpless. We ' re helpless and you know, I' ve got to the stage ... I'll tell you 
this; I' II buy a whole rump and we slice it up when it's cheap over here and have a couple 
of roasts and some for stewing steak and (my husband) will say, "Which way do I cut it?" 
and I say, "Oh for (goodness) sake, cut the bloody thing up" you know? He ' s not confident. 
He ' s lost his confidence in lots of things and I have lost my confidence in a lot of things 
too. You just. .. 
Interviewer: Your view on what you put your trust in before, has gone? 
Wife: Yeah, yeah. 
Husband: Yeah. 
Wife: Like whereas before if I wasn ' t here, (my husband) would probably slice the thing up 
and not worry about it. Just little things that come up, you know, and you know, because 
I've got a pretty fiery nature and it ' s pretty volatile ... but you know, I snap. I snap more a 
lot because he ' s lost his confidence in lots of things. [interview with Storm investor] 
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As such , what many find themselves in after financial trauma is a position of helplessness. 
From relying on a basis of trust to join Stonn, that trust is then impacted in a way which 
makes future trust difficult again. Yet, the realisation remains that in order to have any 
reasonable quality and basis for life, trust is actually the central ingredient. 
[431] I' m not a stupid person but I certainly feel like one now. They hoodwinked me big time. 
Any lessons to be learnt; yeah , don ' t be so trusting. Just don ' t be so trusting . I mean what 
el se can you do? There ' s nothing you can do about it though , you can't go through life not 
trusting people. [interview with Storm investor] 
6.4.4.10 Visual representation of impact on trust 
A word cloud representation relating to the overall impact on trust is as follows: 
6.4.5 The loss of control 
W11at an impact on the ability to trust can lead to , amongst other things , is a lack of control 
in one· s life . The overall sense from interviewed investors was that the major current 
challenge facing them which had arisen from all the aforementioned impacts, was their 
need to feel they have some say in their life. Two examples highlight this end result: 
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[ 432] Somebody has taken control of your life and there's nothing you can do. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
[433] Interviewer: So there's a lot less flexibility to deal with uncertainties, isn't there? 
Investor: Yes, there is ... the fact that we can't go travelling in the way that we would like to 
and have a lifestyle that we would like, that really is secondary. The primary is really 
fearful of not having the funds to have choices, you know, what will happen to you. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
It is difficult to argue against the fact that most people need and desire to have some control 
or say over their own fortunes, financial or otherwise342 . In the financial context at least, 
this is evident across a number of related areas. For example, the focus group study of 
de Vries (2009) highlighted the desire of participants for control in retirement planning via 
the retention of decision making; it is well acknowledged that the popularity of self-
managed drawdown strategies for the purposes of retirement incomes is partly due to the 
retention of some degree of individual control343 (MacDonald et al. 2011 ); and general 
advisory services whose advice for those suffering from significant financial loss is given 
"to help those in need to regain a sense of control" (Better Health Channel 2012). Even 
business motivators express strategies on the basis that "people change in order to gain or 
maintain control" (Miller 2012). 
This section presents some of the more significant issues to emerge in relation to the lack of 
control being felt by investors. This includes the importance of housing, the damaging 
effects of uncertainty, and a reduced ability to deal with the uncertainties of life. An overall 
lack of control is epitomised by many investors now having to call on Centrelink for 
support - a reliance all were planning and hoping to avoid, and indeed what many had 
worked a lifetime to not be dependent on. 
342 As such and as noted in footnote {310}, this was a particularly disturbing aspect of Storm which 
encouraged the retention of debt (and therefore remain a debtor, or in other words, beholden to the terms, 
circumstances and sensitivities of another party) in perpetuity. There is little potential for any ultimate 
'control' in that approach. 
343 To meet, amongst other things, uncertain future expenses such as those associated with medical needs and 
unforeseen family changes (MacDonald et al. 2011). 
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6. 4. 5.1 Centre link again 
Rather than focus on issues of service and what this conveys (as discussed in section 
6.4.4.8.4), we present here what relying on Centrelink represents to investors. Many public 
submissions touch on this issue (for example [211 ], [220] , [244] and [267]) and the overall 
perception is summised well by one in particular, which describes the plight of many: 
[ 434] All of the options these folk had for a wholesome existence- attaching honor and self 
esteem through not being reliant on the state for support. The destruction of what they had 
strived for most of their life - to ensure that they were financially comfortable in their 
advancing years. Instead their worst fears have been realized, now destitute and cast acirift 
on the scrap heap of the social welfare system. [public submission 280 from Stonn 
Investor] 
Quite clearly a sense of frustration is prevalent with the fact that such dependence has 
arisen. This is especially so given the specific intention to avoid such dependence, through 
investing with Stonn as well as a lifetime of work. This also came through interviews. 
[ 435] Interviewer: The whole thing of - so being self-sufficient, like being able to pay your own 
way in the future was probably the big motivation? 
Wife: Yeah. 
Interviewer: So you ' re not relying on the Government and stuff? 
Wife: That's right. 
Husband: You could imagine what it feels like going to Centrelink and standing in a bloody 
line there with all these mongrel s that don ' t want to work. It breaks your heart . 
Wife: The first time we had to go to Centrelink, I wouldn ' t go there (locally) . I went 
(elsewhere). 
Husband: I had to fo rce her . .. 
Interviewer: You didn ' t want to be seen here? 
Wife: It was so humiliating. 
In tervie,l'er: I guess when you work fo r 40-odd years, I mean it ' s not what yo u imagine, is 
it? 
Husband: No, it ' s degrading. [interview with Stonn investor] 
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[ 436] And that said, going to Centrelink and to that job provider, that is so soul-destroying. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Although the angst at having to engage and have some reliance on social support was 
undeniably difficult for most of those pursuing it, some of those interviewed nevertheless 
put it into context that, as is social support' s purpose, it did and does provide some relief. 
Thus, whilst it is not ideal, it is still helpful, albeit in somewhat guarded terms. 
[ 43 7] Interviewer: How has your experience been going to Centrelink to get the pension and 
stuff? Has that been good, bad? 
Investor: It's okay now. It was like begging when I first started. It was very demoralising 
because they pick the eye teeth out of everything you say and do and when I was earning, it 
was such a fiddle because I'd earned a little bit, not the full amount and it wasn ' t the same 
amount every week. So every week, I had to be saying what I was earning, what I wasn ' t 
earning and then it would be up and down and for a long time, I only got $198 a fortnight. 
But since I've sold everything and everything has settled down, I'm not getting an income 
from Storm, I'm just on the full pension now. But it ' s not lasting. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[438] Pretty devastating . .. that was the one thing that was harder for my wife than for me - and it 
was very tough for me. I mean I've got to say the Centrelink people are pretty good (but) 
that was very difficult experience. Again probably I became a bit sort of fatalistic about 
having to get some support from Centrelink .. . you ' ve got to expose all our financial 
underwear to Centrelink and I've often wondered whether for $2,000 or $3 ,000 or $4,000 
per annum; is it worth the effort, you know? But at the end of the day, well it ' s nice to see a 
couple of hundred come in every two or three months or something into the bank account. 
But no, it was not a good experience. It was what I'd worked all my life for to be out of it, 
you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
Overall then, the reliance on some level of social support was and is viewed as ultimately 
representing a loss of what has been worked for - the ability to have a certain level of 
control in one's life. 
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6.4.5.2 The importance ofhousing 
Housing and in particular home ownership has both a financial and emotional dimension in 
tenns of worth for individuals. The importance of home ownership was highlighted by 
PJCI member Senator Williams (public hearing [3] , p.23), some of the banks themselves 
(for example, the ANZ at public hearing [2], p .51 ]), and by an ex-Stonn adviser as well 
(public hearing [6] , p.91) . Furthennore, it is also widely attested in literature, as described 
in section 2.2.3. 
The loss of one's own home would therefore be reflective of a loss in both a financial and 
emotional sense, further unde1mining one' s level of control in their state of affairs. The 
potential loss of one's home was indicated as likely by 44% of AEC I SICAG survey 
respondents due to the need to pay outstanding home loan or margin loan debts, and 68% of 
respondents did not think that they would be in a position after that to be able to purchase 
another home. Of the 168 public submissions made by Storm investors , 13 indicated that 
they had already sold their homes at the time of writing their submissions (mid-2009). 
This section presents findings relating to both the financial and emotive aspects of house 
ownership, and what implications exist for the control investors feel that they have as a 
result. 
6.4.5.2.1 Financial aspects 
An interview wi th one couple outlined their frustration with issues around the ownership of 
their home. A summary of their financial position is given below. 
[ 439] Husband: 2008; all this happened, we went from having a portfolio that at its high point 
earlier that year was just over $3.5 million. We had this property here and it was valued at 
$700,000 ... we had a mortgage on this house which was an investment mortgage and we 
had $250.000 at the bank ... so we ended up having a $420,000 mortgage on this place and 
virtuall y no income. 
Wife: And we· d already paid the house off once because we ovmed the house. [interview 
with Stonn investor] 
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As such, establishing a sustainable position in terms of a place to live presented significant 
challenges. Staying in their own home was now unrealistic, and selling to buy again 
presented its own challenges. The impact, as indicated below, was a continual dwelling on 
one' s situation with the realisation that their options and ability to have some control were 
in fact quite limited. 
[ 440] Wife: I mean it is such a - well, I find personally, such a wearing - as in wearing down your 
system thing because okay, we put it on the market, we thought it was going to happen, it 
all fell over, it was a great disappointment. We then sort of said, "Oh well, maybe the best 
thing to do is to wait a while because this is all - you know, the real estate market was all 
starting to get the wobbles and whatever." But then here you are another 12 months down 
the track and you ' re still sitting here thinking, well, should we put it on the market? Should 
we not? What are we going to do, you know? And as every year goes by, the house is not 
necessarily gaining in value. The house is getting older. You have to keep up paying the 
rates ($3,000 per year in this case) and paying the maintenance .. . so it ' s very hard on a lot 
of nights to go to sleep, go to bed and go to sleep without having this financial thing 
running around in the back of your brain and you know, that's just the way it is. 
Husband: You have no flexibility anymore. [interview with Storm investor] 
Another couple attested to the relief they felt at achieving an arrangement whereby they 
could keep their house, and this was seen as particularly important for bequest reasons. 
Nevertheless, their journey to keeping the home was fraught with various challenges in 
terms of their own mental state and in dealing with their bank. Furthermore, like the couple 
above, they face extra challenges now just to maintain their home and therefore keep that 
element of control in their lives. 
[ 441] Husband: When we took on the bank and as a result of taking on the bank, we were able to 
pay the house out. That eased things a bit. We were also able to pay back our kids that we 
borrowed money off to get us out of it so that eased it a bit. But still in the back of my 
mind, is that thought that I was contemplating self-harm344 and I probably wouldn ' t have 
went on my own. I don't know whether she would have went with me, but. .. 
W{fe: No, well then the kids could have sold the house and got the money. 
Husband: But they wouldn ' t have, we still owed it to the bank. 
344 Note: this is the investor referred to in excerpt [180]. 
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Wife: Yeah, true . 
Husband: This is the only thing we 've got to offer our kids, is the house and the bank were 
goi ng to take it off us and you know, I sa id , " Where are we go ing to li veT and they could 
not care . Just no compassion whatsoever. I sa id , " What? On the back of the ri ver?" " If yo u 
have to." And of course, that rea lly made me dig in and as I said, we handled our own case. 
Wife: ... We've had a lot of expenses with regard to Yasi345 . You see, we had a few damages 
with regard to electrical stuff and you know . [interview with Stonn investor] 
Other interviewees have had to change their housing status, and as such, they point out how 
much reclaiming some certainty in this aspect of their lives would mean to them. 
[ 442] In terviewer: What would make it better for you? If there would be such a word? 
Investor: Honestly, just enough to get a deposit on a house. That would at least be a start ... 
just to get something that we could start with. [interview with Storm investor] 
[ 443] (My pa11ner and I) couldn ' t, you know, have our own homes and I couldn't survive in my 
townhouse either, now that I had retired ... (so) we do own this house 50/50, so if something 
happened to one of us, we would be in trouble, I worry about that too . [interview with 
Storm investor] 
6.4.5.2.2 Emotional aspects 
For those investors who have lost their houses, it is difficult to appreciate the emotional toll 
that this has taken above and beyond the financial implications. This toll can arise from the 
emotional investment people make into their homes, and importance of this investment is 
evident in much of the public data (for example, public submission [ 150], and the 
testimony in public hearing [ 4 ], p.45). 
Other public testimony describes in more detail the reasons for such an emotional 
investment . As the fo llowing excerpts attest, homes provide both a basis for stability and as 
a vehicle fo r accumulating a repertoire of one 's life achievements and memories of life 
events. 
:i -1 5 Yasi was a tropica l cyclone that ca used severe and widespread damage across northern Queensland in 
February 20 11 . 
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[ 444] Only those in a similar situation can understand what it is like to have the stability in your 
life threatened and destroyed and the very roof over your head put at risk. [public 
submission 403 from Storm Investor] 
[ 445] I might be more fortunate than some to have enough to buy a very small home. Whilst I 
remain grateful for that - part of the bitter pill is also having to get rid of most of my 
treasures that make up the tapestry of my life. [public submission 320 from Storm Investor] 
Similar sentiments were expressed in interviews. The emotional ties to a home anse 
because of the association with one ' s life events, and as such, for investors it can represent 
far more than just a place to live. 
[446] This is our house. We've lived here all our lives, all our man-ied life, (nearly 40) years 
we 've been here and to lose that, that hmi. [interview with Storm investor] 
[ 447] I bought my home out of my divorce settlement, it meant a lot to me, not just bricks and 
mortar; emotionally it meant a lot to me to have my own home ownership in spite of what 
my ex did to me and he took all that away. Took all that away, my house and like I said, not 
just bricks and mortar, it represented an achievement of something that I survived my 
maITiage. I don ' t even have that anymore. [interview with Storm investor] 
As such, losing one ' s home means a loss of control via the loss of what has been of huge 
importance and significance to many people, as well as the financial implications of such a 
change. 
6.4.5.3 The problem of uncertainty 
Both Marx (2012c) and Smail (2012) document cases of Storm investors who when offered 
settlements of their affairs through resolution schemes, have for various reasons rejected 
those settlements. They also highlight cases where investors have accepted the settlements 
for the reason of expediency rather than anything else. Indeed, acceptance of settlements 
has often been done begrudgingly, or out of desperation. Clearly there is a trade-off 
between expediency and contentment with the conditions of any settlement offers, which 
... 
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poses an interesting quandary - which option gives the investor a degree of control over 
their affairs? And more broadly, what is the price paid for continuing uncertainty over the 
position that an investor is in, and what options are available to them? This section presents 
findings and insights into these matters. 
6.4 .5.3.1 The cost of not knowing 
Six of the fifteen interviews were with investors who had accepted some sort of settlement 
with their bank.346, but despite this, all fifteen could be described as still not fully knowing 
what their financial position was or could be, some three to four years after Storm's 
collapse. This relates to the nature of ongoing actions being taken since the collapse, with 
the range of individual circumstances dependent on: whether or not some sort of settlement 
has been offered, and for those investors, whether that has been accepted or rejected ; 
whether or not compensation is being pursued through legal class actions; and whether or 
not ASIC actions and outcomes relate to their individual circumstances347 . 
A major frustration relates to the length of time investors have to wait until some certainty 
is restored to this aspect of their lives. The frustration and angst with such a waiting game 
was mentioned by several interviewees. 
[ 448] I think those that are trying to help are being as helpful as they possibly can be. It ' s just 
taking so long, why is it taking so long? When we first went to the first meeting in 
Townsville, he said - whoever it was, I think it was Bernie, I' m not sure, said, "Oh, they've 
got money put aside. Within 12 months it will all be finished , you ' ll all know.'· Yeah , well 
right, another lie, another lie. [interview with Stom1 investor] 
[449] T here ' ll be a large percentage of us people w ill be looking at the bottom of the turnips by 
(the time that ASIC action is completed) . You know, we won't see the outcome of that. 
That 12 month s, when you' re where we are , there ' ll be a lot of people who won ' t see it. 
[interview with Stom1 investor] 
346 Note: not all of these settlements were with the same bank. 
m Which itself is generall y dependent on whether AS IC is pursuing the credit provider of the investor(s) in 
question , and whether the extent of the in vestor 's position was deemed to be influenced by the action(s) of 
that cred it provider. 
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[ 450] A lot of these other people - in fact, I was sitting in the court a month or so ago in Brisbane 
and when they said that the next hearing . .. is going to be October next year, the guy behind 
me almost broke into tears, burst into tears and said, "Well, there goes the house." He said, 
"I can ' t hang on any longer." He 's been hanging on, hanging on, paying out, paying out, 
paying out and we wouldn't have been here now if we had had to hang on this long or 
certainly until next year. We would definitely have been out. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[ 451] Wife: They put a moratorium on our repayments so ... 
Husband: We live day-to-day with the looming threat. [interview with Storm investor] 
The effect of such frustration and angst associated with the aspect of timeliness is a feeling 
of helplessness, and again, a loss and lack of control over one's affairs. 
[ 452] My future has been on a thread ever since Storms demise & it doesn't look likely to 
improve in my lifetime. ( email from Storm investor, August 2012) 
[453] I mean basically you 've got to cling to the hope that (lawyers) are go ing to do something ... 
you feel absolutely as if your hands are tied . There's nothing you can do because all the big 
institutions like the banks and the Stonns and the administrators who are trying to sort this 
out are in control and to get any basis of any facts or anything is just so difficult because 
you really don ' t know the truth of it all. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Additional stress is also associated with having to make decisions about whether to 
participate, at some cost, in further actions . 
[454] Wife: So we ' re with (some lawyers) now ... so hopefully- we don ' t know whether anything 
will come for our particular case, but we ' re giving it a go. 
Husband: .. . this bloke here now... I've taken up more paperwork to him. I've had a sit 
down personal meeting with him in Cairns. I said, "I don ' t want to waste my time. Have I 
got a chance of getting anything or not? That's all I want to know." He said, "Well , you' ve 
got a chance"; the same as what (other lawyers) said. So then that's another thing ... you' re 
chasing good money after bad money, you know? 
Wife : I didn ' t want to do it at all. [interview with Storm investor] 
... 
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These effects extrapolate further into associated perceptions of fear and a reduced ability to 
deal with the world. The couple from excerpt [ 451] describe such additional impacts . 
[ 455] Husband: (My wife) won ' t answer the phone. 
Wife: I won' t answer the phone. 
Husband: The phone rings and its associated with bad news or something terrible. (My 
wife) will not answer the phone most of the time unless she 's predicting that it 's someone 
that she will want to talk to . 
W[fe: .. . That ' s another thing too with this (ongoing uncertainty) , your brain just - like I can 
remember - years and years I would remember all our niece ' s and nephew's birthdays and 
appointments. I miss appointments now, I mi ss kid 's birthdays, I' m just dreadful and that 's 
terrible too ... [interview with Stom1 investor] 
The continuing uncertainty is also not just due to ongoing action(s). For another couple, 
they had experienced recent losses from a business venture as well and although the loss 
via Stonn was of greater (and major) significance, the other losses were also impacting 
them. 
[456] Wife: Because we didn ' t have enough really and it was also our business; the development 
which has crashed. 
Husband: Yeah, which we went into with (someone), who we knew for 15 years and he 's 
taken us on and left us with all the debt so that 's another issue we've got. 
Wife: We 've got two major issues. 
Husband: We've had a no win situation and two investments you know, that both never 
should go wrong but the one we had in . . . we've had a bit of a horror run when we shouldn ' t 
have . [interview with Storn1 investor] 
As such, for such cases whose financial position is a combination of adverse events , they 
are in a position of simply not knowing where they stand, even putting aside the uncertainty 
associated with any future recompense. 
[457] lnten •ie,1·er: Did you know what you owe now? Overall to everyone altogether? 
Husband: No, not really . 
!11rervie11"er: No? 
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Husband: No. 
Interviewer: It ' s just too hard to know? 
Husband: Too hard to work out. [interview with Storm investor] 
Thus, this couple too faces helplessness and a stark vacuum of control over their lives. 
[ 458] Interviewer: So where to now for you? 
Husband: Yeah, I don ' t know. We don ' t know where we ' re going to go. It ' s just a waiting 
game. But how long can we wait? We can't wait. ... Yeah, so I don't know where we go 
from here, Aaron . I don't know where we go from here . I don ' t know. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
6.4.5.3.2 Two case studies 
Two further cases demonstrate the various insights from interviews regarding the costs of 
uncertainty in one's affairs348 . The first of these concerns a couple who were awaiting an 
offer from their bank, and had been waiting for some time. 
[ 459] Husband: We just sit here. We sit in our home waiting for the bomb to drop. Is someone 
going to say, "Righto, we want our money now." 
Interviewer: So are you currently getting bank statements from (the bank) regarding your 
mortgage? 
Wife: Yeah, it' s still saying steady. It ' s not going up, it ' s just staying. 
Interviewer: ... but they' re not charging interest currently? 
Wife: No, they ' re not. 
Interviewer: But you don ' t have any ce1iainty as to what it actually is? It could be suddenly 
$1 million or it could be wiped? 
Wife: Well, they ' ve said they ' ve wiped it and we have been assured that they are not 
accruing that interest and it's not showing on the statement. 
Husband: But when you say that, where ' s the piece of paper that says that? 
Wife: Well, it's not showing on the statement. On the statements we get, it says zero 
interest. 
348 Neither of these cases has yet been referenced in previous discussion in this section (6.4 .5.3) . 
... 
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Husband: T hat ' s what worries me. J"ve tru sted other people and we have signed things and 
we have n' t got something now ... you keep going to the mailbox thinking you' re go ing to 
see something from (the bank) .... It's a time bomb and it 's not good. 
Wife: .. . I do want it over. I find it really, really hard . I sti ll wake up in the middle of the 
night sometimes and it all comes back and you know, because I want to put it behind me. 
Husband: . .. you can ' t do anything ... you're just waiting to be kicked somewhere. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
The second case concerns a retired couple for whom the ownership of their house was still 
uncertain. Some correspondence with the couple prior to the interview outlined their major 
fears. 
[ 460] I personally have had after affect from Storm. The fear factor, loss of trust in the human 
race, going to the post box to see if the banks are going to take the home we li ve in. It is 
like waiting for the Guillotine to drop ... the not knowing of when. [email con-espondence 
from Storm investor, October 2011] 
The interview itself then gave opportunity to expand on those fears, including the 
highlighting of how any actions and decisions in the meantime were effectively frozen 
whilst uncertainty reigned. The implications of this in terms of additional emotional tunnoil 
was clarified and reiterated further in additional correspondence following the interview. 
[461] Wife : And that ' s what ' s hanging over our head. You can't spend. 
Husband: Well , you can't spend the money yo u've got because yo u don' t know how much 
(the bank) . . . we don ' t know whether they'll let us out of a certain amount of money or 
whether we ' re up for the lot; whether we've got to se ll out or do it. They just won ' t do 
anything. They keep it over you r head all the time. They ' re just playing hardball apparentl y 
for some reason ... we ' ve got some money in the bank but you can ' t go and spend it 
because ... 
Interviewer: You don ' t know what ' s go ing to happen? 
Husband: No. 
Wife: No, we don ' t know. 
- 345 -
Husband: .. . Like I think we'd be a lot better off if (the bank) said to us, "Here's a deal" -
we mightn't even like the deal , but there's a deal and we can live with it. We'll say yes or 
no and go for it but you know, you just don't know. You're just up in the air. 
Wife: ... You just don 't know what to do. You just don't know what to do. 
Husband: You're left in a quandary where you - you know . . . how can you do it if you 
don't know what you've got? You know, no good going and spending what you haven't 
got. All the money we're spending now is the bloody banks anyway. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
[ 462] Fear factor, waiting for the mail to come. Phone calls, emotionally and physically it has had 
its toll on both of us . [email correspondence from Storm investor, November 2011] 
And, like the investors in excerpts [ 440] and [ 441 ], formerly simple issues of maintaining a 
house and a sense of pride in one's home were now also additional casualties of such 
uncertainty. 
[ 463] Husband: There's a lot of work - like there's guttering that needs to be redone around the 
house and there ' s the tiles, the capping on the tiles that need to be all redone and I' ve put it 
off for three years, four years because I knew I was going to do it before it crashed. You 
know, we were going to get it done when we come home. I'm not game to get it done, 
because it's going to cost a few thousand dollars, you know? [interview with Storm 
investor] 
Given the predominance and angst of such uncertainty, the couple highlighted that any 
form of information and offer would assist them from their current position. 
[ 464] Interviewer: So what would help now? What would be the - what do you need now to tum 
it around? 
Husband: Well, clarity to know what we 've got to do, what we can do, so we can still live 
within our means and know what we 've got to do. If we 've got to sell it, we've got to sell it 
but we don ' t know that. 
Wife: It ' s the not knowing, you know? 
Husband: The fear factor. 
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Wife . ... That ' s hov,1 I feel. .. waiting for that guillotine to drop down on your head ; bang ifs 
over and done with, you know? That ' s what it feels like . You know, you just don ' t know 
when it ' s going to come. You just don ' t know. [interview with Stonn investor] 
6.4.5 .3.3 The benefit of moving on 
Two examples highlight the maJor benefits of having gained some degree of certainty 
through accepting settlements with their banks. And, although their respective positions are 
still subject to elements of uncertainty now and into the future, they nevertheless hold that 
some benefit accrued to them from exercising a choice to accept an offer and move on. The 
first example is the investor from excerpt [ 450]. 
[ 465) The (bank deal) ; at the end of the day, look I don ' t know whether it was good or not, you 
know? It was good from our point of view, not the fact that we got (the amount we got) , but 
we got out of it and we were able to get on with our lives. The people who are still involved 
- and our situation was that we simply could not have afforded to continue because we 
were up for in excess of $100,000 a year in interest in the loans, which we had no income to 
support, you know? .. . that is where we are at. We are not left hanging on for ' unknown' 
outcome which may occur at some time in the future .. . we have a chance to get on with our 
lives - albeit very different from that which we had before and that for which we have 
plaru1ed ... at the end of the day, (the deal) gave us some certainty. We knew where we were 
and gave us the chance to get on with our lives , yeah. [interview with Stonn investor] ' 49 
The second example relates to a couple who accepted a settlement with their bank, and 
although they were being kept abreast of ongoing class actions, they were not participating 
nor contributing to that themselves. 
[ 466) Husband: We still get information from (another legal firn1) and you know , that may work . 
As far as we·re concerned, we got out of it without being in debt to the banks. We got 
something out of it. we· ve still got capital losses that we can carry fonvard forever , 
because we· re never go ing to exhaust them . 
q q Indeed . and signi fi cantl y. thi s in vestor also added th at ··r will say that whole closure is never likely -
ha\·ing settled fo r a pittance means we have se ttl ed ... 
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Wife: ... In a way I think we've survived better than some but it's been a very difficult 
experience and life will never be the same again. It doesn't matter what happens, it will 
never be the same again. 
Husband: ... It's happened, it's gone, get on with your life. There 's no way now that we 
would be sane, healthy, sensible people if we followed the (ongoing legal) situation and had 
this constant worry of yes, we ' re going to get our money back. You can ' t go through life 
like that. 
Wife: It's gone on for too long. I don ' t know how they would cope with it. I mean, it's just 
gone on for too long. [interview with Storm investor] 
There are, however, other complications that arise with settling on certain offers and/or 
taking decisions to clarify one's net position as soon as circumstances allow. In some cases 
investors took it into their own hands ( or were advised by others to do so) to sell their 
home, settle their debts as far as they were able to (to reduce significant interest burdens on 
loans) and endeavour to start again. In such cases, as it became more known that bank(s) 
had either financial hardship packages or offers of settlement to assist those who remained 
in debt and were reluctant to sell the home, those that had already made decisions faced a 
relative disadvantage compared to that had they waited. This conundrum was highlighted 
by PJCI member, Senator McLucas. 
[ 467] Senator Mclucas: What about those customers of yours who have acted on the requirement 
to sell their house in order to pay off their loan? Can you revisit those circumstances? I 
know of a couple who have done that. They are living with family members. They are now 
on the pension. Can we go back and revisit those sorts of circumstances? 
Bank CEO: Our priority is to look after customers. We have certainly not forced customers 
to sell their homes, as I mentioned to Ms Grierson before. 
Senator Mclucas: But people have done that in good faith. 
Bank CEO: If customers have issues and want to discuss individual situations with the 
bank, they are more than welcome to do so. [public hearing [8] , p.58] 
This reinforces the insight that although conditions of certainty are generally more 
attractive to conditions of uncertainty, there is also a real or potential cost involved in 
seeking such certainty. 
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6.4.5.4 Ltfe ·s 1'ulnerabiliries 
An earlier reference to Warren (2003a) in chapter 4 highlighted that life events, especially 
adverse ones, are not conveniently timed whereby someone has recovered from a previous 
setback in a sufficient manner to deal with the next. Warren (2003a) also highlighted a 
dependence rather than independence between adverse life events, so that one event can 
lead to , trigger, or make another adverse event more likely. So it is with the fears of Storm 
investors as well - there is a sharpened perception of vulnerability to what life can throw at 
them, and in some cases, the events of Stonn have not been in isolation from other life 
events. 
The major vulnerability of concern relates to that of health. This is partially explained by 
the age demographic of Stonn investors whereby many have already suffered setbacks or 
those close to them have, and it is also partially explained by vulnerability associated with 
the cost of medical insurance, private treatment of chronic conditions, and so on. Other 
vulnerabilities exist as well and these are presented in this section. 
6.4.5.4.1 Vulnerability to adverse health 
Public sources reveal a range of health-related vulnerabilities that investors now realise are 
accentuated, including the cost of treatments, options for future care, and management of 
existing ailments. 
[ 46 8] We cannot now afford the health insurance Irene requires to facilitate necessary surgery in a 
timely manner; with her disabilities , and th.is is an ongoing issue even after five surgeries. 
[public submission 187 from Stonn Investor] 
[469] We have endured the degrading and desperate measures of pleading with professional s and 
service providers to wai ver or reduce fees for products just to affo rd the continuing 
speciali st health care for v,ife· s conditi on and famil y needs. [public submission 306 from 
S tonn Investor] 
- 349 -
[ 4 70] We are on the edge of disaster if anything untoward, such as a health issue, should happen; 
if that were to come up we do not know how we would handle it. [public hearing [4] , p.63] 
All of these aspects were picked up in interviews to the extent that 9 of the 15 interviews 
involved discussion of vulnerability to current or future health needs350 . One aspect of this 
concerned the affordability of health care, even when health insurance is involved. 
[471] Wife: And even when it comes to medical things, you know? I have the horrors about the 
costs of medical stuff and things like that. 
Husband: Well, we 've changed - I had a bit of a scare some time ago and (my wife) has 
just had cataract surgery on both her eyes so you know, things like that. 
Interviewer: And you think twice about getting them now, obviously? 
Wife: Oh, absolutely. 
Husband: Oh, you do. We still carry private health insurance which ... 
Wife: But with a big excess to try and keep the cost down. 
Husband: With an excess and if you get caught at the wrong time, it costs you that anyway. 
So you know, there's that situation. 
Wife: See, my theory is now that we 've had this experience, is you get it all done in the one 
year. You get something done, you pay your excess and then you get all the other things 
you want to have done, you have done in the same year, so that next year, I've got to be 
healthy next year. I can ' t have anything go wrong next year because I've done and dusted 
my excess this year. [interview with Storm investor] 
[472] My other knee .. . needs replacing as well but I can ' t afford it now ... I can ' t afford to have 
my knees done now. But I don ' t know whether I should pull out of private health fund . It ' s 
a catch-22. [interview with Storm investor] 
Others relayed their fears in relation to the costs associated with treatments, notably for 
existing complaints, and how this has an ongoing emotional toll. 
[473] Husband: she's had to have- she got a back operation this year. 
Wife: ... Which I had to have - well, the pain was so horrific ... 
350 Again, this showcases a benefit of interviews, where such vulnerabilities and sensitivities can be explored 
in more detail, albeit as far as the interviewee is comfortable in allowing. 
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Husband: ... We would have never v,1orried about it before . You just would have gone and 
had it done. 
Wife: He' s got two knees and a hip replacement he should be having done . 
Husband: Yeah, I keep putting it off. 
Wife: But he keeps putting it off. 
Wife: And then I' ve found out in the last three months, I've got a bloody iron - too much 
iron in my blood and I've got to go and get it - half a litre taken out every three weeks ... 
the doctor said you just get it taken out; that's a precaution . 
Husband: .. . all those things play on you. 
Wife: It does. 
Husband: It plays on your mind, you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
[474] Interviewer: Have you had to put off any treatment or anything because of money issues? 
Or any checkups or that sort of thing? 
Wife: Well, see I - yeah, because I had to keep going to Brisbane with mine .... And I wasn ' t 
cleared from Brisbane until I was five years into - after the surgery but I had to fly to 
Brisbane and we would take the caravan down to Brisbane and that was still an expense 
and ... 
Husband: ... It ' s in the back of your mind , is it going to come back? You see, I' ve been 11 
years now free and didn ' t have radio or didn 't have chemo. I was pretty lucky. But I' ve 
known of other blokes that have been five years free and then bang, it ' s back on them again. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
Overall then, the sense of vulnerability in the context gives rise to a further reaction - that 
of fear. 
[475] I am fearful if I become unwell , I am fearful if I need money and I don't have it. I am 
fearful for what will happen when I can no longer look after myself properl y, what options I 
would have . I am fearful of all those things . [interview with Stonn investor] 
6.4.5.4.2 Vulnerability to changes in family circumstances 
Two interviews included lengthy discussion of how changes in wider family circumstances 
highlighted a further vulnerability: being able to provide appropriate support to family 
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members at a time of need351 • In one case help was able to be provided, but at a non-
financial cost to the interviewee(s) that was greater than it would have been formerly. In 
this instance, a daughter and her children returned to the parents (investors) family home 
but soon after doing so, the daughter was in the unfortunate position of being separated. 
[476] Investor: Anyway ... she ' s a separated woman with two children and we ' re - I used that 
word, but we're stuck with them okay, for how long? They 've been here nine months now, 
ten months now. We 're stuck with them and we ' re living in this situation. So there 's 
another impact it 's had on us. Had we have been still coasting along and ... 
Interviewer: Yeah, if you had the money you could do other things? 
Investor: We could do other things. We could help them out. 
Interviewer: So it's the option removal , isn ' t it? 
Investor: Yes. 
Interviewer: It 's the hassle? 
Investor: Yes. 
Interviewer: Dealing with life ' s awful things? 
Investor: Yes, that's right and that - since she's been here and the kids, that has affected my 
mental state to a certain degree too, you know? To the extent where I actually went to a 
doctor a few months ago and got a referral to a psychiatrist and to go on medication and I 
asked for the same medication that (my wife) is on because it seemed to be working good 
for her, you know? And he prescribed it and everything. I never, ever did it. I don ' t take 
tablets. You know, because I don 't want to go on medication. So I sort of talked myself 
around it, you know, and I've sort of settled down a lot. It ' s hard when you've got kids right 
in your pockets at my age, you know? When I'm supposed to be retired and just visiting 
them. They say grandkids are good because you can hand them back, you know? We can ' t. 
Interviewer: Can't hand them back? 
Investor: We can't hand them back. They're right here. Now, I love them. I love them very 
much. I love my daughter of course. But they ' re too close. It ' s too close. But anyway, we ' re 
prepared to do that. But yeah, it's like you say, a removal of options. We have no other 
option. [interview with Storm investor] 
351 Other interviews discussed also this issue but more briefly, with one couple not being able to help out a 
grandson in trouble with some debts, and several other interviews mentioning in general terms how they are 
in a difficult position to be able to help out those close to them should a need arise. 
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The lack of options available to the interviewee(s) reflects a lower level of control than they 
previously had to deal with not only their own situation, but also in being able to provide 
for others at their time of need. The resultant cost is not only to the recipient, but also to the 
interviewee. 
Another case was similar but this time involved a separated daughter (again with children) 
having to vacate a home that the parents (investors) had helped her into just before Stom1 ' s 
collapse. In this instance, the home then had to be sold in order to provide the funds to 
Uust) keep the parents in their own home (albeit still with a significant mortgage, with both 
investors retired). 
[ 4 77] Wife: Because my daughter ' s marriage had broken up and she wanted to live close because 
of support and the rents in this area were astronomical so we decided to use the money that 
mum had left us as a deposit and then her rent would pay it off. So we did have that 
property but when we sold that, we weren't going to get enough equity out of it to have 
paid off the loan here, but we would have got some money to have paid the mortgage long 
enough to sell this, you know, because it ' s a dreadful time on the market to se ll a 
property . .. we'd have paid off the mortgage and had nothing. So we sold that property, 
luckily sold it quite quickly and with a reasonable price and my daughter and her two 
children moved in with us. 
Interviewer: One thing that people have said out of the whole thing isn ' t so much ... that 
they lose the money because obviously that ' s a big thing, but that 's not the issue. The issue 
is you lose all the ability to do these other things you thought you were going to do like 
support your daughter in a difficult time or have the flexibility. Is that... ? 
W[fe: That was exactly it. I mean the guilt having to say ... 
Husband: ... I' m so rry we ' ve just helped you get into this place and now you've got to get 
out. [interview with Storm investor] 
Here, the cost was not considered to be burdensome to the parents (investors) , but a real 
regret was apparent at not being able to provide some certainty for their daughter and her 
family at a time when they had other significant challenges to deal with. 
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6.4.5.4.3 Other 
Another feature of how ' control' can be impacted is via the fact that one ' s financial 
devastation arising from Storm is not the only factor in one' s life that contributes to such 
devastation. One investor saw their loss in the light of other traumatic and personal life 
circumstances. 
[478] I've had to cope with a lot of kicks and knocks in my life. So luckily, I've been able to 
cope. I think deep down because I'm feeling a bit miserable as I said, it's all involving 
everything, the money loss and family situations ... it ' s just that I don ' t feel (like going out) 
- I just need motivation and I suppose I just think about why I'm feeling like I do because I 
stay in and sometimes I'm really down and it ' s the children as well as the financial thing. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
The interdependence of one' s life circumstances is also illustrated by the following excerpt. 
In this case, there is what might be termed a ' domino ' effect in terms of vulnerability and 
where the end result again is a lack of control in one' s life. 
[ 4 79] Investor: If I get ill enough that I can ' t work, I won ' t have a roof over my head. I will lose 
my home. Only while I'm working, can I just make the payments. I can ' t buy a new car. 
I've got a car that ' s 12 years old and whilst she's reliab1e, she ' s getting past the used by 
date . There is no way I can buy another car. .. if my car breaks down, I can ' t fix it. I' ve had 
to walk to work because I couldn't get my car fixed , I couldn't get a new tyre when I got a 
flat one. The battery ran out, I had to walk to work. 
Interviewer: Yeah, see even those little things? 
Investor: Yeah. 
Interviewer: Well, I guess they ' re not little anymore, they ' re big things now. 
Investor: Well, they are when you ' re getting on in years. I mean walking to work - I love 
walking . . . but I like it as a choice not a necessity ... my life is just totally restricted. I feel 
like I'm tied up in a ball of string. I can move a limb every now and then but r can ' t expand. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
.Alli 
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6.4.5.5 Visual representation of loss o_fcontrol 
A word cloud representation relating to the overall loss of control is as follows: 
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6.5 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we presented the findings to the major research question of this thesis: what 
are the impacts on people when they experience a significant financial shock? The excerpts 
used to give evidence for the findings in this chapter can be summarised as follows: 
Table 13: Breakdown of data excerpts used in chapter six 
Interviews Public Public Other Total 
submissions hearings correspondence 
Investors 244 81 41 13 379 
Stonn employees and advisers 26 2 8 1 37 
Financial planners 0 9 5 4 18 
Others 0 16 25 4 45 
Total 270 108 79 22 479 
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The predominant reliance on interviews is apparent, with 56% of all excerpts being from 
that source. This bears out the intention of this chapter to discuss the impact upon 
individuals, for which interviews offered the most flexible and appropriate source to 
explore such impacts. A further breakdown of interviews is also informative. The 270 
interview excerpts give an average contribution of 18 excerpts from each of the 15 
interview participants, with 12 of the 15 interview participants contributing between 14 and 
23 excerpts. One contributed 11 , one 9, and there was one arguable 'outlier' which 
contributed 36 excerpts. We note that this particular interview participant was one where a 
dinner meal was offered in the initial interview, giving a setting and availability of time to 
allow a greater reach of interview questioning. We also note that given the nature of the 
research, it is not unexpected that there will be some variation in the relevance of some 
responses across participants. It is also noteworthy however that there are significant 
contributions from the other sources, including the range of ' other correspondence' that 
arose over the course of the research. 
Unequivocally, the impacts of significant financial loss are profound, deep, and very real , 
and relate to far more than a loss of financial status and means. A first and immediate area 
of impact is in the emotional and health-related areas of an individual ' s life (their ' personal ' 
world). In terms of the emotional impact arising from the sudden demise of Storm, shock 
was an understandable and immediate reaction of many, and this was often also associated 
with a feeling of numbness and disbelief which was predominantly, but not exclusively, a 
short term reaction. A deep sense of real and protracted anger at various parties was also 
felt, and still resides some years on for many investors. This has been exacerbated not only 
by the collapse of Storm, but also by events and revelations since that time. A related 
emotional outlet has been fear, which also exists for a variety of investors as they 
contemplate a future with limited financial means. Where the investment with Storm was to 
provide for dependents, a feeling of angst and fear of one' s situation now is especially 
apparent. Aspects of frustration, regret and guilt predominate for many investors as they 
reflect on their own decisions over time, the actions of others, and where it leaves them 
today. 
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In tenns of the impact on health, it is in the realm of mental wellbeing that the impacts of 
significant financial loss appear to be particularly pronounced. Examples of stress, anxiety, 
depression and a need for a variety of medication did and still abound, and were explicitly 
discussed in the majority of interviews conducted. Other evidence indicates that the 
incidence of such conditions appears to be well above estimates for the general population. 
Aspects of self-harm are also frequently raised in the data, and feature as an especially 
severe impact for many. Mental wellbeing is not independent of physical wellbeing 
however, and many examples exist of serious physical impacts as well. 
A second area of impact concerns the social world of an individual 's life. Marriages and 
close relationships have been impacted, and where this has fallen short of a fonnal divorce, 
separation or break-up, the impact has nevertheless been real and very personal. What was 
particularly poignant in interviews was the willingness and openness of some participants 
to share their own stories in this matter. Relationships with friends and family have been 
another casualty, with a range of negative impacts resulting from either very direct 
judgements and criticisms being made, or more subtle changes that have arisen. In other 
cases, responses of others has been favourable , with tangible help and emotional support 
being offered. It may be the case that the status of a relationship prior to such losses is an 
indication of how it will be after such losses, though this is not a conclusive insight - for 
some, formerly close friends are now no longer that, whereas for others, friendships have 
been drawn closer through such adverse circumstances. 
Another aspect of one ' s social world to have been impacted is the ability to be involved in 
wider cultural, familial and community roles . It has been particularly galling for investors 
who were grandparents, who now perceive a loss of means and ability to fulfil that familial 
role in the manner they were anticipating. Other impacts concern the diminished ability 
(and for some, no ability) to be involved in sporting, charitable and other community 
pursuits, due to the lack of financial means to do so. For others, an increased sense of 
social isolation relates more to the emotional bankruptcy now being felt. An especially 
strong response relates to the perception of judgement from the community at large, which 
can lead to further withdrawal from society. Overall social impacts are exacerbated by the 
·network· effect , aris ing from the concentration of investors in family groups and 
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concentrated geographical areas. This can result in support networks not being as available 
or helpful as they otherwise would be. 
A third area of impact relates to a loss of trust. This trust relates to a range of parties, that 
would otherwise be relied upon for financial and overall wellbeing. The most obvious 
target for impacted trust is the strategy offered by Storm and many of the personnel 
involved, albeit mitigated by the fact that Storm as an company no longer exists. It is 
noteworthy that an allocation of blame upon Storm is not universally held amongst 
investors. The financial planning profession in general is another party in who distrust now 
predominates, with many contributers to the PJCI outlining their poor experiences with 
advisers within and beyond Storm. The manner in which some compensation and 
settlements have occurred since Storm has also resulted in anger and distrust towards some 
legal firms. The role of the government is also seen with some suspicion by many, 
particularly through the role of the regulator ASIC but also through the regulatory settings 
in place, services provided by Centrelink, and post-government responses such as the PJCI. 
A loss of trust in oneself has also eventuated for many investors, arising from the 
aforementioned sense of frustration, guilt and regret. 
Perhaps the epitome of Storm' s collapse in terms of trust is the disenchantment, anger and 
adverse perceptions of the banks and credit providers inyolved. Indeed, more adverse 
comment was made in public submissions to the PJCI about such institutions than about 
Storm or other financial advisers. Importantly and especially in the case of Storm, this lack 
of trust has arisen as much from events post-collapse as it has from events pre- and during 
the collapse. It is evident that this severe loss of trust in what should otherwise be a 
cornerstone institution in one's financial affairs, is a particularly damaging outcome of 
Storm' s collapse. 
What an impact on the ability to trust can lead to, amongst other things, is a lack of control 
in one' s life. From the interviews in particular was a sense that the major challenge facing 
investors was a need to feel they have some say in their life. With diminished financial 
means, a low likelihood of recovery for many within any reasonable timeframe, and the 
legacy of the emotional, social and trust-related impacts, there is a heightened sense of 
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vulnerability to adverse life events. These events can relate to changes in some or all of 
housing, health, vocational and family circumstances. 
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Chapter 7: The system of financial provision 
7 .1 Introduction 
Chapter six presented observations and results from Storm' s fallout relating to the primary 
research question. Given the goal to describe what happens to individuals following 
significant financial loss, the results and discussion presented focused on the individual 
investors themselves - 379 of the 479 data excerpts referred to were explicitly the views of 
investors. In contrast, this chapter presents what we infer more widely from Stonn 
regarding issues and challenges with the Australian system of financial provision. Although 
raw data in the form of selected excerpts again supports the discussion in this chapter, the 
focus turns more to the views of those who were concerned with such wider inferences. As 
such, in this chapter just 24 of the 75 data excerpts referred to are explicitly the views of 
investors, with now a greater focus on other contributors to the PJCI. 
The circumstances and fallout of Storm's collapse poses interesting questions for 
individuals, institutions and government. There are obvious challenges to the regulatory 
regime, but it also asks a bigger question: what do individuals fundamentally rely on when 
providing for themselves in a financial sense? And furthermore, is that ' reliance' reliable, 
in the sense that it can deliver to individuals what they seek in terms of financial security? 
Findings from Storm' s collapse give us an opportunity to comment on these issues, with the 
benefit of having talked to investors and advisers, as well as the thoughts of a range of 
parties from what is effectively a selected survey of the industry via the various data 
sources. 
The discussion in chapter two highlighted that financial security in Australia is essentially 
built on a system of ' pillars '. The language of pillars signifies strength and reliability, and 
indicates something that can be trusted. Yet, clearly for those investors involved with 
Storm, we have seen a vulnerability in their ability to attain such financial security. This 
does not infer that the stated 'pillars ' are not delivering the ends to which they are designed 
- 360 -
to provide, but it does mean that another look at such a system can be infonnative -
particularly so to highlight the ultimate basis required for any system to function - that 
being trust. 
In this chapter therefore we di scuss and suggest an alternative way of looking at financial 
provision in Australia. We also discuss the extent to which environmental issues such as 
regulation, levels of financial literacy, and the financial services industry in general, 
provide a help or hindrance to such provision. The discussion provided is based on 
observations and findings from the impacts we have observed in the real marketplace. 
Given that such observations and findings are firmly grounded in the data, we believe the 
views expressed carry credibility to the extent that the evidence and our own interpretation 
allows. 
7 .2 A system of pillars revisited 
A statement that there are ' three pillars ' upon which one can rely on financial provision can 
conjure an image of strength through independence - three separate pillars together 
supporting some stated goal or feature. However, one aspect of Australia's system of pillars 
that has been highlighted here is that the pillars are not independent of one another. This 
lack of independence is apparent in various ways. 
One way in which this can be seen is in the intent of each of the first two pillars - or, 
perhaps, more accurately, differing interpretations of what the relationship between them is. 
The CEO of IFSA asked the following : 
[ 480] If we go back to the original principle, which is pretty bipartisan , of compul sory 
superannuation we can ask: was it simply to require that people had the pension and a bit of 
money or was it that we had a huge number of people having full self-sufficiency based on 
superannuation? [public hearing [3] , p.56] 
Others understand pillar two as being an encouragement rather than fulfilment or 
deliverance of self-sufficiency, wi th pillar one onl y intended to be a safety net rather than 
an anticipated supplement to income from other pillars . Whatever the particular 
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interpretation or understanding of the relationship, what is clear is that pillars one and two 
are not independent of each other - for example, if pillar two can provide substantial funds 
for an individual, then income from pillar one will be reduced for that individual as a 
consequence of means testing. Without doubt, the introduction of compulsory 
superannuation as pillar two has put more onus on the individual for financial provision 
rather than the mechanism of a collective, taxpayer funded age pension, and as such, no 
reasonable interpretation can be that pillars one and two are independent mechanisms for 
providing retirement income. 
Another reason to not view the pillars as independent is via the responsibility being 
delegated to individuals in respect of investment decisions in pillar two, and savings and 
investment decisions in pillar three. An individual brings to bear their own levels of 
interest, knowledge, and intent to each of pillars two and three, and as such, the investment 
decisions in each of those pillars are not independent. For example, whilst many may 
choose an equity-heavy investment option for their superannuation, such a preference may 
also be demonstrated with their investment decisions in pillar three. Or a preference in 
general for cash investments may well be reflected in a conservative superannuation 
investment option, and the choice of a term deposit for other savings. Neither of these 
possibilities is right or wrong per se, but the point is that the decisions lie with the 
individual, rather than with expert managers with mand~ted expectations to deliver a 
certain outcome such as with DB funds. In other words, diversification of expertise would 
exist in a system with pillars of an age pension, a DB scheme, and one ' s own savings, but 
with the current system where the majority have DC superannuation, such diversification 
( and hence to all intents and purposes, some independence between the pillars) is 
lessened 352 . 
A related aspect concerns behavioural realities which can emerge as well. Somewhat 
perversely, it is possible that pillar two does not encourage independence or self-provision 
in the long term in the way that it was intended. For example, as attested by investors such 
352 With many individuals somewhat apathetic with regards to their superannuation (and therefore utilising 
default investment options) but potentially taking a more direct involvement in savings in the third pillar, 
arguably this reliance on ' pension / default / self provides some independence in terms of expertise, but not 
much as that for a ' pension / DB account I self' combination. 
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as those in excerpts [301] and [ 417] 353 , a general malaise, laziness or misplaced confidence 
can apply in the belief that such material provision from pillar two could feasibly look after 
itself regardless of the detail of decisions made with it. To quote the CEO of IFSA again: 
[ 481] We have also seen - and this is a little alarming - a significant drop in personal savings, 
because people sit back and say, ' My super is looking after my savings; my home ' s looking 
after my savings. ' That gives them little flexibility as a consequence. [public hearing [3], 
p .56] 
Indeed, the evidence points to the existence 111 some cases of poor financial habits, 
knowledge and planning, a reliance on others who are similarly uninfonned (and not just 
other investors), false confidence based on heuristic shortcuts when making decisions, the 
admission of laziness and a lack of engagement on occasion, and so on. It cannot be 
claimed of course that the current system of pillars is the exclusive cause of such 
behaviours354, but it is noteworthy that this system has not removed such issues either. 
What is suggested though is that for many where superannuation savings have delivered 
healthy fund balances, and where such growth has occurred with little effort from the 
individual355 , perhaps such relative affluence breeds its own problems - not just expectation 
of a certain lifestyle, but an avoidance or delay in acquiring the skills to manage one's 
affairs. 
Furthermore, even more critical than the initial settings of such pillars is the compounding 
impact of changes over time to the system. When a system of pillars has constant changes 
to it in tenns of the relative advantage and potential provision from each (to be discussed in 
more detail shortly), then the complexity of such a system increases over time, and 
arguably, a level of trust in the reliability of such pillars decreases as well. 
353 These excerpts relate to different investors. 
354 Indeed , many investors will be very happy with the opportunity that having substantial encouragement and 
compu lsion to save has given them. As one non-Stom1 investor states, " the Australian Superannuation 
Scheme has added purpose and value to our rema ining years and we urge you to encourage and promote thi s . 
A message that ·'Yes we can '· manage our own retireme nt fund s is badly needed to counteract the prevailin g 
message that it is too hard for the ordinary person. Support us with the regulatory too ls to manage and we will 
get on with it. Teach us how to fi sh .. . ' · (public submi ss ion 172). 355 Or more correctly little perceived effort, as many individuals may not appreciate the SG contributions as 
being fo regone consumption or an opportunity fo r alternative savings mechanisms in the meantime. 
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One further point to note is that not all pillars are equal in value to an individual, and 
neither are they of similar relative value across different individuals. The following 
interview excerpt indicates that perhaps a potential 2.5 rather than 3 pillar system is seen as 
d · · fi 356 a more apt escnpt10n or many . 
[ 482] Interviewer: So you get your super next year obviously? 
Investor: Oh, there ' s nothing much of it. I'm from that era where we didn ' t come into it 
long tenn. I don ' t have much in super. I can 't even retire on the super. [interview with 
Storm investor] 
Thus, in as far as strength is through the provision and independence of three pillars, the 
current system may not be the epitome of strength that it first appears to be. Rather, instead 
of individuals viewing themselves as operating within a three-pillar framework, a more 
accurate picture would be that many hear a message to take steps to self-provision. Notably, 
if it is pillars two and three that deliver self-sufficiency, then the adequacy of these pillars is 
dictated in part by the appropriateness of decisions made with respect to them. 
Furthermore, despite these decisions, there is also a dependence on other parties as to 
resulting outcomes - namely, the relevant institutions as well as government. 
7.2.1 The 'real' pillars? 
The discussion above is not intended to dismiss the adequacy or otherwise of the Australian 
three pillar system, but such a framework does not serve to highlight the key findings 
arising from the example of Storm. Rather, to understand the impact of financial loss for an 
individual and what this says about wider issues of financial provision, requires an 
alternative lens to see what key dependencies exist for an individual ' s financial wellbeing. 
Vile therefore offer a re-framing of the three pillars in this section and provide a discussion 
on each, with respect to what financial loss means . 
356 Even further, if the reliance on the age pension is seen as the epitome of financial ' failure ' (as it was for 
this particular investor), arguably this investor is only operating on the basis of 1.5 rather than 3 'pillars' for 
overall wellbeing (meaning ' ability to participate in society') , rather than just financial provision. 
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Australia·s three pillar retirement savings system is a framework to view what could be 
called the ' mechanisms ' of income. Undoubtedly, each of those pillars can potentially357 
supply a degree of financial provision for an individual into the future. If, however, we 
view a ' pillar' as something to be trusted so that something else can be provided, then 
looking beyond the mechanics of provision to the sources of provision is more 
enlightening. What the case of Storm showcases is that three major 'sources ' of trust are 
required when making financial decisions, and that these sources of trust are the very things 
that are impacted when traumatic financial loss eventuates. These three sources are the 
government, the industry and its institutions, and oneself. 
This alternative framework can also be viewed as analogous to the accepted and cunently 
promulgated framework : the age pension is a provision from government, superannuation 
savings is a provision via industry and institutions, and other savings is a provision sourced 
more directly from oneself. Like the accepted framework, these sources are separate but not 
independent358, but an advantage of this alternative framework is that it allows us to 
consider not just one' s financial wellbeing but also one's sense of overall wellbeing. 
7. 2 .1. 1 Government 
Although we make an analogy above between government as a source of trust, and its role 
in providing an age pension, this analogy does not highlight the crux of the matter for either 
one' s financial wellbeing, nor indeed one' s overall wellbeing. Indeed, trust in the 
government as a provider for individual and collective welfare goes far beyond the 
provision of an age pension, even in the context of financial prov1s10n, and even in the 
more focused sphere of retirement income359 . 
357 G iven the ex peri ence of Stom1 investors, ' potentially ' is th e correct word for outcom es ari sing from dec isions made w ith savings made from pillars two and three. 358 Indeed, institutions of course must work within the legis lative and regul atory environment that is decid ed by government, governments are elected by indi viduals, and so on. 
'
59 C learly, the influence o f government is foundational in financial and overall wellbeing of its governed 
c itizens through taxation, infra tructure, education and health policy. But even putting this and the prov ision 
of an age pension aside, there are other relevant and vital contributi ons by government to retirement income 
outcomes. 
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How government has a say, and therefore demands trust, in the welfare of those saving for 
and drawing an income in retirement are manifest in many ways . It is clear from evidence 
presented earlier that trust in government firstly involves how individuals hear and take on 
board all messages about the need to be self-sufficient. Importantly, this message is not just 
through translating the verbal messages and cues of political figures with regard to the 
future and intent of the first two pillars - but it is also through the plethora of other 
messages and information that individuals receive. For example, where there are changes to 
rules and regulations, where advice is received from Centrelink, where perceptions are 
formed of other government decisions, these all shape one ' s belief about the urgency for 
self-sufficiency. 
Other factors are also critical in forming beliefs about the need to look after oneself, and as 
such re-allocate trust for financial provision from government to oneself. As seen in chapter 
six, such factors include government reactions to calamitous events, misunderstanding of 
the role of ASIC and regulation in general, the service and care at an individual level at 
Centrelink. All of these send a message to individuals regarding a key question highlighted 
earlier: does government care or not? Notably, the more that individuals perceive a push for 
self-sufficiency, the more the answer to that question is 'no ' . 
The issue of trust in the pillar of government is also hinted at by the insightful questions of 
Smith (2009). In the light of individuals suffering losses as a result of engaging with 
financial markets in a manner in which, perhaps, they were not and could not be equipped 
to do so, she asks : "Did governments intend this as a possible result when they privatised 
retirement income provision through superannuation? Did retail investors, who are also 
voters, perceive this as a possible risk of the privatisation of retirement income provision? 
Did regulators ever warn ( or require providers to warn) retail investors about these risks?" 
(p.515). Others provided similar thoughts to the PJCI: 
[ 483] Governments throughout the world have actively promoted the idea of building personal 
wealth to fund retirement. The privatisation of public utilities and business globally 
introduced millions to the share market. Australia is no different. It ' s a case of setting the 
environment before educating the people. [public submission 398 from Law Academic] 
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[484] Many people, for example, talk about consumer responsibility , saymg that consumers 
should take more responsibility . The reality is that it is not going to happen in the current 
environment where you have got limited consumer literacy. So you cannot pass it off and 
say consumers need to take more responsibility. [Head of Financial Planning, Institute of 
Chartered Accountants in Australia, public hearing [7] , p.12] 
The belief that the push for self-reliance should not remove responsibility from government 
was also highlighted by other submitters to the PJCI. In effect, there is a view that ' self-
sufficiency ' is to a degree, an oxymoron - no-one is independent of others and no-one can 
work in isolation from the environment in which they exist, and notably, this environment 
itself is shaped in a major way by government intention, communication, and more 
fonnally via policy and regulation: 
[ 485] The introduction of compulsory superannuation is somewhat conflictive itself. To ensure 
the populations have adequate savings for retirement, the government compels individuals 
to save - implying the belief that they would not do so vo luntarily ... perhaps the 
government should take some responsibility of introducing such complexity into the li ves 
of many Australians. [CEO of IFSA, public hearing [3] , p.56] 
[ 486] Implicit with the passing on of this responsibility has been the transference of the risks 
involved with managing these issues; without any consideration by the parties transferring 
the responsibility (i .e. employers and governments), of the public ' s capacity to understand 
financial risks or their ability to manage these risks . [public submission 168 from Financial 
Planner] 
One aspect of government as a ' pillar ' of financial and overall wellbeing relates not just to 
the environment at a point in time, but also how this environment changes over time. More 
pointedly, where government itself makes changes to the environment in which individuals 
and advi sers must work, then this is seen as particularly unhelpful , frustrating, and 
darnaging360 . The irony is of course that the goal of individual self-sufficiency is itself a 
government-encouraged one. 
·
160 An analogy may help here. If a parent wants his child to learn to play cricket , then they might buy them a ba ll , a bat , and some wickets. The parent then has at least two cho ices - to get alongside the chi ld and show 
them. or leave them to learn it themselves. In the latter case, suppose that after several weeks of the child learning by themse lf, the parent then changes the length of the pitch, the a ll owed style of bowling, the value 
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Given their role and exposure to such changes, the group most strongly commenting on this 
issue in PJCI hearings and submissions, as well as in additional correspondence to us over 
the course of this research, was financial planners. Two excerpts from financial planners 
indicate the types of views held. 
[487] Successive governments (of both political persuasions) have built a superannuation system 
and a Centrelink system that have a complexity that almost mandates the requirement to 
seek advice. Amongst the salaried technical support people in the industry there is a 
standard joke that each Federal Budget further cements their indispensability to the 
financial advising community as another layer of complexity is added to the system; 
another set of "grandfathering" is added to the rules governing superannuation and 
Centrelink pensions. [public submission 168 from Financial Planner] 
[ 48 8] As an example, the laughable issues we have at the moment with superannuation and the 
continual regulatory changes imposed on us by a government, who only have their 
preservation in mind rather than what's good for the long term. Today's knee jerk 
legislation on the run by Shorten is a prime example: "Lets tax every fund that earns 
$100,000 in a year ... " [email from financial adviser, April 2013] 
The environmental feature that is desired by these financial planners and therefore their 
clients, is certainty. Naturally enough nothing can ever be totally certain and unchanging, 
but this is actually not what is being asked for. Rather, any changes should consistently 
align with self-sufficiency if indeed that is the goal, rather than other motivations such as 
attested by the above excerpt. Furthermore, the direct consequence of continual changes is 
a lack of confidence (and thereby trust), a point also highlighted by others with respect to 
yet more changes recently made to superannuation (for example, Maiden 2013). The two 
financial planners above also commented further on this aspect of certainty: 
of runs earned per boundary and also the rules around dismissals. It may still be cricket, and the parent may 
still want his child to play, but the child is not getting consistency or certainty in which to learn and become a 
decent player. A financial planner may argue further that if they are allowed as a cricket coach to help the 
child along, then as a result of such changes to the game, their own role and expectations thereof is as difficult 
as anyone else's. 
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[ 489] It would be more economically beneficial to every stakeholder if there was certainty. 
Clients could plan with more certainty, the regulator ' s task would be easier, and the 
Government ' s tax revenue would increase. [public submission 168 from Financial Planner] 
[ 490] The reason the general public are disillusioned with super has more to do with certainty of 
legislation than any of the other reason .. . Keating when treasurer once stated "This now 
completes the governments changes to retirement and superannuation Australians can now 
invest in certainty for their retirement future" since then there has been on average a major 
change to superannuation approximately every 28 days. [ email from financial adviser, April 
2013] 
The collapse of Stonn highlights that the pillar of govenunent can be a fragile source of 
assurance. The dependence on this pillar is multi-faceted and as such, has multiple points of 
vulnerability. Notably, Storm's collapse reflects some regulatory shortfalls (Chardon 2011), 
which implies that the welfare and protection of financial victims is not just their own 
business, but also that of govenunent361 . Thus, there should be concern that potential future 
outcomes for individuals more widely are not immune from significant setbacks. 
It is clear from earlier evidence that this fragility has been exposed and as such, the trust is 
now a fractured pillar for many. What this means for many of those impacted is 
summarized in the following interview excerpt: 
[ 491] It was the Government who made superannuation compulsory and yet there was no 
guarantee - there was no security for your money ... these people are out there giving 
financial advice and in our case, we lost it all. Period. So the Government stinks. The 
Government - we should really be suing the Government. Well , we shouldn ' t have to sue 
them ; they should just be compensating us because it was the Government 's fault. 
[interview with Stonn investor] 
·
16 1 Indeed, ·government ' in a broader sense is representative of what the ultimate collective pooling of ri sk 
and provision could or should be (notwithstanding the right and habits of individuals to make their own dec isions. outsid e the reasonable care and restraints of the ' collective '). 
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Although the logic leap from the loss event to the government being the responsible entity 
in the outcome is the cry of a hurting individual more than an objective participant, it 
nevertheless showcases the feeling and lack of trust in this pillar that now exists for many. 
7. 2.1. 2 Institutions 
We use the term ' institutions ' to incorporate those entities of the financial services industry 
that are corporate, professional or commercial-orientated. As seen in chapter six, the main 
entities of relevance are financial advisers, credit providers, and legal firms , but for the 
purpose of suggesting ' institutions ' as a second pillar of wellbeing, this more 
comprehensively would cover most financial service participants such as superannuation 
funds, deposit-taking institutions, and related professions such as accountants , actuaries and 
auditors. Pillar two can then be thought of as any entity in the business sphere which exists 
by virtue of trust and faith placed in it, to deliver certain financial and advisory outcomes 
for individuals. 
Quite obviously in today 's world, an individual needs to be able to rely on and trust some 
or all of these entities at various times in order to provide for themselves over a lifetime and 
into retirement. Historically, a great deal of trust has been placed and been reflected in the 
ethical orientation of such entities. For example, Littrell (2010) highlights that historically, 
senior bankers appreciated that their role involved a moral duty to deliver fair service and 
outcomes for depositors , shareholders, the bank, and employees. Such historical trust was 
also highlighted by SICAG in its appearance before the PJCI. 
[ 492] Our fathers and grandfathers trusted their bank manager implicitly and accepted their 
advice, safe in the knowledge that the banker would act in the customer ' s best interests at 
all times. [Mr Mark Weir, SICAG co-chairman, public hearing [6] , p.70] 
However, Littrell (2010) contrasts his observation about a banker ' s moral duty historically 
to what he now sees applying. He considers a better representation could now be 
'shareholder value above all' , whereby ' depositors are just another supplier', and for 
investment banks ' clients' are now ' counterparties'. None of these representations infer 
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immoral activity or motivation, but they do suggest a trend away from true stewardship362. 
To also contrast SICAG's views on historical aspects of trust, their public submission also 
highlighted similar changes in recent times: 
[493] During the 1980s all the major banks moved from being "service providers' ' to "se llers of 
financial products" . Personnel management systems required annual setting of business 
objectives that were linked to substantial bonus payments. Bankers became " used car 
sa lesmen", their primary concern being the selling of financial products and receipt of 
bonus payments. This culture has led to many problems for the banking industry not the 
least of which is the current world financial meltdown. [public submission 276, from 
SICAG] 
More specifically to Storm's collapse and as seen from the extensive evidence presented in 
chapter six, a loss of trust in many institutional entities has resulted363 . Consequently in 
tenns of our alternative pillar framework , there is also a fracturing of the reliability and 
trust of pillar two. For an adviser impacted by Storm's demise, a comment was made to 
clarify that it is not necessarily trust that is lost, but more a perception and realisation of the 
historical trends highlighted above: 
[494] (It) is not so much I've lost trust, I just put things more into perspective and say banks are 
big greedy institutions that answer to their shareholders ... and I don ' t think that they have 
got an altruistic bone in their body. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 364 
Furthennore, it is not just those directly linked to Stonn as investors and/or advisers that 
perceive a fault-line in one's trust in relevant institutions. Interesting insights were also 
362 Littrell (20 I 0) also adds that "my sense is that Australasian industry practice is so under than in some Ameri can and European banks, a senior Australian bank executive is still likely to agree to the proposit ion that deposi tors have a special status and deserve special consideration , to ensure that their money is safe". 363 This also reflects a modem day mistrust of institutions in general - for example, survey resu lts highl igh ted by MacDonald et al. (20 11 ) suggest that a maj or reason for avers ion to the utilisat ion of amrnities in 
retirement is a distrust of financial insti tutions. 
364 Another P JCT submitter described his concerns about trust in some institutions, notwithstanding his own invo lvement in the industry. If individuals are fo rced to consult more direc tly wi th banks than via independent financial planners. then such consultation with a " friendly bank manager for adv ice" has a metaphor: " 'Come into my parlour ' sa id the spider to the fly'· (public submi ss ion 35 from non -S tonn Investor and owner of financia l advisory fim1). 
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given by PJCI members in the course of the Inquiry, as well as by family members of 
Storm investors365 : 
[495] I am not surprised that the world is experiencing a 'Financial meltdown' if this is how our 
Financial institutions behave. My parents trusted Storm Financial. They trusted that Storm 
and the banks were doing the right thing for them, not ultimately destroying them. [public 
submission 310 from daughter of Storm Investors] 
[ 496] I have always been of the belief that banks existed to help businesses get ahead, but over 
the past few months I am starting to wonder if Banks think businesses exist to help banks 
get ahead. [public submission 291 from family member of Storm Investor] 
[497] Senator Williams: Let us hope those financials around the world who actually brought on 
this global financial crisis through subprime lending and reckless lending have learnt the 
same lesson so that we are not back in this position in the near or distant future. The whole 
thing comes back to reckless lending and unsecured lending, and when things tum sour, 
whether it be Storm or whether it be the subprime in America, this is what has brought the 
globe to its knees economy-wise. 
Senator Boyce: I do not think human nature is going to change. [public hearing [9], p.57] 
[498] Senator Williams: We will probably end up with more ethical banking in the next five or 10 
years. But then when the greed for money gets too much, we will be back here. I was 
involved in foreign currency loans with Swiss francs. When we looked back that was 
foolish lending. The banks should have learnt back in those days . But now we have the 
CBA and the CGI in the middle of this issue up to their ears ... I would not be surprised if 
we see the same issue in another 20 years' time with people back here doing the same thing 
again. [public hearing [8], p.53] 
A loss of trust in pillar two has serious and concerning implications for those involved. One 
implication is a call and potential response to give greater protection for the individual, 
which is clearly not a concern per se, but it does mean an intrusion into a market whose 
365 As a further perspective as well, public submission [400] from the Finance Sector Union highlights survey 
findings of Union members (predominantly from the banking sector). Notably, 59% "felt pressure to make 
inappropriate sales to meet sales targets meet sales targets"; 52% "felt obliged to try and sell debt products 
even when a customer didn ' t need them; and 63% "felt that inappropriate sales targets are having a negative 
impact on their ability to provide responsible customer service" . 
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operation is premised on the minimisation of such intrusions. The concern with this (other 
than questions of regulatory efficiency which we briefly touch on sho1ily) is that this 
possibility has been raised only because of the lack of trust in the existing framework and 
institutional players. One investor attested as much in their public submission to the P JCI : 
[ 499) The lay person must be protected when they pay for a service. Banks also have to return to 
the time when the customer was an important and respected commodity ... Bankers are no 
longer respected by society and isn ' t it sad that they have gone so far down in soc iety 's 
thinking. [public submission 21 from Storm Investor] 
Such a lack of trust and respect in any institution is not a healthy state of affairs for any 
market participant (including the institution). Nevertheless it is a real outcome, and this 
presents challenges to the ability of an individual to function as a citizen in today ' s society. 
One Storm investor who had much hope riding on potential legal actions against various 
credit providers highlighted this challenge: 
[500) (If we are restored via legal action) that ' s got its own emotional problems with it too 
because what do we with that money? I' II never, ever trust a third party to manage my 
money again and I've trusted professionals in the Storm Financial matter and they failed 
me. I've trusted my bank and they (did far worse than just fail me) . .. So I' ll never trust 
them again ... I' ve had enough bad experiences with people in that industry to know that I 
will never, ever trust any of them to manage my money ever again. So that in itself creates a 
problem. [interview with Storm investor] 
Thus, if pillars one and two have crumbled for many in tenns of trust, that potentially 
generates or forces a great reliance on the third pillar of one's overall and financial 
wellbeing: oneself. It is important to note though that thi s concentration of reliance on 
oneself is not necessaii ly the preference of many individuals - rather, they perceive that as a 
result of their experience with Stonn and its aftennath, they have little choice. The 
following excerpt highlights the crumbling of trust in pillar two for one couple, and serves 
as an introduction to a discussion of pillar three: 
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[501] A representative of the National Australia Bank contacted my husband and I last week. 
They asked us to consider coming in and talking to one of their financial planners. My 
husband laughed and asked if it mattered if he swore on their recorded conversation. She 
asked why he might swear, and when my husband said, ' We 've been caught up with the 
Storm Financial debacle,' she asked : 'What is Storm? I don ' t know what you ' re talking 
about. ' My husband and I discussed the conversations later and the things that we have 
learned from this: one, do not trust banks or financial planners; two, do not risk things you 
cannot afford to lose, in dollar terms or emotionally; and, three, ask many, many questions 
and ensure that you get the answers. [public hearing [ 4] , p.86] 
7. 2. 1. 3 Oneself 
Armed with growing superannuation balances and messages about self-sufficiency from 
government, individuals appreciate that they must also rely on themselves and what they 
choose, and what they can provide via other self-sourced means for financial wellbeing. 
This reliance on self represents a third pillar. Its precedence now in the minds of many has 
arisen not only from the overall push and trends in society towards individualisation, but 
also by default as a result of a crumbling trust in the first two pillars. This was indicated by 
several of those interviewed: 
[502] Don't retire, because the minute you retire - not unless you do your homework before you 
do ... think about it a long time. Now is the time. This superannuation bulls---; mate, I don ' t 
trust it. You get - build yourself some houses . Hang onto them because one day - one day, 
they ' ll have a big boom again. [interview with Storm investor] 
[503] It ' s been really hard. It ' s been really hard to even want to go to back to investing 
anything .... but I know that there ' s no other way. You know, I don ' t want to be at 
retirement age and have to live on the pension because there won ' t be one for my - anyone 
our age. [interview with Storm investor] 
[504] You have to be in charge of yourself from day one, even from birth. [interview with Storm 
investor] 
- 374 -
[505] I do think financial advice is very important because things are getting so complicated in 
the world . However, at the end of the day, you ' ve got to take responsibility on what yo u 
decide to do yourself and something that I believe in a lot more now . [interview with ex-
Stonn adviser] 
However, such reliance is not and cannot function in isolation from the first two pillars . 
Institutions are still needed, and choices are still made within the framework and decisions 
promulgated by government. Given the discussion in the previous two sections regarding 
the first two pillars, this presents challenges for pillar three. The exacerbation of such 
challenges by the overall push towards individualisation is discussed in more detail in 
section 7.3. 
7.2. 1.4 More than three? 
As indicated in chapter two, housing is also highlighted by some as a fourth pillar in the 
network of financial security in Australia. Given the discussion in section 6.4.5.2, the 
findings from Storm support any assertion that one' s housing ' s circumstances has both 
significant financial and emotional implications, and can also be impacted by unfavourable 
outcomes arising from the first three pillars366. Hence, changes in one's housing 
circumstances can also be directly related to the issue of trust of other parties as well 367 . 
An additional pillar is that of ' others'. This includes family and friends and other personal 
contacts, rather than professional engagement with an institution in pillar two. The 
influence and reliance on others was clearly shown to be relevant in section 6.3.4 in the 
context of deciding whether or not to invest in Storm, but the pillar of 'others ' has far more 
direct influence as well. Indeed, many people rely partly on their family to help and provide 
for them in retirement, given the role of families to "serve as a mechanism for the pooling 
366 For example : encouragement to buy via first home buyer grants or concess io ns which change over time 
according to the political winds of the day; a mortgage rate not reducing in line with expectations of socie ty 
and govern ment as RBA cash rates fa ll can force the sa le of a home; and one ' s own respons ibiliti es and dec isions in choosing a house of a certain location, price and/or condition which may or may not be favourab le in the long term . 
367 What this furth er suggests is that indi viduals should comprehensively consider the pros and cons of the deve loping range of products that access home equity fo r the purposes of re tirement income. Furthem1ore, the 
onus should c learly be on the product provider(s) to ensure (rather than just di sc lose) tha t those considering 
such products are aware of the ri sks invo lved in a manner which is meanjngful to them. 
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and sharing of income and consumption" (MacDonald and Moore 2011 ). But despite this, 
the role of wider social circles is usually given scant regard in the normal course of 
retirement planning. 
Additional participants in this pillar also include those collective groups which can arise 
from such traumatic events (Quarantelli's (1999) 'emergent quality' of disaster responses 
discussed in section 4.4.1.2), most obviously SICAG in the context of Storm. Indeed, the 
value placed by many investors in the collective power and comfort of such groups is even 
more poignant when considering the sense of social isolation that many investors otherwise 
find themselves in (as evidenced in section 6.4.3.1.4). Perhaps such poignancy is more a 
reflection on modem society where older persons often live alone and away from family, 
and where the busyness of life does make genuine relationships more difficult to foster. As 
per an earlier interviewee's realisation that banks are not altruistic entities, perhaps the 
same could be said as a precis of the state of affairs of communities in modem (western) 
life368. 
The related point to this commentary on modem life, showcased by the impact on Storm 
investors, is that perhaps some degree of collective care and responsibility should exist in 
such matters. In an early paper on the effects of those suffering from an accident, Morris 
and Paul (1962) describe the impacts on family life at that point when "serious economic 
disruption becomes great" (p.918). Significantly for our discussion here, they state their 
belief that those families "would suffer sufficient disruption to warrant community 
concern". In other words, the fate of a few can and could sometimes be the concern of 
many369. The additional factor with Storm however is the downside of the 'network' effect 
- if multiple parties are impacted and those parties have dependencies such as familial 
connections with one another, then the impact is made even worse. Effectively, another 
368 Indeed, Keynes himself stated his hope that mere financial issues would eventually take a back seat to 
more interesting and deeper questions: "The day is not far off when the economic problem will take the back 
seat where it belongs, and the arena of the heart and the head will be occupied or reoccupied, by our real 
problems - the problems of life and of human relations, of creation and behavior and religion." 
http://www.brainyguote.com/guotes/guotes/j/ johnmaynarl52041.htm1#3rFv6WZkW5j6lLiC.99 
369 Of course, this may well be a rose-tinted view of society's standards in generations gone by, or an accurate 
contrast to today's (over?) self-reliance, or something in-between these possibilities. 
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·pillar' of security itself is compromised, and notably, it 1s a pillar that 1s a critical 
component of any potential recovery370 . 
The role of others in recovery from financial trauma has been hinted at in the earlier 
discussion of sections 6.4.3 and 6.4.5.4, and what is apparent from the interviews with 
investors is that this pillar is significant in the context of recovering from a financial shock. 
However, it is a pillar that we cannot give detailed attention to here despite its likely critical 
role for all individuals, but we set it aside for future research into examining what factors 
are critical for such recovery ( or otherwise) over time. 
A sixth pillar, often lost in discussions which are premised on the concept that ' retirement' 
is a good and expected thing, is employment. Like the pillar of ' others ', this also is a factor 
which has significance in the recovery of Stonn investors37 1. As such, it too is something 
we give detailed attention here, but also set aside for future research. 
7 .3 Individualisation to the fore again 
The societal trend underlying the prev10us discussion is that of the push to greater 
individualisation. Its influence in the provision of one ' s financial wellbeing, pariicularly in 
retirement, has been attested by many sources in the course of the PJCI372 . What various 
professional groups and parties have further highlighted is that the advent of 
individualisation has run in parallel with other societal changes such as increased longevity 
and lower fertility rates which together give rise to an ageing population373 , industry 
370 Public submi ss ion [400] from th e Finance Sector Uni on hi ghli ghts an ' outcome ' asymm etry aris ing from financial losses, whereby '' institutions such as th e CBA that engage in ri sk ier lending practices may lose a percentage of profits when things go wrong", but " in contrast, the potenti a l impac t on consumers is devastating and may have wide ranging effec ts such as increased demand fo r welfare services, lower work productivity due to stress and absentee ism, and greater re liance on support networks to surv ive' ·. Of relevance here is that this latter reliance on support networks itself may also be compromised, suggesting a lack of in depe ndence between our restated pillars of ' oneself and ' others ' , at least in the case of Storm. 171 But it is a lso a fac tor which is challenging fo r many, as it is di ffic ult fo r many at older ages to re-enter the 
workfo rce (for example, see the comments of the AS IC Chairman, public hearing [8], p .7). 
m As further examples, see the comments of a law academic in public submiss ion [39 8] ; a financial planner in public submi ss ion [67]; and Bob Such MP highlights that ·'consumers too face an increased ex pectati on to 
ass ume respons ibility for the ir own financial sec urity, even into retirement" (public submi ss ion 279) . 171 For exampl e. pub lic submi ss ion [385] from AXA. 
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changes such as deregulation374 and the decline in defined benefit schemes375 , and also the 
availability of significant sums of money and options for shareholding in demutualized 
institutions for individuals who have not previously had to be concerned with such 
things 376 . 
As a result, risk has, and is, transferred from employers and government to individuals. 
This is perhaps even more pointed in the Australian context because of the combination of 
the above factors with the compulsion, magnitude and growth in superannuation across all 
employees. As Smith (2009) highlights, this leaves many individuals nearing or in 
retirement in Australia with little alternative but to engage in a meaningful way with 
concepts of risk and return and a host of other issues around financial provision, that they 
may not have encountered or been interested in before. Furthermore, this requirement is 
forced upon them with superannuation being compulsory, so that "consent or choice is 
more apparent than real" (p.524). 
Obvious issues to emerge from such trends concern whether individuals really are equipped 
to deal with such risk(s)377, and whether they are assisted or hindered in doing so by the 
general regulatory and societal framework within which they exist. We first briefly discuss 
the issue of the regulatory environment, before moving to wider issues concerning what it 
means for individuals in today's world, and what we perceive_as a core issue highlighted by 
Storm' s collapse - that of ethical disposition. 
374 
"The last quarter of the twentieth century has seen a significant transformation of the Australian economy, 
notably, the deregulation of the financial services industry" (public submission 346 from MLC Ltd), which 
notably has meant higher access to and utilisation of more risky assets by everyday investors. 
375 For example, the testimony of the Financial Ombudsman Service (public hearing [2] , p.34). 
376 For example, the CEO of IFSA highlights that "we have had a whole generation of people forced to be 
investors. We have had a whole generation of people who have had shares arrive in the mailbox through 
government actions or demutualisations and the like" (public hearing [3] , p.56). Julie Owens MP highlighted 
that "we are facing a situation which has developed over the last 20 years or so which we are really the first to 
have to deal with ... we have built enonnous superannuation funds. We have a whole stack of inexperienced 
investors in their 50s with cash arriving in the market. There were the mum and dad investors who discovered 
shares with Telstra. And we are unique-we are new in this. We happen to have done it during a boom time, 
which was perhaps really lucky" (public hearing [3], pp. 22, 56). 
377 As Smith (2009) asks: "are governments just asking too much of individuals when they expect them to be 
able to analyse risk and make complex decisions about investment such as for retirement income?" 
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7.3.1 Does the environment help? 
The risks accruing or transferring to individuals as a result of those trends highlighted 
above, can either be helped or hindered by the general regulatory setting for the financial 
services industry. We offer a brief overview of some of the core features of the general 
environment and regulatory settings, providing comment along the way about what the 
Stonn example has specifically highlighted as concerns. 
We note further that the Australian Federal government announced in November 2013 that 
a new Financial Services Inquiry is to be held378 . Some sixteen years after the fonner 
Wallis inquiry, this will consider how elements of competition and consumer protection can 
be balanced, with a view to a stable and efficient system overall. Tailoring this thesis to a 
focus solely on regulatory solutions to such questions would be a substantial diversion from 
our main research goals, so we do not pursue this at length other than the more general 
insights offered on regulatory shortfalls from this point onwards . However we do note our 
agreement with the rationale for this inquiry, whereby it is clear that the environmental 
challenges facing individuals today are quite different to those considered sixteen years 
ago, thus making the latest Inquiry highly significant, and timely. 
7.3. 1.1 Too complicated? 
The breadth of product and other choices available to individuals has been described as 
'enormous ' by ASIC executives appearing before the PJCI, to the extent that the situation 
in Australia is an 'outlier ' in such availability379 . One immediate implication of such choice 
is that individuals are exposed to greater risk though their own decisions380 . Furthennore, 
decisions made as investors differ substantially to decisions made as consumers of more 
tangible goods, with the latter scenario the more common one in which individuals gain 
experience as decision makers38 1. As such, the Australian system of financial provision is 
378 See, for examp le, http ://www.pm.gov.au/media/20 13-1 1-20/financial-system-inquiry. 379 Furthermore, thi s genera lly " has been a successfu l settin g, but a co mmittee like thi s wou ld , I think, have to have a look and see how that is working" [J eremy Cooper, AS IC Deputy Cha irman , publi c hearing [I] , p.48]. 380 Publ ic submission [67] from a Financial pla1mer, amongst others, conm1ents on thi s issue. 38 1 Such differences include aspec ts of immediate consumption versus long tem1 intangibility (as touched on in sect ion 2.5.2.6), the ability to phys ically inspect a material good prior to purchase, consumer goods running 
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complicated, for which many individuals would be exasperated in attempting to negotiate 
their way through382 . One interview in particular highlighted the difficulties that they face 
in this regard: 
[506] W(fe: Actually, when something comes on the computer. . . I can ' t understand half of it 
because it' s a lot of jargon . .. just simplify things. Simplify it. 
Husband: I'm not that way inclined. 
Wife: Simplify things and it would be a lot better but when it's not simplified, I don ' t know. 
Husband: Put something to work with my hands and I'm a chance at doing it but you 
know ... 
Wife: I find it very hard to understand .. . if we knew ten people that we could sit down and 
have a chat to, it might have been a lot better. [interview with Storm investor] 
Others state the underlying issue and requirement just as succinctly: 
[507] In the mam the Finance industry is a master of voluminous statements of legal 
gobbledegook. [public submission 43 from a non-Storm Investor] 
[508] The industry and the products have become very complicated, and maybe what the 
consumer would like to see is a little bit more simplicity and transparency. [Executive 
Manager, Guardian Financial Planning, public hearing [2] , p.92] 
Such an environment leads many to consider that the environment of choice and 
complexity is simply not suitable. The senior policy officer of consumer advocate group 
CHOICE383 put this to the PJCI as a result of their observations of the market: 
[509] There has been an explosion in the types of products that are around and the complexity of 
products ... what we have seen is that the changes that were made, particularly as a result of 
the Wallis inquiry and financial services regulation, are not working ... The risks have 
increased, and consumers are not in a position to manage them. [public hearing [7] , p .107] 
down over time versus investment products (hopefully) not doing so, and differing degrees of control and 
maintenance one can apply to each (e.g. car versus share option) (Smith 2009) . 
382 
"The tax system and retirement income system in this country is complicated and it requires a level of 
professionalism and intellectual rigour in order to sit down and understand that and then to impart that to the 
customer" (Executive GM of Advice and Marketing, MLC and NAB Wealth, public hearing [2] , p.12). 
383 http://www.choice.com.au/. 
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7. 3 .1. 2 Can regulation help? 
Unsurprisingly given its regulatory focus, substantial attention was given to questions of 
regulatory oversight in the course of the PJCI. Such discussion helped shape the PJCI ' s 
views, which were then reflected in the recommendations in Appendix A. Given our 
research goals, we briefly summarise here two aspects of the regulatory enviromnent that 
influence how individuals operate and understand the financial environment. The first of 
these concerns the balance between protection and freedom to innovate, and the second 
concerns aspects of licensing and disclosure. 
7.3.1.2 .1 Protection versus innovation and choice 
Any system of regulation and control upon a market provides some balance of protection 
versus innovation. Of course there are extremes where laissez-faire rules the day, and 
others where very little choice is granted. The need for a suitable balance in the Australian 
financial market context was specifically highlighted several times in the course of the 
PJCI384, with various parties leaning to one or the other side of the balancing act depending 
on their own perspective. 
Arguments for avoiding unnecessary restrictions on the operation of the market centered 
around three main aspects. The first of these was around the right and/or preference to have 
choice, the second concerned aspects of efficiency, and the third concerned the issue of 
moral hazard . Regarding choice, the FPA argued that most people do want choice in their 
affairs , and utilizing regulation in a heavy manner would not only undennine choice, but 
also competition and innovation385 . Furthermore, choice is important because "you cannot 
predict, based on income, age and circumstance, what people can and cannot do ; it is their 
right to choose that"386. More generally, an argument for choice arises from many studies 
:l84 For example , public submissions [385] from AXA and [38 8] from Treasury; and ex tended and informative discussions with ASIC executi ves in public hearings [ 1] and [8] and with Treasury in publi c hearing [3]. 385 FPA CEO, public hearing [3] , p.4 . 
386 FPA CEO. public hearing [3], p .33. This excerpt however raises an additional aspec t that is related to our overa ll po int regarding the push to se lf-s uffic iency. In the main, this push has not been the cho ice of individuals - it has essentia lly been forced upon them. It is perhaps a stretch then to appeal so le ly to an argu ment of indi v idual •rights' to choose any poss ible opt ion , when in rea lity the overa ll sys tem is itself a mixture of choi ce and compulsion. Furthermore, if indiv iduals make bad choices, or if instituti ons and 
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which indicate that the presence of choice can be linked with a sense of control, hence 
giving various material and psychological benefits to those with that choice (for example, 
see Taylor and Brown 1988)387 . 
The importance of market efficiency was discussed by both ASIC and Treasury, with 
Treasury highlighting that an unfettered market promotes product innovation, lower costs 
and increased choices for individuals. As such, innovation contributes to market 
efficiency388 . ASIC highlighted that stronger market interventions can restrict the flow of 
capital into the market, ultimately compromising competition and thereby market efficiency 
as we11389 . Both Treasury and ASIC further pointed that the level of international 
competitiveness was also a potential casualty of stronger market restrictions. 
Moral hazard is where certain behaviours are more likely to be taken, if there are things in 
place for others to bear the costs of any risks associated with those behaviours. Both ASIC 
and Treasury discussed this as a specific downside of greater intervention ( equating to 
greater protection for individuals) in the market. Two relevant excerpts are below: 
[51 OJ There are several matters that would have to be considered (with greater protection), 
including that if there was a more paternalistic approach then it might exacerbate the moral 
hazard amongst retail investors-for instance, faced by an apparently safer regulatory 
regime retail investors might decide to take on more leverage and therefore more risk or opt 
to invest inappropriately in the riskiest of the apparently approved investments. [ASIC 
Chief Economist, public hearing [1], p.6] 
professionals let them down, or if outcomes are poor for some other reason - then others one way or another 
bear the cost of those outcomes. Nobody' s ' own ' business and rights in a financial context are indeed just 
their own, and especially not in a world of taxpayer subsidised superannuation tax advantages, age pension 
and welfare provision, and so on. Furthermore, society by nature is necessarily a system of varied subsidies, 
forced-philanthropy and forced behaviours to some degree - hence taxes, the provision of welfare, children 
being required to attend school, and so on. Any behaviour has limitations placed on it by the interests of 
society at large to some degree, and we see little rationale why financial choice should be any different based 
solely on such an appeal to one's 'rights'. 
387 Again however, 'choice' is not always so demonstrably beneficial and we would argue that neither is it 
synonymous with control. The presentation of choice to Storm investors was such that many ' self-selected ' 
into the model (thus exercising their choice) , and certainly a lack of control in their life affairs is the 
unfortunate outcome now. More subtly, if one is presented with many different choices, but none of them are 
appropriate or they are limited to the weaknesses or biases of the organization involved in offering them, then 
there is little scope for ultimate 'control' in that circumstance. 
388 Public submission [388]. 
389 ASIC Chairman, public hearing [l], p.49. 
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[511] A key regulatory principle of the Wallis Report is that although there is a need to reduce 
certain risks that arise purely because of market failures, governments should avoid 
imposing regulation that seeks to eliminate the financial risks of participating in financial 
markets. This type of regulation induces a ' moral hazard ', by creating complacency about 
risk among investors, and may ultimately encourage the risky behaviour it is trying to deter. 
[public submission 388 from the Treasury] 
We have no specific disagreement with either of the above, but note that it is apparent from 
Stonn that the horse of moral hazard has already bolted, to a degree, from the overarching 
stable of regulatory oversight. Many Stonn investors weighed up much of what they knew 
and could know from their investigations: Stonn was licensed, it disclosed everything it 
needed to according to the process of the day, it had credibility as a result of associations 
with strong APRA-regulated entities that are promoted as 'pillars ' of society, it belonged as 
a principal member to the FPA, and so on. Therefore, with these safeguards in place, 
investors perceived it as a risk worth taking, and as such their behaviour was influenced ( or 
as they thought, essentially insured to some degree) via such safeguards390 . 
Despite the rationale for a weighting towards innovation and choice rather than 
intervention, numerous PJCI participants and other commentators have called for greater 
protection for individuals (for example, Smith 2009). Reasons for greater protection are 
varied, including: 
► The reality that there are vulnerable groups in society. In particular, those receiving 
superarurnation as a lump sum, with vulnerability at the point of first having to think 
about investing one's money (Ms Sharon Grierson MP, public hearing [8] , p.13) ; 
► If goverrunent expects individuals to be self-sufficient in retirement, then without 
some protection the cost of getting it wrong is continued (and greater) reliance on 
welfare and the age pension system; 
► ASIC itself highlighted that the underlying basis of the current regime (the Wallis 
Inquiry), did not foresee the extent to which retail (non-institutional) investors 
390 Of course none of these safeguards implies a government guarantee of any financial promise (such a guarantee wo uld be the cause for potential moral haza rd that ASIC and Treasury are actually referring to, and as such, the Wallis Inqui ry advised to avoid such guarantees (ASIC Chief Economist, public hearing [ 1 ], p.5)). But, if perceptions count as much as anything for describing the rationale for individual ' s actions , the perception of pro tection was indeed strong in the case of Stonn. 
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would participate m the market. The significance of this type of investor has 
accelerated because of rapid growth in superannuation, and as such there are 
questions as to whether levels of protection are appropriate (ASIC Chairman, public 
hearing [8], p.7)391 ; 
► The risks involved are not necessarily ones that an individual could be reasonably 
be expected to know about and manage392 . 
7.3.1.2.2 Licensing and disclosure 
As discussed in chapter two, key regulatory tools applicable to ASIC-regulated entities 
include licensing and disclosure. ASIC explained the intent and limits of the licensing 
regime in section 6.4.4.8.1, against the backdrop of investors feeling that an AFSL was 
essentially a ticket of credibility. Treasury highlighted that if licensing was to incorporate 
additional and stronger goals, then the following could result393 : 
► If a judgement of the appropriateness of business models was incorporated, a risk 
averse approach would likely be taken by ASIC; 
► Market innovation and competition would likely be stifled; 
► In addition to the aforementioned problem of moral hazard, such vetting by ASIC 
could not reasonable be expected to prevent all future collapses; 
► Higher compliance costs would be imposed on bu_sinesses, both initially when 
applying for an AFSL and on an ongoing basis; 
► Such costs would likely be passed on to consumers; 
► ASIC would require additional expertise and resources, with the associated costs 
likely met via government or directly from licensees. 
As such, licensing itself is a feature of the regulatory environment which may be better 
enhanced via greater consumer appreciation of its shortcomings. Disclosure, on the other 
391 And as St. John (2011) adds, retail clients "are in greater need of protection than are wholesale clients who 
should be better informed and better able to assess the risks involved in financial transactions" (p.6). 
392 For example, regulation should be strong enough to "inhibit the foolish actions of rogue, careless and 
selfish operators of investment products" (public submission 43 from non-Storm Investor), but even if such 
strong regulation was in place, Smith (2009) comments that "the GFC has made it impossible to ignore that 
there are some risks that no matter how expert or diligent, retail investors cannot control" (p.531 ). 
393 The list that follows is our summary of the points made in Treasury's public submission [388]. 
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hand, was widely critiqued as a regulatory tool in the course of the PJCI394 . ASIC defended 
the role of disclosure, describing it as necessary and highlighting that investors need to 
have infonnation to assist them in making appropriate decisions. Nevertheless, ASIC also 
acknowledged shortcomings: 
[512] If disclosure caru1ot fulfil its role of overcoming the infomrntion asymmetry between 
industry participants and investors, then it is necessary to consider other changes to the 
(regime) to protect investors . [public submission 378 from ASIC] 
It is the detail of such shortcomings that interested many of those contributing to the P J CI. 
A first element is how disclosure impacts an individual who has had some detail disclosed 
to them. Somewhat counter-intuitively, it is claimed that such disclosure may not have the 
desired effect of providing a warning as to the quality or limitations of the advice being 
offered. Rather, it may increase confidence in the advice being given because the consumer 
sees the adviser as forthright and honest in disclosing particular details395. Additional 
insights as to what disclosure means for the recipient were provided via another public 
submission: 
[ 513] The problem with disclosure is that (1) recipients of disclosure cannot utilise the disclosure 
effectively, and (2) the disclosure becomes routine or a "boilerplate" clause in 
documentation that ceases to reinforce, or even undennines, the advisor 's obligations to the 
recipient. A substantial body of cognitive psychology research has found that recipients do 
not correctly discount advice from biased sources. The recipient does not know if or how 
the conflict may affect the advice they receive. They only know that it might have an effect 
which they are not in the position to quantify. [public submission 180 from Law Academic] 
As suggested by point (2) in the above excerpt, a further element of disclosure of concern 
to many was that disclosure has tended to focus on process, rather than substance. Treasury 
highlighted that it is the quality and usefulness of infonnation that is important rather than 
394 W e note that interviewees themselves, as demonstrated earlier, commented heavil y on the licensing aspec t. For other parti cipants in the PJCI however, disclosure was to the fo re as well. 395 T his in particular applies to the disc losure of issues of conflict, o ften apparent in commission payments and other remuneration an-ange ments from product providers. As such , " these are th e sorts of perverse an-angements that are in pla y in disclosing conflicts . That is why our preference is to simply get rid of these confli c ts in th e first in stance' · (Senior policy offi cer of consumer advocacy group CHOICE, publi c hearing [7], p.106). The removal of obvious sources of confli ct was part of the FOFA reforms. 
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the quantity396, and a legal practitioner pointed out the following with respect to Statements 
of Advice (SOAs) offered by Storm to investors397 : 
► SOAs most likely did not impart the advice that should have been given; 
► SOAs did not explain the risks associated with the products and the strategy; 
► SO As did not have anything to do with the quality of the advice that was imparted. 
The general point is that disclosure requirements have led to compliance for the sake of 
compliance, so that laws are not breached, but consumers are not necessarily given what 
they need to make informed choices. An interesting conversation occurred in public hearing 
[1], illustrating a key realisation of PJCI members with regard to this matter: 
[514] Bernie Ripoll MP: How do you get a choice in an environment where your choice is limited 
by what is presented to you? You tum up at a buffet and there is a lot to choose from but it 
is all the same. As long as we have some clarity about that being an issue, because that 
leads directly into disclosure. Disclosure in terms of what is actually disclosed is limited to 
what is offered. It is not disclosure about the total market. It is not disclosure to the investor 
that, 'Yes, sure, we will disclose to you that there is a conflict of interest. ' In fact, if you 
went down the road you could get the very same product-in fact, a better product-and 
get it with few fees or no fees or completely different. That is not disclosed. 
ASIC Chairman: That is not competitive disclosure; that is correct. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: It is only disclosure in terms of what you are offered. If you are only 
offered one product you will get disclosure in terms of that one. You have got nothing to 
compare it to. Disclosure is highly limited in its capacity to, in the first place, offer you any 
choice. Even if you are very good and in fact you are a financial planner yourself being 
offered this, you may not learn anything from the disclosure. Often disclosure can be a form 
of protection more for the people providing the product rather than for providing 
information. [public hearing [1], p.38] 
As such, disclosure can be seen as an insufficient regulatory tooi398 . Some see disclosure as 
having little to do with helping the consumer understand what they need to know399, and 
396 Public submission [388]. 
397 A summary of points made by Ms June Smith (Principal, Argyle Lawyers, public hearing [2] , p.113). 
398 For example, the Vice-President of the Australian Investors Association claims that after several years of 
trying to "get it right", it "has not worked" (public hearing [6], p.46); and the CEO of MLC Limited claims 
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some see the regime as requiring simplification to work better400 (echoing similar points of 
the overall system in section 7.3 .1.1 ). An interesting analogy is given within another public 
submission: 
[515] The current system of disclosure and education is not particularly effective. Think about 
your doctor. They diagnose the illness, give you a name you cam1ot spell and a treatment. 
They don ' t give you 50 pages and attempt to educate you about the illness and treatment. 
Why should this industry pretend people are suddenly going to start reading and educating 
themselves. Our financial planning regulations attempts to educate people and turn them 
into investment and risk assessment experts . For a critical number of people this fail s. 
[public submission 18 from employee in financial planning industry] 
As with most insightful analogies, the above excerpt makes its point well but is open to 
further comment. We agree from the observations of Stonn that the responsibility being 
bestowed upon individuals is high and in some cases misplaced, but more importantly, this 
highlights an even more exacerbated responsibility on those who do know the detail of 
financial choices and options40 1. A defence of disclosure with respect to the above analogy 
would be that although understanding the detail of one's treatment is not necessarily key to 
the success of that treatment, nevertheless the concerted health campaigns over many years 
as to the dangers of certain choices (most obviously, smoking as a public health issue) have 
infonned individuals as to the riskiness of such choices. In this sense, is disclosure in a 
financial context more about knowing the detail of remedies and options, or is it about a 
statement of risk and opportunity? This issue is not one for us to resolve here, but it does 
rai se the key aspect of how regulation in its entirety cannot touch all relevant issues for 
financial welfare in today ' s environment. What is clear though is that the regulatory 
framework has to provide some tangible protection and/or guidance for individuals when 
now being forced to participate in their long tenn financial affairs. For if not: 
that .. th e fund amental premise that di sclos ure has become the onl y way th at a cli ent will rece ive information 
or be able to make decisions'· is .. wrong'· (public hearing [2], p. 7). 399 MD and CEO. Securities and Deri vatives Industry Associati on, public hearing [3] , p.6 1. 
·
10° For example. the .. huge vo lume of in fo nnati on'· required to be generated makes it ·'difficult fo r a consumer to make a trul y in fo rmed deci sion·· (publi c submiss ion 67 from fin ancial pl ann er). 40 1 Thi s analogy highli ghts an additional key issue - that of infom1ation asymmetry and what this infers in 1en11S of responsibili ty fo r di ffe rent participants. For example, the knowledge of the doctor versus the pati ent, 
or the adviser or institution versus the individual. Thi s is di scussed in more detai l shortl y. 
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[ 516] If we are going to say to a generation, 'You go out there and you fund your own retirement. 
Don't care how you do it,' that is just not playing fair. [Financial planner, public hearing 
[4],p.94] 
7.3.2 What regulation can't touch: the key issues? 
The fact that limits exist to what regulation can and cannot do is an important point made 
by many professionals to the PJCI. Some professional associations stated that legislation 
and regulation cannot prevent the impact of excessive greed of market participants 4°2, and a 
financial planner highlighted that with the breadth and variety in possible roles that 
professionals could take, no regulatory 'silver bullet' exists to solve all problems403 . Others 
highlighted that where innovation is encouraged and a market responds to that 
encouragement, policy and regulation often (virtually unavoidably) lags such 
innovations 404. 
As such, in this section we discuss two key issues that reside outside of what regulatory 
action can enforce. The first of these arises from earlier discussions of financial literacy -
that being the broader issue of the 'information game'. But, rather than continue the trend 
to merely bemoan the responsibility that individuals should be bearing in this matter for 
themselves, we place it more in the context of what individualisation and self-sufficiency 
requires from other participants as well. The second key issue is, perhaps, the standout 
feature that we feel overrides all others in financial (and other) promises between different 
parties - that of the ethical disposition of participants to that promise. 
402 For example, see comments by a Director of the Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board 
(public hearing [2] , p.77), and public submission [391] from the National Institute of Accountants. 
403 Public submission [ 407]. On a similar note, a Treasury official also stated that there is never any guarantee 
that regulation can stop every adverse circumstance (GM, Corporations and Financial Services Division, 
Treasury, public hearing [3], p.24). 
404 Mr David Liddy, MD and CEO of Bank of Queensland, public hearing [8] , p.34. In this vein, Davis (2009) 
states that "regulation faces a difficult task in a world of innovation, where new financial products and 
techniques are rapidly created to get around regulations which constrain profit opportunities, and where 
under-resourced regulatory agencies are always playing ' catch-up ' dealing with those developments" (p.453). 
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7. 3. 2.1 Th e real prob! em of the information game 
The aspect most prevalent in industry discussion about ' infornrntion ' and ' understanding' 
of participants in financial services concerns the levels of financial literacy of individuals . 
As discussed in chapter two, many commentators and studies attest to the insufficiency of 
this at the individual level , and there is little doubt that the regulatory challenges discussed 
above are clearly exacerbated by this405 . As such, the need for financial advice is prevalent 
and only likely to increase in the future . An additional aspect to this discussion concerns the 
financial literacy of many financial planners themselves, which is also seen to be an issue 
according to various sources in the PJCI. 
However, although the need for financial advice and assistance is real and that this is 
mostly (but not exclusively) provided via professional financial planners, even when there 
are high levels of financial literacy on all sides challenges nevertheless remain. This 
includes assessing the value of advice, as introduced in section 2.5.2.6. Importantly, 
infonnation asymmetry is a virtually unavoidable consequence of any transaction between 
a client and a service provider. Thus, infonnation asymmetry - its cause and its 
consequence - is what the case of Storm highlights as a central problem of the infonnation 
game that individuals must participate in. 
7.3.2.1.1 Financial literacy 
On evidence from Stonn and through contributions to the P JCI, the fact that many 
individuals do not possess the required levels of financial literacy to operate constructively 
in Australia's financial setting is not disputed. Indeed, many individuals lack the required 
expertise and experience to participate effectivel/06 , overconfidence of many in relation to 
405 For exa mpl e. the insuffici ency of disc losure as a regul atory too l is sa id to be "partly due to the mann er in 
which disclosure is made and partl y because many people do not have the financial literacy to understand the imp li cations of disc losures·· (publi c submi ss ion 67 from finan cial pl anner). 406 For example. public submission 279 from Bob Such, MP . 
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making financial decisions is apparent407, the complexities of investing are lost on the 
majority of individuals 4°8, and particularly as it pertains to an understanding of risk 4°9. 
Furthermore, although efforts to increase levels of financial literacy over time are to be 
encouraged, it is likely that limits also exist in such moves. It is unlikely that the majority 
of people can learn about the complexities of many products and strategies that are 
available410, any improvements are only likely in the long term411 , and progress to date is 
slow412 • Additionally, regular calls (often as 'motherhood' 'fix-all' statements) to utilise 
education in schools to equip a generation with the required literacy was (repeatedly) met 
with a degree of scepticism by PJCI member Senator McLucas, herself a former 
schoolteacher: 
[517] I suppose my view is that financial literacy is something you should be adding to all your 
life rather than being a one-hit wonder when you are 16 years old. [Senator McLucas, 
public hearing [3], p.68] 
[518] I note that you recommend that we change the school curriculum, which really troubles me. 
I suggest to you that a person who is 17 will not remember when they are 65 what a margin 
loan is. [Senator McLucas, public hearing [8], p.12] 
Nevertheless, it is a worthwhile goal that important principles are promulgated in a way 
that interests and engages individuals as much as possible 413 • The cost of not improving the 
ability and wherewithal of individuals to deal with the choices and associated risks being 
faced is significant. Smith (2009) describes a worst case scenario as "sending lambs to the 
slaughter" (p.525) if individuals are forced to operate in a market before they are ready to, 
407 For example, Mr Michael Lim, Analyst, Investor Protection Unit, Corporations and Financial Services 
Division, Treasury, public hearing [3], p.12. 
408 For example, see the CEO ofIFSA, public hearing [3], p.56. 
409 For example, see the CEO ofMLC Limited, public hearing [2] , p.12. 
41
° For example, Ms Delia Rickard, Senior Executive Leader, Consumers and Retail Investors, ASIC, public 
hearing [1] , p.46, and public submission [378] from ASIC. 
411 For example, public submission [378] from ASIC. 
412 For example, the CEO ofIFSA, public hearing [3], p.56. 
413 Particularly pertaining to general principles such as "diversification, asset allocation, even a bit around 
risk" (Ms Delia Rickard, Senior Executive Leader, Consumers and Retail Investors, ASIC, public hearing [l], 
p.46). 
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and a non-Stonn investor highlighted that it is simply too late to try to pick up the required 
wherewithal at a time --when accumulating years have passed"414 . 
Importantly however, remarks about low levels of financial literacy should not just be 
restricted to individual investors. For even if an individual understands little, they can still 
call on professional help for assistance, which at least in theory should obviate their own 
requirement to be financially savvy, to some degree. This point was made by both investors 
and financial planners: 
[519] With respect to the statement of advice, I can remember writing an email to Stonn Finance, 
say ing, ' If I understood every page of this statement of advice that I have to sign I would be 
a financial planner, wouldn't I?' I use a theory, because I am an electrician. I can explain to 
you electron flow and normal flow , but can you sign off on it to say that you understand it? 
We were given 30- to 40-page documents. I have a rough idea of margin loans , but do I 
understand every detail of it? If I did, wouldn ' t I have spent four yea rs at uni ? [Stom1 
investor, public hearing [4] , p.81] 
[520] I totally encourage clients / the public to take control of their financial affairs, but for most 
it is the last thing on their mind. We cannot give up on education, but it is not the answer, 
the answer is restoring faith and confidence in the financial advising industry, and 
reinforcing the need for all Australians to visit an adviser. [public submission 407 from 
Financial planner] 
Clearly then, and as also seen in earlier evidence, a trust in the quality and appropriateness 
in advice being given is vital - certainly for its own sake as the delivery of a professional 
service, but exacerbated by the effective 'offloading ' of expertise from indi vi dual s to the 
adviser. What was of concern to vari ous PJCI members though was what they perceived as 
a limited educational foundation in many cases for the giving of such critical advice: 
[521] We have taken advice that people are doing courses for as little as a week to nine days and 
are out popping product advice, advising people to put millions of dollars into different 
rn Public submi ss ion [ 172). 
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products, which in my humble opinion is sheer nonsense. [Mr Stuart Robert MP, public 
hearing [8] , p.18] 
[522] The advice that financial advisers will be giving in a sense, in many cases, could be more 
important than the advice the a lawyer, an accountant, a plumber or an electrician ever 
gives. And yet the training and the requirements involved are so much lower. That is what 
I, as someone who has no idea about the area, am astounded at. [Senator Mason, public 
hearing [1] , p.15] 
Notably, such concern is not just the view of those outside the industry, with public 
submissions [ 168] and [ 407] examples of financial planners who also indicated similar 
concerns. The Ombudsman for Investments, Life Insurance and Superannuation also 
expressed shortcomings in knowledge of advisers specifically with regard to risk: 
[523] I am not saying it is the whole financial services industry, but our experience with, for 
example Westpoint, was that there were about 60 licensees that we dealt with in relation to 
Westpoint complaints, and what came across in those disputes was that the financial 
services providers themselves did not understand what they were getting the clients into 
and, therefore, they were not capable of explaining the risks. [Ms Alison Maynard, 
Ombudsman, Investments, Life Insurance and Superannuation, Financial Ombudsman 
Service, public hearing [2], p.23] 
7.3.2.1.2 The need for advice remains 
It is against this backdrop of challenges to regulatory oversight and reach, and levels of 
financial literacy, that a need for financial advice exists. Kozup and Hogarth (2008) state 
the need for financial advice is made even more pressing with individuals facing their own 
time pressures as well as financial shortcomings, particularly as advice and financial 
decisions should be specific to one's particular circumstances rather than be subject to any 
' temp lated' one-size-fits-all approach. 
Given such lack of resources and wherewithal in general at the individual level, Macquarie 
Bank executives highlighted the importance of advice for more complex requirements such 
as understanding risk and reigning in excessively risky behaviours in times of market 
- 392 -
boom. Importantly, they also noted that this applies to " institutional investors and banks as 
well as individual investors"4 15. A reason as to why professionals may be well equipped to 
deliver such advice is that if experience is the teacher of many lessons , those with that 
experience are more likely to be informed than otherwise (such as first time investors with 
little prior interest and/or experience). As such, AXA highlighted the view that the financial 
services industry will be of major importance to society overall for decades 4 16 . 
Although tenns such as 'complexity ' are frequently used to describe what is associated 
with financial options and decisions, it is worth noting that what financial planning is meant 
to fulfill is actually not that overwhelming. AMP highlights that there are three things that 
most people seek in tenns of financial goals and as such, these represent what good 
financial advice is all about: 
[524) Helping people own their own homes sooner; 
Making sure they protect themselves and their families in the event of misfortune; and 
Ensuring they can retire comfortably. [public submission 367 from AMP] 
Naturally enough, various challenges exist around each of these points, particularly (in the 
context of Stonn) the goal to save for retirement. A financial adviser expressed the 
challenges arising from the reality that retirement itself is now itself an extended phase of 
life, with its own lifestyle expectations (rather than mere survival). And importantly, 
working towards paiiicular goals and overcoming such challenges along the way is not 
meant to be an unsunnountable hurdle and not one that everyone needs advice on, but 
nevertheless a need for advice remains for many: 
[525) The average person in the western world wants to live with dignity throughout their life and 
given this length of time that people li ve now, yo u know, there ' s 20, there ' s 30 years of life 
potentially without working. So providing for that, however you want to describe it , is hard 
work. Right, that ' s neve r go ing to be easy for yo u to now set yourse lf the challenge of 
say ing, " Hey, at some point between 60 and 70, I' m not go ing to wanting to be doing thi s. 
I'm go ing to need an income from somewhere." It' s go ing to take a lot of work from yo u to 
415 Public hearing [9], p. 18. 
41 6 Publi c submiss ion [385]. 
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put yourself in that position. Right, so that's a western world challenge ... whether you take 
advice on that or whether you do it yourself is academic, right? It's your challenge ... now 
you can do that yourself or you can take advice on it. To make all that work, I don't think is 
as difficult as they're making it sound and that's really the financial services industry. 
There's a bunch of silos that sit within that. I'd like to think most people, not all, most 
people need the advice. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
As such, the role of professional financial advisers often takes on the form of guidance, 
encouragement, education and accountability towards these goals as much as anything 
else 4 17. 
7.3.2.1.3 A major challenge: assessing value 
Despite the fact that the overall need for advice is premised on relatively straightforward 
goals for most people, the assessment of the quality of financial advice is a difficult task418 . 
This is particularly concerning in the light of the need for such advice and the high stakes 
involved with poor financial outcomes. Two financial planners attest to the difficulty of 
determining what quality advice is, and the Financial Ombudsman suggests that good 
advice is not necessarily a unique construct. Rather, perhaps it is better to categorise 
reasonable advice on the basis of it not being obviously poor: 
[526] There is no doubt that investors should be aware of what is reasonable value for advice, but 
to date there is nothing from anywhere that helps to establish what this is. [ email from 
financial adviser, August 2012] 
417 For example, investors "need encouragement and hand holding to commence an investment programme 
for life and to stick with it during difficult times" (public submission 135 from financial planner). 
Furthermore, from AMP again: "most people know they should pay off their mortgages earlier, stop revolving 
credit card debt, have adequate insurance and save more for their retirement; however, most don 't get around 
to doing it or doing it well" (public submission 367). 
418 The discussion of section 2.5.2.6 is in agreement with much of the input into the PJCI, as evidenced, for 
example, by ASIC's Deputy Chairman (Mr Jeremy Cooper) in public hearing [1] (p.36); public submission 
[319] from the Institute of Actuaries of Australia; and Mr Bernie Ripoll MP in public hearing [7] (p.118). 
Bernie Ripoll also highlighted that 'good' or 'bad' advice is not just a one-hit assessment and issue such as 
with "the worst-case scenarios of Storms", but it can be people going "through a whole lifetime, get a heap of 
bad advice and end up quite poor. Perhaps they would not lose their home, but just end up really poor because 
they never got good advice" (public hearing [7] , p.113). 
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[527] I ha ve always presumed that we would all broadly agree about the quality of advice, but it 
is something which the industry has not meaningfully discussed and ASIC bas never shared 
its views about the quality of advice. To date, discussion has focused more on the process 
of giving advice. There has been an implicit assumption that a good process will lead to 
good advice. However, it is not hard to tick the boxes and demonstrate compliance with a 
·good ' process and produce dodgy advice. [public submission 67 from Financia l planner] 
[528] We even see in the media that sometimes a case study will be presented and then a couple 
of advisers will be asked to give advice based on that case study; you might get two 
different strategies for that consumer that are published in that magazine, but they will both 
be appropriate. They will not be the same, but they will both be appropriate. You are really 
looking for what is below the bar, what is really inappropriate . [Ms Alison Maynard, 
Ombudsman, Investments, Life Insurance and Superannuation, Financial Ombudsman 
Service, public hearing [2] , p.28] 
An approach to describing 'good' advice by placing bounds on what it is not, was a point 
of discussion in several of the P JCI public hearings. The main factor in the discussion, 
arising directly from PJCI member's knowledge and growing familiarity with the example 
of Storm, was that merely having a certain outcome can provide little indication as to the 
quality of advice leading to that outcome41 9 . This again agrees with and echoes many points 
in section 2.5.2.6: 
[529] Mr Elvy (Head of Fin ancial Planning, Institute of Chartered Accountants): Inappropriate 
advice is inappropriate advice whether you are actually making money or you are losing 
money. 
Bernie Ripoll 1\1P: ... how can it be inappropriate if somebody is making 10 per cent more 
than eYerybody else? I am seriously asking the question to try to understand how that might 
work . 
Mr Whit e (G1\1, Leadership and Quality, Institute of Chartered Accountants): In some 
ways. being a left brained accountant you often think about risk and reward. I think there 
needs to be elements of risk blended into measures of successfu l advice . Whilst today might 
be sunny. tomorrow \·ery well may not be; therefore, that is an important element to qualit y 
ad\ ice. [public hearing [7]. p.13] 
-l l
0 
.--\nd indeed this \\ as suggested in so me subn:u -sions al so. for example: .. during boom times .. . even bad ad ,ice can gi,·e good results·· (p ublic submi ss ion 67 from Financial planner). 
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[530] So we had inexperienced investors and 15 years of boom and you could actually be sloppy 
and still not fail. [Ms Julie Owens MP, public hearing [7] , p.36] 
7.3.2.1.4 The major challenge: information asymmetry 
The prior discussion regarding the obtaining and understanding of information which is 
relevant to making financial decisions highlights the crucial problem of the information 
game: that of information asymmetry between different participants420 . Financial literacy 
levels, the need for financial advice, and the difficulty of assessing the value of advice all 
point to the fact that a party offering advice has, in all likelihood, a different level of 
understanding of that advice than the receiving party. 
The regulatory tool of disclosure is meant to close this information gap but as discussed, 
this has inherent limitations. Whilst some call for government to give more attention to the 
provision of information by industry to individuals (including disclosure practices) 
(Bateman et al. 201 la), even ASIC itself admits that disclosure "may never be sufficient to 
overcome information asymmetries between industry participants and retail investors"421 • 
Treasury as well as ASIC highlight further that such asymmetry is a symptom of market 
failure, with this failure being the existence of imperfect information of parties to a 
transaction 422 • 
Some consider that such asymmetry arises from the manner in which information and 
decisions are presented to individuals, even in the case where individuals are well educated 
(for example, Merton 2008). Others highlight that individuals may simply lack the 
wherewithal to engage appropriately (for example, Smith 2009). Others consider that rather 
being an issue of capability, the main issue is individuals having little interest in pursuing 
appropriate behaviours which would provide them with the information that they need. This 
latter perspective is evidenced in the following two excerpts: 
42
° For example, Senator McLucas refers to an "absolute imbalance of knowledge" between "a person who is 
probably in their early 60s and a fmancial planner" (public hearing [8] , p.12); and others such as the Institute 
of Actuaries of Australia attest to the "significant asymmetry of information between the financial planner and 
their client" (public submission 319). 
42 1 Public submission [378] from ASIC. 
422 Public submission [388] from The Treasury; ASIC Chief Economist, public hearing [l] , p.4 . 
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[531] One of my big concerns with advice and the provision of advice is that people will sit in 
front of an adviser and nod their head but have no idea what the adviser is saying. [MD, 
Professional Investment Services, public hearing [7] , p.115]4 23 
[532] Interviewee: They were told to always - they were never allowed to say, "Yeah, I want to 
do this, sign here ." They had to take it, sign and every page had to be initialled that they ' d 
read and understood it and usually the next appointment was three weeks later, two 
minimum, three weeks so they gave them three weeks to show it to their friends, to go to 
their accountant if they wanted to and so they were always told at these seminars, "Get a 
second opinion if you want. You know, we have no objection about that. " 
Interviewer: Do people do that? 
Interviewee: Most people don ' t. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Our view on evidence from Stonn is that all three possibilities apply for infom1ation 
asymmetry. Not all individuals are equipped to negotiate the maze of decisions and 
complexity before them; those that are or could be equipped may not pursue, in all 
instances, what they should in order to be aware of the potential consequences of decisions 
that they are taking; and even where they are capable and engaged, what is disclosed and 
available to them in terms of potential risks is not always helpful , relevant or complete424 . 
This simply is the reality of a market place such as Australia which features a large volume 
and variety of consumers, service providers, products and strategies on offer. In Australia 
where essentially a free market philosophy reigns, the consequences of such asymmetry are 
not trivial. Furthennore, it exposes the need for the most important ingredient of any 
agreement as discussed in chapter six - trust425 - and it also highlights the importance of 
ethical behaviours of all participants to such agreements. 
423 Such behavior is seen, fo r example, in excerpt [ 405 ] in chapter six . 424 We also remind that a fa ir defence of such observations is that this is why an adviser is engaged in the first place - to deliver the capabi lity, interes t, knowledge and experience that an indi vidual may not have. 425 AS IC's chi ef economi st gave a direct link between infonnation asymmetry and trust as follows : " A borrower, whether it is an individual or a complex financial institution, may know what he or she is going to 
use the borrowed funds fo r but the person or institution lending the money typically does not know as much. These infonnation gaps are in forma tion asym metri es and th ey undermine trust between the parties" (public hearing [ I ]. p.4 ). 
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7.3.2.2 Ethical disposition 
Given the factors discussed above concemmg information and knowledge and its 
asymmetry across different market participants, this infers a significant role on a vital yet 
seemingly intangible factor: the ethical disposition of those participants426. This factor is 
apparent in most exchanges between any people, and is one that is centered on trust. The 
significance and central importance of ethics was attested by many in the course of the 
PJCI427_ 
In a financial services context ethics can be at the fore of a relationship for many reasons -
for example, the potential for the abuse of power that results from information asymmetry, 
and its implication for responsibility of decisions. These circumstances are highlighted in 
the following excerpts: 
[533] Mr McKenzie, Vice-President of the Australian Investors Association: I had someone walk 
into my office yesterday. She sat down and talked with me and accorded me all the power 
in the relationship. I had to do whatever I could to empower her to ask. I told her some of 
the things that maybe she should have asked questions about. I could see that because she 
did not understand what we were talking about, despite my best efforts-
Bernie Ripoll MP: So it is really up to your integrity. It is up to your standards. 
Mr McKenzie: Absolutely. 
Bernie Ripoll MP: It is very personal. [public hearing [6] , p.43] 
[534] As an experienced trusted adviser you need to know your client well enough to know their 
circumstances, and in some cases, as silly as it sounds, you have to be able to make a 
decision for them as to whether that is reasonable or not, because they do not know. They 
are relying completely on you. This is where the fiduciary relationship comes in. [Director 
of Accounting Professional and Ethical Standards Board, public hearing [2], p.84] 
426 Of course, someone can be highly ethical and yet have limited knowledge, but a more complete 
understanding of ' ethical ' also infers that in such situations, advice would not be given on matters in which a 
knowledge base was low. This is a feature of ethics and integrity upheld by various professional codes of 
conduct, such as: http://www.actuaries.asn.au/library/Standards/CodeofProfessionalConductNov2009 .pdf. 
427 For example: the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia public hearing [7] (pp.10, 16) and public 
submission [363) ; the FPA in public hearing [3] (p.45); the Executive Manager of Guardian Financial 
Planning in public hearing [2] (p.93); public submission [251] from a financial planning business; PJCI 
member Senator Williams in public hearing [3] (p.87). 
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Despite the fundamental importance of ethics, some PJCI participants claimed that as an 
industry, financial planners had not spent a lot of time at thi s issue428 and that ethics itself is 
an outworking of a cultural setting rather than a regulatory setting 429 . However, it was also 
noted by many that appropriate regulation can help430 . It is thi s possibility that was behind 
the P J CI ' s recommendation for a fiduciary duty for financial advisers to place their clients' 
interests ahead of their own (see Appendix A), which was then adopted as part of the FOFA 
refonns (see section 3.3.2.2). It was also appreciated by some that this represents only a 
start in the right direction and that long term change would be the goal43 1, but by placing 
such obligations in law, this was seen to be an analogous step to the obligations upon the 
directors of life insurers to policyholders, and those of trustees to superannuation fund 
investors 432 . 
There was, and is, much conviction and hope that both a cultural- and regulatory- assisted 
approach could lead to behaviours and actions which would always give primacy to the 
needs of the customer. Such optimism was not shared by everyone however, and as such 
we temper the discussion with excerpts from a range of parties which highlight a more 
critical assessment of the underlying ethical issues: 
[5 35] No matter what the laws, Government and the legislators put into place, they ' ll a lways be 
somebody that can serve them better. .. there will be somebody that wi ll get a loop about it. 
[ interview with Storm investor] 
[536] I believe the general regulatory environment is sound in Australia, and you cannot regu late 
against people that are determined to do wrong and cheat the system. [public submission 
407 from Financial planner] 
[53 7] Whatever the legal and regulatory framework , it is almost impossible to eliminate fraud or 
unethical behaviour. [public submission 385 from AXA] 
m Executive M anager. Guardian Financia l Planning. public hearing [2], p .93. 420 Fo r example. see the FPA CEO in public hearing [3] (p.45 ); and the GM of Leader hjp and Quality. Institute of Chartered Accountan ts in Australia , public hearing [7] (p . l 0). 43° For example: Mr Benj amin Hancock. partner of Stonehouse Wealth Management , pub lic hearing [6] (p . 11 0) : the V ice-Pre ident o f the Australian Investors Assoc iation. publi c hearing [6] (p.4 7): Ms June Smith . Princ ipal of Argyle Lawyers. public hearing [2] (p. 111 ); and the CEO of MLC in public hearing [2] (p. 7). 4
·
11 V ice-Pres ident of the Australi an In \·estors Assoc iation. public hearing [6] (p.4 7). 4
·
1
' CEO of MLC. publi c hearing [2] . p .14. 
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[538] Legislating against greed, fraud and some of the other nefarious aspects of human nature is 
very difficult. [Executive Manager, Guardian Financial Planning, public hearing [2], p.93] 
Another excerpt from a Storm investor illustrates their disillusionment with what transpired 
with Storm. Notably, their experience and perception is not just based on Storm, but also 
the events since then which consolidated a distrust and disbelief in the ethical standards of 
various institutions that they have had to engage with. The result is the somewhat 
draconian, but entirely understandable, approach they would now take when dealing with 
financial professionals again. This shows further that their view on ethical disposition of 
participants is not established nor damaged solely on single experiences, but via the 
aggregation of ongoing engagement and interaction. 
[539] In the financial advice industry, there is massive temptation. Absolutely massive 
temptation. A lot of money at stake. If someone came to me and said, "I'm going to invest 
money with these people; they're really good" I would say, "From the moment you ring 
them to the moment you sign your documents and the moment - every moment from then 
on that you deal with them, not only do you get their written documents full of the jargon 
and the disclaimers and the bulls--- that they give, you will tape-record every single 
conversation. You will state to them very clearly what your risk exposure tolerance is and 
you will record and you will have them repeat back to you significant things like what 's 
your level of risk tolerance. Get them to articulate exactl_y what they are doing with the 
money, what they are buying" because what we learned out of this, even though we asked 
all those questions and we went through all the due diligence we could, what we have found 
since is that people who were not even intentionally lying, who made comments to us that, 
in hindsight have proven to be incorrect, are now running so far and seeking legal advice to 
cover their butts, that they are of no assistance to us. [interview with Storm investor] 
It is also important to note further that even with high levels of knowledge and a high level 
of ethics, this still does not eliminate risk and does not provide any guarantee that outcomes 
will not be adverse. As highlighted by St. John (2011), even where financial intermediaries 
bear appropriate responsibility for advice given, this does not imply that a guarantee is 
given of the outcomes of that advice nor fidelity of the products recommended. 
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7.4 What it all boils down to: Trust 
Our direct observations in chapter six highlighted the primacy of trust , and how this is 
impacted in a variety of ways in the event of traumatic financial loss. So it is here too in our 
discussion of what we can infer more broadly from such circumstances, that trust again is 
deduced to be a core issue of importance. 
Undoubtedly, trust is an essential ingredient of human relationships and as such, trust is 
also a cornerstone foundation of the financial services industr/33 . The way in which it is 
essential in a financial context is multi-faceted: 
► Those who do not understand investments or the market, trust those who can offer a 
professional service because they say they do understand it434 ; 
► In the face of risk and uncertainty which is perceived to be complex, trust can be the 
"short-hand way of making investment decisions" (Smith 2009, p.532); 
► Such reliance on trust can and will over-ride regulatory tools such as disclosure435 ; 
► The scale of what is at stake is enormous and yet trust can be given so easil/36 ; 
► The scope of trust bestowed upon financial professionals is large, with the belief 
that the customer is at the forefront of decisions made437 ; 
► The nature of trust bestowed is seen to be influenced by the trust placed in other 
professionals such as medical doctors, implying a ' credibility transfer ' due to the 
perceived association of professionalism with each 438 . 
433 lan ni co la and Parker (20 I 0) state th at " relation ships and trust are cornerston es of the financial advice indu stry' ·. What we add to thi s from the case of Ston11 is that it is not just the adv ice industry, but the financial 
services industry as a whole. 
434 PJCI member Senator W illiams, public hearing [3 ], p.87 . 435 
" Because of the large number of people who sudden ly find themselves with super payouts, and it may be 
their first investment ever or they may have di scovered shares through Tel stra or whateve r ... for those peop le disc losure and a ll of that sort of stuff means nothing because they are basica ll y taking advice from a person" (Ms Julie Owens MP, public hearing [3] , p. 85). 
436 PJCI member Senator Mason compares how people can spend signifi cant time over home, car and CD purchases, "yet th ey wi ll instantl y hand over the power to someone e lse to spend half a milli on dollars ... peop le's life sav ings can be g iven to so meone and with the stroke of a pen- yo u look after it. It is an 
enon11ous tru st, isn·t it. to fin ancial advisersr (public hearing [6] , p.44). 4
·
17 For example, the CEO of MLC (public hearing [2 ], p .7) ; PJC I member Bernie Ripoll MP (public hearing [7] , p.1 16) . 
438 As one in terviewee stated: ·'you th en shou ld just be ab le to trust - well , you give it to this crew to go and look after it. you kn ow ... yo u go to yo ur doctor and yo u trust that you ' re gett in g th e right advice .. and it 
wasn·t actua ll y as ifwe on ly went to one fin anci a l adviser' · (interview wi th Storm investor) . 
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Put simply, trust is needed for individuals to operate in society and the financial system 
itself is built on a trust that financial promises entered into will be honored. Without this, 
the system itself cannot work, and individuals cannot rely on that system. The excerpt 
below highlights this acceptance by an investing couple, and highlights why such trust is 
bestowed: 
[540] Wife: (My husband said), "Well, who do you trust? We have to trust somebody with your 
money." 
Husband: I've never been through a financial adviser before in my life until I retired. 
[interview with Storm investor] 
7.4.1 So much is at stake 
In line with Flyvberg (2006) who suggested that detailed case studies can spring surprises 
on the researcher, this section discusses one such surprise to us: what money actually 
means to people. Whilst most (including us) would hold that the accumulation of money 
does not enable contentedness of its own accord, the evidence from Stonn is that in order to 
have contentedness in life, monetary affairs cannot be in turmoil. Indeed, the previous 
section indicates the importance not only of trust for its own sake, but also for what is at 
stake as a result of granting such trust. 
7.4.1.1 What money does 
Money is more than a means to buy things and its sudden loss means a real loss of options 
in life. Though it can represent a loss of status (in line with comments of Allen et al. 
2000439), it also aligns with other important insights such as from the Financial Literacy 
Foundation. Indeed, whilst "money can't buy happiness, good money management can 
make a big difference to people's lives and therefore their happiness" (FLF 2008, p.36), 
and having the attitude that money is just a means to an end can limit motivation to see 
439 
"We are rewarded with money for meritorious acts and honored with money on ceremonial occasions. We 
are induced to perform undesirable chores with the promise of money and punished for not doing our duty by 
money being withheld. We admire those who have money and ridicule those who do not. Money measuring 
how good or how bad someone is when we are young clearly foreshadows money measuring how successful 
or unsuccessful someone is when we are older" (Allen et al. 2000, p.428). 
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good financial choices as a way to achieving goals440. Such goals of course may be as 
varied as the people who have them - they may include wealth maximization, security, 
status, survival, a way out of difficult circumstances, or some other ends. As such and not 
unexpectedly, attitudes to money will also range across individuals, from casual 
nonchalance to a strong attaclm1ent which can then result in a rigorous pursuit for more. 
Importantly however and as noted in chapter six, whilst not downplaying the possibility of 
destitution for some as a result of Storm, typically this is not the issue for those in a society 
like Australia. Goals are more likely to be about realising certain dreams and plans, and 
meeting certain lifestyle expectations441 . As such, many people may prefer a moderate or 
conservative approach to achieving such goals442, which does make Ston11 a slightly 
unusual case with so many people being involved in such a high risk strategy. We have 
already seen the rationale for involvement expressed by investors in chapter six, and 
indeed, others in the PJCI also suggested that reasons for such involvement are not simply 
described as wanting ' more' money: 
[ 541] Bernie Ripoll MP: Doesn ' t everybody want to make a lot of money? 
Mr Graham HODGES, Deputy CEO of ANZ: No, I do not think they do. Some people just 
want health and happiness. [public hearing [2], p.5] 
What others do want from their money can also be inferred by what they lose when it is 
gone. The excerpts below from Ston11 investors indicate that money can be in fact a means 
to an end - but rather than just material ends, a real underlying provision arising from 
money concerns other essential aspects of human life - independence, health, ability to face 
the future and other things that allow a life to be led: 
[542] I think a lot of it is because I' ve lost the independence of having a good income. [interview 
with Stonn investor] 
44 0 Wh ether those goal s are "security and peace of mind , as well as more specific goa ls which may have 
sig nifi cant and lastin g va lue" (FLF 2008 , p.3 8). 
44 1 Public submi ss ion 39 1 fro m the National Institute of Accountants . 442 Espec ia ll y so '"where th ey do not have substantial mean s" (Deputy CEO of ANZ, publi c hearing [2] , p.49). 
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[543] Ah, well the main thing is the finance; it would have to be. People say money is not the 
most important thing, but it is really, you know? Now if we had - if we were still in the 
position that we were, eve1ything would be fine, wouldn ' t it? (My wife) wouldn ' t be crook. 
Everything would be fine. So yes, the financial side of it. (My wife ' s) health was caused by 
that, you know? [interview with Storm investor] 
[544] The pain the Storm disaster has caused is immeasurable. It is not just about the money. It is 
the worry about the future. [public submission 58 from Storm Investor] 
7. 4.1. 2 What money means 
Money may provide what is required to live a life in a particular manner, but as well as that 
it is also a representation of work and achievement over a lifetime. This association with 
and reward for one' s efforts also suggests an explanation for why its loss hurts so much -
not only is the provision for life choices impacted, but also a representation of such reward 
and recognition of a life ' s work. This aspect of what money actually means was 
commented on by many in the course of the P JCI, as the views below demonstrate: 
[545] It ' s just destroyed my whole future, my whole life. Everything I' ve ever worked for, I will 
never ever achieve ... most of us are from an era where you worked hard all your life, got 
your home and then when you retired, you had a stable roof over your head that was 
unlikely to be taken away and you could spend the rest of your days in your home ... He 
took that away from us, all the years we 've worked hard, he took it all away. So it was like, 
what a waste of - all the time I had to work and be away from my kids and I went without 
and things you had to put up with were all for nothing. So what was our life worth? What 
were we here for? [interview with Storm investor] 
[546] Financial products need to be considered like another product. The difference 1s that 
people ' s life efforts are often at risk. [public submission 398 from Law Academic] 
[547] All of this has had an enormous effect on our lives , of course. It has affected our health; we 
are suffering from bouts of depression, anxiety and nerves. It has had a marked effect on 
our relationships with our family and friends. To have lost everything that we have worked 
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for over the last 50 years is certainly heartbreaking. [Stom1 investor, public hearing [ 4] , 
p.36] 
[548] Not only had we lost 25 years of blood, sweat and tears in our family business, we still 
owed a short fall. [public submission 164 from Stonn investor] 
[549] It has taken me some time to write this submission and it is very harrowing to go back over 
the events which led to the loss of 30 years of hard work for myself and my wife. [public 
submission 263 from Storm Investor] 
A related impact is what money provides for in terms of legacy. Bequest obviously is a 
motivation for many when considering financial plans and goals (MacDonald et al. 2011 ), 
and the loss of potential bequest arising from such losses can exacerbate the sense of loss of 
a life's achievement. And it is not a loss only for the impacted individual - the loss can also 
impact future generations. Although the trauma of such loss may not translate to similar 
trauma for subsequent generations, nevertheless it is an impact of some significance due to 
the downstream effects: 
[550] Financial planning practitioners are in the privileged position of looking after their clients ' 
wealth - a matter second in importance only to their health. In fact, financial plan11ers can 
provide advice that benefits several generations of the same family and not just the current 
client. [public submission 251 from Financial planning business] 
7.4.2 The ultimate impact 
We have shown that significant financial loss is anything but a trivial circumstance, but can 
clearly be traumatic with severe impacts on both the personal and social worlds of an 
individual. The nature of the loss can be as influential as the loss itself, as can the reaction 
of others (especially institutions) to that loss. 
The culmination and ultimate impact of losses, the nature of these losses, and the responses 
of others after the event, is a loss of trust in a range of areas of one ' s life. This is significant 
because trust is needed to function in society, and trust is needed for society to function . In 
a specifically financial context, the role of trust is succinctly put this way: 
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[551] The result is more than the loss of funds which culminated with the credit crisis, it's a loss 
of confidence and trust critical for any financial system. [public submission 398 from Law 
Academic] 
Winning such trust back in a financial system is not a straightforward task, and one which 
can be undone again: 
[552] Transparency and trust will be the battleground of the next decade in financial services. It is 
not going to be so much about products, bells and whistles . You cannot have trust if you do 
not have information and understanding. [CEO ofMLC, public hearing [2] , p.12] 
[553] Many people don't seek advice, not because they don 't want it, but because they don ' t trust 
it, and therefore, they don't value it. [public submission 342 from financial planner] 
Where does this leave those now without such trust? What is left is not just a financially 
devastated circumstance, but a real and very human challenge to trust again - and not just 
in financial matters: 
[ 554] Who do you trust? Your financial adviser? Like you just feel I ike you can ' t trust anyone 
and that was really hard too. You couldn ' t - anybody, the shopkeeper or anyone; you just 
felt like, can I trust you to do the right thing by you? ... that's why I said to (my husband), 
who do we go to? Who do we trust now? [interview with Storm investor] 
7.5 Summary of Chapter 
In this chapter we discussed issues and challenges with the Australian system of financial 
provision. In terms of presented evidence to support this discussion, the contribution of 
non-investor contributions is relatively more significant than that for chapter six. A 
breakdown of sources utilised within chapter seven is provided in table 14. 
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Table 14: Breakdown of sources referenced within chapter seven 
interviews Public Public Other Total 
submissions hearings correspondence 
investors 14 6 4 0 24 
Storn1 employees and advisers 4 0 0 0 4 
Financial planners 0 8 4 3 15 
Others 0 10 22 0 32 
Total 18 24 30 3 75 
Given this chapter' s focus on wider issues including regulatory implications, the 43 % 
contribution by 'others' such as banks, professional associations and P JCI members 
themselves is unsurprising. The 20% contribution by financial planners is also 
understandable in that light, and naturally enough individuals still have a view and a voice 
to be held in such matters - hence their 32% contribution overall. 
This chapter highlighted that the current three-pillar system for financial provision does not 
have the advantage of independence between the pillars, and that in a push to self-
sufficiency many individuals do not regard all three pillars as equal contributors. We offer 
an alternative view of the three pillar system in Australia. Rather than being based on 
'mechanisms' of income, an alternative view is based on sources of trust. In this context 
our alternative three pillars are government, non-govenunent institutions, and oneself. This 
view dovetails into the findings presented in chapter six where we saw that these three 
sources were major casualties in tenns of impacted trust, arising from Storm's collapse. As 
such, this framework highlights real sources of vulnerability that exist for individuals in 
their goal and perceived duty to seek financial self-sufficiency. We also suggest that in a 
more general sense of wellbeing, the role of housing, others, and employment could 
similarly be considered as additional pillars. 
The trend towards greater individualisation of financial prov1s10n has occurred in 
conjunction with other risks increasing as well, particularly those associated with greater 
longevity. We di scussed these and additional challenges in this chapter, including aspects 
of the wider envirorunent where complexity is seen to be a particular challenge. The role of 
regulation within this envirorunent was also discussed, with questions raised as to the 
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effectiveness of a regime with a heavy reliance on licensing and disclosure. Such issues are 
exacerbated by levels of financial literacy which are lower than what they need to be for 
individuals to function effectively. This in tum suggests a real need for professional 
financial advice, which presents its own challenges in that assessing the value of advice is 
not straightforward for even an informed investor. 
A major issue underlies most of the discussion in this chapter and indeed was also brought 
out in chapter six - that being the relationship between those with more information and 
influence, and those with less. This information asymmetry demands that for true efficiency 
and fairness to operate in the overall system, there is key and fundamental reliance on one 
factor in particular - that being the ethical disposition of all participants within that system. 
We offer that this somewhat intangible factor may well lie outside what regulation can 
provide, a view certainly shared by many contributors to the PJCI. In the context of the 
financial services industry, any loss of trust undermines the ability of an individual to work 
within that system, which will likely lead to poorer outcomes. 
Storm's collapse highlights that money does indeed matter, but not for its own sake - it is 
the subsequent loss of control and options that is tangibly impacted. Significant financial 
loss is therefore anything but trivial , and where trust and control is lost, this highlights the 
strong dependence of overall wellbeing on financial wellbei?g. Any system which places 
excessive risks upon the attainment of such financial wellbeing should naturally be 
subjected to critical scrutiny. 
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Chapter 8: Conclusions 
8.1 Overview 
This thesis has investigated the impact of significant and sudden financial loss at the level 
of the individual person, using the collapse of Ston11 financial as a case study. It has 
considered what such financial losses have meant for a sample of investors. This has 
allowed a discussion of the detail of such impacts, and has also allowed a discussion on 
what this infers for the wider context of financial provision in Australian. 
In this final chapter we summarise the adopted approach and source and use of data. This 
includes an overview of those factors which gives some cause for confidence in the 
credibility of presented results. We then summarise the overall findings , and then finish 
with some concluding remarks. 
8 .2 Adopted approach 
By reviewing relevant literature and past studies utilising qualitative research, we 
considered that using elements of ' grounded theory ' and 'naturalistic inquiry ' were useful 
for seeking insights relevant to our research goals. When utilised within a case study 
framework , the advantage of such approaches was the enabling of a way to engage with and 
interpret available data relevant to our research goals. 
In this context, the collapse of Ston11 financial offered an important and infonnative case 
study. In particular, a detailed study was made tractable by the magnitude and profile of 
losses suffered and the substantial wealth of qualitative data. We review this data below, 
and then provide a summary of the approach to construct and present themes and findings 
from that data. Following this a case for the credibility of findings is summarised. 
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8.2.1 Data 
The data relating to Storm financial was extensive and arose from multiple sources. This 
included: 
► 356 publicly available submissions to a Parliamentary Inquiry, constituting 2,879 
pages of written documentation; 
► 9 public hearings that occurred as part of that Inquiry, constituting 823 pages of 
written transcripts; 
► 27 interviews with 15 different individuals/couples (24 people altogether) who were 
involved/impacted by Storm, constituting 33 hours of recorded conversation; 
► various observations from interviews, public meetings and from others; and 
► a variety of other correspondence with financial advisers and ex-Storm investors. 
8.2.2 Constructing and presenting themes and fmdings 
By taking a highly systematic approach when engaging with the data, key themes 
' emerged' in relation to our research goals. This systematic approach operated as follows: 
► An initial consideration of possible issues arose from reading a selection of public 
submissions to the Parliamentary Inquiry, as well as reviewing and synthesising a 
vast range of media attention and commentary on Storm' s collapse ( as presented in 
chapter three); 
► This first step helped shape the approach to interviews, by suggesting a series of 
relevant questions and further lines of possible investigation; 
► The advantages of in-person interviews in allowing familiarity, flexibility and depth 
of inquiry then allowed us to suggest an initial assessment and emergence of the 
major themes, and hence an initial framework for further analysis; 
► With this initial framework in place, other data sources were examined to glean 
their contributions - these contributions variously shaped, corrected, or supported 
the initial framework of major themes; 
► This allowed a discussion and significance of these themes to be examined in more 
depth than otherwise, with all data sources analysed in an iterative manner to ensure 
that all supporting points were accurate in the context in which they were made. 
- 410 -
Naturall y as qualitative researchers we brought and recognised our own sense of 
interpretation and intuition as a primary tool of analysis when engaging with the data. 
Importantly however, by presenting evidence sourced directly from the data in its full 
context (where possible), such analysis was demonstrably grounded in the data itself. As 
such, there was substantial emphasis on presenting verbatim quotations from the full range 
of data sources and research participant contributions. In addition, where relevant and 
tractable to do so, a range of summary statistics were also presented for particular insights. 
Such statistics came from surveys of ex-Stonn investors, a coding of the 356 public 
submissions, a statistical summary of interview findings , and from analysing the frequency 
of some statements made in public hearings. 
8.2.3 Ascertaining confidence in results 
Ensuring and demonstrating the credibility of findings from any study ( qualitative or 
otherwise) is important and we adopted a number of approaches and procedures to assist 
with this. However, we recognise that as with any research into human affairs, what we 
consider as 'findings ' may merely scratch the surface of what are complex issues for those 
suffering from significant financial loss. Nevertheless, there is cause for confidence in the 
credibility of the points made. This arises from: 
► the variety and substantial volume of data available; 
► the public availability of much of the data; 
► the triangulation of data 443 ; 
► the systematic nature of the process taken to examine that data; 
► the extensive member checking with interviewees and SICAG members; 
► the feedback provided by others (peers) throughout the course of the thesis; 
► an adherence to the underlying data via the written account offered ; 
► ' time-sampling ' via repeated interviews with some participants; 
► the use of mechanical recording devices for the fidelity of interview transcripts ; and 
► an acknowledgement and management of both our and others ' biases involved in 
the research questions of interest. 
44 3 Both in the number and var iety of data sources (takin g ' triangulation ' in its soc ial sc ience sense to mean two or more), but also in the nature of each data source' s derivation as di scussed in section 5 .4 .3 . I. 
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In particular, the important issues of bias and selective memory of events was raised several 
times in the course of this research444 . This is and was always a challenge with our 
particular research goals, but for at least four reasons we suggest that this has been 
mitigated somewhat: 
► Research indicates that individuals are reluctant to admit to failings in their own 
knowledge and decisions made, particularly in the context of financial products 
(DiCenzo et al. 2011). Yet, we have seen ample evidence of such admission of 
personal shortcomings by investors, indicating a genuine openness about their 
circumstances and perceptions; 
► In many interviews with couples, there were examples of differing recollections of 
certain details of events: timings, monetary amounts, conversations, phrases used by 
others, and so on. Even with single interview participants, some details of their own 
circumstances (notably dates) had more than one possibility from certain accounts. 
However, there were some details that were clearly consistent across many 
recollections. It is these less ambiguous responses that we focussed on (though not 
exclusively, as there is no requirement for such research to not present 
con tradi cti ons); 
► The strong predominance of some views across multiple data sources is borne out in 
many of the key points raised; and 
► The main research question itself focuses on impacts at the individual level, 
including perceptions. Too much sanitising of such perceptions to fit the 
interpretative belief of the researcher rather than the views of individuals 
themselves, would be an inappropriate approach. 
Additionally, we provided as much context as possible for the major points made, and this 
has meant that the coverage across many participants is substantial. A summary 
highlighting the breadth and frequency of data sources used as direct evidence is presented 
below, to allow further qualification of confidence in the findings. 
444 For example, highlighted by an ANZ executive in stating that ·'people's appreciation of their own risk 
profile before the event and after the event can often be clouded" (public hearing [2], p.49). 
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Table 15: Breakdown of all data excerpts used 
Interviews Public Public Other Total 
submissions hearings correspondence 
Investors 258 87 45 13 403 
Stom1 employees and advisers 30 2 8 1 41 
Other financial planners 0 17 9 7 33 
Others 0 26 47 4 77 
Total 288 132 109 25 554 
Thus, we contend that there is a reasonable, broad and appropriate coverage across all data 
sources, supporting claims that the results testify to a reasonable interpretation of the 
underlying and core issues at play. 
8.3 Findings 
In this section we summarise the findings of this thesis. Firstly, this concerns the main 
research question: what are the impacts on people when they experience a significant 
financial shock? Secondly, this concerns insights into some of the major features of the 
system of financial provision in Australia. Thirdly, we then highlight those impacts which 
are particularly ' distinctive ' firstly to financial loss when compared to other adverse 
circumstances, and then highlight further those which appear to be even more specifically 
distinctive to Stonn' s collapse itself. 
8.3.1 Impacts of a significant financial shock 
Sudden and significant financial loss is devastating. The case study of Stonn highlights that 
thi s devastation is evident in several areas of an individual ' s life, and much of the 
devastation can be viewed in light of what was relied on when choosing to invest. Indeed, 
those interviewed all indicated their trust in various aspects of what was presented to them 
when considering an investment with Stonn: an ASIC-granted AFSL licence, close 
associations with major and trusted banks, membership of professional bodies, the adviser, 
the experiences of friend s and family with Storm, and ultimately, trust in one 's own 
judgement and deci sions . On the other side now of significant losses, many investors doubt 
whether their future can operate with the same level of trust as before. 
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We explored the detail of such impacts in terms of one ' s personal world, one ' s social 
world, and how a resulting impact on ' trust' and 'control ' in one ' s life affects their 
interaction with the environment around them. Such a framework also reflects behavioural 
influences upon an individual when they make financial decisions - there are personal 
biases and beliefs, there are social influences, and there are overarching environmental 
influences at play as well. 
8. 3.1.1 Impact at a personal level 
In terms of an individual's personal world, the emotional impact is strong, varied, and raw. 
The initial sense of shock was palpable for many Storm investors, and this gave way to 
strong feelings of anger for many. Others responded with ongoing feelings of disbelief and 
feeling numb towards not just the losses but also the manner of those losses. Feelings of 
frustration, regret and guilt applied to most of those impacted, and was particularly 
exacerbated where other family members and friends had been impacted as well. Others felt 
much fear of what such losses meant for their future and where the investment with Storm 
was to provide for dependants, this sense of fear and angst was especially apparent. An apt 
summary of the overall emotional impact is a devastation of dreams and plans. 
The strength of such emotional impacts is further reflected in the realm of mental 
wellbeing, with adverse impacts particularly pronounced. Examples of stress, anxiety, 
depression and a need for a variety of medication did and still abound, and were explicitly 
discussed in the majority of interviews conducted. Many investors in both interviews and 
other data sources talked openly and candidly about their struggles with feelings of self-
harm. 
8. 3.1 . 2 Impact at a social level 
In terms of an individual ' s social world, there is an unavoidable impact on relationships 
including marriages. For some the added stress was too much for a marriage to bear, and 
for others it has damaged relationships with spouses, friends and family. Negative impacts 
could arise from either very direct judgements and criticisms being made, or more subtle 
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changes that have arisen. What was particularly poignant in interviews was the willingness 
and openness of some participants to share their own stories in this matter. 
Notably for some, their dire circumstances provided the opportunity for some relationships 
to strengthen and prove more valuable than before. It may be the case that the nature of a 
relationship is accentuated by such traumatic circumstances - where there were stresses 
previously, these have been exacerbated, but where there was togetherness, this has been 
strengthened. However the complexities and varieties of the human experience does not 
lend itself to universal claims in such matters , and we did not attempt to do so. 
Wider social influences are highly influential in the period after financial loss. For 
pragmatic reasons such as a lack of funds, a decreased involvement in sporting, charitable 
and other community pursuits can eventuate. For others, an increased sense of social 
isolation relates more to the emotional bankruptcy now being felt , or for more reflective 
reasons of embarrassment, fear and vulnerability. Adverse perceptions and judgements of 
the community at large can bring further angst and damage upon individuals, leading to a 
further withdrawal from society. 
A particularly debilitating outcome for many was the decreased ability, for both financial 
and emotional reasons, to now partake in cultural and familial roles in the manner which 
had been plaimed, dreamed of and anticipated . This was especially so for those who were 
grandparents, or those who had other family members that they intended to support. 
Overall social impacts are exacerbated by the ' network ' effect, ansmg from the 
concentration of investors in family groups and concentrated geographical areas. This can 
result in support networks not being as available or helpful as they otherwise would be. 
Such outcomes can only serve to further increase social isolation, which in turn further 
reinforces ongoing and adverse emotional reactions. 
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8.3.1.3 Impact on trust 
The direct impact upon trust is broad, complex, deep, and above all, very real. Overall, 
many institutions and professions whom were formerly trusted, are now viewed through 
highly sceptical eyes and are very likely to remain so. Most obviously, Storm' s strategy and 
many of its personnel are now seen as sources of misplaced trust, but it is of interest that 
such distrust is not universal amongst ex-investors. 
Wider professional bodies are also distrusted now by many. The financial planning 
profession in general is a particular target, as are elements of the legal profession in the 
wake of how some compensation and settlement arrangements have occurred since Storm 
collapsed. 
More complex are elements of distrust in government, and notably for those in the public 
sphere, it is not enough for officials to merely intend or say something - messages are more 
believable and trusted when all arms of government align to give a consistent picture. Many 
Storm investors would point to a complex and changing environment in the context of 
financial provision, mixed views on direct government responses to the collapse of Storm 
(and others), and a confused picture of what regulation means and what regulators do, as 
indications that government does not portray a deep care about their needs. 
The strongest sense of distrust however relates to the disenchantment, anger and adverse 
perceptions of the banks and credit providers involved with Storm. Importantly, this lack of 
trust has arisen as much from events post-collapse as it has from anything else. This severe 
loss of trust in what should otherwise be a cornerstone institution in one ' s financial affairs , 
is a particularly damaging outcome of Storm' s collapse. 
Many investors also now admit to less trust in their own judgements and ability, arising 
from the aforementioned feelings of frustration, guilt and regret. In an environment when 
self-provision for one ' s financial wellbeing is strongly encouraged - and notably for the 
most vulnerable phase of life when employment has ceased and significant risks around 
longevity, investment volatility and health are at the fore - the loss of trust in not just 
oneself, but also the environment in which one exists, is concerning. Such widespread 
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distrust is an outcome that 1s not favourable to any party involved - individuals and 
institutions alike. 
8.3.1.4 Impact on control 
The aggregated impacts upon emotional, health, social and formerly trusted spheres of 
one ' s life, has resulted in a lack of control, options and choices for many individuals. Given 
that any financial contract and indeed any human relationship centres on trust, then when 
such trust is broken, it leaves the impacted party at a loss of where to turn and in whom to 
trust. This is a major factor why the ability to have some control over one ' s life is greatly 
diminished. The interviews in particular highlighted that investors need to feel that they 
have some say in their life. But a resulting uncertainty about the future, a lack of ability to 
do anything about it, and a real and enhanced sense of vulnerability to future life 
circumstances has left many wondering what their efforts in life to date were all about. 
The need to now engage with Centrelink for financial support is the epitome for many of a 
lack of control. Indeed, any degree of 'self-sufficiency' and being able to provide for 
oneself and others from the efforts of one's working life is now perceived as unattainable 
for many. Importantly, the avoidance of destitution is not the primary issue in the case of 
Stonn for many but neither should it be in an Australian context - but it does represent 
something akin to the next worst outcome for many, which is now not having options in 
one ' s life. Perhaps this itself indicates that destitution is not so much an amount of 
monetary provision, but more to the degree to which choices and some control can be 
exercised. 
8.3.2 The system of financial provision 
The existing framework of financial provision in Australia consists of the 'pillars ' of the 
age pension, superaimuation savings, and other savings, which all act as mechanisms of 
such provision. When considered in tenns of sources of reliance and trust, we postulate that 
a framework of government, institutions and oneself gives a better indication of the true 
source of provision. As such , the loss of trust that eventuates in the case of Stonn implies a 
loss of trust in these three pillars of (fonner) reliability, and as such it highlights real 
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sources of vulnerability that exist for individuals in their goal and perceived duty to seek 
financial self-sufficiency. 
This trend towards greater individualisation of financial prov1s10n has occurred in 
conjunction with other risks increasing as well , particularly those associated with greater 
longevity and complexity. In the context of these risks, the effectiveness of a regime with a 
heavy reliance and focus on disclosure is questionable, especially where levels of financial 
literacy are lower than what they need to be. 
This highlights the crux of many issues highlighted by St01m' s collapse - that of 
information asymmetry between various participants involved in the financial services 
industry. In the case of Storm, an ' outcome' asymmetry can be considered as important as 
well , whereby individuals suffered devastating losses, but institutions did not. Such 
asymmetry demands a focus on the ethical disposition of all participants. 
8.3.3 'Distinctives' 
Some impacts on Storm investors are clearly in line with those often associated with other 
traumatic experiences. The fact that financial loss is painful, devastating, isolating, impacts 
relationships and health, and often presents limited chances of recovery is certainly not 
unique to financial loss, nor to the particular circumstances of _storm. 
It is apparent however that significant financial loss presents some features that are 
different in nature to other traumatic experiences. The sense of frustration (and regret) with 
the lack of control available after financial loss is apparent, especially where decisions were 
made earlier to get involved. This is qualitatively different to trauma arising from a natural 
disaster for example, where a belief that ' nothing could be done' and a sense of fatalism 
may be part of the later coping strategy. Unfortunately in the case of financial loss, whilst 
little may have been able to be done whilst the damage was being borne out, there was still 
the initial decision to invest and being exposed to risks as a result. An excerpt of an investor 
attests to this: 
- 4 I 8 -
After all the Queensland Disaster with the floods there are people worse off than us , bush 
fires , floods . I rea lize are Nature's cruel way and they happen so quickly. Financial Advisers 
on the other hand have time to convince their clients how good investments are, unfortunately 
most folks listen . The difference between Natures Disasters you don't get much time to think 
about it and very little warning. Financial Adviser you have time & stress to think about if 
you are doing the ri ght thing. [ email correspondence from Stom1 Investor, February 2013] 
The other di stinctive feature of financial loss is the fact that money itself is an enabler of 
other facets of life - from options in housing, to involvement in some cultural and 
community pursuits, and to an engagement with society at large. Thus the loss of money is 
not just an impact in terms of dollar value - all that it enables one to do is also 
compromised, which itself asks a bigger question of what money actually means . 
Not only do we see some impacts of financial loss differing to those from other traumatic 
circumstances, but the specific example of Stonn itself presents a further refinement and 
specificity of impacts as well. What is characteristic about losses with Storm includes the 
network effects arising in part from the reliance on the testimony of friends and family to 
get involved and in part from the geographic and demographic focus of Stonn, which leads 
to a concentration of impacts in certain spheres; the widespread level of resulting 
distrust445; and the extensive and intense domino-like effect of one impact leading into 
others such as emotional and social impacts. In this sense, the following excerpt from a 
Storm adviser highlights some of the real and debilitating impacts, which are exacerbated in 
the case of Stonn: 
On every single day since January, I can vow to you, I have spoken to somebody who has 
contemplated suicide seriously, or who is contemplating it as we speak now and has 
displayed suicidal tendencies. There have been severe strains on marital relationships. 
Healthy people have had cardiac arrests. There has been loss of dignity and self-worth ; severe 
depress ion; and .. . a tremendous breach of trust, leading to a suspicion of people genera ll y, 
including betrayal. [Storm adviser, public hearing [6] , p.92] 
445 The Storn1 adviser of public hearing [ 6] (p.92) and the Stonn investor of public hearing [ 4] (p.48 -49) give very clear accounts of how wide ranging, and widely fe lt , has been the impact on trust in all areas of life. 
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It is therefore noteworthy that the issue of 'dependence' is also to the fore in the case of 
Storm. There are dependencies between impacts; people themselves are not agents which 
are independent from others; and financial loss can be just one life stress amongst many, so 
that the impact of financial loss is dependent and influential on the impacts of such other 
stresses - either to leverage the impact of other circumstances, or to itself be felt more 
keenly as a result. Unfortunately in the case of Storm, the sad irony is that much of the 
angst being felt is against the backdrop of efforts to be self-sufficient, rather than be 
dependent on the provision of government and others. 
8.4 Concluding remarks 
The cost of devastation of one's financial affairs is significant, and its impact is far more 
than a loss of money. The damaging impact of a loss of trust is prevalent and this is of 
major concern, as no society or ordered system ultimately works without trust. Arguably 
the regulatory system involved in managing and allocating such trust across the financial 
environment is shown to be inadequate. Its foundations of market efficiency are premised 
on not only participants having appropriate information and knowledge, but also that all 
participants have such wherewithal and can act on it appropriately. Unequivocally, this is 
not the case, nor is likely to be. Professional relationships and services exist because of 
information asymmetry, and thereby power asymmetry as well. This places the onus on the 
professional standards and ethical disposition of the service provider(s) to act in accordance 
with the responsibility that this power asymmetry bestows. Few Storm investors would 
claim that ethical and responsible service has been their experience with service providers. 
And rather than cast more responsibility at the feet of individuals, it is apparent that not all 
service providers have the appropriate knowledge and risk management in place when 
providing their services. 
A worrying observation is that the offloading of investment, longevity and a host of other 
· risks onto individuals has meant that the exposure to such risks in the Australian 
environment may be only just beginning. A lesson of Storm is, in whom will such 
individuals trust? 
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8.4.1 Contribution 
By highlighting the costs and implications of poor outcomes, this thesis makes a 
contribution to furthering the understanding of personal finance, an area which has not had 
the attention it is due. Importantly, it also provides a record of the extent of consequences 
when things go wrong and as such, provides insights for those involved in such matters in 
the future. It may even highlight for anyone who has forgotten, the reason why the financial 
services industry exists at all - to meet real needs of real people. 
As to the utility of this thesis for those who have contributed to it and participated in 
providing feedback along the way, and by way to offer further assurance as to its overall 
fidelity and interest, a selection of excerpts received as feedback is given below. 
I have just read your article in the Australian Journal of Financial Planning and congratulate 
you on this and I would like to see more as you write them. You speak of hindsight and we 
have plenty of this through history unfortunately investors, financial engineers and advisors 
tend to forget as headlines move. It gets frustrating as an advisor to see disasters time and 
time again that should have been avoided by the investor with good advice and investment 
fundamentals. The more articles like yours that speak of the client outcomes rather than the 
financial porn we generally get the better off we will all be. Well done . [ email from financial 
adviser, April 2013] 
As a Queensland based business we've helped and comforied a number of ex-Stonn clients. 
I also have come to know a Storm victim in my personal life and I found your insights re the 
non-financial impacts added to my small appreciation of what it must be like for them. [email 
from financial adviser, July 2013] 
I am an affected Storm Financial investor and I just had the pleasure off reading your artic le 
Aftennath Of A Stonn, passed on to me by SICAG. Thank you for your thoughtful insights, 
they have helped me toward coming to terms with some of my demons. [ unsolicited email 
from Storn1 investor, July 2013]. 
Your (artic le) describes our own circumstances and describes in words that I would dearly 
wish to have expressed myself, the many dimensions of the impact of the Stonn catastrophe. 
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I shamelessly admit that it has brought me to tears and I feel sure that there are many among 
the Storm investor group who will be nodding their head in acknowledgment of what you 
have identified (and) expressed. [email from co-chairman of SICAG in response to article in 
Australian Journal of Financial Planning, June 2013] 
We anticipate further contributions in two areas that the case of Storm highlights, but could 
not give attention to in this thesis. The first of these, as indicated in section 7.2.1.4, is an 
examination of what factors are important in recovery from significant financial loss over 
time. If interviewees are agreeable, following this up over time and providing a series of 
'nested' case studies within the overall case study of Storm may be informative. Early 
indications from interviews to date attest that the role of support networks of other people 
(albeit compromised in many cases for Stonn investors), employment options, and a range 
of lifestyle and other changes being made are important factors to examine further. 
Undoubtedly age too will be important, as the unfortunate reality is that the cost of adverse 
outcomes are likely to be harder to recover from, at more mature ages. 
The second area concerns risk. This concerns both its evaluation in cases such as Storm, as 
well as its presentation to investors. Some contributors to the PJCI spoke to this issue446 
and its importance is also raised by others447. We also received emails from financial 
planners highlighting this issue as a key one for further consideration. 
For now however, making a contribution to an understanding of the impact of significant 
financial losses has been the main research goal. As one final excerpt attests: 
The perception in the media was that the clients of Storm Financial - the unwitting victims of 
this debacle that was unfolding - were greedy highflying gamblers . Little attention was given 
to the human tragedy that existed behind the headlines. [public submission 276, from 
SICAG] 
It is hoped that this research contributes something to this end. 
446 For example, the Institute of Actuaries of Australia (public hearing [3] , p.89). 
447 For example: "I believe that one of the primary weaknesses of much personal financial planning is an 
inadequate focus on risk and how to manage it" (Rappaport 2008 p.180). 
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Appendix A: PJCI 
Terms of reference448 
On 25 February 2009 the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial 
Services resolved to inquire into and report by 23 November 2009 on the issues associated 
with recent financial product and services provider collapses, such as Storm Financial , 
Opes Prime and other similar collapses, with particular reference to : 
1. the role of financial advisers ; 
2. the general regulatory environment for these products and services; 
3. the role played by commission arrangements relating to product sales and advice, 
including the potential for conflicts of interest, the need for appropriate disclosure, 
and remuneration models for financial advisers; 
4. the role played by marketing and advertising campaigns; 
5. the adequacy of licensing arrangements for those who sold the products and 
services; 
6. the appropriateness of information and advice provided to consumers considering 
investing in those products and services, and how the interests of consumers can 
best be served; 
7. consumer education and understanding of these financial products and services; 
8. the adequacy of professional indemnity insurance arrangements for those who sold 
the products and services, and the impact on consumers; and 
9. the need for any legislative or regulatory change. 
In conducting its inquiry, the Committee has made a decision to focus specifically on non-
superannuation products and services. 
44 8 Sourced direc tly from: 
http :// \vww.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary Business/Committees/Senate Committees? url=corporations ctte/fps/in fo .htm. accessed 28 August 20 12. 
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Additional term of reference 
On 16 March 2009 the Senate agreed that the following additional matter be referred to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Corporations and Financial Services as part of that 
committee's inquiry into financial products and services in Australia, adopted by the 
committee on 25 February 2009 for inquiry and report by 23 November 2009: 
10. The committee will investigate the involvement of the banking and finance industry 
in providing finance for investors in and through Storm Financial, Opes Prime and 
other similar businesses, and the practices of banks and other financial institutions 
in relation to margin lending associated with those businesses. 
Recommendations released in November 2009 
Recommendation 1: The committee recommends that the Corporations Act be amended to 
explicitly include a fiduciary duty for financial advisers operating under an AFSL, 
requiring them to place their clients' interests ahead of their own. 
Recommendation 2: The committee recommends that the government ensure ASIC is 
appropriately resourced to perform effective risk-based surveillance of the advice provided 
by licensees and their authorised representatives. ASIC should also conduct financial 
advice shadow shopping exercises annually. 
Recommendation 3: The committee recommends that the Corporations Act be amended to 
require advisers to disclose more prominently in marketing material restrictions on the 
advice they are able to provide consumers and any potential conflicts of interest. 
Recommendation 4: The committee recommends that the government consult with and 
support industry in developing the most appropriate mechanism by which to cease 
payments from product manufacturers to financial advisers. 
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Recommendation 5: The committee recommends that the government consider the 
implications of making the cost of financial advice tax deductible for consumers as paii of 
its response to the Treasury review into the tax system. 
Recommendation 6: The committee recommends that section 920A of the Corporations Act 
be amended to provide extended powers for ASIC to ban individuals from the financial 
services industry. 
Recommendation 7: The c01mnittee recommends that, as part of their licence conditions, 
ASIC require agribusiness MIS licensees to demonstrate they have sufficient working 
capital to meet current obligations. 
Recommendation 8: The committee recommends that sections 913B and 915C of the 
Corporations Act be amended to allow ASIC to deny an application, or suspend or cancel a 
licence, where there is a reasonable belief that the licensee 'may not comply' with their 
obligations under the licence. 
Recommendation 9: The committee recommends that ASIC immediately begin 
consultation with the financial services industry on the establishment of an independent, 
industry-based professional standards board to oversee nomenclature, and competency and 
conduct standards for financial advisers. 
Recommendation 10: The committee recommends that the govenunent investigate the costs 
and benefits of different models of a statutory last resort compensation fund for investors . 
Recommendation 11: The committee reco1mnends that ASIC develop and deliver more 
effective education activities targeted to groups in the community who are likely to be 
seeking financial advice for the first time. 
- 425 -
Appendix B: Information for interviewees 
Attachment 1: Background information letter sent to participants 
Dear [X] 
Thank.you for your time to talk on the phone the other day. By way of follow up, I am 
lecturing at the Australian National University (ANU) in Canberra as well as studying for a 
research degree (Ph.D). As part of this, I am looking at the policy, risk management and 
personal implications resulting from the collapse of Storm financial and other financial 
providers. To this end I am hoping to interview a number of people who were personally 
impacted by the Storm collapse. 
The expectation of the research is that it will produce material suitable for publication in a 
peer-reviewed journal in a related area - for example, public policy, finance, financial 
planning, behavioural economics, actuarial science, or education. It is intended that the 
findings will be able to inform the public debate around the provision of financial advice, as 
well as providing insights about regulatory reform as well as the public policy process. 
The interviews would have a ' semi-structured ' approach, where there are some specific 
questions I would to ask to establish common themes or points of difference across 
different interviewees, but also be open to talking about what else you consider important. 
If you would like to contribute but do not wish to participate via an interview, arrangements 
can be made for postal questionnaires instead of interviews if that is preferred or more 
convenient 
It is important to point out all answers and insights would be aggregated with other 
responses, so as to not identify any specific perspective with a particular individual. Full 
confidentiality of participants would be assured. A range of additional ethical issues apply 
to research of this nature and for your information and consideration, an information sheet 
is attached. 
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Please also allow me to stress that there clearly is no obligation to participate 111 thi s 
research - it is entirely voluntary. If however you are open to participating in this research, 
please read, complete and send back the 2 page infonnation sheet and 1 page acceptance 
note (labelled pages 2, 3 and 4) in the enclosed reply-paid envelope and I will contact you 
again in June or July of this year. Please retain the 2 page infonnation sheet (labelled pages 
5 and 6) for your own records. 
Additionally, if you are agreeable to being interviewed in person, an amount of $25 will be 
paid per family group (individual or couple) as a contribution to any travel expenses 
incurred in attending the interview. For all interviews, I envisage being able to travel to 
wherever is convenient for you, so that the interview can take place a short distance from 
your residence. Further details regarding payment are also on the attached infonnation 
sheets. 
If before making a decision to participate or not you wish to discuss any of this further, 
please feel free to contact me anytime at the contact details given above. Alternatively, you 
can contact the ANU Human Research Ethics Committee if you have any concerns or 
queries that you would prefer to ask them directly. 
Yours sincerely, 
Aaron Bruhn 
Fellow of the Australian Institute of Actuaries (FIAA); 
Fellow of the New Zealand Society of Actuaries (FNZSA) 
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Attachment 2: Ethics information sheet sent to participants. 
INFORMATION SHEET AND ACCEPTANCE NOTE 
Topic: An investigation into the personal and policy impacts surrounding the collapse of 
Storm Financial and other financial service providers 
Researcher name and contact details: 
Mr Aaron Bruhn Telephone: (02) 6125 4904 
Lecturer in Actuarial Studies 
School of Finance and Applied Statistics 
ANU College of Business and Economics 
Australian National University, Canberra 
ACT 0200 
Research supervisor: 
Professor Tom Smith 
Professor of Finance 
Telephone: (02) 6125 8123 
School of Finance and Applied Statistics 
ANU College of Business and Economics 
Australian National University, Canberra 
ACT 0200 
Research methodology: 
Email: aaron. bruhn@anu.edu.au 
Email: tom.smith@anu.edu.au 
A series of semi-structured interviews and/or questionnaires will be conducted with individuals who 
were impacted by the collapse of Storm Financial, and who also made a public submission to the 
Parliamentary Joint Committee ' Inquiry into financial products and services in Australia ' . The 
purpose of this is twofold: 
(i) Do contributors consider that the Inquiry's recommendations are appropriate, and do 
contributors consider such reviews to be a useful forum to have their voice heard [the 
public policy perspective] ; 
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(ii) Assess I describe the impact on individuals from such collapses and the extent to which 
people financially recover, or otherwise, over time [the personal impact perspective]. 
The expectation of the research is that it will produce material suitable for publication in a peer-
reviewed journal in a related area - for example, public policy, finance, financial planning, 
behavioural economics, actuarial science, or education. It is intended that the findings will be able to 
inform the public debate around the provision of financial advice, as well as providing insights 
about regulatory reform as well as the public policy process. The use of infom1ation gained from 
interviews will be in line with the ethical considerations below. 
It is important to note the following key ethical considerations: 
1. Participation is completely voluntary. If you indicate that you wish to participate, then at 
any time after that indication you are free to withdrawal, without any need to provide a 
reason for your withdrawal. If you decide to withdrawal at any stage, then you have the 
choice to also withdrawal all information that you have personally provided to date. If you 
choose to do this, then all copies of that information will be destroyed and not used further 
for the purposes of this research . 
2. All interview answers and identities of those participating will be kept confidential as far as 
the law allows. In particular, all insights and findings will be presented on a level 
aggregated across all participants. Individual participants will not be directly identified in 
any presentation or paper relating to this research. 
3. In order to provide an accurate summary of each interview, if you are agreeable an 
electronic audio recording of each interview for later transcription to a written record would 
be made. However this is entirely voluntary on your behalf, and the interview can proceed 
without such a recording if that is your preference. 
4 . The recording, storage, disseminat ion and management of all responses collected over time 
would be carefully managed. In particular, all paper transcripts of interviews will be kept in 
a locked cabinet in the ANU office of the primary investigator. All related material will be 
in a secure locked cabinet for five years after any publication arising from the resea rch . 
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5. Within one month of the interview a record that summarises the interview will be sent to 
participants for their records. Participants then have an opportunity to inform the researcher 
of any corrections or changes that they wish to make. 
6. Participants will be sent a copy of any published paper(s) directly relating to information 
obtained from interviews. 
7. The research is funded by the ANU, with no outside sources of funding. If this situation 
were to change, participants will be notified accordingly. 
8. Interview participants will receive a payment of $25 per family group as reimbursement for 
any travel costs associated with attending the interview. This will be sent out as soon as 
possible, after the interviews have taken place. 
9. The research is under the supervision of an experienced researcher at the ANU (Professor 
Tom Smith, with details given above). 
10. The researcher has no association with Storm Financial, nor with the Parliamentary Joint 
Committee 'Inquiry into financial products and services in Australia'. 
11. Additionally the research operates under the research ethics protocols of the University, and 
any questions or complaints of this nature can be forwarded to: 
Human Research Ethics Committee 
Office of Research Integrity 
Research Office, Chancelry 1 OB 
The Australian National University, ACT 0200 
Tel: (02) 6125 7945 
Fax: (02) 6125 4807 
Email : Human.Ethics.Officer@anu.edu.au 
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Attachment 3: List of indicative interview questions sent to participants 
PART A: For all participants 
Questions 1 - 3 relate to your situation at the time when you first entered a business relationship 
with Storm Financial: 
1. What were your main reasons to seek out financial advice from Stom1 Financial? 
2. At the time of implementing and acting on their advice, would you say that you were 
reasonably happy with the advice being given and the choices being made? Why or why 
not? 
3. Did you feel at the time that you had "peace of mind" about your future financial affairs? 
Questions 4 - 13 relate to your situation since the time Storm Financial went into administration in 
January 2009. 
4. Can you describe the impact on your lives as a result of the collapse of Storm Financial? 
Please only include anything you are comfortable to share. Examples include changes in 
financial plans for the future, impacts on i1m11ediate and extended family, personal health 
impacts, changes in living arrangements, etc. 
5. Have you sought out financial advice since January 2009? If not, can you explain why you 
haven ' t - for example, distrust, lack of affordability, lethargy, a focus on day to day living, 
etc . 
6. If you have sought out financial advice since January 2009, can you describe: 
a. The reasons why you have done so; 
b. The type of advice sought (for example, budgetary assistance, options around 
housing arrangements , advice to deal with debts , tax advice, etc) 
c. How you have selected the provider of the financial advice; 
d. Your contentment or satisfaction, or otherwise, with the advice given. 
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7. Compared to January 2009, do you feel you are any better off now in terms of recovery 
from the financial shock you have suffered? This may be in terms of financial affairs, 
personal affairs, or any other area of life (your answers to question 6 may provide prompts 
for you to consider your current situation). Please describe areas where you feel you are 
better off, as well as areas where you feel you are worse off. 
8. For any areas in which you think you are in a better position now than January 2009, what 
do you think the main factors have been in getting to this better position? For example, 
support from friends, family, changed perspectives, etc. 
9. For any areas where you do not feel you are in a better position now than January 2009, can 
you describe the reasons why it has been difficult to recover. 
10. Purely in terms of your financial future, do you feel that you will ever recover from the 
collapse of Storm Financial, to a point where you are content with your financial affairs? 
11 . What do you feel you need now to have contentment with your financial , or wider life, 
affairs from now on? 
12. If there were some major lessons that someone else could learn from your experiences, 
what would you say they would be? 
13. Is there anything else you would like to add about the impact of Storm Financial ' s collapse 
on your own personal affairs? 
Questions 14 and 15 establish your circumstances and perceptions of the change in your financial 
affairs since first entering a financial relationship with Storm Financial449 . 
14. How has your financial position changed between when you first entered a financial 
relationship with Storm, when they went into administration and now? The table below may 
449 Note: In most interviews, questions 14 and 15 were subsequently not pursued. Given the fact that 
participants were more than happy to discuss at length their perceptions and thoughts towards the overall 
events, the judgement was made at the time that proceeding with these questions would be a big diversion the 
themes emerging from the interviews. It also would have been difficult for many participants to locate the 
exact details of their affairs at that time, given that for many, revisiting what was a very painful period was 
difficult enough. 
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be of ass istance to answer this question, but is not necessary if thi s level of detail is not 
your preference. 
When you first Immediately after Stom1 As of 
entered a business Financial going into today 
relationship with administration (January 
Storm Financial 2009) 
Assets: Value of primary housing 
residence (if owned) 
Value of other real estate assets 
( e.g. investment properties) 
Value of other physical assets 
(car, household goods, etc) 
Value of superannuation savings 
Value of other savings 
Value of any other assets 
Liabilities Mortgage on primary housing 
residence (if owned) 
Mortgage on other real estate 
assets ( e.g. investment 
property) 
Loans on other physical items 
( e.g. car finance, hire purchase 
for household goods) 
Debts on credit facilities 
(e.g. credit cards) 
Value of any other liabilities 
15 . As best as you are able, can you estimate on a scale of 1 - 10 your satisfaction or 
contentment with your overal l financial position at each of the fol lowing times. A " l" 
represents extremely dissatisfied, and a " IO" represents extreme ly satisfied. 
When you first entered a business Immediately after Stom1 Financial going into As of today 
relationship with Storm Financial administration (January 2009) 
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PART B: For those who made a public submission to The Australian Parliamentary Joint 
Committee on Corporations and Financial Services "Inquiry into financial products and services in 
Australia" (Ripoll Review) 
1. Since making your public submission, have you kept up to date with the findings / 
recommendations of the Ripoll Review which were released in November 2009? 
2. If so, do you consider the recommendations of the Review address the concerns or thoughts 
you raised? 
3. Are there some areas of the Review that you consider have gone too far? Are there other 
areas that you consider have not gone far enough? Please describe here reasons for your 
thoughts on each area. 
4. Do you consider that you had a fair opportunity to contribute to the overall process under 
the Review? 
5. Would you consider it worthwhile to submit again to such a Review? Why or why not? 
6. Are you familiar with the Federal Government's response to the Ripoll Review, which was 
announced in April 201 0? 
7. If so, do you have any comments on the Government' s response? 
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Appendix C: 'Surprises from Storm' article 
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Qf i::trLI'S.G:,. th.c SJ ' ~ lTh thl_s l!i t r:mpc:-r.:1d 1: .. , th.:: f.ict fihi'l t 1 ::: 
li:"il =n..\Jffii.'!~ ar'C a :&ch;!ct .i-1ullcn..:>!:, •&+,a hii'l"il'C lm.ru;b"i:l lhro Sin ii 
;aiiid t:lnm:i fnro ii.Wit lt1iJ\"2 .ilnmrlf m::ot\p t.!}rl · •'= ,rccnmlssioct 
:strurtur,r.: illll! Jiu 1fi~ili:a,::im aound r . w ·llt it. t .it~ mon::, <!Jr -
:i; urprlse i?. ~mt in. 17 · ,rlslg t, fee En;;Sc"- ·~c~tiln iih;it h •'I? s.~, 
·th!:511' fflll: 1'...C."f dis-p p~;u , i:h~ r.c l.s lflru ,.;.·ldi!~~ri. fru~ rnlion wit!T,. 
m cnrr~.:k,mn.amn f, thl.s J?.H cul r ;i~d aL!ihDiirn)y:s mua.- . 
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• COMP£ ENCV 
'" i~ appare t t a. t ort e~e e amp es . the Storm 
1od~I ge erat e:s a - :e ter : ., It f-o r t 1e i_n vestor 
tt e longer t e invest e n '· h o r izo , .a n d ha the 
a.;; · ude ot it e dol ar ite s is 
e ii: ret ur .,_ Th eH! a re 
o r. · he a ~ urnpti on s m a de in ith e e- ntim e. 
'.': ho Id .e no ectf o ,e,.•E r t ~,at t h is is a ven 
s i . 1µ,l"f c.d exa p ie "" Ii - cr i katly take.; no aoco nt 
o he: infl ue n [E: o fre \ \0 a il it ·~· of utune re-urns . 
0 f co r r.se. e-i.-en H ir •.·es t-a s '•\IE! re app·, ,...,it ~ ·h is 
a nra ngerr e nt, · h:e lb ·~get u es.ti rrn i'.': w et er- · 1e:y 
we,re d en ri app:ro r ia t ie l" ,e co rag"f:::d a re-
le"!J-erage. t ~e ir ir;p.•e:.st nie nt I D1ain:s a .rel)l l.ar 
i ntren.·.a.15, d e so.- . it:D .- . e in ce · -· ,.·e o s~o. to 
ockietl: a.m:rt e,r T{, o ' a ny r,es u I tar t irn::re.ase 11:c, t E 
im.r,2st m ent la,a.n. bis i:s of course the m a_:or 
ccm err11 nde rl ·~iin.§. il:~e if 'l:u re •Df Ri1T1a111nial k • ic,e 
( FO A' refo s - llio"' j r st t he .ac . a I level ,at fee.3 
a nd comm is~lons, t· mar e !1: h e t \rµ,e of be , a· ·Jou r 
t a'" is a _ c.e ·bi•.-tsed. 
TH E fUTURE FOR ll1NVESTORS 
0 ri:e It e Ji? fr o m 1ir,1 ~e .- i:e•.vs is it e es o li de cy 
;a'bo !PO e I i;a I reco-v>er1·. r· is is n a,t m eant to be 
in Ens i- ive: tD1Na rds 11:isE i m a-c ed j r.11es.t-o 'S as 
t er e: is D q E tion ,cit all aha t t e , a~ nit udl _ 
a nd irn ad of fos:!:es su tfered, t rt ca g 
;a ut a r o-t g u ar, ·, o :see t E e-ff.ect o 
ca.n . ct i o n wi·h t h e fa ct t hai: I:. a ~· o no ': see ;a Ii: 
real ';,\la· o . Or e , aps r c:, r e correr:-it l· - hce•t do 
o see a '•\•a to g.et ;a nyt i g re otel _ , ose o 
·.v ere t hev o nce we re, o !I: a i o r e r t o o :rn i·t 
·.v I ta ke an eY. i e ab i ,I en oe to do t hb ;_u_ as a 
s ig ni ti:rnnt le,gal ·. tor~·. o a p'h"la nth rcp·c a,c from 
a · a k ' . T is · if e rs depend in 5 on t e 
de m og .ap ~iic gro p ..... as ;a ha ket generalL;:tio . 
t et.SE stil I e p lo•.·e d ;a nd 'Nif yo u Jger t a i Ii-es 
a ve bo ir h t e e-m, .and h-e dai ,, .rem in. e 
t o r~e ane~d .:~ best a.!> fh.;:0 • ca ,, 1,-,. hereas t hose n o 
l r:rngEr e r plo•,·ed ·· nd p e r~·aps s lig ti•, more 
'.:oci: I y isolat ed a•.•e that muc h less o ppor un· 
to oo e from h ere o I in. Th.e imp e'!>si n n t o ug h is 
a l'.':-0 'k hat e·.,en i t ti ,a 1cia I fc,r t u J -~ a re res o re · in 
:: o 1e· it/a'(, .as •;.· ith a ll r.a ma tic eve nts ere i'.: 
;al•.vays sc- r tis.s E an so e t ing las: rust in 
o:hers, t !:it in ones.2 1-t , a fear o t , u re c ekes, 
.a, d so o , t at,. he i g o f a i,· oloc,ical n ~ u re, 
- re n-e,.-er s r ai_ghtfo ,.• a.-a il:o res ariE·. 
P E CEPT O SO PARTJ ClPANTS 
/-l. o ng t · e sil: r nge.st vie'i.-\•., exp ressiea 
ih:ave c,e r-ed o the att i u e.s an 'l ews 
C aite, 
0 1; -.- e d 
nL lb·~· e -S' 
t e 
rexciep · o ns li.o it i5 , o ne are e tre 
ajori ti, ot 
h.ere a re 
hei Ji; '' y ;Ed vjs.or 1.u.a s I c J( I av.e m · ,g n 
!handy., para,p ras,e ) of t 1E j '•'e Or-
;.! ··'1,,•1so relations i s ,er.e a s.<E!d o Jo , i;er ter 
eaJ d p · -Storm as~ciatioh s a d rie .nals ips, -, d 
t .10 gh rt i.s tr ' e 11:D :: ai· t I at mos.t, f a t all ot t he:ie 
1relat1icms ips a ·Je a t.ered pn~t-:S cHm, t hi!. h a :: nnt 
n-.a sla ed i to appare t a nger. 
It i-s .c1 lso i nte resting ito no· e h.a it ose interv1e ed 
d o no l!: gen,era ly h o d he ·e·.v t alt IP b l m :s 
;a,r05e -ecii s.e he ;a d\ · sc, r s d i d no t lhav-e :!> uthtie.nt 
·'ed ucati,a ' . Seve ra l i nterview,ees co e,n-te rl o 
t e a.ca de m ic a nd -nd s,tr,· ere e tials ot - .vi:rn.rs 
t at were m a ' e ear o bhe 
her in :se i a 
t e ~J a rio s c.er ti -c··tes hu ·~ 
Sto r':s lhe·a o ·firc:e . .Vhtit cnuld 
}s'.!>u es 11-.iit , in 
se ns,e a nd in 
a, ·y p rofes:s io 
;a d IP ovid _ e re 
lb each ea I an 
ir,eg I:::! ca n a nd s 
el:epha t in "h e roo, 
c>ecl i t is 
a b l ·· n ke 
D f -it il:O 
t an 'e. ca·ron'. But o . 't each' em at ~· . 
t ,a t :sa:meon-e e l!:·e ':!. i ere:sb a t:e r a s rr u [ a-s 
' o r o·~vn. P,ro ess io al Gdh2s ca n, a d ao. as!.i s 
1 aevelo i ng t · wit , _ andarl'Jls o t e ben h·p 
a d lbeh ;: 1.- io r v ia cooles of c o ned , b ut p'=:rhaps: 
t e fi na n d-al :se v ·ces m d~!:t r • m ore o it a ot he r 
IP o ession.s. as a di t ic It i:s:s u:e t o deal \\tit 'he re'. 
C 
!icr ·:11rr 
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Bn · · h-e it.ase c;f Sto rm m dh of tihe .ar:i.gl:! r .and 
d i,s al Ii i:S ftiO!IS1Seim in ste·.adl t oijvards tlhe rt te;dit 
prrcrn.fotllsts 1b;m~,- 'M~- Jh h'.1 cl.sight ei rig a 
,,vond:erhul frie rttf ,(.acknnvwledlged b-'1· 1rnan 1~r 
i l"l!t ertVje·,R-eE.5 ~ IITl:aiii¥ l;t'a'D.ndfet lll OOJ" h tiil.l'l it 1.l!a'.i:f!i : l\a . 
·.ar11ks ai:rp;roved the :sit heme ;ail l.airge as 'i."1.1i:':ill' as 
ciie·ta'ils .a~cnj a iindJvi dua1I loa 11;1 . f1'1Jany tla'ims h'.21.,e 
emce.-ged' o f ilt ,s ig;hi!:ed yet .sigh e · doc . rn en ... rt ia11_, 
!2.Sti ,·a,ti DJi~ of h11t,a,,me far abOvE · he 1neal i:t'r '!!!.°th 
,tileta,ls not ,dhe.dk:ie · lbe ·orE• aip:;pn r,..iat and so. on., 
Thene a'.re rnain . i:$s es .around t h;e i'l:eeitl · or· . · aq~in 
c.al ls IT'lll:!i.. lbiei rig !t:D'mrrn a iitat etl (-1:Jhe irespolflsih i li t 
f.o:r ·11ihi1th iin-beitv.ie.w.ees hr:arve. ijenerajly atlr.gnre · ia..!itlh 
~he ~anks . anti · h.iel1' the sellling, up arf in,.,e:!f o(f"s 
po~i · 0 11£S ~>" 1ha u t ·.heir · r.!i!.l'i:led~e- Th b is prtaibiably 
ii: , e mai.n ·ftus tr:.a io r-. - 0 ;·o,,u cou I Um.:y dl'.11 t h i:!,/1 
::;,u 1, a p1 · h,e g1E rne.ra1 ant§st f.etlt ,. 
I .. 1,ro,.JJlicl ibe fai r to :sa t -1 ail t:het,e is n CMJ.r an 1 , eas e 
a:ni11 .shcod: y,i-J h t he 1rE3al is.··~t io n .- halt a ks .ate 
li'imar~lv a IJ(nfl llt ITii:iki111 1; e nte:11prise- like an'{ o'1:h,er r 
rath e::r ·ltlhain pre firri iin arrtil',' a se,n.n·c:e i n:d;ustl' 't,' Jn th e-
Sielilse th at .. .ais p,erih ap.,:J u n.cile·r.s:tood pr,e: ~a;u1;h · 
(v.i~here ~i.iaud ary, care:~· o'f .-.h,e tu:.=. ~o.mell' It,.• as, 
thD'ugjht ·" D !be .a pr.iorit~{ .. Tihi:s pe1maps Ii.es ini Hr11=, 
fa ct · ·hat ilh e 'fin.1:intial \.'l.'o. 1tld has. a .mt-ea '· deal. c( 
1 us' o 'i rroo ,ed fi . fr'hen ly Sfi-.ci:eties, !!vi ut I a1s,. (d-
Op·er.athte'2 alir . of to · r:se· as •Govet!Tlm eht-.m, e<I 
enrti miesr 'l..\rhenr:' !l:·o/llie;rtii1;;1e c.ar:e: .and f,o.rh.mss 
matli:e:red,. Th'.is has me allil"' t'ha.t it · tomet:::i wf biarnks 
ave ~etil:affo.ns. .about, to ara;p I r:aSJ.E a.§ai.n 
so 1·e f n't:esn.l'iewee1; ·• · - udar,• cil.. ._ ·, ,.., re~ onsihle 
p.iractiioe'\. ...hon trn1r ilil.ls. of .aj-g1eem e•nts'!,"r J.isim;i:'.lle 
·. olit:eness a d 2r11.l'aireness"',,. a:nd ffcare 1of t . e 
r:: U:S ,omer""'. Tihe ·fesli rig of e·brayal fts S D m iJ h ~ 
il:h,a fu:r :SOiti ·e, : hy.si 03il rreooi l ,ot:curs \.\1hs:n 'f'a ite.d 
s ubj~ra!YC . rlSllml"-M Ir,,;- 'It . ~ .... ~ . ll'i citlu::·r Mltml~ H ai:i.v.h:c ~ 
il~Ul"l:!d ~nlclt hy ith.,. n1r'-~ror"!.: ~i?'li !rif t:h r: ms.uit ;rt 
:oom•"' i!hrut ·!he fumn, Ht:...:1.1:'i ,lhiri i!; ~ z ·tht: m agim af ijh£'. 
qm:i'.Ur C•' r,h,e ar~n:al iil.il. o::. ·8~1' . · b'i r1l t MOB-Ji;rirtlit il ll 
pm,pn!.lmn ·: m~· l.bc ;:i ~fJ! · ~d ~..&J:Cc af adiu:c fo r .s01,'Tlt:cn.ie 
~:i::,, Im. · In .i:ash fc._r .s,:,i~-r: ~Im '° 1;mn· ucf f-i:tr :i:nr.:'\C' .gr,.•c,r. scl ,r;f 
r;a.u!X'l, ;:md .gnab... t: ~ lnl.'!:dl.'b::,t; m:a~· l:'!l! di!.$Nm ::d In !t,m, 
• 'f-,Hir!i 1i' ·'Bi · ('f· ask, • 1f .:m'tf!' I 1-.am l~ t !'!rl liTt :Sh,m:::.s _." .. ,)?aJ,thtHfg,h 
ijill&l , e, am "'*'1~ ;m:,x ,.rl th!~ . !to.:i wll , d.;,cu r.enii llii •tl-!il-, ,i:rr -
~ !l.sliu; iX'r!1 o::mri,.x: •-'$ ...n e~it 'f1nan· · Iii!.:-~ ... ~ --sis or m 
• .;q-1.1mlt!nt, itfm prdbtibilk 1:. na Uf · rr, · l1Q 1:111 i!!...· ooirui::;. !dnn:. 
mrum i:hat the jc!'.ITT','"i,' f ,.,m ai:h,•~c i:. CAutc ~ Is. a'l..ctms.arl l · 
,:,nil c,f f!J r..;i~i?li lly, 1nnt .:,crralntv. l'l', ,tt lu!r wocd.. I.rim ,,..1th ,:;lh..:r 
Jl;,rolas~ Ciil~ :i; udh .;.e. me:d idM: thi!f'C 1h ~lld p-ractl!i:i. ~'ihk:1-. 
rI~rlihi?itis ,c:.1.:"'\ 1r11si i : l n. ,u~i.lr.l~ roi:o!in:~. !hut - A!'. ll also 
pra:etl«: ik, ~h. r..ili:1 lti"' p r,D'fi?~a _ ru:;i b - rt fiMn&.I .1iifoh;, 
m ii m.:ii. he skai,,gh:.trDl'llnrnd nr ..i, lf.:&grnr.i i.l!!tl ll cnt o 
fore.n.11 re tx:,w ·r:n · ,!: ~w11. 
l';!ij'.,,.~ iii!n i tb ·i,.,.:,.. 
~rl."Y!-LQE:u ui 
· -~,h m a1 .e:bin.l\; ef for~ m :aidle . ~· (w.me.~ baniksr .a rt 
lh-, ·:t scsptitis · ,e:a;:is ·s a • iDut anv dlafrn.s of ge ·. UJ i · e: 
1co nc:ern fo ·. h :e c: r sto er·. O 5Di 1.~ lega I d ass 
;.;id i-o n .aga:i l't5t S:o:rne a ·'.!:, oo I t i 1ue:5 . 
l'he •regu larbr:, it ~~Sl'C is .al!i.o not,. or all: ilea~1. iJ,a~. riot, 
OITI man,.· ( 1:-.r i! ,t ~;as ·t:I Ii · Oi:!.i:s. Even a:DteJiti.ng, t I e 
'fact th1a margjn loans f,,ete 1t1tDt . n( 1er fl.'S lC's 
1u breHa1 alt !the tirn,e of St!:!t ttrtl"s demi:s..e strong 
1per,cepti Dlis e.· ·ist .aba.ut , e lt:D"t.al h~llownes.:s of 
·
1regu lati iJ(fi t · .a t e e1.·e'r~'!fiJ;ay ~nvert,:n'. 1 uefir q ue11<· 
ijsJ iis it p,ro ec io o r fis it nmil:'~ The bee ief o·f 
ii te 1'!;.!i!SWF.:!E:S that .A.SK ~nspec. ·ed S'bon'r JS o:ffi t E':Sr 
s ~udie!tll ~ s mcotil1:,1, and 'jfi.r,as .a,Nate,_ of its .s: r.a:begj 1:s. 
w.elJ int ad!i.aru:e in · t e GFC,, yet ei.d :no · or oo.uld 
1na~ ,dJsd osie an,,. .t,:::ir11 be!rn; to ente r·esN:,t.1· ·n'liesll:ots~ 
lha:s n o·t ~li5p:irted ,ton •~d.ernc,e0, 
A .~ rthe:r fac ·,tlir 11:hat fha.s also e , gi nee1red 1rni t{!2 • 
fe;el in.gs is. · he -ua nriie r \'1.•hlt u s.a..rne la~r11.•ve.r-
1neg,e,·aiaft:e,d setH.eme nts bet1J.i1ee n i 1i..•e,sbo. s alild 
Iba nlks: wer,e OOii (il cted.. Having iini.iie:Storrs ace: 
'l.\,i' ih aed sio to .actep,t Dr re:]ect what t he-/ are 
to l:d is .a ·. -a~xe-it -o r- efi:!i\i·e- it di:!:a11, at a :trrm:! 1.,..·h1:,n 
t 1eir tr.'H.st irti m o.!:it thin.gs. .arou.nd 1them a::. been 
:s · a ter,eifiir ,.,.. -- Ii, press1u , lo m \alk)e d Etisiion s ~ ~ hin 
:.:. · o.rt ti rn~ pe r io s, has. ni:itt .co lfi1e ,dawn well 111 
many· ,tases.. T e;re is a, delfiit11ite r oepiNon,, .as one 
n ter,.iiewee has tort me be: pa p · .1iras.ea1;1,; ""the. 
adi.riisot di l!ll s.,. tihe ban · dial !l.!ls, t e r'Etufator aid , '· 
·o .anv.tlhii 6r the la'i-r!;'E -. dlitl · s""" w · a/s lliie .f?'' It is 
fair t ,o sa . tlh:at .a lcv.ss o,f :trust i · m:ajbr i n:Stiiliutitins 
w , idh ma'k:e Hi e--m,tiiliem world tti:tl over is n,ot :a: 
lheal tJh·t ,o too ~ e in airn1,•on;e"s ila1ng,ua~:e. 
.!l.Slt: JI~ oon: ~:iiYb.":-d m il::fi ~It~ • .it ~.CWl. liirri&: ipcs,,:. 
1Idh:iJ?.s1Z:. !for "*i'ilTIJlk , ilt ~ 1pubilc :hn.1rtr4 l1111::..int:«r.i ,er; 2'.4 Ju t: 
:21.103: -~ 1c ik Mi 1Y.ic.r:s ~ ti' .a-rd er. nr,rnn·i':liilt bnd'f . .l'l l.s nrrt 
:1. uw..-,1;cd to lnt4m!eru: In thr.: ,C,p,:!:F.Jtkt .1f' 'If-~ m~Jk.i:it . I t i:. tn:rt 
· ri=rn t,o p.T::'!.'111:m!l: !b u.s inm.a. · · i;re- i0r b,...s /i:c, r~tall li°fli'in,'h.~ It 
1rn11n.at ;;'I ·d d nru. r.i0t ·tJh .:u:i'li;i.r. 1mrern it ttn. 'lt:"Z: b.i.si, d .1 •lfa .,.,~ 
lhusi~ mll'if,;J..1r~11<rtablilt-,- frg · 1-'lii<~ b.1uirum, rrrrlldais l~ 
'iii,; •it 1tmlMl;ll!r:'·a.:m.'i· ani±. ·!;he lba..ar;rl t!!r il oo.mp.!r'l i' .. .JtSIC oouirl i:r t 
II'. UP .i !Uc1m.s~ b:£z,us It nl li lt!:!t .ipfX0',!1:: ,c l' arr. .i t"~ 
11:.i unr~ mm.1:.d. T ~ · ru le ,iri th.c- li!~r, ::.g msm11:i u. di· n.c~ .trtly 
'i!atll ur:.d,...rst:oorl 1:1~ r,r:i:.111 ~ "'13~ lit', ·, m°""f oo a . ·Ct:!Jl i 
, ·:nn.~~ s.cf:nr:: rct:aJI 117#1'.l.st::ms t'h21t ;an .~tr.:i lmri ' 1Zll'.'ltb.1 l ;1; i:i,r.;.or: 
l .cr::rm: Nil::" s ~hilt ·lh~ s,c· Jl!:•i! prc"l.idcr ii ~, !l:mr:.ri ilppr.,:tnl l:i iby 
~ IC onr · ,.-. the hc.<in!.r.: tr; In s,::,mc 11.!il"!,' · .eill!.u1·-':[£i:'r1C n t ·II · 
,quah'Pf. 
ih tlp:,~/WiO!r", .ilpip.gO'"··• UiP.:trli.a·--mmtN'f' &..1.51 ~ /Comr· Jt""'•_l5 r.: 
1r, 1:r'b.:: C.nnm--. .. ,r.-r.ns ·,ur~~nrr.mtl!! ;;, crn· .'bs,'l'~ rln&r.li rlcx. tm 
JAr::~rn-hdr:ss._, lrv1-!i:1.l:or pci:'D"...;p·lk.:',:r. l:F!:m ':iiF:id o:F , o>,n:ir;,,U 
llir,ii'.:if:c!J U.l t'( w:lth n?jnrds tc, mi1C'.lr · 'itu.i.tkJn_ 
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ot trus'-rc ion ·or i ve_ t ors are 
· thE rea ,:. io s ot ho!e a o 
the . 
opi 
s he- r i ,~ o me t- r ies a d 
.:::, 
co . ;b D'{:. 'l.' D rcil le rJ t :e 
~.o et ng ck.,~e o thatJ re·s 
dete_ ce, o e I i ly it 
da 1a,gi ,g :S § u·I. 
era 
o~her 
!:."m p 'f' ... uned u::atc 
·· c:e. ;a nd l.o_t'' or 
lb in eit her ;a t ier 
u h.er ;a 
t . P brr: 
ic: ia s -c ti 
r::,rd w i I aJ·, ·a·,.: 
1 rt are t ,a is a p rec:iat d. It i~ ate h;;rt 
t a:.se ex-i n . :e.:itor.s i te ie ·. •,ed i cl ded .ea e-r.s, 
a 1k ag:ers, pa lice, e g ineers a 1a o he r 
'•\lorb:e~ a d ·uhe the r- it ·.va~ t 1e o'"iva t · n 
troth~ cwt by Sto or ge u in e eio cer s held by 
·m ,est r:i r s. :c l ost -=IJ 1n er1.•iewe.es sa i .a simi lar 
t i g th.ey di d not •.va a E Hant o t e 
G,::i'.'ern e t i , the ti uTe, · - nd :th at f o r ,t e 
ta t=e ed dem~r.aph·c of ho.se lose t o er in 
retire e nt, th·!:. ·cs he: dir_.:."'io t he,; tel· the· 
\\iere .!( ,2 w .hen t e co mp lsor supera nuati on 
· ·a: t ,e 5GC ·..-\~:S int o uced in 1 92 . 
Th:ere ls :a. defin·re -sen~e ot r-e15ret o r anii iooki g 
ad: :c:·· d_ is· n h~t h:E',' m-cd:e, an:d this ref lects 
o the fa . t t h at E. 6 rea.t loss of r.:. ntr I 0 1 o e.i~ life 
a:: re~u tied. In .2ct, th·"' lack of ccrntra:I t.s pe aps 
t e .s .ro gest ·ir-e r- 1 h e e that hai~ e e r-ged 
fro . he inte rvie\~ -· Sad ',', .,om e inter ·e·.'lre-e! 
~po ·e opi:n iy, t not p roudi~·. of .s trong fesl i gs 
o - ~= -ha soon a f:er S· ';:, coJlap,se u.e o 
t is om inca · ion o f elp es_~r:ies.:i ·· n d reg et . 
rv'lONE· ER 
. i~ o :Surp ·se t r.a .. m o ey at e _ to ople, but 
t e s rp ·se is o 1 i h-c.t e · e 1: it does matte-r -
o. for its o i sa e. . -deed, it is ·~ om:!{ but 
'_ a l::a t e e- -s to ave· co trol a :!:a·, in your 
lite . ia.rhe n t a. co nt o l is ,:.one, it is ha r to 
.-e lace . a nd a l!o h~rd to t ws t or e::e f o.J rh t ut re 
de sin s . nd .ee-d.. est i ve_t or.s i t e ·d 
cllmvi :: s· o · 's de ·Le a1.1e been aced a 
. 0 
1:€ cf 2 i.:i · o n.s: e e r t o eccepti g 'i al' 
::2t. le m: ts; • het he r nr ot t j n lc.s:: .a 
·i.v-,e t :-ier o !pE d so ciu.se 
a t:e ck 
thcug 
tt-e ,ouse a ''\'a·"; •; · ethe .c u ae o -h ;:;,t 
1e diG: I treat me t or to ris del.a i g · . a d a I 
:so rt~ of ecision!! t a. a·..ie ..tire en-ergy. 
- i.dce a d t ought. fl . as o 1 sai 
o .ior-s . ..-
CO JCLUDIN 
The stor o 5 o 
ire uk menh at 
se ·ere a et 
o hj ed ·u it 
ent bat le · h c cer : 
h is .. ,, a 
-·!· 
. 
RErv'lA KS 
then ·!i ~ ~t .a 
vice t r 
re u ir 
j - t i a 
a 'si ng fro 
a taJ 
a t € 
t,e 
res la tor · 
I .: term o i 
hs G C, 
m 
mu ic:at on between Storm .. nrl ~o me e di" 
f i a ciaJ lo.:i:: ulte or 
r!, so e · w om 5adl a 
no in a p it i on to _everJ rec t to an·t · 6 itica 
erlen \e · 1-aps a ma i I Je.:Sso fro m the Hor1 o t 
· is h-a.t fo t o~..s .o king in he i au-!:. 1 it i~ 
mo j st so eo ·~ ti a cial a ai rs that ,~au are 
U:E ci O E: u~I of e ;an•.,i "r-€ and :se .ii e 
he:1· ge t i pact_ t .,eir wellbe·n0 i a l l are a t 
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AFTERMATH OF A STORM 
Aaron 8 rutm 
enders will be well aware of t he many high -
R profi le finandcl collapses in rec:eru. years, such ::is Westpoinr, Opes Prime, 83.liis Capital, FinCorp and Storm Financial. T ll.e collapse ofTovmsv:ille -ba$.ed Storm Financial in es i:.ly 2009 in parricu lnr provides much fo<)d for ,houghr for ind ividuals, advirers, regufa tors, Cl'edit p roviden, and others 
who nre connected to t:hl' finiu"1.ci11J 9.ervicei:i: i_ndu~rry. 
By w~y of b<id ,ground, many of Storm's client.~ bor roW<id sgainst. 
their ,;x ist ing a,;sets to ,dlow investment imo an indcx~-d share fund . 
T he asse t> which were bonov.•ed against often inc .uded propccrty thac 
was a ln,,,dy owned outr~ght (irid ud ing t he fam ily home). In v1es tors 
were typirnlly, but not exclusively, retirees or ,ho,e dose to retirement. 
S,o rm Finendal had total funds u ndet nuurngemem of well ove, 
AUD $4b ellion in Augu,t 2008, but !hen fell to li p o~ition in January 
2009 wher , it had to be placed into admini,~tr:ilion. L iqu idation 
follc•,,;ed in Mnrdi 2009, and since lhcn a nu mber of th ings h.av<e 
occurred wb ich, th(.ugli seemingly with t-hc in tent to pm th ings dgh! 
or f:tnd out \Vhat \"-e n1 w1·ong, hav~ left m any investo rs. ev~n m-0rc 
fr ustrated a nd despondent about their fa;:e . T he S!lbsequ em actions 
include " Pailiomeruary Inqui.ry, vorioll! iu, ttlemettts between som;, 
be.n~s as credit providtrs l\nd sorne of Srorm's inves trn:s., nnd. onuoing 
legr, l :.ction. 
A n\unber o f lntervi~w:s hav,e be.!n carrie-d o u:: with investors ,vl10 
were in\'oived w ith Storn1 Fi nfl ncia1. 'The m;,i in goal o f the in tervi·ev.·S 
wai; ro understa.nd or fi ppr--ecia e the perspective of 'what nov,• for 
~hartered investors', rdther th4'n a more investig:aLivc work i.nlo wh at 
happened , why things happened the w2y they did , and so on. Wilh 
~u -h int.:~r viev;s th·ire ar.e a!v.,,ays E nu mber of Ll SI>t:C 5 to accou r..\ iOr 
when a;ppreciating an inrcrviewc--c's rc:;:porn,e - iudeed, fe.cdback 
alrc;idy received from others has cent.red a rou nd lhc ex pected biases 
th at might e1<pcct to "merge vrith such a sa mple of intervie·..,·ccs1• 
However, the focus b.qs not be.:.n the 'why ' and 'how' of Storm'£ 
collups.e - but of far m ore in terest pe.rsonaUy is the 'what now '. For 
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that rea, on, this arti-de fa deliher.:teiy span;e v.,;th judgemer.ts 11bou t 
the :i.ctions of various grollps involved, and rather, what ful lcw3 fa 
merely sn opinion on some of t he signific-,mt theme, to emerge. 
One thing thPl !he Sl!<i sto ry o( Storm h ighlights is seemingly not 
the first thing thal would come ID mind from such a n extreme cese 
of fina nci:d o~s is t hat the service prnvided by the fimmci:a.l services 
industry is h ugely impomrnt ro th e gene ral wellbeing of people . This 
m ay be an obvious point 10 t h,is.c ~vho ar t he coalface of ,he ind ustry 
2nd who fuily &pprecime whr,c the indu st ry actually exi s~ for, bu t 
the ()Ul cQrne from Storm __ perhaps underlies tlie whole rationale, of 
the finan-::ial ~ rvicL~ indwuy in a roundabcirn: ,,;vay ... 1JUs is th at tl1e 
indusi ry is funciarnen ta!ly ab Dut peopl~ and their need s, and when 
fi1rn ncia l om cnmc,s rnkc. c tu rn fo r the w-0rse. us it diu wi th S torm, 
th.ings ai n g o w ry badly for thu se impacted, and not im r fi nam:ially. 
\'qhet this imp lies i5 wh11t is culled the 'contrnp ositive' statement: thsJ 
for people generally to be ~•once m in their lives. their f1mmck,! :.ffa, rn 
need to be in goad order•. F undomcntnlly, when ~ou are working , or 
advising, or s.d min istering, or reviewing, or p!~nning thing,; to do 
wi.th someone's financia l affai rs, it is aot solr; ly on e s;-..g regnred nrea of 
cheir li fo t h"r you a re intlu.encing - the <'ntin , life of thm persDn c,1n 
be c nh um:ed o r adverse! ,, impe<c t<:d t hrou gh suc h in fl uence. 
Financial situation after Storm 
One noreworthy point is [h a<: a !though many investors h ave 
exp,:rienced nothi ng shon of a to,ai c2lamity in a financial , ease, 
an-d th,st this sh ould never b e tm derpl&fed , ll hrge proportion of 
inve~tors neverthdt ss ~.re not facing destitut i,Jn - but rnlher, most face 
de.vas Lr:. tinn - of dn::a.rns, pJan t-1, ~nd the ine ans to ~ vc control of onc .. s 
choice~ . Perh aps d::stitm.ion i& not re.:lly about a ,c~rtuin level of wcrurh. 
but is ubout to whet degre<: options and choi~es ,are available to p-eople. 
T b ir; relate. lo the u.nderlying role thr.t m or:er plays in our Jis,es - and 
whilst it is true th:u what has bc-;:n}.)St is, colloqunclly, ' just mon-,y ', th.is 
is not the poinr "" that mo,r~ey for rrrnny pe:ctpte repre&en.uo ahe m e-ans to 
pro~ide for their goals a nd ds.-am s in mo, , aren in lift . In effect, ir h 
lhe currency to have soroo cnnrrnl on one's choice, and options. 
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'1:rhaps the uos t Hriki n;; fc~l\.!rc ari sing out of 
Stormi& :J:~ d1 vers1ly, scope and depth of ,be impact 
ou p~c;.,'.<,s hv,,. ln i..hc artcrm~tb of Storr.i's .. nd 
no dnub: (11. hn ('oll ~pscs, :n pacts include a vasrly 
hq)11e1,t :I v:ii ri ~r;1bi iil\' lu rd ut iomhiD d1 ff:\: ullic~, 
f. 1111ily H!H~~s, l-.nl tli i»ues (particu larl)' ;r, 1he ~re~ 
cf n:en:~l wc!:b c:ng), unea, e wi, h socis l inttr.1c:ti ,1:1 
and a st:mc of iu::lgement fro:n ot hers, Jnd 1nr, :1y :r::Jre 
chuman' iac~ors . ~,•:i;ny o:" tht-s= im1);1c!~ :11~ wha·. c ·uld 
be tc rr:.cd ' l 1rs1 o!ckr ' - for c.x.;;.rr:pk) l{·,t'. !-llenific tJnl 
s, re,; inrnived in l.1, ine o: ie's li:c ~-vi 1;:s and pla(;, ot' 
abode i1,1id r i~ c:J e. r:d1uus enough in lt rrr1 s of mcnti:.l 
heJILh, b:H u rnngc ol 'second order ' 1mpa-:1s d sc1 o~nn. 
To conti n·Jc the exa m ple of he alth, many ormer 
Storn·, ir.ve-st or~ would n ov; no t undertah in,:di,~:,1 
lrcatmcnl3 due solely to the co~t inyor;c d. Evs':n 1hougJ1 
med ical u c.Uncnr; were formerly co:iside, ed e1H~11 lial 
10 their qua lity of ·1 fi:, many have also cancelled t heir 
med ical insurance . And those that c~n keep in su rance 
i:: some fo rm ol ten delay medical trtalrnems w 
mnxirni~,; erF i, lern ents ner of i.! eductfo!c-~. Th~ lack of 
funds norr: ,~ily rn e~ns 1ht ra p<ll l i~ ~( ti vi t it, such ~ ~ 
1:1kinr, r,rr, ndch ildrt n Otlt ,He n--.>w a gu ilt-ridd ~n Lime 
tc bt cm ll1rcd Ql1itc lll:wiously many of the impact& 
arc i:: tcr-rd:md and this u.ndcr.ics the fact th:il in 
i:idividu.;i's fina ncial affai rs arc rwt rmc is . .t<: d asp ~ct 
of !ifc which should be viewed as art ificially seg regaed 
from the rest of 1. hei~ lift - their fi nan ·i2 l wel!beinl'. 
he~~ v.s.h)c:~ and in1po~ r1:tnt~ vt" i!l:. in tht cwt-:.ral conltX( 
a! ar. md1 vidua h cin:umstinn:~, wh id 1 vu rir:.s irnm 
person io person. 
lt i~ ,; perhap$ e1·en « commenr on modern dr.y 
society tc sta:~ tha l thtse ou tcomes are exacerhaic.d 
ar,d <.:umpoumlc<l wl11:; t inJivid uul~ fact \>me degree 
of isolation. T b.is isobtion oppcarn in many forms · a 
chnn~ i:~ frienCst: ips afrei" fintnci2 I ru tn, frusaaticn 
frnn fa mily at a po rem, a brmher, E sister or 1e. spouse. 
Jr: ::ci:i:!ion, there nrc often m exclmion rrom circl es 
t hnt were commonplac e beforehand (nor (.klibcr:a tcly or 
p ,,imed ly so, but o:tea where money" wni re:iuin:d t:o be 
i::rntvcd ), a rota! cmbarr.1 • ment at what h~! irnp;.i~n~ d 
fin d S<) volunrn ry withd r;;waJ from so:r.c asprct of 
so~iet y r:i a> occu rs. ft is no! mc;;.m to bt: a trite or 
,i inpiifi ed add irional ccmmcnt re m3k~, but how many 
ii;tlividuab wnLtU apprcciaic a nc:ghiiour, 2 friend, a 
family n1 em ber bcinr. 1hcrc to help or ro listen with out 
i'JUgrrn<:nl it i~ a.s irnport an i u:1d helpful here i~ in ony 
ot her !ifc-d:Ei,ging 1:1rcumH1,nces. One i111e rvicwce 
mace rhi3 clear w:1rn dcs~r ibini; tht g1a1it ude felt 
,,·hen " rcb:iv~ handed mu a vc r-. iclc for his fa rn i ; 's 
irn.idi :1itc u~c, }hortly al:cr il..is owr, c,i r broke d-:wm wi rh 
311 expensive r:;,a ir bi:! ahead. Th~ implicnLicu i~ that 
~ct, of klJ'lrlncs, and gene~osi:y c~r tainly help a· cvime 
tn1Jnc1;;l press :irc, hur ·hey also F" w~n beyond tho!. 
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Trus1 matters 
A fur(hcr a1eo of lo,., fu r tbu,o 1mµa~ tcu i, tru:;1. ' lie 
financ12I advisor is of con rsc p1 rt of 1.h15, but ~urpri ,ingiy 
from interviews to date, 11 is not univcr~ully he d that 
th,s is where the, mGjority of Lht bla me g~m~ lie5. Tw0 
or her art>a , r,f hla rne lie with in Hit utmni, and j,.1sr ~s 
d~n:~~inr,ly, wiih c,n,sc I. In the l"llS c or Storm, the re 
is m\J<'i! wg~r and disd~in held Low a.rd.;; tl-.t cred,t 
pruv ido:r; (bank~) whnc it wus bc Li cvcd 1hat 1hey would 
prO\'id l· a r~asonab'.cncss check to investment kisnb 
granl("1'.l to individuals and thcv (or Storm' would 11 01 
sd l up an ind:vidual's p n folKJ witho,it the ch~ncc 10 
make ex tra paymeim tn keep ir &oin,!; 1hr. acliom (or 
a3 many intcrvirwee, have ober ved, t.bc inaction) of 
the Aust r.di un regula;or ASIC'; Hnd nrn the manner 
in which some l:N•y~r-m:g1>tialt:d stll lcmrn ts between 
illl'tSl\J/~ und bu11k~ ,wre com!u~ ii:d . As llM: i .tcrvicwcc 
ha; commented, "rh( adviser cid u.~, the bank did us, the 
re;;:ul~tor didn't do anylh.ini:;, the mwy.:r~ dici ui - who's 
ntlil? " Ongoing egal cla~s action lg',U.JU;t some b~nks 
continues in the c;1,e ofSwrm. l t is fuir to say that n loss of 
trust in mujur imti, utions which mukr the modern world 
tid , owr is t1ol u he:,khy outcome in uDyone's anguag;c . 
Alm, m,my im·c·swr~ blumc thcmsd\'cs - with 
hindsight evrryonc'£ best friend - but on top of 1hn1 is 
the i,~m of m onl rcg:-: t airnciai~d with alw advi~ing 
fa mily and fr iends into the scheme , or indeed being 
reccimrnencie d 10 join hr fo mi ly and friend s. I f you bave 
rd ied oo younelf, fom i!y, fr ie nd:; , prr, fes~ionnl advisors, 
~nd i11 sti, ut i1_1 t1 ~ tr, lo,~k Efter ynu ,<11d you·r fami ly's 
interests, and Lhe n that dtdsion goes dr vas atini;ly 
wrong - iL ~ct:ms Lhut aU or most cl these levels of trust 
fall over like dominoes, and thm~ imp~cted really 
·1 rui;gle 4 > know where to turn to next. 
More pra•:tically in lcrmt of lessons for investors - one 
factor that s~em~ to corn.r bcncc lh.i.n g,; is the d~nger of 
'mis~ion creep'. At'Cvrding lu Wikipcd i:,, thi~ i~ th<:~~-
p;imbn of a projEc-t or mission beyond it, ori1{ ml gou ls, 
often nft.er ,ni;fa! 8Ucces~cs. ln a financial sens~ it could oc 
considered as 'why make gains of $X, when you cEn make 
guim of S (X 4 Y)?' W hat is nor unders tood so well is the 
incrcas~ in risk inv(l!vc.d in moving from gain (or goal) X , 
to .~ . .,me biJll,t:r ,;?. in. T h i~ i~ co mpli::arcd in a fi.rumcia! <Cl · 
ting btcausr. muH r•:opk do nm ha\·c a concrete and con-
cise guul e~ sud • - of1 en it is n ore case of ~ec how well OT\€ 
c11n do, and HS mon: ujcc co rmt, are hcl;J out a, In what 
greater wcallfi cJn buy, takini; t.hc next sttp of 1110re retu1 !I 
(int unRtatcd, or underplayed, or mi,understood, or nor-
rcaiy -believed higher risk) is WL-acconip!.i for many, T his 
co:ne;;; bac:k LO perlJ:ips a more fu ndar.,en tli l question of 
bow people sec their lives nnrl mvo!vcs a qtte~1ion which 
probob!y no t many t'Wr :1sk - thit i~, 'Wh., t will ii ,~kt fo: 
me iO be contrnt?' ln H fim,r,~i,d ~cn,e, ;in u:1,wtr to 1h31 
qut~t1 nn g:vcs !iOi11cthing concrCL~ tu worit to und pl:111 
fo1. Cri:ically, n shnu.:i be appm:ia t~cl tha r rnhsc4.urnlly 
t ryir.g t;; achieve ~omcthinF L•ti1er t.lun ti~~l wiU iuwJvc a 
differen t d:g,ce o:· risk th~ n wha1 w" i in itially w nsidercd . 
Tho quote 
0 1u ,wuworJ:y 
p~int is that altfumglt 
ma,,y iu't-e;torr hatit 
,;.Jxmnc:d 11othing 
.11:orr ef a roral 
c,alumity in u fi r,a ncial 
sum, and ihat this 
rl.o~ld ntwr bt 
u11derplay2d, a large 
propom·on of i,wworr 
11ew nhe!ess are r.C1 l 
facing dmirurion 
- bra rallwr, moi! 
face devas1ari.m1 of 
Jrc;:,m ,, pla11S, anJ ch, 
mi!a>i5 to hao, control 
aj 011,·'s chQiW, 
• Th:11 quote 
The /ac/1 of funds 
1wm1ally mw11.1 
ilu:rapct11i, aciit1icics 
.iu,h ar raking 
grandchildmt aur ar( 
11011 a iui/i -riddm 
,imt w b2 mdur,d. 
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Risky business 
be i~sm u it. ing from the above point i~, of cou rse , ' risk', 11 nd the 
obvious fu~J to throw on the Storm fire is ;;imply to ssy I.hat the 
investors shou ld have Ileen more awa.n:~ of ihe risk involved - hut 
chis mi,se~ 1he pninr on .seve.1~l fronts in i-hi$ case. Cennitily it 
w~s a l,ii;h Iis!<.. .,;ndeiwou and i, i:, r~,;Jsomble tu say that ior m~n~ 
peopk: 1he. .adv jct.~ lO fr1vf!S1 ht r' :f" Stonn rrir.Jdtl , ..,,&~ irnlppraµriate 
- H highl)• b·cragcd prod\1ct, in 100% tqu lti~"S, f r tho,, in or do~c 
to r~tirtmrn.L with liuk op tir,ns around future cmpkiymml and 
,~ltcroor,v,: w9y~ lo derive fi nancial secur ity il nm going LO fit many 
peopk'6 appcti,c for risk. Howc-.cr, o:hcr~ m.:y wcH h.1.Yi understood 
the ri6ks, or consid~rcd the chance to iurn whM they perceived as a 
mcll_gre s\Jlpernrum:,tion entitkm~:!t into .S<>m1ethi11g more subM.antial 
us a reaMm.ible option, or for Gthers who were younger and deriving 
go1Jd incomes fro m employmen: , it quite possibly fitted t heir goals 
and risk i;.ppctirre. 
T hese ~re ail very po,slbk Rod reF.~onuble po$itiom where 
invc~tors were c:,)mfor;~bl¢ with the ]()an to vrdue nitios involved, 
the relative siie of cnsh huffers bu il: up, their inrerprernrkm of the 
hisrnidr: voliJ1:ifo}' o· !f ir e.iu iry markc.t, rhdr ( >Wri Hbility from o,her 
funds m make margin cal s, and tl1eir particu!u invesanent boriwn . 
~'h:it wa~ more spec Lile to Storm 1:hough, was th-at iL docs nol appear 
m have been fundamen lly s question of 'market ritk' thatled to an 
unraveJing nf the scheme ~ but more ont qf 'opera,ional riik' whm: 
1~1iny in~·•stNs were not evet1 given the chance i<) meet marg'in cilio 
be,~aose 1he c.redit pnwider~ fnld Storm il8df, did Ml hnve th ings in 
place {or more to th~ point, they seem lo havt dis~:greed in hi11d~ii;ht 
wbo wes r~sro ·ible for doing s,1) to coma,t ioves.or" a.i oan to 
value. ratios were bre11ched. T he fi!"ilt tbst maoy inr.stors knew of 
probkms specific "~ thdr l.itu~tion wa,i when [hey were rnnr: up, by 
the respective credit prnvi\kr, o:nd to.d tltqt their position had J:!rcady 
he~n sold up or down, tA1 be more precise. 
So where an obviou5 critique would be to lob grenades abou, me 
nature of tile ris.~ involv-ed, it should be hnrne in mind that lh~ ri8k 
tlrn1 unctd Storm was not ttJe k nown risk urmmd m3r'.--et fl rc1ctui;1ions, 
bu t the nuconsidered (t!Je '1U1~nown u nknown ', to quote Donald 
Rumsfeid) ri~k thul the ,idtnirumat"va p:rnce,s would ccll~pse. 
Undoubtedly, the laue.r would 1101 lm•e occurre.d hMI 11',e imp,.ct <1f 
, he GFC throughout 2Co08 not prrssurccl Storm's posilion with iti 
cr<:dit providers, bUL ncvtrthdt~s ii i5 Luo easy and sirnp!ifk d 3 rn , r:et 
10 S3Y i,ive~tors were undone by the market risk they should bav~ 
' e::n more ~og ni&ant of. T hi, doe, not, of coursf, underplay or shift 
focus from shoncomi11gs a 1'0\tri,j tb,e 'one "i1-c fits all' m(,dd f1do p 1e.d 
by Strorm nor the import"ncc of understlnding ' ri&k ', bw Lh.e fact is 
th~, ri~k has many l hapc5 and fonns. 
Ho-i?iC\'cr, a o:intcrn i~, that the <:onunun icati~1n of 'risk' in this 
conrcxt dn-c~ not stress -enough the doV?o·side of Em invt,stment 
cbok·e. Risk avcrsion would suggest th~t rhe joy some-on:, gets from 
making 10% cm an inwsrmcnt, is lt$S t.hao the anguiF.h suffered 
frc-m a t0% loss, yet the cic,wnsidt ri -~ of such pos1dhilide;: is usually 
coudied in terms which equme 'risk' 10 'gre3teI re urns i11 1hf 'long 
nm', r 'high ,·o ali ity of rernms '. T he;e rerrn , :ll'c unhelpfu l and 
p:)te11tially mi~kading in mnny c:is<:s - r :H1HT; ' iisk ' con mean '1her•~ 
is n probabil ity of ruin for yrm', o: even more coUoqnially, 'things can 
g(I really b.1d'. Thi.; is not rn sc:m off ani•unc ever takiJJf; rcasonabk 
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Appendix E: Overview of industry perceptions of 
Storm's strategy 
In tenns of public submissions made to the PJCI, 14 out of 43 public submissions from 
financial planning businesses and seven out of 21 financial service organisations / institutes 
/ associations documented some concern about the overall strategy offered by Stonn. The 
four major areas commented on were risk levels and tolerance, assumptions underlying the 
investment strategy, the use of the one-size-fits all approach, and the self-selection aspect 
of investors joining Stonn. 
For the purposes of acknowledging a fair consideration of the critiques of Storm ' s strategy 
that follow, it is important to also note that Storm ' s founder, Emmanuel Cassimatis, gives 
further, detailed insights and a defence of many aspects of Storm' s strategy in an extended 
2 hour discourse with PJCI members in public hearing [6]. An ex-Stonn adviser also gives 
a defence of Storm' s strategy in public hearing [4] , with his overall view that the key issue 
is not one of Storm ' s strategy (which he maintains is reasonable) but rather the action(s) of 
the CBA. As he states: 
It does not matter what levels of protection one can put in place or what ri sk management 
tools one can put in place at the end of the day. It is impossible to factor in product failure 
from a bank as a risk to a management tool , for me or for any client. Do you understand that 
point? [public hearing [ 4] , p.4] 
Nevertheless we give a brief overview of the specific concerns expressed about Stonn 's 
strategy, using a selection of views from financial planners and others connected to the 
financi al services industry. 
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Risk levels and tolerance 
The main aspects of risk that were highlighted concerned the overall level of risk being 
high and inappropriate, given the likely tolerance levels of the target market, as well as 
communication of that risk to investors: 
As recent events such as the collapse of Storm Financial have shown, a proportion of clients 
still end up adopting a financial strategy that, on any objective test, is inappropriate and 
involves an excessive level of risk, given their circumstances. [public submission 319 from 
Institute of Actuaries of Australia] 
I am deeply distressed for the reputation of my industry to learn of the errant behaviour of a 
fellow financial planner, to structure and offer such products of this nature to any person, but 
particularly for persons who had had no prior exposure to the stock market or indeed 
leveraging. The clients are basically illiterate in financial products and most certainly don 't 
have a speculative investment risk tolerance. For semi retired persons nearing the end of the 
wealth accumulation stage of their lives, I submit that the advice provided was grossly 
irresponsible. [public submission 332 from Financial planner] 
It seems unlikely that so many people would have mortgaged the family home, their only 
asset, if they had understood that there was a significant risk that they could lose it as a result 
of a decline in investment markets. [public submission 385 from AXA] 
(Storm was) able to exploit the fear of a poor retirement and put billions of dollars at extreme 
risk. They simply took no account of the clients ' financial risk tolerance. [public submission 
324 from Financial planning company] 
Assumptions underlying the investment strategy 
Two mam aspects of the investment strategy were highlighted. Firstly, the underlying 
understanding of and belief about continuing equity market returns. Secondly, the 
dependence on margin lending as an investment vehicle. 
For many working within our industry, Storm was not a failure of the financial planning 
industry or a failure of the FSR Legislation. It was a failure of the Storm model, principally 
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reliant on the Stock Market continuing to " bull run '·. [public submission 330 from Financial 
planning company] 
The advice given by Stonn Financial Planning ' s planners was stupendously wrong. Their 
understanding of financial markets was woeful; their understanding of retail client's 
psychology nowhere near sufficient. Yet they managed to convince a relatively large number 
of people to pay their fee. [public submission 168 from Financial Plarrner] 
Over the last 28 years, top marginal tax payers had only a 23 % chance of making reasonable 
money from margin lending. That is not investing - that is gambling. [public submission 293 
from Financial planning company] 
In the case of Storm Financial, it had experienced a financial meltdown in the relatively mild 
2002 bear market, where its Ozdaq Hi Tech Index collapsed causing numerous margin calls 
for clients. In some cases Storm Financial stepped in to meet margin calls for clients by 
lending them funds. It would have certainly been clear to any competent financial planner at 
this time that the Storm Financial model had serious flaws. However it is now apparent that 
Storm Financial did not heed nor learn from the 2002 warning. [public submission 154 from 
AEC Group, consulting finn] 
No planner worth their salt should claim to be able to pick the timing, or even frequency of 
share market volatility. Where a client presents though at close to the end of their working 
career, without other significant financial resources, there are enough known knowns to tell a 
good plarrner that a gearing (and double gearing on top!) strategy is not appropriate. [ email 
from financial adviser, June 2013] 
It is opportune here to highlight one aspect of the basis underlying the investment strategy, 
as put forward by Stonn. We refer to the following excerpt: 
Senator Mclucas: What did the ( education sessions offered by Storm) cover? 
Mr Cassimatis: It covered teclrnical aspects of finance , the psychology of investing, 
accounting principles, financial principles and risk . Specifically, because our space was 
leverage, it gave explanations as to how wealth can be enlrnnced significantly using leverage, 
and it also gave quite horrific examples of how equity gets destroyed when markets are 
negat ive, but then in the end it is the averages that count. [public hearing [6] , p.22] 
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It may be that the reference above to the primacy of 'average returns' is meant to highlight 
that such strategies require a long term rather than short term horizon and as such it is long 
term trends that are more important than shorter term fluctuations. Other than the risks 
involved with gearing, with such an inference we have little issue. If however there is a 
belief that a long term average returns are what count most of all , then this misses the key 
point of risk. For example, if returns on an indexed fund over ten years were +20% for each 
of the first nine years, but then a fall of 50% occurred in the tenth year, then as for Storm, 
any geared strategy is going to be under severe stress unless it is very conservative. Yet, the 
ten-year average geometric return of +9 .9% 450 looks highly attractive and in any appeal to a 
long term horizon, the risk associated with fluctuations may well be underplayed. In 
contrast for example, a ten year period where the return every year is a constant +9.9% will 
give a vastly different outcome, depending on the gearing strateg/51 . In other words, it is 
most definitely not just the averages that count in geared strategies. 
As such, the use of margin lending is one of the more debated issues within the overall 
investment strategy. Certainly no submissions supported its utility to the extent, market and 
manner utilised by Storm, but nevertheless it was and is not considered an inappropriate 
strategy per se. 
IFSA does not believe that a high level of leverage is , in and of itself, inappropriate or that 
investment strategies involving debt are inappropriate for retail investors. However, IFSA 
recognises the additional risks that leverage can introduce both to a financial product and to 
450 Here, the arithmetic average of + 13% is significantly higher than the geometric average of +9 .94%, but the 
geometric average is the more informative and useful one to base any discussion and planning on. 
45 1 A simplified example makes this abundantly clear. Suppose a strategy starts off with $100 of assets and 
$40 of liabilities by way of margin loan (to give net assets of $60 and an L VR of 40%), and suppose that at 
the end of each year the overall position is rebalanced to maintain that L VR of 40%. Suppose also that one of 
two things occurs: (1) returns are +20% per annum for 9 years and then -50% in year 10, versus (2) returns 
are +9 .9% for each of 10 years (note that each of (1) and (2) have approximately the same 10-year average 
geometric return). Then, the net position after 10 years under (1) is $133 , and under (2) it is $276 (a difference 
of 238% of the starting net position) . Even more stark is when the L YR is changed - suppose now the initial 
assets are $100 and the initial liabilities (borrowings) are $60 to give an L VR of 60%, and that this again is 
maintained throughout 10 years. The net position after 10 years under (1) is -$384, under (2) it is +$365 (a 
difference of 1873% of the starting net position). The risk increases substantially with each increase in L VR: 
with an L YR of 70%, the difference is 8,347%, and with an LYR of 80%, the difference is an astonishing 
82,3 77%. Notably, this also assumes an interest rate of 0% on the margin loan itself so as to focus on the 
differences in L VRs in terms of investment outcomes - with an interest rate of approximately 10% likely on 
the margin loan, then the higher the L YR, the more pronounced also this interest burden would be. Clearly 
and unequivocally, it is not the averages that matter in such a strategy. 
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an investment strategy. [public submission 317 from Investment and Financial Services 
Association] 
If you asked most financial advisers for their view of margin lending as a product set, they 
would say : ' Handle with care. ' If you asked for their view of a double-geared margin lending 
product, they would say, ' Handle with serious care. ' [CEO, Association of Financial 
Advisers, public hearing [7] , p.42] 
I suspect in the case of Stonn it is the advice that has failed. If you take a margin lending 
product on its own, it has not failed ; it is an appropriate product. [CEO, MLC Limited, public 
hearing [2] , p .14] 
Gearing is a legitimate strategy for the right type of client. [ email from financial adviser, 
April 2013] 
In fact, despite their poor experiences with such a strategy, some of those interviewed still 
held it to be a workable approach in some circumstances, albeit with different parameters to 
that which they had with Storm: 
Wife: And yet the whole thing was - and then we were told over and over again it ' s not a get 
rich quick scheme. 
Husband: It ' s not. 
Wife: It ' s only an income scheme. 
Husband: We ' ve got a friend here who is one of the richest guys (locally) and he says, "Quite 
frankly , it sounds like a pretty good scheme to me except you were very unlucky for it to 
have hit the global financial crisis ." 
Wife: And that it was too highly geared . 
Husband: And too highly geared. 
Interviewer: . . . The actual model itself? 
Wife: The model itself would have worked if it had been geared at about 25 per cent and 1 
think. [interview with Storm investor] 
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Furthermore, others such as those in excerpt [322] have again gone into a gearing strategy, 
but with more conservative parameters. An ex-Storm adviser also continues to attest to the 
value inherent with some gearing strategies: 
Interviewer: With the product that was being sold, is it still an approach you think has value? 
Interviewee: Absolutely. I used the model well before I got involved with Storm and it 
works ... the issue here was the borrowing ... was just so large, okay? It was just far too 
much ... that level of debt that clients and the company carried that eventually it led to the 
GFC and Storm ' s demise. So the model unquestionably works if the debt levels were set at 
appropriate levels much more moderate than they were . .. the level of debt to pensioners, to 
people who weren't working, was crazy ... I mean I would use the model , but you either had 
to be employed, you had to have a very good understanding of where we were going and we 
certainly left retired people out of the gearing strategy ... on reflection, gearing for retirees is 
dumb, right? ... Now with the benefit of hindsight, it doesn ' t work for retirees at the level of 
debt that was loaded, okay? [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Of further interest also and in contrast to the reported Storm strategy, Macquarie Bank 
stated that they give advice along the following lines to those taking out a margin loan. 
We sent every customer a margin investment lending document. .. We said: ' When borrowing 
to invest there are additional risks that you should consider. These risks include margin calls 
as a result of market volatility; increased exposure, which can potentially increase losses; 
interest rate risks et cetera.' We then said: ' We recommend that you seek appropriate 
financial advice to ensure you adopt a strategy that suits your specific circumstances and 
discuss the strategy with your financial adviser to address any potential margin calls.' And 
then we gave clients some insights as to how they should manage risk. The points that we 
made were these: 'Be conservative in the amount that you borrow, always b01Tow within 
your capacity so you can accommodate any interest-rate rises, check the lending ratios before 
implementing the plan, diversify your investments, reinvest dividends to reduce your loan as 
a proportion of your total portfolio, make interest payments regularly, ensure that you have 
stable cash flow to meet interest payment obligations, monitor your investments closely, and 
invest for the long term'. [CEO, Macquarie Bank Limited, public hearing [9] , p.15] 
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What is abundantly clear then, is an awareness that the use of margin loans has risks and 
features that need careful management. 
One-size-fits all 
The use of the ' one size fits all ' approach in offering investors an option with Stonn was 
also an issue of major concern, to a range of parties. 
An adviser needs to tailor an investment strategy to the client. To do so the adviser needs to 
understand the client ' s own financial situation, their objectives, and their attitude to risk . That 
so many of the clients affected by these failures had very similar investment strategies 
suggests that there was not sufficient regard paid to their own individual circumstances . 
[public submission 385 from AXA] 
Countless lives have been ruined by the double gearing that Storm encouraged for its clients . 
Storm and its advisors failed every one of the three main requirements about giving suitable 
advice452 . What was their compliance manager doing? [public submission 293 from Financial 
planning company] 
Storm Financial consistently imposed the same one size fits all leveraged strategy with no 
regard for their client ' s risk tolerance or ability to service the loans. [public submission 154 
from AEC Group, consulting firm] 
Stom1 Financial' s advice was completely inappropriate for many of its clients. It was not 
personal financial advice; they simply offered one solution, which was for clients to borrow 
heavily against their homes and to use this to leverage further into margin loan and invest 
100% into Australian shares. Stom1 Financial had a square hole and jammed people into it no 
matter their shape and size. For example, Stonn Financial had clients on the Aged Pension 
and minimal other income signing up to borrow $1 million . Irrespective of market conditions, 
how is that appropriate financial advice? [public submiss ion 178 from Financial Planning 
business] 
452 Namely. to know your c li ent. know your product. and ensure your advice is appropriate to the member (s945A( 1) of the Corporati ons Act 200 1) (publi c submiss ion 293 from Financial planning company). 
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We feel that Storm has failed every part of the Corporations Law. Firstly, knowing your 
client, because they used the one size fits all; secondly, knowing the product-they did not do 
the research that we did, and that is not very hard; and, thirdly, ensure that the advice is 
appropriate for the member, which they did not do. [Financial Consulting Group, public 
hearing [2], p.96] 
CEO of !FSA: A pensioner who relies solely on the old-age pension and has a $400,000 home 
should not be geared up to bill yo; it just should not happen. 
Senator Mason: I appreciate your comments. In effect you would say, without putting it too 
bluntly, that Storm Financial, in pursuing this one-size-fits-all approach, is clearly in 
contravention of the Corporations Act. That would be your contention? 
CEO of !FSA: Yes. [public hearing [3], p.53] 
I believe that you've got to find a solution for each individual person. You don ' t have one 
solution fits all , that's bulls---. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
So your question is the one size fits all, yeah that was a problem because they were lumping 
retirees in with the general public and that's where most of the problems have emerged 
now ... the one size fits all obviously, clearly doesn ' t work. It doesn ' t work because the guy 
in Cooktown requiring $90 a week and being genuinely happy, needs a plan very different to 
the guy that wants two planes. [interview with ex-Storm adviser] 
Self-selection 
Storm' s approach to let potential investors ' opt-in ' to their commoditised, rather than 
individualised advice offering (with advice effectively 'packaged' as a part of the product), 
was also commented on. This issue however generated slightly more subtle and considered 
critique when compared to the issues above. 
Deputy CEO, FPA: There were what we have would term some very unusual circumstances 
that occurred in relation to Storm. One of them was a practice which is very uncommon, the 
concept of prequalifying clients ... clients were asked to qualify themselves as being suitable 
for the strategy-' If you want to achieve these goals and these outcomes then this is the sort 
of client you need to be. So are you in fact that client? ' Clients themselves consented to be 
identified in that particular way. Whether that was a misunderstanding on their part or a mis-
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se lling on the part of Storm is yet to emerge in our investigations and prosecutions. It was 
that essence, that clients themselves were part of thi s dialogue, perhaps inappropriately. That 
satisfies the prequalification example of knowing your client. To contemporise this if you 
like, the argument from Storm Financial was the idea, ' We can work with you to achieve 
great wealth in an extraordinary journey to capitalism, if you are prepared to be on thi s 
particular journey. ' So clients were invited to qualify themse lves into the relationship . 
Bernie Ripoll MP: Is a good point. How does that comply with the regulation, with FSR? 
Deputy CEO, FPA: It does in fact comply with the law because the client is then required to 
satisfy how they- the advice is provided relevant to the client. 
Senator Mason: This is a breach of professional expertise. 
Deputy CEO, FPA: That is absolutely the point, Senator. In fact, we do not believe it 
complies with our expectations. That is an important distinction in this process. 
Senator Mason : This is a professionalised industry. You cannot let people prequalify and 
detennine what they think they are. 
Deputy CEO, FPA: That certainly is a significant issue that arises in Storm. [public hearing 
[3], p.30] 
The institute 's perspective on (the issue of Storm clients self-selecting in) is that the 
responsibility still goes back to the adviser and the advice being provided. The client may 
self-select and say, 'I am interested in going forward with thi s,' but in the current 
environment it is still the responsibility of the adviser to provide appropriate advice . . . part of 
the role of the adviser is to say, ' This is not appropriate for you.' As it seems to be the case 
with some of the examples out of Stonn, the advice was not appropriate. If a person is retired, 
is paying off their home and is elderly, gearing is not an appropriate option, and if the client 
is say ing, 'Th is sounds great; I want to head down that track,' a professional needs to take a 
position and say: ' No, it is not appropriate for you. There are other solutions.' [Head of 
Financial Planning, Institute of Chartered Accountants in Australia , public hearing [7] , p .15] 
Other aspects 
Other industry-related submissions highlighted more detailed criticisms. For example, a 
financial planning business (submission 1 78) highlighted that the focus on gearing towards 
the top end of acceptable limits meant that it was "just a question of time before markets 
corrected and clients were margin called". Furthennore, when combined with the high 
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initial fee model, this provided motivation for Storm to push for maximum leverage as 
often as possible. 
Furthermore, the FPA mentions risks associated with index funds including: in major bear 
markets there is no easy exit; the use of high L VRs without the benefit of institutional 
investors to provide a buffer to retail investors, thereby magnifying risks; and income from 
the investments has a high dependence on highly cyclical stocks and property (public 
submission 277). 
We note that one major fault, and in some ways the fault of Storm' s model that most 
investors would have been most oblivious to, is what we termed ' concentration risk ' . Some 
interviewees made an analogous comparison of the strategy to borrow firstly against the 
home and then against total investment assets via a margin loan (so as to generate 'passive ' 
income from ' good ' debt) , with that of taking out a mortgage for a non-investing home 
owner. Whilst these are both similar in that money has been borrowed, that is about where 
the comparison ends. In the latter case, the ability to service a mortgage depends on 
earner' s income (and if investment earnings were available, they would be independent of 
that income). In contrast, the ability to service both a mortgage and investment loan in the 
case of Storm depends entirely on investments held. Some submitters to the PJCI observed 
the essential risk to this point. But then, at the very time that investment values fall and 
thereby raise the L VR, this is also the very time that income from those investments is 
likely to be compromised in servicing the loans . Depending on the size of money put aside 
for a cash 'dam' (as labelled by Storm), a point will be breached when servicing the loans 
themselves is under pressure, adding further pressure on the L VRs. In other words, when it 
rains (investment markets drop) , it doesn ' t just pour (LVRs increase due to decreasing 
investment values), it actually turns torrential (loan servicing runs the risk of being 
compromised, on both mortgage and investment loans). This does not make such a strategy 
inappropriate for all people - but in all probability it was inappropriate for the majority of 
Storm's mvestors. One financial planner essentially made this point. 
The issue, to me, was that when you borrow to invest you should have cash flow to support 
that. Essentially, this model borrowed the cash flow, and that is where everything started to 
tumble down. If I am doing margin lending and, indeed, if I am doing double gearing-and 
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the gentlemen before said, ' I do not think you should have it,' but that would be my personal 
strategy out the window- I have got to have the cash flow to support it. The failing here was 
about borrowing to pay for it as well as to build that wealth to pay for their retirement 
lifestyle. [financial pla1mer, public hearing [4] , p.95] 
Overall, where a defence of the overall strategy has been given (such as in the public 
hearings mentioned above and also in submission [281 ]), we note further that: (1 ), those 
who actually paid out margin loans suffered major losses as well; and (2), the concentration 
risk above would trump most reasonable protective measures in a big enough market fall 
(sh01i of having costly cash 'dams ' and ratios set at levels so as to render the leveraging 
strategy pointless). Furthermore, although it is generally held that the GFC was certainly 
the catalyst that set off events leading to Storm' s collapse453 , this in fact was and is not the 
basis for the overall criticism of Storm's strategy. 
The requirement for appropriate advice is significant. We believe that the activities of Stom1 
with respect to some of their clients were not appropriate. They did not give appropriate 
advice. And that act existed well before the crisis. [CEO, Investment and Financial Services 
Association Ltd , public hearing [3], p.59] 
453 See, fo r example, the discourse with Mark Weir, SICAG Co-Chaimrnn, public hearing [6] , p.69 . 
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